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Summary
Value redistribution plays a key role in land use policy, not only because land use
policy induces value through zoning, but also because it captures and redistributes
this value through various policy instruments. Anchored primarily into article 5 of
the Swiss Federal spatial planning act of 20 June 1979, redistributive goals of the
institutional regime of soil range from the reduction and relocation of building zones,
over the finance of land service, transport and other public infrastructure, to the
implementation of other policies regulating soil uses, such as water protection, soil
remediation, or energy policy. Through an actor based analysis of five case studies
in Switzerland, this thesis questions the conditions of implementation of a set of
land use policy instruments that impact the land’s economic and ecological values in
different geographic and demographic contexts, as well as the redistributive limits of
the current institutional regime of soil.
Main results are that despite a growing number of punctual redistributive in-
struments, the amount of value redistributed remains limited. Durative instruments
stemming from fiscal policy are underused, and do not specifically target revenues
from land. Part of the explanation lies in the incoherence between fiscal policy and
economic promotion, and land use planning and sustainability goals. Further, res-
ults show that successful implementation of instruments capturing value, or inducing
value reduction, require at least a full compensation of the captured or reduced value
and, in the majority of cases, the creation of additional added economic value for the
landowner. In terms of ecological value, soil quality is marginally considered in new
zoning processes, and there is no incentive for landowners to remediate polluted soils
beyond legal obligations.
The revision of the spatial planing act in 2014 tackles some implementation prob-
lems such as value compensation, land hoarding, building zone dimensioning, and
coordination between urbanisation and transport, but is unlikely to resolve the initial
land use policy problems of urban sprawl and loss of fertile soils.
La redistribution de la valeur joue un rôle clé en aménagement du territoire, non
seulement parce que cette politique induit de la valeur par le zonage, mais aussi parce
qu’elle la capture et la redistribue à l’aide de nombreux instruments de politiques
publiques. Ancré principalement dans l’article 5 de la loi fédérale sur l’aménagement
du territoire de 1979, les objectifs redistributifs du régime institutionnel de la res-
source sol vont de la relocalisation des zones à bâtir, en passant par le financement de
l’équipement, du transport et des infrastructures publics, jusqu’à la mise en oeuvre
d’autres politiques publiques à incidence spatiale, tels que la loi sur la protection
des eaux, la dépollution des sols, ou la politique énergétique. A l’aide d’une analyse
actorielle portant sur cinq études de cas en Suisse, la présente thèse interroge les con-
ditions de mise en oeuvre d’une série d’instruments d’aménagement du territoire et
leurs effets sur la valeur économique et écologique du sol dans des contextes géograph-
iques et démographiques différents, et identifie les limites redistributives du régime
institutionnel actuel.
Malgré un nombre croissant d’instruments captant de manière ponctuelle la valeur,
la quantité de valeur redistribuée reste limitée. Les instruments de capture perman-
ente de la valeur issus de la politique fiscale sont sous-utilisés, et ne ciblent pas
spécifiquement les revenus du sol. Une part de l’explication réside dans l’incohérence
entre les objectifs de politique fiscale et de promotion économique d’une part, et
ceux d’aménagement du territoire et de durabilité d’autre part. En outre, la mise en
oeuvre d’instruments de capture de la valeur, ou induisant une réduction de celle-ci,
requiert au minimum une compensation entière de la valeur captée ou réduite, et,
dans la majorité des cas, la création d’une valeur économique supplémentaire pour le
propriétaire. En termes de valeur écologique, la qualité des sols est considérée unique-
ment à la marge des processus de mise en zone, et il n’existe pas d’incitation pour les
propriétaires à dépolluer les sols au-delà des obligations légales.
La révision de la loi fédérale sur l’aménagement du territoire en 2014 doit per-
mettre de répondre à un certains problèmes de mise en oeuvre, tels que l’absence d’un
mécanisme de compensation de la valeur, la thésaurisation des terrains à bâtir, le di-
mensionnement des zones à bâtir, et la coordination entre urbanisation et transport,
mais il est peu probable que ces changements permettent de remédier à l’étalement
urbain et à la perte de terres cultivables, problèmes initiaux de la politique d’aménage-
ment du territoire.
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Introduction
1.1 The problem at stake
In 1976, the first federal legislation on spatial planning in Switzerland was rejected by
referendum. Opposing parties, composed of federalist organisations, real estate mi-
lieus, the Swiss trade and crafts association, and some of the farmers’ representatives,
contested the restrictions imposed on private property. Further, they argued that
the legal proposal consisted of a centralist threat, and expressed their loss of faith in
the benefits of planning (Lendi and Elsasser, 1985). The legislation’s initial rejection
induced, in the subsequent legal proposal, the abatement of one of the law’s core
instruments: the tax on added land value created through zoning. The instrument
was intended to capture part of the value increment created by authorities through
zoning operations, and to redistribute these gains primarily to landowners who would
suffer a loss of rights and subsequent value subsequent to a building zone reduction1.
The objective of the instrument was to decouple zoning from property rights and
to provide to authorities the necessary means to use zoning without being hindered
by financial considerations in case landowners claim compensation (Nahrath, 2003).
The spatial planning act adopted in 1979 left the instrument’s implementation to the
cantons, and most did not utilize it until the act’s revision in 2014.
1.1.1 Land surface changes
The instrument’s initial unsuccessfulness reflects the political controversy surroundingIncrease of sealed
surfaces value redistribution in land use policy. And not without cause: land use, particularly
in Switzerland, is characterised by major rivalries which are intrinsically distributive
and redistributive. Redistribution occurs primarily from ecological to economic value,
or between surfaces dedicated to agricultural production and building zones dedicated
to housing and employment. Since the launch of the federal land use statistics in
1979, spatial development trends in Switzerland have shown an increase of settlement
areas, a growth in urban sprawl, and a reduction of agricultural surfaces, mostly
at the expense of surfaces devoted to agriculture, which, over the same time period
(1979-2005), have been reduced by close to 6% (84,081 hectares).
Comparing the last two periods of data collection of the Arealstatistik with demo-Continuous grow of
sealed surfaces per capita graphic changes during the 1979-2005 time frame, settlement and urban areas grew
by more than 9%, population by 8% (FOEN, 2015, 44). This means that the average
amount of sealed surface used per person continues to grow. It exceeds 400m2 per
person2, which corresponds to the upper limit defined by the Federal Council in the
national sustainable development strategy (Federal Council, 2012). As sealed surfaces
are one central indicator for the ecological value of land and the provision of ecosys-
tem services (Breuste et al., 2013), the overall ecological value of soil has diminished.
Soil sealing occurred despite a reduction of industrial activities (Carpataux and Cre-
voisier, 2000), close to already developed parts of the territory and primarily in rural
peri-urban areas: whereas the average surface per person (305m2) has remained stable
in urban areas, it reaches 672m2 in rural peri-urban areas. Further, between 2002 and
2010, urban sprawl increased in 93 % of all Swiss communes (Schwick et al., 2013). In
1Swiss legislation obliges authorities to pay compensation to landowners under specific conditions
detailed in section 2.4.1.
2The average amount of sealed surface per person includes developed areas, industrial areas,
special infrastructure areas (energy provision, sites dedicated to waste and water treatment, sites for
mineral extraction, landfills, construction sites), transport surfaces, and recreational areas.
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2015, the consumption of arable land for construction continues at the pace of 0.7m2
per second (FOEN, 2015, 76).
These problems are not new (Häberli, 1975; Häberli et al., 1991; Jaeger et al.,
2008), but have been highlighted through a renewed worldwide political and scientific
interest in recent years: the United Nations declared 2015 as the international year of
soil, using the occasion to produce a set of reports, effectively triggering an alarm on
the status of the world’s soil (Abdalla et al., 2015; Bartz et al., 2015). In Switzerland,
the 2014 revision of the spatial planning act has raised interest in land use policy
instruments (Estermann, 2016; Institut für Wirtschaftsstudien Basel, 2016).
1.1.2 Land price changes
The rivalries around soil use are also distributive in nature, as seen in the price Strong increase of land
pricesdifferences between agricultural and constructible land. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
evolution of real estate prices compared to construction costs, inflation, agricultural
land prices, and the average mortgage interest rates. Three real estate price indexes
are displayed: one for Switzerland, one for the Lake Geneva area, and one reflecting
changes in canton Bern. These perimeters correspond to the ones in which the thesis’
case studies are located. The value changes observed can therefore be retained as a
reference throughout the thesis. The figure calls for the following comments:
− price differences between the essentially urban and internationally oriented re-
gion of Lake Geneva,and the rather rural areas with a cantonal focus in the
canton of Bern has increased over the last fifteen years;
− general real estate price increase is due to an increase of land prices, as con-
struction costs tend to follow inflation rates. Land price increase is itself partly
explained by lack of housing supply (FSO, 2016);
− the real estate price reduction subsequent to the recession of the 1990’s is clearly
observable;
− the apparent stability of agricultural land prices is recent and has been strongly
conditioned by the urgent federal decree of 1972, the adoption of the spatial
planning act in 1979, and the prohibition for farmers to sell land to non-farmers
(Giuliani, 2002; Giuliani and Rieder, 2003; Nahrath, 2003, 2005) (see also section
2.3.1);
− the average mortgage interest rate has dropped from over 7% in the 1990’s to less
then 2% in 2015, which reduces the costs of borrowing money for investments
in land and real estate.
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Figure 1.1: Left axis: agricultural land price index, transaction price index for owner-
occupied apartments (average sized, mainstream property), inflation index, construc-
tion costs index from 1985 to 2015. 1998 = 100. Right axis: average interest rate for
domestic mortgage loans in Swiss francs. Data: Giuliani (2002); Wüest and Partner
(2016b); FSO (2015b,a); Swiss national bank (2007, 2016).
Comparing soil prices between agricultural and building zones, there is a highDropping agricultural
land prices multiple between the two values: agricultural land is sold between 5 and 8 francs/m2
nowadays and its price has been dropping since the 1970’s, reaching a level com-
parable to the 1930’s (Giuliani and Rieder, 2003; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2008). On
the contrary, prices for unbuilt, serviced land for apartment buildings in the least fa-
voured locations of Switzerland average 100 francs/m2 to 4,500 francs/m2 (in Geneva
or Zurich) (Wüest and Partner, 2014).
The observed evolution of real estate prices not only augmented rivalries betweenFreehold housing
becomes unaffordable agricultural and natural areas and building land, but within other categories of hous-
ing as well. The Credit Suisse real estate report 2015, D. Fries et al. (2015, 8) states
that at the end of 2014, "an average household no longer fulfils the imputed affordab-
ility criteria for the purchase of a new standard condominium." Taking into account
the low vacancy rate on the rental market, in particular in cities (FSO, 2016), housing
is major issue for residents in Switzerland.
1.1.3 Soil quality changes
Rivalries on soil uses also reflect major redistributive changes in terms of soil quality:Soil sealing and
compaction as main
physical threats
human intervention substituted the soil’s ecological value by economic value. One can
distinguish among physical, chemical and biological interventions on soil (Knoepfel
et al., 2010):
1. soil sealing, which definitevely subtracts soil from agricultural use, and prevents
the infiltration of surface water (such as rain);
2. soil compaction, due to increases in the weight of machinery used for agriculture
and forestry;
3. hydric erosion, linked to the reduced vegetation on steep grounds;
4. land remodelling, due for example to the preparation of ski pistes, to the con-
struction of energy transport infrastructure and of transport surfaces in general,
and to the filling of land recesses in agriculture.
In terms of chemical threats, the federal office of the environment notes that allGasses and manure as
main chemical threats soils in Switzerland are polluted, although 90% of loose soils only slightly (FOEN,
2006). The most polluted soils are housing and transport areas, and contaminations
are partly due to emissions that date back to several decades. In terms of soil pollu-
tion by heavy metals, there is an overall decline of the amount of mercury and lead
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present in soils used for arable farming, vegetable and fruit crops, grasslands, forests,
protected sites and urban parks FOEN (2015, 76f). However, contamination by zinc
and copper has increased in soils used for arable farming and intensive grasslands,
which is due in large part to the poor quality of the manure used for fertilisation.
Biological threats concern threats by genetically modified organisms and foreign Moratorium on GMOs
organisms introduced in the natural milieu. Despite public debates on the issue, they
have limited impact on soil in Switzerland.
In regards to contaminated sites, there are 38,000 polluted sites across the country. Industrial brownfields
and landfillsOut of these, 15,000 have been designated as requiring investigation, of which 7,000
were investigated up to 2013. Four thousand of them are considered a threat to
humans, and the environment, and must be remediated. As of 2015, more than 800
of them had been remediated (FOEN, 2015, 26).
1.1.4 Policy problems linked with soil use
Considered from the angle of natural resource uses, urbanisation and soil quality Challenges of soil
management in
Switzerland
challenges in Swiss land use policy are characterised by the following problems (Jaeger
et al., 2008; Lambelet-Haueter et al., 2011; Valda and Westermann, 2004; ARE, 2013,
2012; Nahrath, 2003):
− limitation of soil consumption per capita: since the beginning of their statistical
accounting, the total amount of sealed surface per capita has been increasing,
and currently threatens the sustainability objectives fixed by the Federal Coun-
cil;
− reduction of oversized building zones (Bühlmann and Jäger, 2010): compared
to federal requirements, a majority of Swiss communes have dimensioned their
building zones incorrectly, leading to suboptimal use of space. The lack of
compensatory mechanisms granting local authorities the financial means to po-
tentially compensate landowners who would lose development rights has blocked
the removal of these zones;
− unavailability of building zones (Bühlmann and Perregaux Dupasquier, 2013),
creates rivalries among different potential uses of building zones, such as: hoard-
ing, speculation, and investment versus housing and activities. The rarefaction
of available building land can impact rental prices, but more importantly foster
the creation of additional building zones in order to compensate the scarcity of
supply;
− relocation of badly located building zones: in addition to the oversized building
zones, the issue of their location has become crucial (since the beginning of the
2000’s), in order to limit the environmental impact of urbanisation;
− densification within cities: combined with the limitation of soil consumption, the
densification of already developed areas aims to reduce the important amounts of
underused surfaces benefiting from good connection to transport infrastructure,
either through additional uses or their reconversion (ARE, 2013);
− reduction of biodiversity loss: according to the Federal Office of the environ-
ment, a third of all surveyed species in Switzerland are under threat, because
"the area available for valuable habitats has declined considerably, and unique
regional characteristics are being lost" (FOEN, 2015, 57);
− limitation of secondary homes in tourist areas: the environmental and landscape
impacts of secondary homes have been a major political issue over the past
decade, culminating in the 2012 Swiss adoption of a constitutional limit of 20%
of homes which may be dedicated to secondary uses;
− remediation and reuse polluted soils: urban and peri-urban brownfields require
investigation, monitoring, and remediation measures in order to prevent pollu-
tion spread that can turn out to be very costly. Authorities estimate that former
brownfields constitute an unused land reserve of approximately 1700 hectares
(Federal Council, 2008). These areas are already serviced, and in certain cases,
benefitfrom optimal locations (Jaccaud et al., 2008).
22 of 327
The problem at stake
These various soil-related problems induce numerous value redistribution chal-Complexity of soil issues
lenges each of which rely on specific intervention hypotheses elaborated by authorit-
ies, and whose implementation through specific policy instruments creates different
winners and losers. The issue of passing on costs and capturing benefits is deemed a
central role in the implementation of land use policy objectives. For example, author-
ities have increasingly relied on the capture of value created through zoning decisions
in order to solve the mentioned soil-related problems. Searching for a bridging ele-
ment between these problems, one option is to study the economic and ecological
value regulation, distribution and redistribution that underpin soil-related problems.
From a political perspective, understanding the allocation processes requires analysis
of how various public policies dealing with soil – land use planning policy being the
most prominent one – are initiated, how these issues are tackled, what redistributive
processes are planned, what impact these processes have on target groups, and, in
the end, in which way the identified problems are solved.
Table 1.1 provides a set of examples of value redistribution. It also shows existing
trade-offs between added and reduced economic and ecological values, and the possible
combination of these values.
Ecological value
Added value Reduced value
E
co
no
m
ic
va
lu
e Added value E.g. remediation and re-
use of former brownfield
E.g. construction of
single family homes on
open land
Reduced value E.g. non contaminated
brownfield with growing
vegetation
E.g. irreversibly contam-
inated brownfield
Table 1.1: Example of added and reduced economic and ecological values (Nahrath
et al., 2012).
1.1.5 Research questions and steps
The fundamental question asked by scientists studying soil and land use changes are:Value redistribution as
necessary condition for
sustainable land use
why, despite an increase in environmental regulations, is there constantly increasing
land consumption? How do soil and land regulations tackle the issue of expanding
urbanisation? Why do regulations succeed or fail to provide a response to existing
problems? This thesis postulates that understanding the political conditions of redis-
tribution of economic and ecological values are central to explaining land use changes;
further, that value redistribution is a necessary condition in order to achieve a more
sustainable use of soil. The postulate leads to the following research questions:
What is the redistributive capacity of the current Swiss institutional re-
gime of soil? What obstacles and limits does the current institutional
regime of soil face in terms of redistribution? What are the consequences
in terms of land use? And what are the most promising strategies for
increasing the redistributive capacity of the institutional regime?
This thesis analyses first the evolution of the public problems linked to soil in
Switzerland, the politically defined objectives that aim to resolve the public problems,
together with the underlying logic of public intervention, and the policy instruments
adopted in order to solve the public problem. The analysis of the institutional setting
of land use policy in Switzerland is combined with an analysis of the economic, demo-
graphic and geographic contexts in which selected policy implementation processes
take place.
Second, the thesis focus on the involved actors’ interests and strategies through
the analysis of micro-political policy implementation processes. Depending on the
institutional setting and the demographic, economic and geographic contexts, actors
elaborate strategies, mobilise policy instruments and policy resources, in order to
reach their goals. The analysis of policy implementation processes takes place on a
micro-political scale, i.e. on a local level, where the power games between political-
administrative authorities and target groups result in effective planning and land use
changes.
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Third, the thesis aims to explain the redistributive effects produced in the analysed
policy implementation processes. Value redistribution is assessed through the effects
produced on actors, policies, geographical spaces, political scales, through the effects
produced in time, and on the economic and ecological dimensions of value.
I subdivided the provision of a response to the research questions in three broad Three research steps
steps, which form the structure of the present thesis:
1. review theoretical explanations for value redistribution in soil and land policies
and define a conceptual framework that allows for its analysis (chapters 2 and
3):
− the literature review provides explanations from research on property rights
and public policies in order to define the institutional structure in which
land policies and land transactions are embedded;
− I refer to socio-political theories that conceptualise actors’ resources and
strategies in order to explain their behaviour. These explanations are com-
plemented by economic land theories in order to assess the land’s value and
integrate it into the explanation of the actors’ strategies;
− based on instrumental theory, I then draw a typology of the main policy
instruments that target owners and users of the resource soil;
− taken together, these elements allow to draw the conceptual framework
used for the empirical research and formulate a set of research hypotheses;
2. analyse and compare the redistributive capacity in five local case studies and
their underlying 15 redistributive processes:
− the case studies’ analyses provide historical, spatial, and socio-political
data allowing for the tracing of land use policy and land use changes over
the past 25 years, and identification of the factors which explain the policy
outputs, as well as the redistributive effects achieved (chapters 4 and 5).
They provide local examples from the field and show how actors shape the
resource soil in a variety of planning and land use situations;
− based on the case studies, I then synthesise the results into redistributive
processes, compare them, test the hypotheses on them, and draw a set of
factors which facilitate, restrain, and explain instruments’ uses, the outputs
produced, and the redistributive effects achieved;
3. discuss the postulated link between value redistribution and a more sustainable
use of soil (concluding chapter).
1.2 Research gap to be filled
The genesis of Swiss land use policy has already been analysed and explained by S. land use policy and value
redistributionNahrath (2003), who studied the period from 1960 to 1990. The 2014 legal revision
of the spatial planning act defined the taxation of added land value created through
zoning as mandatory. This instrument is defined as the cornerstone of Swiss land use
policy (Gmünder et al., 2017), because it compensates advantages and disadvantages
created on land property through planning. The new federal law obligated the cantons
to introduce a redistributive mechanism at the core of their land policies, and directly
targets the rent induced by land use policy as well as its redistribution. Thus, the
2014 legal revision required an update on the way land use policy implementation has
evolved since the 1990’s, but more importantly, is a reconsideration of land use policy
outputs and effects under the angle of value redistribution.
Other issues, such as the management of contaminated sites (Alexander, 2015; Reuse of brownfields
Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015), have become central topics for researchers and practi-
tioners. In fact, the management of contaminated sites involves redistributive stakes
(between ecological and economic value, and between policies like soil protection and
land use planning), which have only been subject to contamination-specific case ana-
lyses (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015).
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Further, the coordination of urbanisation and transport initiated by the federalEmergence of new
political-administrative
arenas
agglomeration policy has led to the emergence of new forms of political action on
a supra-communal scale (Jaccaud et al., 2008; Pflieger, 2013b). These integrate the
regulation of soil surfaces dedicated to transport, housing, and employment at a
functional level, and constitutes a notable change in the use of resource-soil.
In addition, the rise of the governance concept requires researchers to considerIncreasing mix of
instruments? the increased "mixture of public- and private-sector instruments" when explaining
how instruments are being used (Peters, 2005, 362). Linked with the above men-
tioned agglomeration programs, but also other political reforms on energy planning
and a tendency to centralise land use policy competencies, the rise of intermediary
norms and decisional bodies has become central in the shape of land use policy in
Switzerland.
Moreover, there is relatively little knowledge on the conditions under which landContent of localised
arrangements use policy instruments are implemented by local actors. Using a case study approach,
I aim to shed some light on the local outputs and effects of land use policy. The
knowledge provided by the analysis is not only relevant for research, but also for
politicians shaping future legislation, and land use policy practitioners.
The introductory chapter has shown that for several decades, urban sprawl and soil
consumption have been central issues linked to the management of soil in Switzer-
land. The redistributive characteristic of soil-related problems and resulting public
interventions, or the challenges of imposing respectively avoiding prohibitions and ob-
ligations, of passing on costs and capturing benefits, justifies an actor-centred, local
approach in order to analyse the implementation of the institutional regime of soil.
The following chapter 2 is dedicated to the literature review and theoretical frame-
work that underpins the thesis. Once the state of the art, the Swiss policy design
of the resource soil – including existing policy instruments –, and main legal inco-
herences have been presented, I introduce the institutional regime framework, which
serves as basis for the definition of the conceptual framework exposed in chapter 3.
Once the hypotheses derived from the framework and the methodology have been
exposed, I turn to the five case studies of the thesis. These are subdivided into two
chapters: chapter 4 is dedicated to the peri-urban region Oberaargau, chapter 5 to
the urban region Lausanne. Chapter 6 presents a summary of the case studies, dis-
cusses the hypotheses’ results, sums up the findings of the analysis, and discusses
them along with the theories used for the conceptual framework. Finally, chapter 7
responds to the research questions, synthesises recent legal changes, and proposes a
set of recommendations for a more sustainable use of soil.
25 of 327
INTRODUCTION
26 of 327
Chapter 2
Literature review and
theoretical framework
In order to grasp the redistributive questions underlying the economic and ecologicalRebuild the resource
soil’s regime value of soil, it is necessary to first look at the existing literature and at the responses
it provides in order to explain value distribution and redistribution. In a subsequent
step, I will describe the social problem(s) at stake and review the policy solutions
provided in order to solve these problems. In turn, this allows insight into the main
difficulties and incoherences inherent in current policies impacting land use. Based
on this knowledge, I will then identify the stream of literature I want to contribute
to, and define the knowledge gap I intend to fill. Finally, I introduce the theoretical
framework used in this thesis, and show how it is able to bring together the various
theoretical and practical elements presented earlier. The present chapter is structured
in order to achieve the following objectives:
− provide a literature review of ecological, legal, and economic explanations of the
observed distributive trends (sections 2.1 and 2.2);
− review, with help of the tools provided by policy analysis, how society conceives
the problems at stake, what causal and intervention hypotheses are formulated
by policymakers and what objectives are set (section 2.3);
− show how political theory explains the instrumental choices made and how these
instruments regulate soil uses (section 2.3.2.3);
− present how political science conceptualises actors’ strategies, behaviours and
means of action in policy implementation processes (section 2.3.4);
− review known gaps and incoherences of the current legal setting and present the
knowledge gaps this thesis aims to fill (section 2.4);
− present and justify the theoretical framework used in this thesis (section 2.5);
2.1 Ecological value of soil
As outlined in the introductory chapter, one way to assess the value of soil is to
focus on the various uses that the resource provides to humans in terms of goods and
services (see table 8.32 in the annexes). This anthropocentric approach allows us to
qualitatively distinguish soils and to assess their evolution in a quantitative manner
(in terms of m2 or m3). But this standpoint does not explain why these uses are
valuable and how the goods and services’ value can be compared to one another.
A short literature review of the factors that make soil valuable from the angle of
environmental sciences is necessary in order to reveal how the ecological value of soil
can be explained.
According to environmental scholars, soil is conceived as a set of physical, mineral,Soil functions as basis for
ecosystem services chemical, and biological properties that allows for the fulfillment of several functions
essential to life (de Groot et al., 2002; Adhikari and Hartemink, 2016): source of
raw material, carbon pool, biomass production, storing, filtering, and transforming
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nutrients and water, hosting biodiversity. From an anthropological perspective, these
functions provide a set of ecosystem services on which humans activities rely. But
these service are also affected by human activities (Millenium ecosystem assessment,
2005). From this perspective, "ecosystems through the lens of the services that they
provide to society, how these services in turn benefit humanity, and how human
actions alter ecosystems and the services they provide" (Carpenter et al., 2009, 1305).
Researchers have defined four broad types of ecosystem services whose condition and
use by humans fluctuate over time:
− provisioning services: crops, livestock, wild fishery, aquaculture, wild terrestrial
foods, timber, agricultural fibers, wood fuel, genetic resources, biochemicals and
pharmaceuticals, fresh water;
− regulating services: air quality regulation, global climate regulation, water regu-
lation, erosion regulation, water purification, disease regulation, pest regulation,
pollination, natural hazard regulation;
− cultural services: spiritual and religious, aesthetic, recreational;
− supporting services: support for human habitat.
Over the last centuries, there has been a general expansion of human use of ecosys- Urban development as
main threat to the
ecological value of soil
tem services and a subsequent decline of provisioning and regulating services. Decline
is essentially due to "climate change, land use change, invasive species, overexploit-
ation, pollution, population increase, and economic growth" (Carpenter et al., 2009,
1306).
In regard to soil, one issue is the extension of built surfaces and urban sprawl.
The increase in construction is principally due to demographic growth, the demo-
graphic structure of the population (ageing of population and increase of flat sizes),
the economic context (increase of GDP), and the amount of secondary homes. More
specifically, accessibility by public and private transport, the quality of life in a given
area, and public funding supporting the acquisition of homes, play major roles in the
increase of housing surfaces (Schultz et al., 2003; Jaeger et al., 2008). The increase in
transport surfaces is due to the extension of built areas (in surface and density), and
to the degree of motorisation of individuals. In regard to the extension of industrial
and commercial uses, structural economic changes play a central role in explaining
land use change. Urban sprawl affects the ecological value of soil negatively (Jaeger
et al., 2008): it induces soil sealing and non-reversible losses of natural soil functions.
Development is particularly problematic, because it occurs mainly on agricultural
lands, which, once developed, lose their original agricultural functions permanently.
Further, urban sprawl repulses endangered plants and animal species, introduces non-
local species and transforms the natural spectrum of species. It also increases noise
and light in the landscape, reduces available recreational areas and increases needs
for transport, which itself induces soil sealing.
Another issue is agricultural land use. Depending on the production mode and
techniques used, the provision of ecosystem services through agriculture vary signi-
ficantly (Swinton et al., 2007). Whereas diversified agricultural systems support sub-
stantially greater biodiversity, soil quality, carbon sequestration, and water-holding
capacity in surface soils, energy-use efficiency, and resistance and resilience to cli-
mate change, intensive monoculture can create ecosystems whose services completely
depend on off-farm inputs (Kremen and Miles, 2012).
An additional way to value soil in an ecological perspective is through landscape
analysis (Roth et al., 2010): a growing population, growing surface requirements per
person for housing and employment, increasing mobility, and tourist infrastructure in
mountains contribute to the extension of built surfaces and the consumption of soil
(soil sealing).
Although various factors contribute to determine the ecological value of soil, I chose
land development (and the absence of development) as main determinant. Focus-
sing on development implies a reduction of the qualitative assessment of the analysed
land surfaces: the criteria neglects positive effects of land development (provision of
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ecosystem services, or soil functions such as water filtration), as well as the negative
effects of undeveloped land on ecosystem services (e.g. intensive agriculture). Con-
sequently, the assessment of the soil’s ecological value in the analysed cases is limited
to the possibility to fulfil basic functions such as agricultural production. At the same
time, the focus on the development of land provides a clear and measurable criteria
in order to assess soil value, and allows to keep the lens of political science as the core
approach used for the analysis.
Hence, inferring from part of the research results presented above, one certitude is
that the expansion of developed surfaces reduces the ecological value of soil. Factors
such as the demographic evolution, living standards, increased mobility and structural
economic changes explain a wide part of soil consumption, which negatively impacts
the ecological value of the resource. Soil sealing is an ecologically non reversible
step that can lead to a complete loss of its ecological functions (Abdalla et al., 2015,
339), but it is also determinant for its economic value, as the price difference between
agricultural land and building zone shows (see figure 1.1 in the introduction). Under
this aspect, compensation efforts, such as no net loss objectives set up by biodiversity
offsetting policies, appear rather illusory (Calvet et al., 2015). But there are other
means to limit the impact of human action of the ecological value of soil (Valda and
Westermann, 2004; OFEV, 2007): in this regard, densification policies and the reuse
of already sealed surfaces can play a central role.
The determinants of the soil’s ecological value used in the present analysis have
put forward as land development and soil sealing as central variables for assessing
the ecological value of soil. These land use changes result primarily from economic
and demographic changes, from an increase of living standards and an increase of
mobility.
2.2 Property rights and economic value of soil
Land prices reflect the economic value of soil. They play a central role in explaining
land use changes. In order to understand the economic value of soil, it is necessary
to first study the legal anchor defining the property rights on the resource, because
it is through these rights that western societies define the resource holders and the
exchangeable characteristic of the resource. Further, right holders play a central role
in determining land use changes. Section 2.2.1 deals with the legal definition and
the content of property rights in Switzerland. Section 2.2.2 presents the implications
of the property rights system on the resource’s uses. Section 2.2.3 presents a set of
economic approaches and their contribution to the explanation of land value.
2.2.1 Legal anchors of property
2.2.1.1 Property regime and the State
The current legal anchor of property in continental Europe can be traced back to theA legal anchor dating
back to the French
revolution
French revolution, when property was considered an intrinsic part of the human per-
sonality (Knoepfel and Schweizer, 2014, 13). In Switzerland, a nationwide definition
of property was established through the adoption of the Swiss civil code in 1907. It
is defined as follows:
"The owner of an object is free to dispose of it as he or she sees fit within
the limits of the law.[...] He also has ownership of all its constituent parts
[and][...] of its natural fruits."1
The definition mentions explicitly two fundamental attributes of property as in-A legal doctrine inspired
by Roman law spired by Roman legal doctrine, namely the fructus, that is to say the right to enjoy
the natural and financial rent provided by the object and the abusus, which refer to
modification, alienation and destruction rights (Boulay and Buhot, 2013). The third
Roman attribute of property, the usus, is implicit in the disposal rights of the notion
of property. Until 2003, there was only one type of property, notwithstanding the
type of object considered. It is only with the introduction of a specific property right
on animals in the Civil Code that a less absolute definition appeared.
1Art. 641ff of the Swiss civil code of 10 December 1907 CC,SR 210.
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The definition of property cited above is a private definition, because there is no A single private property
regimeother (public) property law defining property (Leimbacher and Perler, 2000): notwith-
standing the type of owner (State, collective, individual), the same and only property
regime applies. In 1969, this private regime is reinforced by the introduction into the
Federal Constitution of the guarantee of property/ownership2. Since then, property
is not only a matter of private law where one can defend his or her property against
other individuals (the traditional function of private law). It is also a matter of public
law, which corresponds to the recognition of a right by the State to the individual.
This right is twofold: on one hand, the Constitution introduces the concept of prop-
erty as such, which grants every individual the possibility to acquire a subjective right
on a thing, on the other hand, property is protected against the State’s intervention
(Dubey, 2012, 24ff).
State intervention in private property occurs primarily through the limitation Policies relying on
private lawof use rights or expropriation and appropriate compensation (Aubin and Nahrath,
2015, 60). However, the fact that there is only one (private) property regime leads
to the emergence of policies that rely both on public and private law. This fact
materialises, for example, in agricultural policy through the restriction of disposal
rights on agricultural land (see table 2.3 in section 2.2.1.4), or when public authorities
leasehold their land to fulfil specific objectives.
But State action based on private law is subject to restrictions. The first is Limits to State
intervention through
private law
imparted by article 5 of the Constitution that specifies that the State’s activities
are based on, and limited by, law. This is to be understood as the requirement of a
legal basis for public action. The second is that its freedom to contract is bound to
public interest. Thus, notwithstanding the legal nature of State intervention (public
or private law), the act could be contested by an administrative law appeal. This
conception of "private administrative law" however, is rarely accepted by the Swiss
Federal Tribunal (Moor, 2002, 375, 388).
An additional element that deserves attention is the distinction between public Public domain vs private
land owned by the Statedomain and other private land owned by the State. According to P. Moor (1992,
253), one has to distinguish two types of public domains: the "natural" one, which is
set by the civil code and in possession of the cantons (or the communes), or in other
words, high mountain areas, waters, the sky and the underground; and the "artificial"
one, which "fulfils a social function of communication" and is used for transport,
such as roads, squares, bridges, canals (Moor, 1992, 253). The latter is defined by a
concrete legal act and usually entered into the land register. Depending on its use,
what is at a certain moment in time public domain, can become private property and
vice versa (Moor, 1992, 254ff).
This section has shown that ownership of land or soil is regulated through the legal
concept of private property, notwithstanding the type of owner. However, natural,
remote, and less-used areas, as well as transport infrastructure, are public domain.
Although the public domain can be part of the land register, its value is not finan-
cially assessed. Further, public intervention on landownership can occur both through
private and public law.
2.2.1.2 Property rights as a bundle of rights
The first conceptual developments on property, property rights, and ownership stem Property as reciprocal
relationfrom legal realism, a research movement of the beginning of the twentieth century in
the United States of America (Cole and Grossman, 2002). According to W. Hohfeld
(1913), property is defined as a bundle of rights, i.e. as distinct pairs of rights and
correlative obligations, combining formal and informal rules, and various sources of
rights and legitimacy. These sources of rights include routines, traditional practices,
standards, customary law, etc. This conception considers property not as a natural
right, but as a reciprocal relation. It is "an affirmative claim against another" that
others are due to respect. Thus, it implies its recognition and protection by the law
and/or by others (Hodgson, 2014).
Within the bundle of rights applied to natural resources, E. Schlager and E. Os- Distinct right holder
positions2Art. 26, SR 101.
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trom (1992) distinguish four different rights associated with four distinct positions3.
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized user
Access and withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X
Exclusion X X
Alienation X
Table 2.1: Bundle of rights associated with right holder’s position according to Sch-
lager and Ostrom (1992).
2.2.1.3 High stability of property rights over time
Referring to the bundle of rights approach (Leimbacher and Perler, 2000), I distin-Few legal changes over
time guish three types of rights that compose property rights: use rights, disposal rights
(transmission and alienation of the title), and formal possession of the property title.
One characteristic of property rights are their high stability over time. Table 2.2
shows the main modifications of the property rights system and restrictions through
public law since its introduction on the federal level. One can observe that the formal
rights associated with property have changed only marginally since the second World
War: they were extended to condominiums/freehold apartments in 1963. Then, in
1969, the right to property was introduced into the constitution, together with the
attribution to the federal state of a competency in land use planning (Nahrath, 2003).
3One position that is not self-explanatory is the one of the "claimant" and the associated "manage-
ment rights". The authors define claimants as "individuals who possess the same rights as authorised
users plus the collective-choice right of management", that is to say that they define more precisely
the rules of withdrawal among users (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, 253). Applied to the resource soil,
the distinction of claimants does not appear to be very fruitful: one could, for example, consider the
janitor of a dwelling as a user with management rights.
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Formal rights Disposal rights Use rights
1911 to 1965
1912: Introduction of the
Swiss civil code
1930: Federal
expropriation act
1963: Introduction of
condominium property into
the Civil code
1911: Swiss code
of obligations
1951: Revision of agri-
culture act and modific-
ation of land betterment
provisions
—
1965 to 1980: Emergence of federal land use planning policy
1969: constitutional
articles 22ter and 22quarter
regarding guarantee of
private property and
principle of land use
planning
— 1970: Cantonal
constructions act
1971: New federal
water protection act
1972: Emergency federal
decree on land use planning
1979: Federal spatial planning
act
1980 to today: Environmental policy,restrictions for agricultural land and foreigners
— 1983: Federal act on
acquisition of prop-
erty by foreigner
1991: Federal act
on rural land rights
2012: Limitation of
secondary homes to
20 %
1983: Federal environ-
mental protection act
1985: Revision of the can-
tonal constructions act
1987: Constitutional article
22sexies regarding the pro-
tection of swamps (popu-
lar initiative Rothenthurm)
1999: Revision of fed-
eral spatial planning act
in regard to constructions
in the agricultural zone
2014: Revision of the federal
spatial planning act and rein-
troduction of a compensation
mechanism
Table 2.2: Evolution of the property rights system of the resource soil according to
S. Nahrath (2003, 151ff).
2.2.1.4 Private law instruments
Beyond the various rights conferred by the property title, one element that is central Instruments as entry
point of the analysisfor understanding land use is how the holders of rights on land can use, sell, exchange,
or transform these rights. The possibilities granted to the right holders are defined
in legal norms: the Civil code regulates relations between individuals; public law
regulates relations between individuals and the State (Dubey, 2012, 24ff). These
legal possibilities can be conceived as the instruments available to individuals, and
to the government, in order to exploit, manage, exclude, alienate, and control these
rights and their holders. Instruments regulating the formal, disposal and use-rights
on soil constitute the entry point of this research, because I aim to explain why and
how actors involved in a land use policy process use a specific instrument in order to
achieve their goals, and how these instruments influence the economic and ecological
value of land. Table 2.3 presents a list of private law instruments that the Swiss
federal civil code provides to property title holders: buy and sale of land, easements,
in particular the building right, preemption, emption and pre-emption rights as well
as different types of mortgages.
The distinction between property rights (private) and public policy instruments Two legal sources define
instruments(presented in section 2.3.2.3) has legal grounds. As there is no distinction between
public and private property in Switzerland, authorities, when dealing with their
private properties, that is to say the land that is not public domain but in their
private ownership (Moor, 1992, 254), act as private landowners. Further, contracts
have become one of the means that authorities use in order to implement land use
policy (Ruegg, 2013; Adank, 2016).
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Instrumenta Description
Private law contract (1, 216 CO) Can contain any obligation that is not prohibited by
law. Has to be done as a public deed
Land exchange (237 CO) Swap of land against something else that is not
money. Same rules as for contracts apply
Land buy/sell (656, 666, 184 CO) Same rules as for contracts apply.
Restriction of acquisition of
agricultural land (art. 63 RLRA)
The buyer of agricultural land cannot buy land that
they do not cultivate personally
Repurchase right (216 CO) Seller’s right to re-buy sold land at a predetermined
moment. Same rules as for contracts apply, except
that its duration is limited to 25 years and that it
can only be inherited, not assigned
Emption right (216 CO) Holder’s right to buy land at any moment. Its dura-
tion is limited to 10 years and it has to be done as a
public deed
Preemption right
(216 CO, 681 CC)
Holder’s preferential right to buy a property when
the owner sells it. Can be defined by contract or
by law, e.g. co-owner, emphyteutic lease holder, a
farmer’s relative under specific conditions
Easement (730 CC) Specific right agreed on by two parties and granted
to a dominant plot in favour of a servient plot
Building right/emphyteutic lease
(779 CC)
Holder’s right to use the land according to the con-
ditions specified in the contract signed with the
landowner. Transferable and inheritable, unless oth-
erwise agreed. Only valid if done as a public deed
Land betterment (703 CC) Redefinition of property geometry, service and de-
velopment. Requires the approval of the majority of
landowners owning more than half of the surfaces of
land concerned. Cantonal legislation regulates the
matter further
Real burden (782 CC) A real burden is a monetary obligation of a
landowner towards a third party for services
provided to his/her land. It can be defined by con-
tract or by law
Gift/donation (239 CO) Can be made within the limits set by matrimonial
property law and inheritance law
(Legal) Mortgage (824 CC) Charge on immovable property guaranteeing a debt.
It can be defined by contract or by law (legal mort-
gages). Mortgages are constituted through their
entry into the land register.
Bernese specificity: legal mortgages are valid
without inscription into the land register (109ff
EZGBb)
Mortgage certificate (842 CC) Personal debt secured by a charge on an immovable
property and all personal belongings. It is incorpor-
ated into an exchangeable security
Encroachment (art. 674-3 CC) Legal right of constructions using a neighbour’s
land. As opposed to an easement, these rights can
be imposed to the servient plot
Right for pipes (art. 691 CC) Legal right for pipes crossing a neighbour’s land
Rights of way (art. 694 CC) Legal right to pass through a neighbour’s land to
access one’s own land
Right to use an essential water
source (art. 710 CC)
If access to water requires excessively high costs, a
landowner can claim access to one’s part of water
that is unused
Usufruct (art. 745 CC) Use rights of land granted to a natural or moral
person that cannot exceed 100 years
Table 2.3: Property rights instruments of the resource soil. Description: Haefliger
(nd); Convers (2012); Canton de Neuchâtel (2015).
aSwiss Civil Code of 10 December 1907 CC, SR 210; Federal Act of 4 October 1991 on Rural
Land Rights RLRA, SR 211.412.11; Federal Act of 30 March 1911 on the Amendment of the Swiss
Civil Code (Part Five: The Code of Obligations) CO, SR 220.
bGesetz vom 28. Mai 1911 betreffend die Einführung des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches EG
ZGB, SR-BE 211.1.
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2.2.2 Consequences of civil law on natural resource manage-
ment
According to Aubin and Nahrath (2015, 62ss), the institutionalisation of private prop-
erty in most of the world has four main consequences on the regulation of environ-
mental and soil resources:
− the disappearance (or substantial weakening) of common property: most of
what institutional economists call common pool resource institutions inherited
from the middle ages are privatised or nationalised;
− incapacity to attribute property rights on common natural resources systems:
environmental and land use planning policies face great difficulty to regulate
use-rights regarding major common natural resource systems such as air, wa-
ter, landscape, ecosystems, biodiversity, etc., because these resources cannot be
owned in the current private property regime4;
− difficulty to regulate certain land uses, because of the exclusivity of occupa-
tion conceded by "absolute property" (Harvey, 1982, 338f). These difficulties
lead to a (re)invention of multiple ownership, e.g. easements, building rights,
community of heirs and agricultural enterprises (both community ownership),
condominiums, securities on land and immovable property;
− integration of environmental and land resources in the market economy in order
to give them an exchange value, in the form of a credit to the property owner
or as an investment for the capital lender. Land and its subdivisions (plots)
become commodities that have a use value and an exchange value.
Further, it is acknowledged that landowners enjoy a wide autonomy on how they
use their plot of land, but benefit also from a privileged access to decisional processes
that relate to the use and protection of the resource soil (Knoepfel et al., 2003, 335f).
These privileges are, for example, the articles on neighbour’s rights listed in the civil
code5, and the consideration of existing interests in planning procedures6.
Submission of resource uses to monetary return
The presentation of the legal historical context aimed at clarifying the link between
soil and property. The integration of soil units (plots) in the market economy and its
attribution of an exchange value is of the utmost importance, because it dissociates
land from the property titles that represents them (Marx (1967) in Harvey (1982,
343)).
As van Griethuysen and Steppacher (2015, 33f) put it, property titles gained an
existence of their own, and grant two returns to their owner: the material return
linked to the possession (and exploitation) of the resource and the immaterial return
provided by the social guarantee that the rights associated with the property title are
protected and can be used further.
These additional uses can occur, for example, through a credit or a mortgage.
They create additional funds that can be reinvested in order to increase revenues,
and thus initiate a circular and cumulative process (Veblen, 1904; van Griethuysen
and Steppacher, 2015). The growth process that results from this exchange value
conceded to property implies a complete restructuring of society’s economic rationality
(van Griethuysen and Steppacher, 2015, 41f): whereas economic decisions could, in
an agrarian economy, be coordinated with ecological and social considerations, in a
capitalist economy they are subordinated to the return brought by capital.
4According to the Swiss civil code, an object can be owned if (1) it is not a person, (2) can be
physically and spatially delimited and (3) can be physically seized (Leimbacher and Perler, 2000,
30). The natural resources systems mentioned do not meet these conditions.
5On the effects of land property, in particular art. 667 to 712 CC, SR 210.
6Art. 4 of the Spatial planning act of 22 June 1979 SPA, SR 700; art. 3 of the Spatial planning
ordinance of 28 June 2000 SPO, SR 700.1.
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The existing property rights system strongly influences the use and exchange of land
as a commodity: ownership of land entails a bundle of rights that grants significant
powers to the title holder, specifically in terms of financial leverage and/or return.
The economisation of land brings us to the question of its value, an element discussed
for more than two centuries in economic theory and addressed in the following section.
2.2.3 Economic theories on land
Understanding what the value of land is and how it is created is a central step for the
definition of the thesis’s theoretical framework. According to D. Harvey (1982, 371),
land value reflects "temporal and spatial considerations" of material use values of land.
Land value influences, at least indirectly, the definition of land use policy problems,
because the allocation of uses defined by land use policy has direct consequences on
land value.
2.2.3.1 Classical perspective
In classical economic theory, the value of a commodity is, in the most abstract terms,Rent as means of
coordinating land uses defined by the labour necessary for its production (Harvey, 1982, 17). Considering
that land is a commodity, this theory of value only allows us to assess the value of
improvements to land (through the human labour necessary for their realisation). But
raw land also has a value, and landlords can obtain payments from tenants (rent). This
payment for raw land corresponds to the coordinating role of rent in the capitalist
mode of production: rent helps, through the land market, to fashion the spatial
organisation of activities; it determines land use and coordinates the production of
surplus value (Harvey, 1982, 331).
D. Ricardo (1817, 2.2) defines rent as the "portion of the produce of the earth,Rent as payment to the
landlord for land use which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of
the soil". In the words of H. George (2006, 89), rent is "the part of the produce that
accrues to owners of land (or other national capabilities) by virtue of ownership"; it
"is determined by the excess of its production over that which the same application
can secure from the least productive land in use" (George, 2006, 92). Referring to K.
Marx’s Capital, D. Harvey defines rent as "a payment made to landlords for the right
to use land and its appurtenances (the resources embedded within it, the buildings
in place upon it and so on)" (Harvey, 1982, 330).
Main explanatory models in classical economics dealing with rent such as thoseDifferential and residual
attributes of rent of D. Ricardo or H. George link the production process to three interlinked factors of
production: capital, labour and land. The use of these three factors in the produc-
tion process allow their respective individual retribution through interest, wages and
rent. These authors emphasise the specificity of rent compared to interest and wages,
because of its differential and residual attributes (Boulay, 2011, 48):
− The differential attribute refers to two elements:
– the "difference between the produce obtained by the employment of two
equal quantities of capital and labour" [on two distinctly fertile plots] (Ri-
cardo, 1817, 2.8)7.
– the difference between the produce obtained by the employment of addi-
tional capital and labour on two equally fertile plots, also named scarcity
rent (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2015)8.
− The residual attribute is due to the private property right on land which con-
cedes any production surplus not captured by capital or labour, to the landowner.
In other words, it is a consequence (and not a cause) of the transaction price,
because the price is conditioned by the other factors of production. Rent takes
what is left after the two other factors of production have been remunerated
7D. Harvey (1982, 337) mentions that K. Marx challenges D. Ricardo’s view in the sense that the
fertility of plots or the "indestructible powers of nature" are "as much the product of history as they
are of nature", e.g. more permanent improvements such as irrigation works, levelling, buildings etc.
8The scarcity rent arises from the (limited) quantity of land available in a given location.
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(Boulay and Buhot, 2013, 88). In regard to its distribution, the residual attrib-
ute itself has two specific characteristics (Guigou, 1982, 591):
– it is variable, because it relies on power relations between the landowner
and the user;
– it exists on all plots, even on those of lower quality.
The differential and residual characteristics of rent make the value of land specific: Specificity of land as a
commodityit depends on the quality and location of the plot, the use rights associated with it,
and its exclusive possession.
2.2.3.2 Marxian perspective
As opposed to the classical vision, Marxian economics do not consider land itself as
a source of value (Harvey, 1982, 332ff). It is through the monopoly powers conferred
by the law of private property that land becomes a commodity that can be rented
or sold. Through this monopoly, landowners can require payment for land for three
different reasons (Marx (1969, 245) in Harvey (1982, 335)):
1. for "it is the element in which production is to take place, as in agriculture";
2. for "it enters into production as one of the conditions of production, as in the
case of the waterfall or the building site";
3. for "it is a reservoir containing use values", as mines.
These reasons can allow landowners to appropriate rent in case there is a positive
"difference between the landowners’ productivity and the average productivity and
price or production prevailing within the industry" (Harvey, 1982, 336).
Beyond these production functions of land, land also serves "as a place and space
providing a basis of operations" for all human activities (Marx (1967, vol. 3, 774) in
Harvey (1982, 337)). The monopoly on portions of space conferred by the property
title allows to use land plots as "units through which capital circulates" (Harvey, 1982,
339). This circulation of capital can take different forms:
− monopoly rent, which "depends upon the ability to realise a monopoly price for
the product (wine, grain or housing)" (Harvey, 1982, 350); this can occur in two
ways:
– through special quality or location of land, which allows for the sale of
goods above market prices and thus creates rent for the landowners;
– through the landowners’ claim to release land at a price which forces the
price of the commodities the land produces above market prices (i.e. when
rent becomes a cause of the increase in the price of the product); such
barrier to the free flow of capital is referred to as absolute rent;
− differential rent, which has been presented earlier.
Marxian economics explains land value through the anticipated future revenues
that the property title owners can claim. In this conception, land titles are fictitious
(interest-bearing) capital (Harvey, 1982, 266).
2.2.3.3 Neo-classical perspective
As opposed to the classical theory on value that insists on the specificity of land as Rent explained by supply
and demanda production factor, or Marxian theory that considers the role of land as an "open
field for the circulation of interest-bearing capital" (Harvey, 1982, 371), neo-classical
or marginalist value theories explain the creation of value as the relationship between
supply and demand and do not embed it into a wider theoretical explanation (Harvey,
1982, 10). With the emergence of utilitarianism and methodological individualism,
the specificity of land as factor of production fades away (Boulay, 2011, 50). The
argument is that both rent and profit make up the producer’s surplus. Others treat
land as an ordinary, scarce, and exchangeable private commodity whose value is part
of the production costs. The underlying assumption is that freely determined land
uses lead to the allocation of the most lucrative use for every plot of land.
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With the development of urban economics, land becomes a commodity whose priceRent as monetised utility
is determined by the buyer’s willingness to maintain a given utility level, namely the
trade off between the price paid for housing and the distance to the centre where, in
the traditional North American model, employment is located (Alonso, 1964; Mills,
1967).
In order to overcome this model’s strong homogeneous views and reintroduceSpatial characteristics of
rent land specific attributes, the hedonic pricing method is introduced (Geoghegan, 2002;
Sirmans et al., 2005). This technique differentiates land prices according to a number
of characteristics such as location, view, access to transport and public services, the
buildings’ characteristics, etc. These characteristics are used to justify the amount of
rent that can be obtained from land, and serve to determine its use. In other words,
neo-classical economics overcomes the attributes specific to land by suggesting a set
of empirically tested variables influencing land value and land use.
However, other aspects such as time and social constructs play a major role, asSocial and time
considerations linked
with rent
the rent gap hypothesis (Smith, 1979) or D. Harvey and L. Chatterjee’s (1974) work
on differential and absolute rent in Baltimore have shown. Further, land uses are
almost never freely determined: with exception of rare cases like Houston where land
use policy is deliberately kept at a minimum (Ruegg, 2000), public policies strongly
influence land use by allowing or prohibiting specific uses, and taxing or subsidising
these uses (see section 2.3).
2.2.3.4 Institutional economics
Economic theory applied to land use does not limit itself to the explanation of landSpecificity of land
transactions value. Institutional economists, for example, attempt to consider the institutional
setting that constrains individual action on the land market. Transaction costs the-
ory, developed originally by R. Coase (1937) and more recently by R. North and
O. Williamson (2007), studies transactions between individuals and the costs these
transactions imply within given governance structures. It postulates that actors are
rationally bound and that they tend to chose solutions that minimize costs. In regard
to value redistribution in land use, two authors have characterized the specificities of
transactions on the land market and the underlying governance structure (Alexander,
2001; Buitelaar, 2004):
− transaction characteristics:
– land is a highly specific asset because of its unique characteristics ensued
from its topography, connection to infrastructure, surrounding construc-
tion, etc.
– its environment is linked with relatively high uncertainty, notably in regard
to future land prices and the evolution of the neighbourhood;
– the amount of transactions of property titles is rather low and infrequent;
− governance structure characteristics:
– the objectives pursued by collective action – land use planning processes –
redefine the content of assigned property rights;
– the provision of information and the coordination processes prior to the
reassignment of rights is complex and time consuming;
– the enforcement of rules requires high monitoring costs.
The specificity of land is widely due to the underlying governance structure, that isLand use planning
procedures not solely
oriented towards
economic value
to say, the land use planning process that regulates the attribution of use rights. The
planning process focusses on other objectives than costs reduction, such as equity,
legitimacy, accountability, etc. (Buitelaar, 2004). As opposed to the neo-classical
perspective, transaction costs theory reintroduces the specificity of land and draws
attention upon the complexity and the strong hierarchy inherent to its governance
structure. But it does not consider democratic concerns in land use policy processes.
Taking these concerns into account in explaining the efficiency of land use policy
processes would require reliance on a set of additional criteria, not defined by the
theory. Therefore, rather than the process outcome, it is more the process itself
whose efficiency is to be analysed.
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Another institutional economics approach to land is economic base theory (Hoyt, 1954;
North, 1955). This model allows to assess the nature and amount of revenue captured
by analysed territories, and thus contributes to explaining local authorities’ strategies
and land use. The theory focusses on employment, and establishes a distinction
between basic production activities that are sold beyond the considered territory –
the gains that are made outside and brought into the territory –, and induced service
or residential activities that serve (are consumed by) basic activities. Over time,
economic base theory has been expanded to three additional bases (Segessemann,
2016):
− public base accounts for the salaries of public servants that are not paid by local
authorities;
− social base accounts for all revenues due to transfer payments (unemployment,
social benefits, healthcare);
− residential base are foreign revenues captured through the residence and pres-
ence of pensioners and annuitants, commuters, and tourists.
A. Segessemann (2016, 151) argues that this model allows for an understanding
of regional development by focussing on the flux of money and the joint considera-
tion of production and consumption. Among other results, the author shows that
certain bases tend to exclude each other, for example commuter and tourist bases, or
agricultural and finance bases.
Before I continue with the analysis of public intervention on land use and its implic-
ations in terms of value redistribution, I provide a short synthesis of the legal and
economic explanations for land value:
− through the monopoly power of private property, the legal system confers the
capacity to appropriate rent on the landowner. Without this appropriation,
land prices would not exist (Harvey, 1982, 371);
− land price captures simultaneously the "temporality of accumulation [...] and
the specificity of material use values distributed in space" (Harvey, 1982, 371);
− price levels is determined by a plurality of factors: the rate of interest, locational
aspects (distance to centre, public service amenities), view, neighbourhood, em-
ployment, transport infrastructure, etc. (Sirmans et al., 2005);
− land use is determined by the nature of revenues which chosen territories may
capture (Segessemann and Crevoisier, 2016).
Now that I have shown how relevant theoretical strains of economic theory, based
on property rights, conceptualise land prices and land rent, I turn to the public law
elements which determine land uses. For several decades, public authorities have reg-
ulated land use through various means. As I intend to show, these interventions rely
on a time-specific conception of the public problem to be solved. Public interventions
operate through policy instruments which aim to control land use, shape land rights
and right holders’ behaviours, all of which impacts land value.
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2.3 Policy design of the resource soil
The presentation of the policy design of the resource soil is an extensive work centralPublic law affecting the
use of soil to the analysis of redistributive processes in land use policy. The policy design con-
tains "all of the substantial and institutional elements relative to the programming
and implementation of all use and protection policies affecting the management of a
resource" (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 475). It is composed of four elements analysed in
detail hereafter:
1. the definition of the public problem(s) to be solved and the causal and interven-
tion hypotheses (section 2.3.1) as well as the public problems and beneficiaries
(figure 2.1);
2. the political administrative program (section 2.3.2), which includes the legal
objectives of the public policies, the evaluative elements, the policy instruments
(section 2.3.2.3), the political-administrative arrangement and the procedural
elements;
3. the action plans as intermediary products of public action (section 2.3.3);
4. the policy outputs (section 2.3.4).
One element that needs to be emphasised is that soil regulation is spread acrossA cross policy
perspective multiple policies (land use planning, soil protection, environmental legislation, rural
land rights, etc.) and that multiple policies have spatial impacts (agriculture, trans-
portation, energy, fiscal policy, water protection, etc.). The concept of policy design
provides an overarching framework for the main public policies that influence the
management of the resource and allows for the combination of the various sectoral
policies influencing soil use. For reasons of time and length, this section focusses on
land use planning and soil protection policies (see also section 2.3.2).
In addition, one can also mention general legal principles which apply to environ-Overarching
environmental principles mental law. Several of these principles figure in the policy objectives (section 2.3.2.1),
or in the procedural elements (section 2.3.2.5). I present them here together, because
they underlie environmental legislation and/or the entire legislation:
− sustainable development9: guiding principle that applies across the entire legis-
lation (Petitpierre-Sauvain, 2012, 97) and encompasses the protection of indi-
viduals’ health and well-being, the preservation, or restitution, of the capacity
of natural cycles, the preservation of the diversity of landscapes, of plants and
animal species, of land surface and non-renewable resources, and of cultural
and economic goods (Petitpierre, 2015, 44). The underlying aim is to satisfy
the present generations’ needs in a way that does not jeopardise the capacity
of future generations to satisfy their own needs (Petitpierre, 2015, 47). land
use policy must include the principle of sustainable land use planning since the
revision of the federal Constitution in 1999 (Mahaim, 2014, 129);
− precautionary principle: preference of prevention to reparation when adapting
legislation. This allows for anticipation of damage to the environment and
reduction of potential irreversible consequences (Petitpierre, 2015, 44);
− polluter pays principle: the person causing the pollution is the one who bears
the costs of cleaning-up the consequences of the pollution (Petitpierre, 2015,
45);
− principle of information10: grants the inhabitants of a polluted region the right
to be informed; obliges the realisation of an environmental impact assessment for
polluting installations; grants the possibility to appeal against the authorities’
refusal to inform (Petitpierre-Sauvain, 2012, 32).
9Art. 2 par. 4, art. 73, art. 104 par. 1 Cst, RS 101.
10Art. 6 EPA, SR 814.01; art. 8 of the Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, SR 0.101.
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− cooperation principle11: cooperation between authorities and private entities,
but also between government levels; consultation of parties prior to the adop-
tion of new regulations, preference of contractual solutions to obligations and
restrictions(Petitpierre, 2015, 46).
2.3.1 Public problem and underlying hypotheses
In order to understand the concepts adopted and described hereafter, it seems neces- Evolution of the public
problem over timesary to provide a set of definitions prior to entering the field of analysis. A public
problem is defined in the literature as a social demand that emanates from specific
social groups, leads to public debate or controversy and creates a conflict between
organised social groups and public authorities (Garraud, 1990). The dominant un-
derstanding of a public problem is that it is subject to change over time (see table
2.4). In the case of soil, S. Nahrath (2003) has shown that the definition of the public
problem changed in the 1980’s due to the development of environmental law, and
more specifically, the raising of qualitative issues regarding soil usage. A second ma-
jor change can be observed in 2014 with the revision of the federal spatial planning
act, when the location of building zones and the necessity to redistribute the value
linked with them are defined as new, central issues.
The causal hypothesis is the result of a causal story (Stone, 1989), the most plaus- Defining the target of
public interventionible story that actors refer to in the process of defining and adopting a public policy.
Based on available knowledge and on the interests and values of involved actors, the
causal hypothesis points out who is responsible for the public problem the public
policy intends to solve (Knoepfel et al., 2006, 153ff). In other words, it defines the
group targeted through public intervention, and suggests how the group’s behaviour
creates a public problem. Depending on the evolution of the public problem, the
causal hypothesis adapts to the new target group or the new behaviour publicly re-
garded as problematic. Based on the causal hypothesis’ conception of the problem,
it is then possible to define an intervention hypothesis, which sums up the logic of
intervention on which public policies rely, in order to modify the target group’s be-
haviour.
Lack of coordination between uses and users in the 1960’s
Table 2.4 sums up the successive public problems concerning soil and its underlying Unchained development
and price risehypotheses over time. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, a lack of coordination between the
diversity of soil uses and users, limited coordination between legislations, and lack of
use restrictions by legislation, led to the emergence of three main problems (Nahrath,
2005):
− the development (hence the reduction) for wide surfaces of agricultural land,
through peri-urbanisation in particular;
− a speculation with land and a subsequent drastic increase of land prices;
− a lack of housing policy providing a solution for the needs of the baby-boomers,
which initiated an endemic housing crisis.
As a response to these problems, left wing parties, unions, environmental as- Rejection of State
intervention in the land
market
sociations, the Swiss tenant association, family associations and protestant churches
launched several popular initiatives in the 1960’s and 1970’s, all of which failed. These
initiatives aimed to achieve better control on land prices, to capture added land val-
ues, and to widen the spectrum of public intervention through the introduction of
pre-emption right and expropriation rights in favour of the Confederation.
In order to counter this questioning of cantonal sovereignty and private property, Compromise reinforcing
propertybourgeois parties, with the support of the Federal Council, proposed the creation
of a federal land use planning policy, whose initiation would be funded through the
inscription of the guarantee of private ownership into the federal constitution. This
proposal encountered wide support, and the so-called Bodenrechtsartikel were inserted
into the constitution in 1969. However, growing population, skyrocketing land and
11Art. 41a EPA, SR 814.01; art. 3 SoilPO, SR 814.12.
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rental prices, as well as urban sprawl, pushed the Federal Council to adopt, in 1972,
a Federal urgent decree which temporarily froze zoning operations until the adoption
of the federal spatial planning act.
In order to distinguish planning from property and financial matters (due to theNo taxation of added
value created through
zoning
full compensation in case of material expropriation), the draft spatial planning act
of 1974 included an instrument that taxed a portion of the added land value cre-
ated through zoning in order to compensate landowners whose development rights
would be withdrawn (and who would be entitled to a compensation for material ex-
propriation12). However, federalist and economic interests (linked to real estate and
construction) won the referendum they launched against the draft act. Subsequently,
the act adopted in 1979 left the choice of implementation of the instrument to the
cantons.
The main achievement of the law was to force planning authorities (mostly theSegmentation of land
market communes), through the mandatory implementation of the instrument zoning, to
separate the building zone from non-constructible zones such as agricultural and pro-
tected zones. The law also imposed dimensions on the building zone in accordance to
future needs. The instrument effected a direct restriction on land use (the prohibition
of constructions outside of the building zone) and indirect restriction of land value
(agricultural land could no longer be built on, which limited potential revenues to be
obtained from this land). However, as shown by the 1991 revision of the act on rural
land rights, the expected effects were only partially achieved: farmers continued to
sell agricultural land to developers, who anticipated future zone changes. In order to
counter this phenomenon, a sale prohibition of agricultural land to non-farmers was
introduced, directly limiting agricultural landowners’ disposal rights.
Lack of qualitative soil protection in the 1980’s
The second highly problematic issue that the soil policy design faced was the lackValue redistribution in
agriculture and
remediation projects
of qualitative protection of soils (Nahrath, 2003, 165): soil erosion and pollution,
and the disappearance of ecologically valuable areas such as biotopes and swamps.
Soil functions such as fertility and water filtration were threatened by soil erosion
and chemical substances. Consequently an extensive development of environmental
legislation resulted, with particular application to the agricultural sector: use restric-
tions and obligations regulating fertilisation and the provision of ecological services
were adopted and implemented together with payments compensating the reduced
quantity of goods produced. In the same period, the (re-) discovery of contaminated
sites became salient (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015). Legislation regulating the ana-
lysis, monitoring and remediation obligations of contaminated sites was adopted in
order to limit environmental damages (in particular the spread of pollution) and force
the responsible entities (disturber through ownership or through action) to pay for
occurring costs. Public funds were also allocated to remediation processes in order
to pay for analysis, monitoring and remediation in case the former owner did not
exist anymore, or for cases in which public entities were involved. Since 2009, federal
funding stems from a tax on waste paid by waste depositors.
Both the protection of agricultural land and the remediation of contaminated sites
involve a value redistribution process in which collective (tax money) and private ad-
ded economic value is used to create added ecological value that benefit the population
and the environment. They use redistributive policy instruments such as prohibitions
and obligations and compensate (part of) the economic loss endured by target groups
through financial payments.
Lack of compensation for zoning in the 2000’s
The 2014 revision of the federal spatial planning act constitutes a third phase of
the policy design of soil. The public problem consists of a lack of compensation
for the advantages conceded to landowners through zoning13. After a first popular
rejection in 1974, the problem reappeared in 2010 in the draft act elaborated by the
12Case law has set restrictive criteria that entitles the landowner to compensation. Please refer to
section 2.4.1 for details.
13The compensation for the disadvantages caused to landowners through zoning has been defined
by case law since 1969. The conditions in which such compensation is due are listed in section 2.4.1.
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Federal Council as counter-draft to the popular initiative for landscape (Viallon and
Nahrath, 2016). The instrument was perceived as salient enough (or as involving
a moderate political risk) by parliamentarians to be defined as mandatory in the
revised spatial planning act. Further, soil protection was reinforced by additional
quantitative soil objectives such as the promotion of densification within built areas,
the fight against land hoarding behaviours, the reduction of oversized building zones,
and the homogenisation of the calculation method for the dimensioning of building
zone needs (Federal Council, 2010).
The successive public problems that the policy design of soil was and is deemed
to have solved show that new obligations or restrictions, or the removal of rights
imposed on the policy’s target group, are intrinsically redistributive problems. These
problems have often been accompanied by compensation measures that benefit the
target group, and protect property or the production value associated with it (as
shown by the examples of agricultural payments, the subsidies for soil remediation,
and more recently the compensation mechanisms for added and reduced land values
created through zoning).
The notion of value redistribution offers a cross time perspective for the analysis
of land use policy, and for the management of resource soil in general. As Knoepfel
et al. (2011, 60) put it: every public policy is “intrinsically redistributive”, because it
“brings about change in the material and symbolic attributes enjoyed by the different
actors, by imposing costs [. . . ] and granting privileges”. In other words, analysing
land use policy implementation through the lens of value redistribution allows us to
grasp the most central issues of land use policy as they are linked with land property.
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In addition to the general logic of intervention exposed in table 2.4, another centralMain actors concerned by
the regulation of soil element to consider in the analysis of the policy design are the actors involved in, or
concerned by public intervention (Peters and Hoornbeek, 2005). A variety of actors
in various configurations, and with different interests, can intervene in the field of a
public policy (Knoepfel et al., 2006, 52): the target group (the ones causing the public
problem), the end beneficiaries (the ones bearing the consequences of the public prob-
lem) and the political-administrative authorities (those who define the public policy
and intervene against the target group). Figure 2.1 displays these different groups of
actors, along with third parties, actors who bear positive or negative consequences of
the public intervention and who may intervene at different stages of the policy cycle
(Parsons, 1995; Knoepfel et al., 2006, 36).
Third party winners
Urban planners, 
architects, remediation 
companies, residents, 
shop owners
Third 
party losers
Specialized cons-
truction companies,
 local authorities, 
landowners
Public problem
to be solved
Political administrative authorities
Federal administration (ARE, BAFU/OFEV)
Cantonal administration (land use planning 
office, economic office, agriculture office, 
environmental office...)
Regional entities (Region Oberaargau, PALM, 
SDOL)
Communal authorities and administration
End beneficiaries
Human beings and 
living species
Intervention 
hypothesis
Causal hypothesis
 
       Target group
        Landowners,         
right holders
Figure 2.1: Triangle of actors of land use policy. Based on Knoepfel et al. (2006, 62)
2.3.2 Political administrative program
In order to more precisely apprehend the definition of the public problem(s), causalActs and norms necessary
for implementing a public
policy
and intervention hypotheses presented above, one has to analyse in detail the legal
elements on which they rely. Together, these legal elements constitute the political
administrative program, i.e. "the set of regulatory acts and norms that parliaments,
governments and the authorities charged with execution consider necessary for the
implementation of a public policy" (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 151). In order to do so,
I analyse the most relevant public policies that apply to the resource soil. As is to
be expected, these policies are numerous14, and their relevance in land use policy
processes vary according to the empirical case being considered.
Two broad categories of environmental policy (Knoepfel et al., 2010, 536): en-Focus on land use
planning and soil
protection policies
vironmental protection policies, and environmental exploitation policies. Over time,
the coordination among the eight traditional environmental policies (intra-policy co-
ordination) has grown (Knoepfel et al., 2010, 511ff). This can be explained by the
introduction of a unique consultation procedure for all (cantonal and federal) offices
concerned by the environmental matter at stake, and by the reorganisation of offices
according to the main domains of environmental legislation, or according to the target
groups the policy is directed towards. A more persistent problem is the coordination
between protection and exploitation policies. As the authors note (Knoepfel et al.,
2010, 521ff), the logic of intervention between these two categories of policies are op-
posed: although they regulate one matter (e.g. protection of biodiversity), policies
14The eight traditional Swiss environmental protection policies are air protection, water protection,
nature protection, soil protection, waste protection against dangerous substances, climate protection
and noise protection (Knoepfel et al., 2010, 521f). Key environment exploitation policies are: land
use planning, agriculture, energy, transport, tourism, economic promotion and defence. One can also
consider that the spatial impacts of fiscal policy (Feiock et al., 2008) and forest policy.
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(such as land use planning, transport, or environmental protection policies) define
public problems that target different actors and define other, losing third parties.
Exposing the political administrative program of each policy that impacts the use
of the resource soil has already been done for the eight traditional Swiss environmental
public policies (Knoepfel et al., 2010). Presenting a summary of the entire book,
adding to the exposé of the political administrative programs of the soil’s exploitation
policies, in addition to the financial and economic promotion policies (which also play
roles in the resource’s use), would be a lengthy work that would, in my opinion, only
indirectly benefit the analysis. My approach is to focus on two policies that regulate
the uses15 of the resource soil: land use planning16 and soil protection17. I justify
this choice as follows:
1. considering land use changes provides valuable insights into the effects of land
use policy implementation: the soil’s ecological value is, as shown in section 2.1,
widely determined by its development;
2. I take into consideration soil protection and remediation policy, which provides
a qualitative valuation of the soil’s chemical components. The consideration of
other environmental policies would allow for the refinement of the analysis by
providing additional dimensions of analysis (such as biodiversity indicators, or
the ecosystem services provided by soil in a given perimeter), but this would not
fundamentally change the results provided by the policies already considered;
3. in terms of economic value, land prices and land rent estimations allow for
the assessment of the soil’s economic potential. A more precise assessment of
the soil’s economic value requires real estate expert knowledge, which was not
available. A detailed analysis of financial flows between actors, for example
through the analysis of the implementation of fiscal and economic promotion
policies (such as tax deals and other arrangements linked for example to the
provision of jobs or fiscal revenues), would, for privacy reasons, unrealistic;
4. my analysis does not focus on the effective ecological and economic value change,
but rather on the actors’ games and the way they negotiate arrangements in-
volving land use (see section 2.3.4 and chapter 3;
5. depending on the empirical observations made, relevant policies with spatial
implications can be integrated into the analysis through a bottom-up approach:
this means that the institutional regime of soil can also be constituted by study-
ing effective land use and the constraints actors deal with, or the norms they
refer to when pursuing their strategies.
The five layers of the political administrative program
Figure 2.2 shows how theory divides the political administrative program into sub- Institutional and
substantial elementsstantial and institutional elements (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 153ff). Substantial elements
contain the objectives, evaluative elements and operational elements (policy instru-
ments) of the program. Institutional elements include the procedural elements and
the political-administrative arrangements. Policy instruments are a central element
of this thesis and are described separately in section 2.3.2.3. Procedural constraints
and the political administrative arrangements are also discussed in greater detail in
sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.2.5.
During the different stages of the public policy process (agenda setting, formu- Actors’ games on
substantial and
institutional elements
lation, implementation, evaluation), actors can play with both substantial elements
(content) and institutional elements (rules) in order to directly or indirectly influence
policy products (the public problem to be solved, the political administrative pro-
gram, the political administrative arrangement, the action plans, the outputs and the
evaluative statements) (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 114).
15The regulation of disposal and formal rights are taken into consideration through the analysis
of the property rights system, which is the main source of law for these rights (see section 2.2.1).
16Spatial planning Act of 22 June 1979 SPA, SR 700; Spatial planning ordinance of 28 June 2000
SPO, SR 700.1.
17Federal Act of 7 October 1983 on the protection of the environment EPA, SR 814.010; Ordinance
of 1 July 1998 on the pollution of soil SoilPO, SR 814.12; Ordinance of 26 August 1998 on the
remediation of contaminated sites CSO, SR 814.680.
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1. Concrete objectives
2. Evaluative elements
3. Operational elements
(instruments)
4. Political-administrative arrangement
5. Procedural elements
Substantive elements Institutional elements
Figure 2.2: The five elements of the political administrative program according to
Knoepfel and Weidner (1982).
2.3.2.1 Policy objectives
Swiss legislation aims to achieve an "appropriate" and "ordered" use of land: building
zones are to be separated from non-building zones in order to ensure an moderate
use of soil and preserve its ecological and aesthetic values. Locational aspects play an
important role: the goal is to separate different land use types, protect agricultural
uses, and occupy the territory in a decentralised manner. Regarding soil protection,
two distinct objectives are pursued: one oriented towards agricultural land use, aim-
ing to guarantee the soil’s fertility for the long run; the other aimed at polluted or
contaminated sites, where investigation, monitoring and remediation measures are
central. These objectives shape the instruments of the political administrative pro-
gram presented in section 2.3.2.3.
Land use planning Soil protection
− "Appropriate and economic use of the
land and its properly ordered settle-
ment" (art. 75 Cst);
− "protection of the population and its
natural environment against damage or
nuisance" (art. 75 Cst);
− separation of building zones from non-
building zones in order to prevent
urban sprawl, preserve the landscape
and reduce the loss of fertile land (art.
3 SPA);
− definition of building zones as areas
fit for development according to en-
vironmental (noise and polluting sub-
stances), natural or water protection
reasonsa;
− coherence between zoning and localisa-
tion of actual land uses (art. 8a SPA);
− decentralised concentration of settle-
ment and preservation of regional equi-
libria (Nahrath, 2003; Bovay, 2005)
(art. 1 AgricA)b.
− Guarantee long term fertility of
soils by monitoring chemical, biolo-
gical and physical damages on soil
(art. 1 SoilPO);
− prevent soil compaction and erosion
(art. 33 EPA);
− ensure soil fertility while manip-
ulating, excavating and stripping
earth (art. 6 EPA);
− define additional protection meas-
ures and use restrictions if the
health of humans, animals or plants
is threatened by damages to soil
(art. 8ff SoilPO);
− register and investigate polluted
sites; monitor and remediate those
posing a threat to underground
and surface waters, in addition
to threats to air quality (art. 8ff
CSO);
− make the polluter bear the costs of
the pollution (art. 2 EPA).
Table 2.5: Objectives of Swiss land use planning and soil protection policies
aFederal Tribunal, 11 October 2005: 1A.130/2005.
bFederal Act of the 28 April 1998 on Agriculture AgricA, SR 910.1.
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2.3.2.2 Evaluative elements
One of the tools that cantons use to steer development is the cantonal structure plan
(plan directeur cantonal or kantonaler Richtplan), which presents the current state
of land use in each canton, and sets development objectives, and whose achievements
are evaluated through regular land use reports. Cantonal structure plans are part
of the political administrative arrangement, because they coordinate public interven-
tion. But they are not policy instruments stricto sensu, because they do not produce
direct effects on the policy’s target group. However, the dimension of building zones
constitute a central constraint in the use of the zoning instrument, because it sets
forth spatial limits above which the instrument cannot be used to zone additional
land. Since 2014, the calculation of these limits is based on a cantonal demographic
growth scenario and on the median surface of building zone per inhabitant.
In matters of soil protection, the soil protection ordinance sets thresholds above
which the health of humans, animals and plants can be endangered (investigation
values), or is endangered (remediation values). Exceeding these thresholds induces
use-restrictions for right holders. The ordinance on contaminated sites (and the water
protection ordinance) also define thresholds, and can induce monitoring and remedi-
ation obligations for excess amounts.
Land use planning Soil protection
− Revision of cantonal structure
plans every ten years (art. 9
SPA);
− building zone statistics as-
sessing their correct dimen-
sion based on the development
needs of the next fifteen years
(art. 15 SPA; art. 30 SPO);
− obligation to list the total
amount of building zone sur-
faces dedicated to urbanisa-
tion, their location, and how
their extension is coordinated
at the regional level (art. 8a
SPA).
− Evaluation of soil pollution or contamina-
tion based on legal reference value, investig-
ation value, and remediation values (annex
1 SoilPO; annex 1 CSO; annex 2 WPOa);
− Swiss soil monitoring network (NABO)
measuring soil pollution and soil fertility
across the country;
− cartography and inventory (cadaster) of
polluted and contaminated sites;
− information of the Federal office for the
environment and publication of site surveil-
lance results;
− for polluted sites, a preliminary investiga-
tion in case of pollution must be done in a
historic-technical perspective and contain
information such as type, location, quantity,
and concentration of waste present, current
and potential impact on the environment,
as well as the location and importance of
threatened areas (art. 14 CSO).
Table 2.6: Evaluative elements of Swiss land use planning and soil protection policies
aWater protection ordinance of 28 October 1998 WPO, SR 814.201.
2.3.2.3 Instruments
Through the various public policies elaborated over time, authorities have created
a set of instruments they can use to determine land use and influence land value,
and attempt to solve the previously mentioned collective problems. This section
aims to provide a set of answers on what policy instruments are, how they can be
compared (and their effects assessed), and where they can be located in the conceptual
framework of the thesis. These questions are discussed in three successive steps:
1. review how research in political science analyses policy instruments;
2. list the main instruments that stem from the policy design of soil and qualify
them based on a selection of criteria driven from the literature;
3. present a literature review of known land use policy instruments’ effects on land
use and land value.
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The fact that I limit the literature review to research on instruments in politicalFocus on political science
literature science and not in economics is due to the fact that I do not explain price variations
or land market participants’ utility level subsequent to the use of an instrument
(Geoghegan, 2002; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2015), but rather
dig into the conditions under which the land market is created and operates, how the
allocation of resources takes place, what interactions occur between authorities, target
group, and third parties, how local arrangements on land use are negotiated, and how
these arrangements influence value redistribution between soil uses and users. The
dependent variable is not a price nor a measurement of social welfare, but the output
of the public policy implementation process and its redistributive effects (impacts on
the target groups and outcomes on end beneficiaries).
Typologies and comparative approaches
Work on policy instruments in political science has followed various paths. C. HoodDifferences between
strains of research (2007, 133) distinguishes three broad categories in which research on policy instru-
ments can be synthesised. Table 2.7 provides a synoptic view on possible typologies
and comparative methods. Presenting these three categories provides an overview of
what has been done, so far, in political science; it allows for the elucidation of the
direction of this analysis.
Institutions-as-tools
The "institutions-as-tools" approach "includes specific forms of organisation as policy
instruments, as well as (or instead of), generic modes of collecting information and
shaping behaviour." (Hood, 2007, 133). The approach explores the effects of different
forms of organisation or agents (public, central, independent regulator, private, local,
etc.) on the delivery of public services. It conceives the State as an agglomeration of
more or less differentiated entities. It also takes into consideration the various types
of instruments (loan, voucher, good or service, protection, etc.) used for political
intervention. C. Hood (2007) raises three analytical issues linked with this approach.
The first one is due to the distinction between instruments and institutions, which
results in two distinct variables that the analyst needs to account for. The second
one is linked to the attributes which characterise the instruments and institutions, or
rather, the theoretical or empirical foundation of their choice: are these classifications
specific to government, or do they apply to any kind of organisation? The third one is
linked to the explanation that instrumental change can provide. Whereas L. Salamon
links "the analysis of tools with the growth of what he calls "new governance" (i.e.,
a move away from stand-alone public bureaucracies to network structures)" (Hood,
2007, 135), P. Lascoumes and P. le Galès (2007) rather conceives instruments as
markers of change in the way public policies are conceived and oriented.
Politics-of-instrumentality
The "politics-of-instrumentality" approach "puts emphasis on the subjective percep-
tions and political processes that surround the choice of policy instruments – that is,
the way policy makers and politicians conceive policy instruments, and the ideolo-
gical or political considerations that lead them to prefer some instruments to others."
(Hood, 2007, 136). The approach emphasises that "the choice of policy instruments
and forms of organization ironically often turns out to be far more ideological and
politically contested than statements about the basic purpose of government." (Hood,
2007, 137). As opposed to the previous approach, instruments, particularly how they
are chosen, are clearly defined as a variable to be explained. Various authors, among
which S. Linder and B. Peters (1989), have focussed on the question of why certain
instruments are preferred over others. As C. Hood argues (2007), this approach is
complementary to the first one, in the sense that an explanation of the instruments’
choice cannot only rely on the actors’ perceptions, but also requires a systematic
comparison of the instruments that can be chosen.
One of the main difficulties in instrument research is the difficulty of compar-Attributes as
comparative tools ison between instruments (Varone, 1998, 37). The "politics-of-instrumentality" path
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proposes to circumvent the problem by defining non-exclusive attributes which char-
acterise the instruments18. The use of attributes constitutes a major theoretical input
in order to compare and understand instruments’ choice and implementation. The
two examples mentioned in table 2.7 distinguish themselves through the following
aspects:
− whereas S. Linder and B. Peters’ typology refers to the sole economy of imple-
mentation, L. Salamon’s compares the investment to the results obtained (input
to effects);
− L. Salamon’s suggestion does not distinguish between the definition of the target
group (selectivity) and the efficacy of the instrument, the latter also included
in the equity attribute. According to A. Schneider and H. Ingram (1990), the
redistributive attribute of an instrument is expected to arouse opposition from
the target group, as well as third parties, depending on the instrument’s redis-
tributive intensiveness, and thus affect their policy participation.
− the degree of constraint mentioned by S. Linder and B. Peters is broader than the
strict redistributive effects as defined by L. Salamon. The degree of constraint
also refers to the latter author’s legitimacy of public action.
Certain factors ease the joint consideration of all instruments’ attributes by policy Insights from the
neo-institutional
paradigm
makers: gathered knowledge on the instrument to be implemented, the consensual
nature of the political regime (non-majoritarian system), and the instrument’s inser-
tion within a harmonisation strategy (Varone, 1998, 324ff).
In addition to the instruments’ attributes, F. Varone (1998, 41ff) emphasises the
importance of neo-institutional theses in explaining the choice of instruments. He
mentions four specific points:
− the ideology of the political majority explains the degree of constraint of the
instruments;
− the pre-existence of a public administration explains the amount of resources
necessary for the implementation of an instrument;
− knowledge transfer and the harmonisation of public policies explain the political
risk, as well as potential adverse effects of an instrument (also referred to as the
convergence thesis (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2013));
− the political power of a target group justifies the quality of targeting.
The explanations provided by the neo-institutional paradigm are of particular Role of existing
structures and processesrelevance for this research, because they emphasise the role of existing structures and
processes in order to explain reality. As our work focusses on policy implementation,
these elements are central to formulating research hypotheses and interpreting the
observed phenomena.
Description-and-categorisation
The "description-and-categorisation" approach sums up typologies of instruments as
such, putting institutions aside. Some are less bound to an explanatory framework
and aim to conceptualise the tools of government action as free from institutions
and technological changes, in order to enhance their comparison across time, area
and policy domain. C. Hood (1983; 2007) conceptualised two broad types of instru-
ments: detectors and effectors. Their use by authorities depends upon depletable
and non-depletable resources that can be possessed by authorities. Another concep-
tualisation is E. Vedung’s (1998) typology, which relies on a threefold classification
of power elaborated by A. Etzioni : the author defines power as "an actor’s ability
to induce or influence another actor to carry out his directives or any other norms
he supports" (Etzioni (1975, 75ff), cited in Vedung (1998)). Three methods exist
to make subjects comply: coercive power, characterised by (the threat of) physical
sanctions, frustrations and force; remunerative power, which controls the material
18See F. Varone (1998) for an extended literature review on instruments’ attributes.
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resources and their allocation; normative power, which contains the allocation and
manipulation of symbolic rewards. As C. Hood notes, some of the State’s activities,
linked, for example, with the provision of infrastructure, are not easily classifiable in
such a trichotomy. More generally, despite numerous efforts of conceptualisation and
debate, there has been no consensus on a determined typology, each of them relying
on different organisational or cultural theories.
These three strains of research (as presented above) overlap, but also vary in regard
to three main elements:
− the phenomenon they want to explain – most notably the choice of instruments,
their effects, or their ability to explain change;
− the typologies they build or rely on;
− the attributes or comparative criteria they define and use.
The first element – the variance in the phenomenon to be explained –, is of centralLocation of the variable
"instruments" importance, because it changes the definition and the place of the variable "instru-
ments" in the causal explanations provided by researchers. As C. Hood notes (2007),
earlier research focussed on how policy instruments could be categorised. The analysis
emphasised the effects produced by instruments depending on their type. In order
to do so, one has to define a set of relevant dimensions common to the various in-
struments. In turn, this requires focus on common, instruments-related consequences
(Salamon and Lund, 1989, 36). As the authors note:
"The key question in tools research is not whether the theory embodied in
a program is correct, but whether the program utilizes a mechanism that
allows that theory to be tested. In other words, it is more the impact of
the tool on the functioning of the program than the impact of the program
on the underlying societal problem that is of principal concern." (Salamon
and Lund, 1989, 40f).
This means that the dependent variable to be measured is the public policies’
impacts on the target group, rather than the resolution of the public problem, or the
policies’ effects on the end beneficiaries (see the "triangle of actors" (figure 2.1) in
section 2.3.1).
In the 1990’s, a shift to the dependent variable operated and the focus of analysis
turned to the question of why certain instruments are selected and others are not.
It hereby drew attention to the ideology and politics behind the instruments’ choice
(Linder and Peters, 1989, 1998; Varone, 1998). The use of instrument attributes
aimed to compare instruments to each other, and explain the conditions under which
certain types of instruments were favoured over others.
In the 2000’s, a more socio-political perspective led by P. Lascoumes and P. le
Galès (2004b, 13) enlarged the field of research by adopting a more holistic concep-
tion of instruments: they defined instruments as technical and social devices that
organise social interaction between public authorities and target groups based on the
representations and meanings they carry. The authors not only ask why instruments
are adopted, but also consider the instruments’ effects as part of the variable to be ex-
plained. From this perspective, instruments are conceived as an intermediary variable
(Halpern et al., 2014, 39).
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As G. Peters Peters (2005, 355f) suggests, future research on instruments shouldPerspectives of
instrumental research involve the following elements:
− it should pay particular attention to the political importance of instruments and
to the multiplicity of criteria to consider in order to explain their choices. This
particularly intends to avoid restraining research to its technical aspects, but to
pay attention to the political coalitions (and their legitimacy) underlying the
choice within the studied political context(s);
− it should consider multiple instruments, in particular their combination, rather
than consider different means of achieving the same goal as redundancies;
− the third element comes close to L. Salamon’s argument on third party gov-
ernment (2002): researchers should be especially mindful of the institutional
context of implementation, particularly when several organisations are involved.
The design of public or private structures that deliver public services has to be
considered, as well as the organisations’ experiences and habits in regard to the
tools used;
− it should consider the shift towards less-direct forms of public action, for ex-
ample, the increased role of soft law and other voluntary agreements, and the
blurring between public and private law instruments. Soft law implies a "del-
egation of authority and discretion to non-public actors" (Peters, 2005, 362), or
rather non-democratically legitimised actors. Voluntary agreements imply an
increased role of bargaining in the instruments’ use and significant changes in
terms of interactions and managerial challenges (Kettl, 2002). In Switzerland,
authorities rely more and more on contracts in land use planning procedures
(Adank, 2016, 55).
Combination of two approaches
As I argue in the presentation of the research design (chapter 3), I opt for an approach
located between the first and the second currents of research. C. Hood (2007) argues
that both the institutions-as-instruments and politics-of-instrumentality approaches
are valid and complementary. Within this theoretical framework, I do not directly ad-
dress the general "big picture" explanation provided by the politics-of-instrumentality
approach (the reasons why an instrument is adopted or not). However, the path I
chose allows me to focus on actors’ games and the resources they use in order to
achieve their goals, as well as to provide a detailed understanding of the instruments’
uses in the field, an element that the politics of instrumentality tends to put aside
(Halpern et al., 2014, 49).
Based on this choice (which is presented in greater detail in chapter 3), the defini-Instruments as the tools
of public intervention tion of public policy instrument that I adopt is a (narrow) functional one. Referring to
Knoepfel et al. (2011), public policy instruments are the tools used by authorities to
influence the behaviour of target groups; they specify the means of public intervention
underlying the intervention hypothesis (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 156). In other words,
instruments are, along with procedural elements (see section 2.3.2.5), the matter on
which the negotiation with target groups crystallises, because the latter try to negoti-
ate their implementation with public authorities, in order to adjust the instruments’
impact according to their interests.
Having introduced the main theoretical elements relevant to instruments, it is neces-
sary to introduce the policy instruments that Swiss legislation offers for guiding the
use of the resource soil.
53 of 327
Literature review and theoretical framework
Public law instruments
Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 present a range of existing public law instruments Instruments’ description
based on attributeswhich influence soil users and uses. However, the list is not exhaustive, as about 158
Swiss federal public law restrictions apply to (land) property (Knoepfel and Wey,
2006). Our selection is based on a legal review and on the instruments used by the
actors in the case studies analysed in chapters 4 and 5. Along with the instruments’
classification based on , I provide a brief description of their functioning. Based on
selected attributes derived from the literature (Salamon and Lund, 1989; Linder and
Peters, 1989), I draw a short theoretical assessment of the difficulties linked with
their implementation and of their impact on value redistribution. The attributes I
rely upon to are:
− Redistributive capacity: the redistributive economic and ecological effects that
an instrument has on the target group, third parties and beneficiaries of land
use planning policy and, more widely, on the policy design of soil (Salamon and
Lund, 1989, 41). I understand the redistributive capacity of an instrument in a
broader sense and conceive it as a proxy for the degree of constraint it exercises
on the target group (Linder and Peters, 1989);
− Target quality: refers to the instrument’s selectivity when applied to the target
groups and beneficiaries, and the technical feasibility of this selection (Linder
and Peters, 1989). Applied to land use policy, my understanding of the criteria
also includes spatial dimension, the perimeter in which the instrument produces
impacts;
− Political risk: defined as the "capacity to attract the support [or the opposition]
of key actors with a stake in the program area" (Salamon and Lund, 1989, 41).
For S. Linder and B. Peters (1989), this attribute also comprises the instrument’s
visibility and potential adverse effects;
− Resource intensiveness: "the degree of ease or difficulty involved in establishing
and operating a program" (Salamon and Lund, 1989, 41). S. Linder and B.
Peters consider political risk and resource intensiveness as correlates of political
feasibility (1989, 47), the prior addressing external concerns of feasibility, the
latter internal ones. Resource intensiveness is assessed from the angle of the
authorities.
− Scale of action: refers to the political-administrative level in charge of imple-
menting the instrument. It is a correlate of the instrument’s target quality, in
the sense that it influences the perimeter of impact. In a decentralised policy
like land use planning, the scale of action is an institutional constraint that
helps to explain instrument choice, use, and effects.
Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 list the most prominent instruments from federal Categories used for
instruments’ classificationand cantonal (Berne and Vaud) laws that have been encountered in the empirical
analysis. Among the unlisted, are: agricultural and housing subsidies, expropriation,
State pre-emption (canton Geneva), protection against water run-off, protection of
flora, fauna, (and their respective habitats), and the secondary home tax (formerly
commune Silvaplana in canton Grison). Based on P. Lascoumes and P. Le Galès’
(2004a) and E. Vedung’s (1998) classification, I distinguish prescriptive/regulatory
instruments (table 2.8), fiscal and economic instruments (tables 2.9 and 2.10), and
information instruments (table 2.11).
In terms of redistribution, the classification shows that few redistributive instru- Few redistributive
instrumentsments exist: the land improvement syndicate, the remediation obligation (polluter
pays principle), and the tax on added land value created through zoning. However,
all instruments have distributive implications, they create winners and losers who
clash over the definition of their content and their implementation.
In regard to the scale of action, land use planning instruments notably take effect A low scale of action
primarily at the communal level. This is due to the subsidiary competence of the
Confederation in matters of land use planning (see also section 2.3.2.4).
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Regulatory instruments
Table 2.8 presents the regulatory land use policy instruments. The table shows
that cantons Berne and Vaud have similar regulatory instruments. The instruments
provide the communes a wide range of possibilities in guiding land use, and effecting
value distribution. The high precision of these tools makes them resource intensive:
they target the policy addressees through a map and follow a long and complex elab-
oration and implementation process. The following remarks on the listed instruments
can be made:
− zoning plans and building regulations include a wide set of restrictions which are
applied with a high degree of precision (single plots). A priori, a zone applies to
a group of plots and cannot target one specific plot out of many closely located
ones. To define specific rules that apply to a group of isolated plots, authorities
use local development plans;
− local development plans allow derogations to general zoning regulation and a
contractual negotiation of value distribution and capture. It grants a high mar-
gin of manoeuvrability to authorities and landowners, but remains open to
public scrutiny, at least in regard to planning aspects. The financial plan or
contract accompanying the local development plan determines the amount of
value captured, part of its redistribution (for example, for local land service
and the construction of local public infrastructure), as well as other obligations
the parties agreed upon. Its publicity currently depends upon the balance of
interests between transparency laws and trade secrecy (Adank, 2016, 204).
− the cropland protection plan defines types of soils that are of superior quality
for agricultural production. There is no national substantive definition of soil
qualities: each canton applies specific qualitative criteria defining areas in need
of protection19, and soil quality is not considered during zoning procedures. The
restrictions, in terms of development, are limited to a cantonal quota defined
in hectares. As long as the quota is not reached, these soils can be developed.
In the canton of Berne, a higher minimal plot ratio (0.4) applies when land
included in the cropland protection plan is developed;
− the “polluter pays” principle is conceived as a redistributive tool that captures
economic value from the landowner or rights holder who creates a reduced eco-
logical value in order to compensate the loss. However, the calculation of these
costs does not take into account pollution costs prior to the introduction of cor-
responding legislation, such as those linked with contaminated sites (grandfather
clause), nor does it include all current polluters. In addition, costs calculation
and the effects of current cost repercussion methods such as an emissions trading
system are still ambiguous (Martin et al., 2015);
− the land improvement syndicate is a tool specific to Canton Vaud. It combines
the use of land readjustment and zoning through the coordination of the instru-
ments’ procedures. It is analysed in the case study of Cheseaux (section 5.2 in
chapter 5).
19Art. 26 SPO, SR 700.1.
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Economic and fiscal instruments
With instruments which use money as a means of constraint (table 2.9), two broad Two types of
incentive-based
instruments
categories of instruments are distinguished (Petitpierre-Sauvain, 2012): fiscal instru-
ments are a source of income for public authorities. They require their own legal basis,
but their revenues are not affected to a specific task and can be redistributed to solve
issues not linked to the activity they capture value from. Economic instruments are
incentives whose revenues are attributed to actions which contribute to the resolution
of the public problem, or are distributed among the residents. Their legal basis stems
from the public authority’s competence to legislate on a particular matter. Following
comments specific to instruments can be made:
− the wealth tax addresses wealth as a whole including land property. Its rate
is set by the canton. The land tax addresses only wealth in the form of land
property. Its rate is set by the commune within a range fixed by the canton;
− in regard to the real estate gains tax, agricultural and forestry properties can
deduct reinvestment costs from the taxed sum. Federal law obliges also the
cantons to tax short-term gains at a higher level in order to prevent speculative
land transactions. Bernese tax law imposes a tax rate of 70% the first year of
ownership. This rate is reduced to a maximum of 8.1% after five years. The tax
rate in the canton of Vaud starts at 30% for ownership of less than one year,
and is reduced to 7% for 24 years or more of ownership. The years during which
the owners themselves live in their property count twice for the calculation of
the tax (art. 147 StG and art. 72 LI);
− the land use steering tax is part of the Bernese draft land use planning act of
2014. It aims to increase coherence between land use planning and effective land
use; it distinguishes between built and unbuilt plots within the building zone.
A key tool used in tandem with fiscal and economic instruments is land valuation. Underrated property
valuesLand valuation determines the official value of land used for taxation and the im-
plementation of other economic tools. Official land value is fixed either through a
general official price evaluation – in the canton of Berne, the latest evaluation dates
back to 1998 (FIN, 2009) – or when the plot is sold. These long time spans between
(re-) evaluations or sale create a discrepancy between market value and official value,
which in turn lowers the income that these instruments provide. Organisations such
as churches, pension funds and moral persons fulfilling aims of public interest are
exempted from wealth, real estate gains and land property income tax20, all of which
reduces the target range. Further, official values are generally lower than market
values (FIN, 2009).
The resource intensiveness of these instruments essentially depends upon the can- Limited resource
intensivenesstonal tax administration. Over the last decade, the electronic and semi-automatic
treatment of fiscal declaration has lowered resource intensiveness of tax collection
(Cour des comptes du Canton de Vaud, 2011a). In terms of target, fiscal instruments
concern all plots, but the mostly transaction-based indexation of land values and re-
gressive tax rates lead to substantial tax discrepancies between long term and short
term landowners. Further, they do not take into consideration the type of use or zone
(except the future possible land use steering tax in canton Berne). Fiscal instruments
are indirectly redistributive, because public authorities redistribute the revenues in
various policies regardless of origin. Their scale of implementation is mixed, and tax
revenues are shared among communal and cantonal levels.
20art. 83 StG, SR-BE 611.11 and art. 90 LI, SR-VD 642.11.
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Looking at economic instruments intended to foster specific behaviours in the
target groups:
− the tax on added land value created through zoning reintroduced in spatial plan-
ning legislation in 2014 captures part of the value created through the granting
of new or additional development rights to a plot. Its yield is to be used for
financial compensation resulting from material expropriation, and for other land
use planning measures. The instrument does not formally oblige the landowner
to proceed with a land use change, nor does it guarantee that the buyer will
not hoard the land. Depending on when the tax is due, and on the financial
capacities of the landowner, it can provide a strong incentive or even force the
owner to change their property’s use, or to sell the land.
− the land service tax is a central feature of Swiss land use planning policy and
aims to ensure landowners’ participation in the investments public authorities
make to their benefit. The extent to which authorities pass the land service
costs on to landowners is one core element in the negotiations linked with local
development plans;
− despite public subsidies of the agricultural sector, there is a huge price gap
between agricultural land and constructible land. Financially, this means that
agricultural subsidies cannot compete with constructible land. As the list of
private law instruments has shown (section 2.2.1.4), the act on rural land rights
separates the land market between agriculture and construction by prohibiting
the sale of agricultural land to non-farmers. However, in cases of inheritance
or when the commune modifies its zoning plan, agricultural and development
interests compete against each other;
− regional economic promotion is an ambiguous set of tools, because they partly
stand against classic fiscal instruments presented in table 2.9 by conceding mon-
etary advantages to landowners which directly deprive public authorities of rev-
enues provided for them by law. One argument holds that there will be resulting
job provision, or additional fiscal revenue due to new employees who might in-
habit the commune or canton;
− subsidies for contaminated sites aim to monitor and remediate plots and thus
stabilise or restore ecological value. Together with the waste tax, they constitute
a redistributive instrument.
The concession is a particular type of instrument: it relies on public law, but Public law contracts
its nature is contractual. Authorities and the concessionary use it to negotiate the
terms of an agreement for an extended period of time. Its use is mainly linked
with the construction and/or exploitation of major infrastructure such as dams, radio
frequencies, and transport. Redistributive counterparts depend on the obligations
imposed on the concessionary (e.g. minimum flow rates for water dams) and to the
use of the revenues from the concession.
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Depending on the involvement of the actors concerned by the land use policy Information can lead to
redistributionprocess, and their resources, information instruments can induce value redistribution.
The success of the claims depends on the way authorities make use of the instrument,
as well as their resources. The nature (e.g. nuclear plant v. housing) of the land use
policy project also greatly influences the political conflicts that can arise.
The above tables highlight the variety of existing instruments that allow for the Few redistributive
instrumentsachievement of redistributive effects and land use policy goals. Instruments like local
development plans, the land improvement syndicate, the tax on added land value
created through zoning, land service tax or the waste tax coupled with the subsidy for
contaminated sites, possess an evident redistributive dimension. But their goals and
scale of action vary significantly. The next section offers a short literature review of
Swiss land use policy instruments’ main effects, as well as selected foreign instruments
with a redistributive dimension. Strengths and weaknesses will be identified, and value
redistributive instruments will be shown to remain rather marginal in land use policy,
and the lack of research focussing on value redistribution in land use policy will be
highlighted.
Effects
Regulatory instruments
Zoning plays a central role in determining land uses and value, but its effects vary Zoning intrinsically
linked to land valueaccording to the type and location of the perimeter under study, and are difficult to
isolate from exogenous factors (Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005). Nevertheless, a set of
elements can be drawn from the literature that studies the instrument’s effects:
1. a zoning gap, or a difference between potential construction possibilities and
effective land use, exists (Tillemans et al., 2011). This gap shows the limit of
constraint that the instrument can impose as well as that economic thinking
is not the sole approach of target groups. The latter do not systematically
maximise additional use rights and value that the authority has granted to
their plot;
2. zoning has an ambiguous effects on prices: depending on which perimeter is
studied, relaxing zoning constraints can lead to lower prices (Gyourko and
Glaeser, 2003; Lecat, 2006; Ihlanfeldt, 2007) or to a counter-intuitive price in-
crease (Ruegg, 2000; Buitelaar, 2007; Dantas, 2010). This effect can be explained
by the limited fungibility of real estate goods (Boulay and Buhot, 2013, 28), i.e.
the fact that real estate goods are not identical and are not interchangeable.
Land values are not a simple relationship between supply and demand;
3. zoning has positive effects on the limitation of constructions, urban sprawl and
on the preservation of ecological value (Napoléone and Geniaux, 2011). The
effects of zoning have even been observed beyond the zoning perimeter;
4. on the question of who benefits from zoning, J. Ruegg (2000) and F. Walter
(1986) argue that landowners accept the instrument because they benefit from
it: the instrument grants them certainty on present and future surrounding
land uses, limits the arrival of new users and uses, and stabilises the economic
value of their property. Landowners gave up the right to use freely their plot
and delegated voluntarily the definition of the content of their property right to
the local authority (Ruegg, 2000, 79). Over time, zoning, as one tool (among
others) to plan and organise society, has been limited to the definition and ne-
gotiation of the context-specific content of private property, to the point where
planning has become merely a task of zoning and solving local conflicts of in-
terests (Cullingworth (1993) in Ruegg (2000)). Other purposes of planning,
such as social, political, economic and ecological considerations are neglected in
favour of private property interests.
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S. Nahrath (Nahrath, 2000, 2003, 2005) has analysed the impact of the Swiss land
use planning policy which emerged in the 1960’s on the uses and the state of the
resource soil. Among other elements, his analysis showed the central role of private
property in land use policy implementation and the difficulties that arise from the
conflict between zoning and property rights. Further, the author draws attention to
the importance of courts in order to solve legal conflicts due to a lack of coherence
between norms and regulatory gaps created by the legislator.
As J. Ruegg (2013) recalls, authorities and landowners or developers frequentlyContractual negotiation
in urban projects negotiate the rights granted by zoning, and thus the amount of added value created,
and redistributed. The importance of negotiation, which has been acknowledged by
B. Peters (2005) in regard to policy instruments in general (see section 2.3.2.3), is
particularly salient for local development plans: in Switzerland, these plans are often
accompanied by a specific financial agreement, whose terms remain secret (Adank,
2016). A similar practice has been analysed in France: through his study of the
definition and negotiation of local development plans, agglomerations’ master plans
and urban renewal projects, G. Pinson (2004) has shown how French urban projects
characterise the transformation of classical land use planning instruments like zoning
and taxes to a broader social coordination tools, which include mutual obligations
and communitarian identities which foster the adhesion of actors to the negotiated
norms.
Fiscal and economic instruments
A general phenomenon acknowledged in western countries is that taxation of land
primarily addresses transactions and not possession (Guigou, 1982; Boulay and Buhot,
2013; Artus et al., 2013). In Switzerland, this fact becomes particularly visible through
three elements:
− the relatively low tax rates on land;
− the anchor of absolute tax limits in cantonal law;
− the calculation of the official land value, which systematically underrates prop-
erty values compared to market prices (FIN, 2009);
− the general tax rate reduction over the last decades (Daﬄon, 2015).
One of the most debated tax instruments in history is the land tax (George, 2006;Minimal land tax?
Blaug, 1980). In Switzerland, the land tax refers to the value of the entire property
and not just the land. Seven cantons, Canton Zurich among them, do not have a land
tax; eight cantons, Basel city among them, only apply the land tax in case the sum
due for the land tax exceeds the tax sum due by the landowner on their income and
wealth (FTA, 2014). In most cases where the tax is applied, the basis used for tax
assessment is the official or fiscal value of land, which often corresponds to a reduced
market value. Further, maximum land tax rates are capped by cantonal law. Waltert
et al. (2010, 35) notes that a revaluation of the basis used for the tax assessment
would increase the incentive to use land according to zoning regulations and limit
hoarding behaviours. Further, the tax rate could be adapted to specific (non) uses,
for example to the extent to which the plot ratio is effectively used, on the type of
zone where the built plot is located, and on the type of building or its occupancy (e.g.
single family homes, secondary homes).
Deductions from the income and wealth taxes also influence land use. The politicalIncentives promoting
property objective to facilitate access to property can be linked to the following fiscal incentives
(Waltert et al., 2010, 47):
− in all cantons, the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings is systematically
below market value21;
− mortgages and mortgage interests can be deducted from the wealth respectively
the income tax. These deductions account for 30% of the deductions made from
the federal tax. A study estimates that their removal would increase the federal
income tax yield by 18% (Peters, 2009).
21According to the Federal Tribunal (125 I 65), the rental value used for taxation should correspond
to at least 60% of the rent’s market value.
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In regard to the real estate gains tax, the major issue in current legal dispositions, Incentives promoting
land hoardingin most cantons, is the tax’s decreasing rate in time, incentivising landowners to sell
zoned land after a long period of time (Egloff, 2008). In addition, the basis for tax
assessment on zoned land which is still used for agriculture is the provided income22,
which is far below the land’s market value. Further, the act on rural land rights grants
co-heirs the right to inherit part of the benefits from land sale lapses during a period
of 25 years23. For the heir, this constitutes an incentive not to sell the land, as they
are the sole beneficiary of the sale’s yield after the delay expires. From a planning
perspective, this delays the availability of land for construction.
The tax on added land value created through zoning as it exists in Switzerland Tax on added land value
created through zoninghas not yet been subject to evaluation, as the federal law entered into force in 2014.
A review of the literature shows that other value capture mechanisms exist, but that
they are essentially used in order to finance transport infrastructure (Batt, 2001;
Cervero and Murakami, 2009; Medda, 2012), and not to compensate restrictions on
property due to zoning, for the protection of agricultural surfaces or to optimise land
use24. Prior to the 2014 spatial planning act revision, four cantons had implemented
the tax:
− Basel-city dedicated the tax’s yield to parks and green spaces25;
− Geneva used the money for housing, infrastructure and agriculture26;
− Neuchâtel used the money for financing expropriations27;
− Berne used the money to finance planning measures and land service (the in-
strument’s implementation is analysed in chapter 6)28.
In regard to the land service tax, it should be kept in mind that different types of Land service tax
land service taxes exist, depending on the type of infrastructure subject to fee (road,
water, sewer, electricity, school, parks, fire protection, etc.). Several authors state
the tax’ positive influence on development control (Nelson et al., 1992; Burge et al.,
2013; Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2013). In the Swiss case, Institut für Wirtschaftsstudien
Basel (2015) mentions three conditions of implementation which have, in certain cases,
diluted the effects produced by the instrument:
− the calculation of the fee was based on average costs and not on marginal costs;
− authorities financed part of the land service (main infrastructure required for
local land service, service linked to specific public interest);
− authorities financed a service that substituted to the effective land service (e.g.
school bus in cases where walking distances are too long for the children).
The waste disposal tax and the subsidy for contaminated sites have not been Waste disposal tax...
subjected to joint evaluation. Regarding the waste disposal tax, its financing occurs
primarily by the companies and individuals who create it (BHP AG, 2006, 130).
Despite an increasing proportion of recycled waste, the absolute quantity of waste
has increased almost constantly over the last decades, along with tax revenues, which
reached 40 million francs in 2015 (FOEN, 2008, 29).
In regard to the subsidies for contaminated sites, around 10% of the 50,000 con- ...and subsidy for
contaminated sitestaminated sites in Switzerland have been remediated over the last years. Estimations
on the overall remediation costs are about 5 billion francs (FOEN, 2015, 41). How-
ever, the OCRCS is conceived only as a complement to the polluter’s obligation to
pay (in case they are insolvent or no longer exist).
Instruments as market creators
There are also foreign examples of redistributive instruments. M. Gmünder (2010) Transferable development
rightshas shown that the creation of a market of transferable development rights forces
22Art. 17 of the Federal act of 4 October 1991 on rural land rights RLRA, SR 211.412.11.
23Art. 28 par. 3 RLRA, SR 211.412.11.
24Art. 3 par. 2 let. a and par. 3 let abis and art. 5 par. and 3 SPA, SR 700.
25Paragraph 120 of the Bau- und Planungsgesetz vom 17 November 1999, SR-BS 730.100.
26Art. 30c ff., Loi d’application du 1er août 1987 de la loi fédérale sur l’aménagement du territoire,
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landowners to integrate the ecological externalities they create through the economic
use (development) of their plot:
− sending and receiving areas were defined at county scale (1,285 km2 in the case
of Montgomery, 557 km2 in the case of Calvert);
− the owners located in the receiving area and willing to build had (or could)
purchase (additional) development rights from landowners in the sending area;
− this allowed for the relocation of development rights closer to the existing trans-
port and urban framework.
In the case of Montgomery county, the author notes that the program allowed
for the protection of 188 km2 from long-term development, an amount corresponding
to 50% of the surface of the sending area. However, only 44% of the density bonus
granted to the receiving areas was used by developers (McConnell et al. (2007, 44)
in Gmünder (2010, 191)). In the case of Calvert county, where the program was
non-binding for landowners, the author notes that the rights transfer mechanism
allowed access to higher densities when compared to development without the optional
purchase of TDR (McConnell et al. (2007, 70) in Gmünder (2010, 191)).
Other instruments link the creation of economic value to an obligation to com-Biodiversity certificates
pensate the ecological value destroyed. In the USA, a market-based system of transfer-
able biodiversity certificates, also called mitigation banking, is a common instrument
which allows developers to fulfil their compensation obligations through the acquis-
ition of assets from a bank29. Mitigation banks certify that the assets developers
are obliged to buy correspond to effective preservation, restoration, creation or en-
hancement measures realised by a specialised organisation within a given perimeter
(Bonnie, 1999). For example, these measures involve the imposition of use restrictions
on land, the acquisition of land for protection purposes, or the artificial (re-) creation
of wetlands. This instrument has been criticised in various ways (Jennings, 1997;
Hallwood, 2007):
− in the case of wetland protection, the instrument does not allow for the achieve-
ment of the federal mandate of no net wetland surface loss;
− the credits are often sold before the mitigation process is effectively achieved;
− the rate of projects in which compensation processes have succeeded is between
25 and 50%;
− the banking system lacks public review.
In regard to the protection of endangered species habitats, similar compensatoryHabitat banking
mechanisms known as habitat banking exist (Bonnie, 1999). However, they face chal-
lenges comparable to those of wetlands, and must additionally dealwith the fragment-
ation of the surfaces placed under protection. In fact, a potential habitat recovery is
only effective if wide and spatially coherent surfaces are protected, a constraint which
is hard to achieve (Bonnie, 1999).
In France, a similar instrument has been tested: an experiment set up by a publicUncertainty linked with
ecological compensation bank (Caisse des dépôts) forced developers within a given perimeter to buy credits
compensating the ecological value loss induced by their construction. The value of the
credits corresponded to a share of the bank’s investment in the ecological restoration
of a former industrial orchard. Researchers who analysed the project’s effects came
to the following conclusions (Chabran and Napoléone, 2012; Napoléone and Calvet,
2013):
− it is impossible to evaluate and manage biodiversity in the long run. The future
of this (re-) created biodiversity remains uncertain in a changing global context
(Robertson, 2004);
SR-GE L 1 30.
27Art. 35ss of the Loi neuchâteloise du 2 octobre 1991 sur l’aménagement du territoire, SR-NE
701.0.
28Art. 142 of the Baugesetz vom 9. Juli 1985, SR-BE 721.0.
29Section 404 of the US Clean Water Act.
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− ecological and financial-administrative processes take place on completely dif-
ferent time scales – the underlying question behind these points is the technical
possibility to value biodiversity economically;
− the integration of the neighbours (other farmers) in the compensation project
allowed for the creation of a coalition of actors supporting the restoration and
the ecological goals set by the public bank;
Based on the North-American and French experiences, one can state that the Lack of redistributive
instrumentsmain objectives of compensation are unachievable, but such an instrument can at
least help to finance protection or restoration measures which allow for the ecological
preservation or restoration of given areas. As the list of policy instruments in section
2.3.2.3 showed, such mechanisms are, in Swiss legislation on soil, currently limited
to agricultural subsidies and the associated ecological services that farmers have to
provide.
Other instruments exist which redistribute economic and ecological values, but
currently the majority of these remain theoretical: soil sealing certificates or a soil
sealing tax30 (European Commission, 2012; Süess and Gmünder, 2005), quotas on
constructions31, etc. (please refer to Gmünder et al. (2017) for additional examples
and references.
Combined instruments
Since the 2000’s, rail and property models, transit-oriented development, and other Rail and property models
policies which capture the value created through the development of public transport
infrastructure to finance infrastructure, housing (social), or the area’s redevelopment
in general, have regained attention (Pflieger, 2013a): with the redevelopment of major
urban public transport infrastructure, cities have been looking for means to reduce
development and operational costs of this infrastructure, and have rediscovered the
economic potential of the plots surrounding these infrastructure. Zoning policy fos-
tering a dense usage of the plots, combined with a value capture instrument (or public
property that by default captures the added value), constitutes a central element of
contemporary urban renewal processes. Although the aspect value redistribution lies
at the heart of such instruments’ mixes, the question of the amount of value created,
of its capture, and its redistribution often remains unclear. Depending on the prop-
erty structure and on the city’s political objectives, two scenarios can be outlined
(Pflieger, 2013b): a corridors gentry option, where the value created, if captured, is
ideally reused for public investments in transport infrastructure. This can lead to a
sharp increase in real estate prices (Cervero and Murakami, 2009) and the gentrific-
ation of neighbourhoods based on their access to public transport. A second option
would be the onsite redistribution of a portion of the added value through the devel-
opment of subsidised housing programs, controlling, de facto, part of the generated
rent. In Switzerland, such combined initiatives have mainly taken place through the
federal agglomeration program. Section 2.3.3 below presents this federal program; the
case study of Malley in chapter 5 presents an urban renewal process with just such
an instrument mix.
Another combination of instruments used at the local scale is the land improve- Land improvement
syndicatement syndicate. P. Weber et al. (2011) have shown the various positive effects
that can result from the instrument’s use: inclusion of all stakeholders (private and
public), majority decision-making which imposes a high degree of constraint, redis-
tributive aspects such as better localisation of construction, and the financing of land
service through the added economic value resulting from zoning. One case where this
instrument is implemented is presented in section 5.2 in chapter 5.
30The soil sealing tax had been previously introduced in the 2010 proposal of a land development
act, which would have substituted the current spatial planning act. However, it was rejected during
the consultation procedure.
31Ordonnance du 22 août 2012 sur les résidences secondaires, SR 702.
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This overview on the effects of existing (re-) distributive instruments shows the limited
role redistributive instruments play until now in (Swiss) land use policy. However,
contractual arrangements, and the combination of instruments, constitute alternative
ways to apply a redistributive dimension to land use policy processes. Hence, beyond
the existing instruments’ use, the more general question of the allocation of resources
(how much value is created and who benefits from it) has to be considered.
This overview on the effects of instruments’ has also shown the difficulty of valu-
ing ecological aspects of soil, because of the different time scales which apply to
legal-financial and natural interactions, and because of the difficulties linked with the
restoration of ecological values. In fact, one central contradiction appears in at least
partial opposition to economic and ecological values.
2.3.2.4 Political administrative arrangement
The political administrative arrangement designates "the competent authorities and
administrative services (public actors) as well as all of the other institutional rules
specific to the implementation of a policy" (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 159), including
the competencies of the different public actors, and the policy resources available for
policy implementation. In this section, I go beyond the institutional rules specific to
land use planning and soil protection policies and present two general characteristics
of the Swiss political system that, as I intend to show, play a significant role in
the attribution, modification, and withdrawal of rights to soil: communal autonomy
(Horber-Papazian, 2006) and fiscal federalism (Wälti, 2003).
With this aim of presenting two generalities regarding the Swiss political system,
it is relevant to begin with the competencies of the different government levels in
the land use planning and soil protection policies (section 2.3.2.4), in order to show
who is responsible for what. From this point, the focus is on a case law review that
synthesises past conflicts internal to the political administrative arrangement in order
to grasp the scope of intrevention of different levels of government in implementation
processes (section 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.2.4).
Competencies of government levels
In order to make the competencies of each government level more explicit, table
2.12 summarises the competencies of each level level in land use planning and soil
protection policies. Following comments can be made:
− land use planning policy is, compared to soil protection policy, strongly decent-
ralised: whereas land use planning is a communal competency that has been
progressively framed by cantonal and federal laws, soil protection has been initi-
ated as a federal competency whose implementation is delegated to the cantons;
− at regional level, land use planning competencies are rather limited. Only the
canton of Berne has defined regional perimeters, introduced formal bodies com-
posed of elected delegates from the communes who can formally adopt regional
development plans. The Canton of Vaud does not have a formal regional level.
However, master plans for several communes or agglomerations can be elabor-
ated on a legally not formalised inter-communal level (please refer to section
2.3.3.1 for additional information);
− threshold levels of soil protection policy are fixed at the federal level, and de-
termine if and what action has to be taken in case they are exceeded. In land
use planning, federal directives set the threshold levels that determine the size
of building zones since 2014 (ARE, 2014), but the choice of the corresponding
demographic scenario is made by the canton and the cantons are only account-
able to the Confederation for a global building zone quota (see also section
2.3.3.2 for additional information).
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Communal autonomy in a general legal perspective
Whereas the old Federal Constitution (until 1999) only sparsely referred to communalLimited relationship
between Confederation
and communes
autonomy, the current one guarantees it within the limits set by cantonal law32.
According to R. Kägi-Diener (2008), the reason leading to this change was the will
of politicians close to the Swiss union of cities, to foster the role of the commune as
a member of the federal State and as a partner at two other State levels. Currently,
this partnership remains separated in two parts: between the federal State and the
cantons, and between the cantons and the communes. The federal State is supposed
to involve the communes in earlier stages of the decision-making process in order to
respond to growing internationalisation of society and the economy.
A infringement of communal autonomy is subject to constitutional complaint33.Limited judicial control
In order to respect cantonal competence in defining communal autonomy, the Federal
Court only checks the arbitrariness of implementation of cantonal law (Kägi-Diener,
2008, 930): they ensure that the cantonal enactment is based on serious objective
reasons, not severely incoherent or frivolous (Tschannen and Zimmerli, 2005, 166).
Communal autonomy in land use planning
In regard to land use planning, federal law states that the planning authorities haveWide decisional
autonomy for the
communes
to grant to subordinate authorities the needed discretion to fulfil their obligations34.
This guarantee also figures in the Bernese cantonal construction law, where the discre-
tion granted to subordinate authorities (communes, prefects), communal autonomy
and individual freedom, in terms of construction, can be restrained only when public
interest (Gemeinwohl) requires it35. Furthermore, article 65 BauG states that the
communes are, within the limits of the law, free to define their own building regu-
lations. In case they fail to do so, the cantonal authority can refuse their approval,
set a deadline for adapting them, and then act through substitutive execution. In
the Canton of Vaud, the land use planning and constructions act contains similar
dispositions (Bovay et al., 2010, 13): art. 2 and 26 LATC mentions that the canton
has to grant the communes the required discretion to fulfil their tasks. Thus, the
cantons can only intervene if the land use planning matter is of regional or cantonal
competency or importance – an issue determined by law, or when a commune does
not fulfil its planning obligations36.
Both in Berne and Vaud, few cases of opposition to a cantonal decision by aFew judicial conflicts
between canton and
communes
commune can be cited37. Most cases concern effective uses of zones, the conformity
of building or exploitation permits to zoning regulations (with the exception of land
hoarding, which had not been a legal issue until 2014). In matters of zone uses,
communes enjoy wide decisional discretion within the limits of superior law. They
are allowed to define their own zones and regulations, and also to interpret the norms
which they decree, as long as their argument is legally defensible38.
One of the few Bernese cases where a conflict emerged, dates from 1988: theLimited cantonal
intrusiveness canton established a reserved zone39 in the middle of a constructed area still being
used for agriculture. The cantonal goal was to impose a higher density for future
constructions in the concerned area of the commune. The commune contested the
cantonal decision, arguing that it unduly restricted its autonomy, and the court ruled
that the establishment of a reserved zone in this area contradicted the purpose of
32Art. 50 par. 1 Cst, SR 101.
33Art. 189 par. 1 let. e Cst, SR 101.
34Art. 2 and 3 SPA, SR 700.
35Art. 54 par. 3 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
36As examples of tasks of regional or cantonal importance, one can mention the cantonal compet-
ence of delivering building permits outside of the building zone, and the definition of cantonal waste
storage sites. On this matter, see ATF 117 Ia 352.
37Cases where the canton opposes a communal decision are handled by administrative land use
planning procedures. The conflict becomes judicial only if the commune opposes a cantonal decision
(for example if the canton refuses communal building regulations submitted for approval), or if the
cantonal spatial planning office appeals against the decision of a cantonal court (art. 34 SPA).
38BVR 2000.109.
39A reserved zone (Planungszone) is a localised restriction prohibiting any use that could hamper
the future use of the concerned perimeter. It is used temporarily while the regular zoning and
building regulations are being modified.
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a reserved zone, (which is to protect agricultural land), as well as the decisional
autonomy of the commune40.
A similar case can be mentioned in Vaud, where the densification of a zone for
single family homes was opposed by a commune against the will of three landowners.
The cantonal tribunal took a position in favour of the owners, arguing that their
location within Lausanne’s agglomeration spoke in favour of higher densities. Never-
theless, the federal Tribunal rejected the cantonal tribunal’s decision, arguing that it
was beyond its jurisdiction to impose a higher density on such a limited amount of
plots, and that the effective gains in terms of density were negligible41.
Another case42 recently opposed the federal spatial planning office, ARE, and Federal zoning
moratoriumCanton Vaud: the federal office appealed the cantonal decision to extend a local
development plan by 4 hectares into the 25 hectare industrial zone. This plan was
established on agricultural land as part of the cropland protection plan. The federal
intervention took place at a very specific moment: since the entry into force of the
revised federal spatial planning act in 2014, the cantons have been subject to a zoning
moratorium: they are obliged to compensate any extension of building zone for an
equivalent zoned surface. The moratorium applies until the cantons have revised their
land use planning legislation and meet the new federal requirements.
However, the canton can exert an important control on the definition of new com- Cantonal population
growth criteriamunal building zones which do not conform to demographic growth objectives. For
example, in 2012, the cantonal tribunal of the canton of Vaud rejected a landowner’s
appeal against the communal rejection of a local development plan that would have
created excessive building zones for a commune as compared with the expected pop-
ulation growth43.
In general, the hierarchy of plans is a central element of Swiss land use planning Hierarchy of plans
policy. The cantonal structure plans (see section 2.3.3) are based on the obligations
defined in federal law and on the federal sectoral plans such as the cropland protection
plan (see section 2.3.2.3). They are approved by the federal authorities. Communal
and regional plans have to conform to the cantonal structure plan and are approved
by cantonal authorities. In turn, building permits follow the communal structure
and zoning plan or development plans, and are approved by the commune (or by the
cantonal authority (prefects in the canton of Bern) for rural communes).
This legal review shows the wide autonomy that communes in the cantons Berne and
Vaud have in matters of land use policy. Until 2014, cantonal authorities could only
stop excessive zoning pretensions formulated after the entry into force of cantonal
land use planning legislation in 1985. Federal control is limited to gross infringement
of federal prescriptions, such as a zoning moratorium, and to the approval of cantonal
structure plans, which are more reflective of the development aspirations of a can-
ton than effective policy targets. However, since 2014, cantonal structure plans are
required to include the sum of communal building zones and their future evolution
according to a federal calculation technique (see section 2.3.3.1).
Fiscal federalism
Fiscal federalism is relevant for the present research, because it is a factor that con- Communal primacy
tributes to explaining the attractiveness of a given area and sets general conditions
under which the financial levies exposed in table 2.9 can be used as capture tools. In
accordance with the subsidiarity principle44, each canton and commune can, within
the limits of the law, determine their own tax rates. The Constitution states that the
Confederation sets out harmonisation principles on direct taxes imposed by the three
government levels45. In matters of land property, federal law obliges the cantons to
collect a wealth tax and a real estate gains tax. But the far-reaching cantonal and
40BGE 114 Ia 295.
41ATF 137 II 23.
42AC.2014.0345.
43AC.2012.0093.
44Art. 5a and art. 47 Cst, SR 101.
45Art. 129 Cst, SR 101; Tax harmonisation act of 14 December 1990 DTHA, SR 642.14.
74 of 327
Policy design of the resource soil
communal autonomy grants them the competence to fix the tax rate on income and
property, which amounts to 70% of the total tax paid by citizens (Ladner, 2010).
In order to limit the negative effects of tax competition, such as the reductionSimultaneous competition
and per-equation of public services, the redistribution of tax burdens between different socio-economic
groups (rich and mobile vs. poor and immobile), and the creation of loopholes, an
equalisation formula redistributes funds between the cantons according to various
criteria (Brülhart, 2014b). In practice, it means that the cantons of Bern and Vaud
do not benefit in the same way from the equalisation formula (EFV, 2015): in 2015,
both cantons had an absolute fiscal potential of 23 billions francs, but because canton
Bern has 260,000 more inhabitants than canton Vaud, Bern is the biggest beneficiary
of the equalisation in absolute terms, whereas Vaud is a net contributor.
Despite the per-equation, the increase in government activities and legal restric-Joint-decision trap
tions on the federal level have led to an increased mix and spillover of policy regulation,
financing and implementation across government levels (Ladner, 2010), blurring the
division of tasks.
Further, the federal conception of the tax system has led to a general fiscal com-Reduced mobilisation of
fiscal instruments over
time
petition between cantons and communes. In his study of the Swiss tax systems, R.
Daﬄon (2015) synthesises the consequences of fiscal federalism and changes over time
as follows:
− from 1960 to 2013, the horizontal fiscal competition has led to a general decrease
of corporate and income tax rates;
− despite the decreasing tax rate, the overall produce generated by corporate and
income tax has increased due to economic growth (increase of the number of
contributors, increase of revenues of individuals and of profits of companies);
− a tax rate reduction by one canton has been generally mimed by neighbour
cantons (in order to keep the same tax rate difference), which has led to an
erosion of the entities’ fiscal basis, without allowing regional redistribution of
tax revenues (through the relocation of companies for example);
− a harmonisation effect: despite competition, the modalities of taxation used by
cantons have become more similar;
− a centralisation effect: over time, the tax yield benefiting the Confederation has
increased.
In terms of policy instruments’ use, these trends can be interpreted as a reduced
mobilisation of fiscal instruments over time, and as a reduced amount of fiscal revenues
available to communes, if these are not able to attract economic and/or demographic
growth.
2.3.2.5 Procedural elements
The fifth layer of the political administrative program contains the procedural ele-
ments, including the administrative procedures, specific forms of interactions, as well
as the general legal provisions authorities must respect when interacting with each
other, and with those affected by public intervention (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 161).
Procedural elements also include legal remedies granted to actors concerned by en-
vironmental policies in order to oppose or support public decisions taken during the
implementation process. The procedural elements of environmental policies include
three types of procedures (Knoepfel et al., 2010, 125): control procedures (control of
implementation of legal norms), authorisation procedures (for example, for polluting
activities), and remediation procedures (for contaminated sites). The means of actor
intervention can be divided into two broad categories: general public information and
consultation procedures, and legal remedies granted to specific groups. As P. Knoep-
fel et al. (2010) notice, the right of appeal granted to environmental organisations in
the implementation of environmental law is a procedural rule that has increased the
intervention of environmental policies on economic development.
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Land use planning Soil protection
− Public information on, and participa-
tion in, land use planning procedures
(art. 4 SPA);
− Designation of dedicated authorit-
ies who examine and coordinate the
approval procedures of development
plans and building permit (art. 25a
and 26 SPA);
− Public enquiry on development plans
and other cantonal and federal en-
forcement provisions; right of ap-
peal against these provisions (art.
33 SPA);
− Right of appeal of environmental
organisations (art. 55 EPA; art. 12
NCHAa);
− Conciliation procedure when the can-
tonal structure plan cannot be ap-
proved by federal authorities (art. 12
SPA);
− Cantonal right of appeal against:
compensation due to property right
restrictions, communal zoning de-
cisions, building permit issues with
construction located outside the
building zone (art. 34 SPA);
− Right of appeal of the federal agricul-
ture office against decisions concern-
ing surfaces protected by the cropland
protection plan (art. 34 par. 3 SPA).
− Obligation to assess the environ-
mental impact of installations sus-
ceptible to modification, (notably
the environment), and report on the
assessment (art. 10a EPA; art. 12
NCHA);
− Principle of information transpar-
ency regarding the environment, as
well as energy related to the envir-
onment (art. 10g EPA);
− Publicity of the register of polluted
soils (art. 32c par. 2 EPA), inform-
ation of the landowner prior to the
inscription of their plot into the re-
gister (art. 5 par. 2 CSO);
− Right of appeal of environmental
organisations against the installation
and introduction of organisms (art.
55ff EPA);
− Right of appeal of federal and com-
munal authorities against decisions
taken by cantonal or federal offices
(art. 56f EPA);
− Expropriation right, applicable if
required by the implementation of
the law (art. 58 EPA);
− Mutual information between levels
of government (art. 41a EPA; art. 3
par. 2 SoilPO);
− Cantons are in charge of surveillance
measure (art. 4 par. 3 SoilPO).
Table 2.13: Procedural elements of Swiss land use planning and soil protection
policies.
aFederal act of 1 July 1966 on the protection of nature and cultural heritage NCHA, SR 451.
The four layers (objectives, evaluative elements, political administrative arrangements
and procedural elements) of the political administrative program of land use planning
and soil protection policies have set the aims and conditions of State intervention on
the resource soil from a quantitative (soil consumption or development through land
use planning) and qualitative perspective (preservation of soil functions through soil
protection). However, these elements do not directly make clear how land uses and
values are determined. It is necessary to discuss the layer that this thesis places at
the centre of attention: policy instruments.
2.3.3 Action plans
Section 2.3.2.4 on the political administrative arrangement has shown the high degree
of decentralisation of Swiss land use policy. However, during the last decade, land
use planning regulation has increased and the communal margin of manoeuvrability
has been reduced. These changes have not occurred through a formal transfer of
competencies, but rather through the progressive introduction of action plans. P.
Knoepfel et al. (2011, 198) defines action plans as a "set of planning decisions con-
sidered as necessary for the coordinated and targeted production of administrative
services (outputs)"; they are "management instruments" used at infra-national level
as intermediate implementation acts. In order to grasp the importance of these action
plans for the management of the resource soil, the current section presents the main
action plans initiated during the past twenty years in land use planning policy:
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− the cantonal structure plan as overarching action plan, and the underlying cal-
culation scheme for the dimensioning of building zones;
− regional global transport and settlement plans (canton Berne), agglomeration
and inter-communal master plans (cantons of Berne and Vaud);
− action plans to control excessive ambient air pollution levels.
The cantonal structure plan is a planning document elaborated by cantonal au-Cantonal structure plan
thorities showing the current state of spatial development and the state of development
they seek to achieve over 15 years. It also shows which activities with spatial impacts
are not coordinated yet, what authorities will do about it, and which activities could
have an important impact on land use planning, but are not defined precisely enough
in order to be coordinated46. In canton Bern, the structure plan is adopted by the
cantonal executive body, whereas in canton Vaud, it is adopted by the cantonal le-
gislative body. The structure plan is composed of several sets of measures that aim
to steer urbanisation and transport, create the necessary conditions for economic de-
velopment, protect nature, and foster cooperation between authorities (in particular
between the cantonal administration and communes).
2.3.3.1 Dimension of building zones
The calculation scheme for building zones is a tool introduced in 2014 by the Confed-Calculation scheme for
building zone
dimensioning
eration that allows for the calculation of the surface of building zones each commune
needs for development in the near future. It is based on art. 15 par. 1 SPA which
states that building zones dedicated to housing have to meet the foreseeable needs of
the next fifteen years. Following parameters are taken into account47:
− the current population, which is multiplied by a cantonal population growth
factor based on demographic forecasts from the Federal statistical Office;
− the prognosticated population growth is multiplied by a median surface con-
sumption rate per person48
With the new federal calculation method introduced in 2014, a cantonal land useMargin of
manoeuvrability remains
high
coefficient – a ratio between the sum of communal building zone capacities and demo-
graphic and jobs forecasts49 – is used for determining future building zone needs. It is
similar to the former Bernese calculation method, because it relies on a median value
of surface use per inhabitant, (which is in fact a density coefficient based on the socio-
economic characteristics of the commune), and on federal demographic prognostics.
However, this technique allows cross-communal and cross-cantonal comparison, which
is intended to provide incentives for cantonal and communal authorities to conform
to legislation (Flückiger, 2014, 49). According to Flückiger (2014, 90ff), the directives
can be appraised as follows:
− only three types of zones are taken into account in the calculation of the correct
building zone dimension50, which excludes land consuming activities, such as
economic development areas and tourist areas from the calculus;
− the cantonal land use coefficient as sum of communal host capacities in the three
different zones taken into consideration does not reflect the real size of building
zones;
46Art. 5 SPO, SR 700.1.
47Art. 30 SPO, SR 700.1.
48This surface consumption rate depends on the type of commune (determined by the typology
elaborated by the Federal statistical office (FSO)) and on the type of zone (housing, mixed, central).
For the Bernese calculation method that applied prior to the 2014 spatial planning act revision,
please refer to section 4.1 in chapter 4.
49Building zone capacity is to be understood as the amount of inhabitants and jobs a defined
surface of building zone can host. One job is considered to be equivalent in terms of surface to one
inhabitant.
50Nevertheless, these three zones account for 70 % of all building zones and host 79 % of all
inhabitants and jobs.
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− a wide margin of manoeuvrability is left to the cantons, as no absolute limits in
terms of surface or density are determined by federal law (e.g. minimum density
coefficient). Only the median density of each category of communes51 is used
as a relative limit;
– in this sense, the current Bernese calculation method is stricter, as it fixes
an absolute minimum density coefficient;
– instead of the median density value as reference value, one could have also
taken the top quartile as reference value;
– no solution is provided for the problem of the location of the building zones;
− the cantons are free to opt for optimistic demographic scenarios, leaving a wide
margin of manoeuvrability when calculating the correct size of building zones;
– as the case studies’ analysis in chapter 4 shows, the use of a single cantonal
growth scenario is also problematic, as it attributes equal zoning rights to
communes with opposite demographic evolutions;
− the restriction of urban sprawl is limited to the reproduction of past urbanisation
patterns: low density communes will remain low density, whereas a densification
process in the centres can be relevant for all communes;
– however, limits of urbanisation, valid for 20 to 25 years, have to be defined
in the cantonal structure plan;
− cantons and communes can define their building zones below the required ca-
pacity necessary to face employment and demographic changes.
2.3.3.2 Agglomeration programs
Other types of action plans which have played a central role over the last decade, Nested action plans
are the agglomeration programs developed by cities in reaction to the 2001 federal
agglomeration policy. The federal levy for contemporary urban value creation and
potential redistribution was provided 6 billion francs, to be allocated to the cities’
most effective programs. The possibility to obtain up to 40% of federal funding for
development of transport infrastructure and mobility networks led to the elaboration
of entire master plans for agglomerations including hundreds of transport and urban
development measures, a realisation schedule, regular updates on the progress of im-
plementation, etc. (i.e. agglomeration programs). In the agglomeration of Lausanne,
the urban perimeter (where two of this thesis case studies are located: see chapter 5),
a set of action plans at different scales has been elaborated and approved by ad-hoc
inter-communal bodies:
− the most comprehensive one is the agglomeration’s master plan Projet d’agglom-
ération Lausanne Morges PALM, which has been handed in to the Confederation
in order to obtain federal funding. Once approved, a contract between Confed-
eration and canton has been signed which lists the measures to be taken, the
schedule of realisation and the financial contribution of the Confederation;
− on inter-communal level, the PALM has been subdivided into four sectors cov-
ering each one part of the agglomeration, so called schémas directeurs. They
provide a higher degree of detail in targeting the perimeters subject to urban-
isation and/or transportation measures and are also co-signed by the mayors of
the involved communes;
− the perimeters subject to transformations have been further planned by a set of
chantiers d’étude and master plans. These are the results of planning and archi-
tectural competitions, approved by the concerned landowners and the mayors of
the communes concerned. Like all previous action plans, these were submitted
to public hearing.
51Categories defined by the typology of the communes used by the FSO.
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The cases of Malley and Cheseaux in chapter 5 analyse the role of these plans in
the land use policy implementation process. Compared to regular land use planning
procedures, the ad-hoc inter-communal bodies and their adopted plans have restruc-
tured the land use policy coordination and implementation process: as opposed to
regular land use planning procedures, where a commune (or the canton) submits a de-
velopment project to cantonal authorities, and the plan is adopted by the communal
legislative body, the agglomeration master plans have been signed only by the com-
munes’ mayors and cantonal representatives (as well as landowners for the small-scale
plans), reviewed by the canton and by the Confederation. Once approved, cantonal
and communal authorities proceed to the required legal changes (adoption of new
zoning and development plans and vote on various lines of credit corresponding to
the planned transport and urban development measures). But the choice to realise
the urbanisation and transportation measures has already been made, because the
federal funding is conditioned on the realisation of these measures.
These changes in the coordination and implementation of urbanisation and trans-Emergence of a functional
regulatory space port means that the political administrative arrangement has been modified in order
to span several policy sectors (urban planning and transport), several institutional
territories (27 communes in the agglomeration of Lausanne), and three levels of gov-
ernment. The emergence of such "new form of State action" is comparable to what
F. Varone et al. refers to as functional regulatory space (Varone et al., 2013).
A similar and institutionally more profound transformation has occurred in can-Bernese regional
governance ton Berne, where the elaboration of agglomeration programs was placed under the
purview of the canton. In 2011, they were integrated to regional global transport
and settlement plans called Regionale Gesamtverkehr- und Siedlungskonzepte RGSK
(Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012). As opposed to agglomeration pro-
grams which focussed on cities and their suburbs, global transport and settlement
plans cover an entire region. In 2012, the global transport and settlement plans were
integrated into a new institutional structure: the regional conferences. The principle
of these regional structures was approved by a popular vote on the cantonal level in
2007. These conferences are public law structures with a set of competences, such as
the elaboration of the regional structure plan and a transport and settlement plan
(RGSK). The regional conferences can also treat matters linked with culture, regional
politics or energy policy. They constitute a new political and institutional structure,
as they have an executive and a legislative body composed of all the communes within
their perimeter. Members have voting rights proportionate to the population of their
commune and can adopt lines of credit for the tasks they fulfil (which is not the case
in canton Vaud). Their perimeter is based on the administrative regions which have
been defined by the Canton.
An additional action plan that steered the development of the agglomeration ofAir pollution control
Lausanne is the one including measures to control excessive ambient air pollution
levels. Due to excessive imissions of nitrogen dioxide, a set of binding measures for
authorities were instituted. These concern the development of public transport and
environment-friendly mobility, the reduction of motorised individual vehicles through
speed and parking constraints, the reduction of energy needs for buildings, and the
optimisation of use of heavy goods vehicles (Etat de Vaud, 2005). The compatibility of
the agglomeration’s master plan qualified with the measures foreseen by the OAPC52.
However, as Knoepfel et al. (2010, 291) note, the overall effects of these plans have
been limited by their lack of mandatory constraints on the polluters.
The increase of action plans in land use policy over the years, shows the growingEach plan has its function
regulation of activities with spatial impacts and coordination between and across
communal boundaries. The cantonal structure plan aims to set long-term objectives
and general development trends that the vast majority of actors can agree on. Project-
bound action plans are meant to coordinate and stabilise the expectancies of the
involved actors, and thus enhance the projects’ technical, environmental, financial,
and social feasibility. Action plans already define the areas subject to future changes
and can set broad zoning options and density ranges, two elements which greatly
52SR 814.318.142.1.
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influence economic and ecological outcomes.
At the same time, these action plans also create an obstacle to popular control, A new form of State
actionbecause, unlike zoning or local development plans, only some of them are adopted by
a formal legislative body (canton Vaud’s structure plan is adopted by the cantonal
parliament, and Bern’s regional plans by the regional conference, if the latter exists).
Part of the explanation lies in their recent introduction, which faces an institutional
vacuum: for the first time in Swiss land use policy, zoning intentions have been defined
on the regional level. The regular land use planning procedure (used for communal
plans and building regulations) was not feasible, because it would have required all
communal legislative bodies to vote on and approve the regional plan. As of 2016,
only the canton of Berne has created a fourth institutional level in Switzerland.
Considered from the angle of (economic) value and policy instruments, action plans Centralisation and
anticipation of
decision-making
are management instruments with indirect impact on landowners’ rights and thus, on
value. They allow anticipation and coordination of land use changes by proposing new
uses, densities, transportation network configurations, and redefining public spaces,
in a chosen perimeter. They do not include any legally binding measure for landown-
ers, but authorities (and landowners) refer to them in the subsequent elaboration of
local development plans. This reference shows a decisional shift where communal
legally binding instruments are preceded by inter-communal or cantonal non-binding
instruments which already set forth broad land use options and expectable economic
value.
2.3.4 Output and local regulatory arrangement
Beyond the ecological, legal, economic, and technical-mechanical aspects of soil man-
agement, there are actors with strategies and resources, who implement the rules
and shape the results of public action. This section presents theoretical political-
sociological aspects which offer explanations for actors’ behaviour in policy imple-
mentation processes and for the observed gap between the political administrative
program, action plans, policy outputs, and the concrete economic and ecological re-
distributive effects on the resource soil.
The actors involved in the implementation processes are defined by the fact that Potentially a wide
number of actors...their behaviours contribute to the structure of the studied object (Friedberg, 1997,
209). Therefore, "every individual or social group concerned by the collective problem
addressed by a policy can be considered as a potential actor capable of being part of
the "arena"" (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 40). Referring to literature from political science
and sociology (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Lascoumes, 1990; Bourdieu, 1986; Aubin,
2011), R. Schweizer (2015, 139) deconstructs the policy making process (the political
games played by actors) into three elements:
− their configuration (who takes part in the game);
− their power relations and the policy resources they have (which cards do they
hold?);
− the strategies they pursue (what do they want to achieve?).
The triangle of actors (exposed in section 2.3.1) accounts for the actors involved ...pursuing a strategy...
in (or excluded from) the political games. The resources which actors possess (or not)
and use (or not) account for the cards they hold. R. Schweizer (2015) identifies five
ideal typical law activation strategies that actors can adopt:
− concretisation/implementation: strategy to implement a rule as closely as pos-
sible to its intent;
− innovation/complementation: strategy to develop an ad-hoc solution that goes
beyond what is provided by law.
− passivity: strategy not to act, or not to refer to an existing rule;
− circumvention: strategy to resist the implementation of a rule by invoking an-
other rule, or simply not implementing it;
− diversion: strategy to activate a rule for other means than intended by the rule;
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Actors’ strategies have been studied and defined in various ways (Crozier and
Friedberg, 1977; Scharpf, 1997; Jessop, 2001). For the purpose of this research, I use
the bridging definition of strategy given by R. Schweizer (2015, 140): "the intentional
conduct by which actors evaluate, select and constantly adapt the course of their
action to their environment, and to the behaviours of other actors". According to the
author, "the gaps between legal rules and environmental outcomes are the result of
political processes, within which actors adopt competing strategies with regards to
the rules that structure their action" (Schweizer, 2015, 133). Hence, actors’ strategies
contribute to explaining the outcome of political processes. The author identifies five
dimensions inherent to all strategies:
− intention: actors opt for a strategy based on specific intentions, or references
and motivations. These can be ambiguous or contradictory and do not have
have to be (economically) rational;
− selection: actors chose among various courses of action;
− dynamism: the chosen strategy evolves constantly, based on changes in the
actor’s perception, beliefs and anticipation, unforeseen events, and other actors’
behaviour;
− interaction: strategies consist of relational exchanges and are linked to the dy-
namics of power and domination, two elements where actors’ capacities are not
equivalent;
− environment: the context in which strategies are pursued is internalised and
weighed by the actors, and determines their behaviours.
The actors are endowed with policy resources that they can produce, manage,...and endowed with
policy resources exploit, combine, substitute or even exchange in order to gain influence on the process
of public policy implementation (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 63). Figure 2.3 shows the ten
policy resources as identified by the authors53:
Infra-
structure
Force
Law
Personnel
Money
Information
Organisation
Consensus
Time
Political
support
Management of resources
(production, combination, 
conservation and substitution)
Figure 2.3: Policy resources according to Knoepfel et al. (2011).
The type of law activation strategy chosen, as well as the policy resources availableLocal regulatory
arrangement
53An extensive literature review of existing resources’ typologies has been done by Knoepfel (2017).
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to actors, affects the negotiation process. The result of the actors’ configuration (who
is present?), of the strategies they pursue (what do they do?) and of the resources
they use (how do they do it?) is formalised in the policy output (Knoepfel et al.,
2011, 206), the "end products of the political-administrative processes which, as part
of the scope of its implementation, are individually aimed at the members of the
defined affected groups". Because this output is the result of political games between
the political-administrative authorities and the policy’s target group on an issue in
a given situation or specific place and in a specific moment in time, it is referred to
as a local regulatory arrangement (Schweizer, 2015; Bréthaut, 2013; Aubin, 2008). It
can contain formal and informal rules (Bréthaut, 2013). As opposed to the "rules
in use" defined by E. Ostrom (1990, 47), the local regulatory arrangement does not
require the crafting of new institutions in order to overcome the regulation problem;
it reflects the temporary compromise that actors have agreed upon. Based on the
strategies of actors that have been "successful", the local regulatory arrangement can
be qualified according to the five ideal-types used in order to qualify the strategies
adopted: implementation, innovation, passivity, circumvention, diversion. The local
regulatory arrangement helps to explain, on a local scale (commune, development
project), the cooperation mechanisms set up to reinforce or weaken the existing policy
design (Knoepfel et al., 2001, 342).
Institutional constraints to actors’ behaviours
It should not be forgotten that the explanatory capacity granted to actors’ behaviours
and resources is also conditioned by institutional and organisational factors. In this
regard, an analysis conducted on the strategies of big landowners in Switzerland
(communes, the Swiss railways, banks and pension funds, the Swiss army) provides a
set of insights (Nahrath et al., 2009a,b):
− the organisational characteristics of the landowner reflects the internal decision
rules applying to the owner’s land property strategy:
– organisations with a fragmented power structure and an important veto
position by a legislative body face more difficulties to implement a coher-
ent, reactive and effective land property strategy than organisations with
centralised or outsourced competences;
– actors who struggle to pursue their strategy and cannot guarantee their
use rights through land markets compensate their difficulties by influencing
public policy arenas; they also proceed to a reorganisation of their internal
division of competences (see previous point);
− the organisations’ types and objectives influence the orientation of the organ-
isations’ land management strategy:
– communes that combine a public policy approach through zoning and a
property rights approach through ownership are granted a wide margin
of manoeuvrability in urban development projects, but face risks of ad-
verse effects such as poorly located urbanisation, public land speculation,
discontinuity of public action if the political majority changes;
– there is an increased use of public policy by private landowners seeking to
guarantee their soil use rights. This is partially due to (1) the increase of
land prices that put a strain on the actors’ budget and to (2) the (relatively)
reduced return on investment provided by formal property;
− the organisations’ land management strategy influences effective land uses:
– actors (managers and tenants) increasingly rely on indirect property titles
(shares of companies owning the land);
– substitution of the traditional patrimonial conception of property through
spatially distributed and temporally unstable relationships with investors;
– landowners can circumvent the rules if they don’t fit their own objectives,
if their attempt to influence zoning has failed or if planners do not succeed
in imposing their rules on the landowners;
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These results underscore the complexity of (democratic) decision procedures facedA margin of
manoeuvrability does
exist
by public authorities in the implementation of the policy design of soil. By contrast,
one can see that public and private landowners, developers or investors look for in-
creased flexibility when dealing with land property. Independently of the owner, the
use of both private and public law appears to be common in order to achieve the de-
sired outcome. In case the interests of the involved parties diverge too strongly, one
can observe circumventions of the established rules. A coherent research framework
for our study needs to take into account the margin of manoeuvrability possessed by
actors, and how they use it to achieve their goals (de Buren, 2014, 117f).
The present section has shown that beyond the legal context, the type of actors
involved and their interactions, the resources they have in order to reach their goals,
and the strategies they pursue, influence the policy output, which characterises a
temporary arrangement for the implementation of various regulations applying to a
specific local situation. The arrangement’s degree of coerciveness and discrimination
produces, in a further step, economic and ecological effects. I hypothesise that the
(expected) creation and redistribution of economic value plays a central role in the
negotiation of these arrangements. And because policy instruments are means by
which economic and ecological values are created and redistributed, the conditions
and modalities of their implementation constitute, together with the policy resources
of the actors, the core means actors use in order to achieve their goals.
2.4 Legal incoherences
Prior to the presentation of the analytical framework appearing to offer the most
adapted tools for the analysis of the management of the resource soil, it is necessary
to review a set of elements that have been outlined in this chapter, and have played a
central role in understanding past and present issues of soil management in Switzer-
land. Further, I need to situate the contribution of this thesis within the wide range
of literature presented in this chapter.
2.4.1 Guarantee of property and material expropriation
The most central incoherence in the legal dispositions is between the guarantee ofA Swiss specificity
property as defined by the Civil code and the Constitution, and the compensation
mechanism in case of material expropriation (Nahrath, 2003). The notion of material
expropriation is typical of the Swiss context (Jomini, 2008): as opposed to formal
expropriation where the landowner loses their property title, a material expropriation
is linked with a public intervention (by the canton or the commune) where the owner
loses the ability to make an economically valuable use of its property. The payment of
compensation for material expropriation has to be claimed in court by the landowner.
As A. Jomini (2008) states, lawful acts of the State are normally not subject toNo compensation of
lawful acts compensation, except in cases explicitly foreseen by the law. With the constitutional
revision of 1969, land use planning and private property were both integrated into
the federal constitution, the latter together with a paragraph stating the requirement
to fully compensate restrictions to property. With the adoption of the federal spatial
planning act in 1979, the compensation principle is reiterated in the spatial planning
act:
"A fair compensation is granted when land use planning measures restrict
the property right in a way equivalent to an expropriation."54
The political compromise from 1969, reiterated in the 1979 spatial planning act,Compensation criteria
left two questions open:
1. the source of the funds to be used for paying compensation in cases of material
expropriation: after the referendum against the first spatial planning act in
54Art. 5 par. 2 SPA, SR 700. Own translation.
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1974, the act adopted in 1979 no longer demanded a mandatory compensatory
mechanism, but left the choice of implementing the instrument to the cantons.
Since 1979, only a small minority of cantons implemented the tax on added land
value created through zoning, (mandatory only since 2014). Most communes
did and do not have the financial means to pay potential compensation, which
has restrained authorities’ use of the zoning instrument, and leaves unanswered
the question of the financial means available for compensation;
2. the conditions under which compensation is due: the federal legislator delegated
to the courts the responsibility to define the conditions under which a landowner
whose rights to the economic valuation of his plot had been restricted could
claim compensation. The criteria defined by case law are (Moor, 1982; Jäger,
2006)55:
− there is a restriction of use rights, generally the right to development;
− this restriction applies on a present use or on a use that will occur in the
foreseeable future; it can be the consequence of a zone change (building
zone to agricultural or protected zone), of patrimonial protection measures,
or various other reasons, but not due to police restrictions, (such as the
prohibition to build in an avalanche corridor);
− the plot is located in a building zone compliant with federal law:
– if the building zone in the communal zoning plan is sized according to
the commune’s needs for the next fifteen years56, the situation is con-
sidered an effective “out-zoning” (déclassement – Auszonung) which
can lead to compensation;
– if the communal zoning plan does not comply with federal law, the situ-
ation is classified as "non-zoning" (non-classement – Nicht-Einzonung);
− when the restriction is adopted, the plot is legally constructible57, connec-
ted to the sewer, it does not require clearance or the adoption of a local
development plan;
Material expropriation was conceived as an incentive for the landowner to comply Landowners won three
timeswith the zoning plan (Ruegg, 2000, 15). The persistent problem of oversized, un-
developed building zones shows that the carrot did not work as intended. Landowners
benefited from the situation in two ways:
1. their property received a substantial added value if zoned as building zone;
2. they were not required to pay a tax (except the real estate gains tax in case of
alienation);
3. they are also constitutionally protected against the reduced value their property
would suffer if it is zoned.
In 2014, the tax on added land value created through zoning was reintroduced as a Compensation issue
remains acutecompensatory instrument whose gains are primarily to be used for compensations58.
But the question of the availability of funds for compensation remains salient for
several reasons:
− since 2014, there has been a moratorium on all building zone extensions in
place until the adoption of the cantonal structure plan as new federal law (or
an obligation to compensate the building zone extension by a building zone
reduction of the same surface);
− as a consequence, the cantons will not have the necessary funds to proceed to
the necessary zoning for several years, because this requires the accumulation of
funds through several extensions of the building zone prior to any “out-zoning”;
55See also ATF 91 I 329.
56Art. 15 par. 1 SPA, SR 700.
57ATF 105 Ia 330.
58art. 5 par. 2 SPA, SR 700.
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− only a portion of the funds accumulated are collected on a cantonal scale (at
least in the canton of Berne and Vaud), because communes and canton share
the tax revenue. In case compensation is due, the question of the amount paid
by each level of government still needs to be solved;
− the cantonal definition of the instrument (or the lack of a cantonal per-equation
for funds dedicated to compensations) is problematic, because of the unequal
distribution of oversized building zones between cantons (e.g. urban cantons
like Geneva compared with rural cantons like Valais and Fribourg). As such,
cross-cantonal payment of compensations are not possible;
− finally, even with available funds, the correct dimension and location of building
zones remains uncertain, because of the high reluctance of communes to proceed
to “out-zoning” operations (see the cases of Huttwil and Cheseaux);
Until 2014, landowners often successfully opposed public intervention, as the re-
lation between unconditional private ownership and increasingly restrictive public
intervention remained ambiguous (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2014, 771). It is not cur-
rently possible to anticipate if and how the problem of oversized and badly located
building zones will be solved.
2.4.2 Economic freedom and sustainability
Another wider problem of coherence is linked with the constitutional principle ofThe balance of interests
sustainability59, which is also a core concept of spatial planning (Mahaim, 2014,
121). The finite character of the resource soil and its non-renewability (or limited
re-usability) makes the economic use of soil (mesurée – haushälterisch) the guiding
principle of its use and implies a shift towards a resource oriented (environmental)
law (Mahaim, 2014, 139). The incoherence between economic freedom and sustain-
ability materialises, for example, when the cropland protection plan and the regional
economic promotion collide (see for example the case of Niederbipp, section 4.3 in
chapter 4).
With the adoption of the revised Constitution in 1999, both sustainability andEconomic freedom and
resource management land use planning have become more closely integrated. Currently, this restriction is
not conceived as an absolute limitation, but as an equilibrium between nature and
its use by humans. However, the balance of interests is often checked when the "com-
petitiveness" criteria stemming from economic freedom is taken into consideration:
according to J.-B. Zufferey (2001), this distortion is acceptable as long as the primary
aim of the land use planning measure is not of economic nature. However, the specific
nature of soil – the fact that it is not an ordinary commodity (it cannot be destroyed
and a plot’s location has unique attributes)– creates de facto a distortion of competi-
tion (Mahaim, 2014, 181) and turns every land use planning measure into a restriction
of economic freedom60. The inverse is that economic freedom becomes reality only
through the land use planning process itself, which grants a place to exercise this
freedom.
The question, therefore, is the relevant degree of economic freedom needed to
implement sustainable resource management. In order to establish this limit, con-
sideration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainability are
necessary, and, based on a set of criteria, a movement towards a balance of interests
(Mahaim, 2014, 173ff). This precision of this balance of interests justifies the import-
ance of studying redistributive processes in land use policy. The hypothesis underlying
the research of this thesis is that a more sustainable solution requires a limitation of
the expected value of the economic, social and environmental dimensions, (the redis-
tribution of the created value– particularly the economic one), in order to achieve this
balance.
59Art. 2 and 73 Cst, SR 101.
60ATF 99 Ia 604.
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2.4.3 Economic promotion and land use policy
Economic promotion occurs primarily through cantonal and communal initiatives
(Waltert et al., 2010): authorities advertise in neighbour countries, and advise and
financially support the creation of new companies or the extension of existing ones
within their territory. Economic promotion plays a significant role in land use policy,
because it is correlated with the development of open land and the extension of
industrial land (Waltert et al., 2010, 42). Although industrial land accounts for a
small portion of urbanised surfaces, it has grown substantially over the last decades
(FSO, 2014a).
Between 2005 and 2015, canton Bern budgeted 11 million francs per year for
economic promotion. Until 1997, canton Bern combined economic promotion with a
land fund, which provided land to interested companies61. The latter was dissolved
in 2008 (Kanton Bern, 2012).
In 2007, canton Vaud dedicated 6 million francs to similar tasks (Canton of Vaud,
2009b). in 2015, 17.5 million francs were budgeted for deposits and direct financing of
investments in industrial production, research and development, and 11 million francs
of subventions to private companies were paid (Canton of Vaud, 2016).
In combination with economic promotion, both cantons defined priority devel-
opment areas, which aim to develop pre-defined perimeters for industrial or other
economic activities. These building zone extensions, much like zones dedicated to
employment in general, were often zoned by the canton or were under cantonal super-
vision, and, until the 2014 spatial planning act revision, not included in the calculation
of the building zone needs of the next fifteen years (Kanton Bern (2011, 35,57) and
Canton de Vaud (2013, 198ff)).
2.4.4 Grandfather clause
The grandfather clause (Besitzstandsgarantie – garantie des droits acquis) is a legal
principle embedded in the constitutional order. It relies on the guarantee of own-
ership (art. 26 Cst) and the principle of non-retroactivity of legislation: according
to the Federal tribunal62, in land use planning issues, the grandfather clause limits
the implementation of more restrictive legal dispositions (compared to former law)
to cases where an important public interest exists and as long as the principle of
proportionality is preserved.
Cantonal legislation on the application of the principle differs: canton Vaud allows
the renovation of existing buildings as long as buildings meet the purpose of the
zone they are located in; however, they prohibit the extension or reconstruction of
existing construction. Canton Bern allows for the transformation and extension of
existing construction, as long as these works do not increase the illegal character of
the construction in question.
The grandfather clause implies that a reduction of use rights is limited to specific
cases in which public interest requires such reduction, and that any case potentially
implying a redistribution of access and use rights requires compensation. However, as
it was shown earlier, in the case of material expropriation, the payment of compensa-
tion depends on a set of criteria whose fulfilment is to be considered individually for
each case.
2.4.5 Acuteness of redistributive issues
Existing research on economic and/or ecological value redistribution and its effects Primacy of economic
approacheson soil uses are rarely centred on redistributive issues. As section 2.3.2.3 on the in-
struments’ effects has shown, several research areas exist. A significant amount of
the research in Switzerland stems from economics and focus on market or incentive-
based instruments such as transferable development rights and the land service tax
(Winkler, 2005; Gmünder, 2004; Cavailhès et al., 2004; Süess and Gmünder, 2005;
McConnell et al., 2007; Gmünder, 2010; Menghini, 2013). Legal scholars have studied
the legal compatibility of such instruments within the existing legal framework (Epi-
ney, 2003). Another research area we have drawn attention to deals with ecological
61Art. 17 of the Wirtschaftsförderungsgesetz vom 12. März 1997, SR-BE 901.1.
62ATF 113 Ia 119.
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compensation mechanisms. Their authors primarily take an economic approach and
tend to focus on the instruments’ mechanism, rather than on legal or actor-bound
aspects (Napoléone and Geniaux, 2011; Napoléone and Calvet, 2013; Chabran and
Napoléone, 2012).
Other redistributive instruments such as land readjustments or the land improve-Analysis of single
instruments ment syndicate have also been analysed from a planning perspective: research has
shown that these instruments can be used as a value capture tool (van der Krabben
and Needham, 2008), but also to supply land for development at the right time and
place (Weber et al., 2011).
Apart from instrumental research, socio-political approaches to urban projects
(Pinson, 2004; Pflieger, 2013a) emphasise changing actors’ dynamics in urban renewal
processes. The Swiss legal framework that characterises the management of the re-
source soil, its evolution and effects have already been analysed in detail (Nahrath,
2003).
The research gap I intend to address consists of a combination of approachesThe research gap I intend
to fill through a legal, economic, and socio-political analysis of the actors’ use of (com-
bined) public and private law instruments, and of these uses’ redistributive effects
in terms of economic and ecological added and reduced values. In recent years, eco-
nomists have increasingly dealt with the question of the allocation of resources. But
resource (re-) allocation is determined by the State. This makes the question of re-
distribution a more fundamental question of power: allocation and redistribution of
value is achieved through political processes in which actors fight in order to obtain
their share. Economics explains the allocation of resources through the price system,
but limits the analysis to a comparison between a current situation and a more de-
sirable situation, which is supposed to be achieved with specific types of instruments.
But prior to suggesting market-ready solutions for power issues, it is necessary to
reveal what the actors’ negotiations on and surrounding soil or land are about. Re-
distributive issues linked to soil, but also more generally to wealth, are more acute
than ever in the twenty-first century(Piketty, 2013, 247f). Swiss legislative changes
have set objectives for coming closer to a sustainable use of resource soil. The project
within which this thesis is written aims to provide knowledge on past and potential
achievements in regard to the resource’s use, and provide insights on what does and
does not work, how it works, and what effects it produces. The present thesis tackles
this challenge by analysing past actors’ behaviours and interactions regarding exist-
ing policy instruments, and the effects produced in terms of economic and ecological
value redistribution.
2.5 Institutional resource regime
2.5.1 Institutional economics and public policy analysis com-
bined
Section 2.3 on public policy and section 2.2 on property rights and economics have
shown that public and private law are relevant in order to understand how actors’
uses of the resource soil is framed by legal institutions. Further, in order to explain
the produce of State intervention and fill existing literature gaps, policy instrument
scholars have emphasised the importance of considering instruments’ mixes as well as
indirect forms of public action (Peters, 2005).
As P. Knoepfel et al. (2007, 471) argue, public policy analysis gives us the toolsA resource oriented
approach to analyse State intervention and products (political-administrative program, action
plans, outputs, effects) as well as conceptualise joint resource uses (different users with
different uses of the same resource). But it also tends to neglect the various policies’
potentially opposed influences on the use of a natural resource and ignore general
market and State regulations. Further, a public policy perspective only marginally
considers the disposal and use rights linked with property titles, (which are at the
core of institutional economics), together with notions of the goods and services that
a natural resource provides. Notions of exclusion and subtractability are central to
the Ostromian conception of natural resource (Ostrom, 1990, 30ff). Through the
combination of both approaches, the institutional resource regime (IRR) framework
diagnoses the current state of regulation on a resource system: it analyses the causal
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relationships between the institutional setting, the actors who own and/or use the
resource, and the goods and services derived from the resource (Nahrath, 2003, 28).
Further, the IRR framework allows for the integration of the three main concep-
tions of sustainability (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 460ff):
− traditional environmental policies, which restrict the emission of pollutants,
without any consideration of the absorption capacity of the resource. In the
case of the resource soil, the absence of absorption capacity of the resource is
conveyed by the obligation to dimension the building zones according to future
needs, focussing on development needs and neglecting others;
− sustainability policies: regulate the sustainable use of the goods and services
produced by the resource, and "take for granted that it is possible to obtain a
sufficient quantity of resource units in the form of goods and services; yet this
is far from evident." (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 462). In the case of resource soil, an
example of how this conception applies is found in the agglomeration programs,
which coordinate housing and employment with the transport infrastructure
(see also the discussion of the empirical findings in chapter 6);
− the sustainable development postulate, which focusses on the reproductive capa-
city of the resource via the definition of a global quota: this conception requires
the definition of an extractable amount of resource units in a given time and
space that do not threaten the renewal of the resource (Knoepfel et al., 2007,
465). In the case of the resource soil, this conception applies for example to
natural and biodiverse areas or close-circuit farming land.
As shown in figure 2.4, the institutional resource regime framework distinguishes Combination of private
and public law elementstwo sources of regulation:
1. the property rights system, which is defined as "all of the formal property rights,
as well as all of the rights of disposal and use arising from them, that apply
to a resource" (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 481). Property rights define the rules
of ownership on the resource and the appropriation of the goods and services
derived from it;
2. the policy design: the sum of "the substantial and institutional elements relat-
ive to the programming and implementation of all use and protection policies
affecting the management of a resource." (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 475). Public
policies influence the rules of ownership and appropriation of the goods and
services derived from it by defining use rights, regulating the access to the re-
source for non-owners, and imposing exploitation and/or protection constraints
(Varone and Nahrath, 2014).
Based on this twofold distinction, the framework proposes four modes of regulation Four modes of regulation
which apply to users and/or owners of a natural resource (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 478ff):
1. regulation through public policies without repercussions on property rights, e.g.
through informational or incentive-based instruments such as, subsidies, taxes,
or minor prescriptions (i.e. limits between construction);
2. regulation through public policies with repercussions on property rights, (for
example zoning and or building regulations), which prohibit certain uses and
limit the dimensions of construction;
3. regulation through the definition of the use and disposal rights inherent to prop-
erty: this was the case with the introduction of condominium property in 1965;
the prohibition of acquisition of agricultural land by non-farmers; easements;
4. regulation through the definition of the structure of distribution of property
titles (definition /change of the rights holder): it includes contractual agree-
ments such as sale and acquisition, but also expropriation, nationalisation or
privatisation of property titles.
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Figure 2.4: Institutional resource regime framework combining regulation by the
policy design and the property rights system (Gerber et al., 2009).
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These four modes of regulation allow for the classification of the instruments af- Four types of instruments
fecting soil users and owners. Table 2.14 shows how and if instruments impact use
and disposal rights of a resource. The first logical observation is that private law
instruments re-define property rights with an impact on the scope and content of use
or disposal rights (3) or by re-defining the structure of distribution of property title
(4); public law instruments work through policies with (2) or without (1) impact on
use and disposal rights.
As table 2.14 shows, a wide range of public policy instruments do not impact Few public policy
instruments impacting
disposal rights
use and disposal rights, although one could argue that the various tax instruments
can, in specific cases, force the owners to sell if they do not have the necessary funds
to pay the tax on added value created through zoning. One instrument, the land
improvement syndicate, combines two methods of intervention – public policies and
property rights – joined in a public law legal basis. Another element is that a couple
of instruments are anchored both in private and public law, (such as mortgages,
or concessions). Other instruments that modify disposal rights are only anchored in
public law, such as pre-emption right (in Canton Geneva only). The rail and property
development models, or more generally public private partnerships, entail a mix of
instruments composed of both public (zoning, plot ratio, development obligations)
and private law (concession, building right, contracts) instruments that can cover the
four modes of intervention. Their impact on value creation and redistribution depends
on the modalities negotiated between authorities and landowner/developer (Pflieger,
2013a).
Private law instruments use a contractual basis: they mix obligation and voluntary Instrument mix as
turnkey solution?agreements. They allow definition of most various restrictions on private property,
as long as they do not contradict public policies. To mention a few examples: an
emption right can oblige the landowner to provide a given use (development, land
service) within a given period of time, easements can oblige the landowner to provide
a right of way or pipes on their plot; a building right can oblige the lease holder to use
the land for a specific use (craft activities, social housing, etc.) and at a fixed price.
Private law instruments offer a full range of possibilities that do not exist in public
law. The increased mix of instruments in development projects constitute a basis in
order to formulate hypotheses on authorities’ use and combination of instruments in
the implementation of land use policy.
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Land exchange X
Land buy/sale X
Restriction of acquisition X
of agricultural land
Repurchase right X
Emption right X
Preemption right X
Easement X
Building right X
Land betterment X
Real burden X
Gift/donation X
(Legal) Mortgage X
Mortgage certificate X
Encroachment X
Right for pipes, right of way, X
right to use a water source
Usufruct X
Zoning/local development plan X
Building regulations X X
Land valuation X
Inventories of sites X
Cropland protection plan X
Expropriation X X
State pre-emption X
Building permit X
Environmental impact assessment X
Surveillance and investigation obligation X
Remediation obligation X
Prohibition to introduce polluting substances X
Mandatory land service and sewer connection X
Maximum emission and imission values X
Groundwater protection areas X
Land improvement syndicate X X
Concession X
Wealth tax X
Real estate gains tax X
Land property income tax X
Land tax X
Land use steering tax X
Tax on added land value created through zon-
ing
X
(Extended) Land service tax X
Waste disposal tax X
Economic promotion X
Home ownership subsidies X
Subsidies for contaminated sites X
Public hearing X
Self-control of producers X
Polluter pays principle X
Table 2.14: Impact of land use policy instruments on soil use and/or disposal rights.
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2.5.2 Qualification of the institutional regime of soil
The two sources of regulation – public policies and private law – create coordination
issues and require the resolution of contradictions between legal sources, as well as
within legal sources. In order to characterise institutional resource regimes, the au-
thors distinguish three criteria (Knoepfel et al., 2007; Gerber et al., 2009; Dupuis and
Knoepfel, 2015):
− coherence refers to the degree of clarity and coordination between the regulations
of the regime. One can distinguish between:
– internal coherence of the policy design: the coordination between public
policies which govern the use and protection of the resource considered;
– internal coherence of the property rights system: "the clarity of the defin-
ition of the property titles or the use rights arising from them" (Knoepfel
et al., 2007, 487);
– the external coherence between the policy design and the property rights
system refers to the connection between the target group of the public
policy and the holders of rights as defined in the property rights system;
− extent refers to the "proportion of goods and services regulated in relation to
those actually in use" (Gerber et al., 2009, 805), a criterion that allows for the
assessment of which goods and services derived from the resource are currently
regulated (or not);
− strictness "is a measure of the coercive force represented by the institutional
regime. A strict regime has a considerable number of obligations that impose
defined and detailed behavioural norms [...]. [It] leaves little scope for manoeuv-
rability to the actors of the management process [...] [and] has the advantage
of being more predictable and comparable." (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015, 25f).
This strictness can be observed within a public policy when it comes to the link
between the objectives of a policy, the instruments that are foreseen and their
effects on the target group, as well as between public policy and property rights,
(for example when public policies lack coercive power to actually restrict the
use rights of users on a resource).
Until 2014, the Swiss institutional regime of soil could be qualified as complex 2014 legal revision
enhances the regime’s
coherence
(Nahrath, 2003, 178):
− the extent of the regime is wide, as most soil use is both quantitatively and
qualitatively regulated. The 2014 revision introduced a cantonal building zone
quota defining the overall amount of surfaces of unbuilt building zone available
to each canton for development during the next fifteen years. These quotas
gave a higher precision to the 15 years rule established in 1979. Over time,
increasing use of both the underground and the air have challenged the vertical
limits to property. These limits remained vague until recently, and now pose
new regulatory challenges (Carrel, 2015);
− before 2014, the regime’s coherence was moderate, because there was no man-
datory coordination between property rights (or the principle of compensation
in cases of material expropriation) and land use policy. Since the 2014 revision
of the spatial planning act, the regime’s coherence can be qualified as moderate:
the missing link between property rights and land use policy has been filled,
but at the cantonal level, which prohibits the proper relocation of zones across
cantons. Further, the increase in public policies pose additional restrictions on
soil use rights and blur the link between target groups and property title, as well
as use-right holders (Nahrath, 2003, 178). Considering the acuteness of redis-
tributive issues discussed in the previous section (2.4), the question of coherence
should be reconsidered from the angle of value and its appropriation;
− in terms of strictness, actors have various policy resources and instruments at
hand, and can adopt various strategies. Depending on the regime’s strictness,
there are various ways to implement regulation, and actors might follow one
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Figure 2.5: Coherence, extent and strictness of the institutional resource regime the-
oretical framework (Gerber et al., 2009; Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015).
or another, depending on the predictability of the outcome, the coerciveness of
implementation (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015), and the margin of manoeuvrab-
ility at their disposal (de Buren, 2014). This recent theoretical addition to the
resource regime framework has been analysed by Dupuis and Knoepfel (2015)
for the policy of contaminated sites; the institutional regime of soil still needs
this analysis.
Both before and after the 2014 spatial planning act revision, the institutional
regime of soil qualifies as complex, because it uses and goods and services derived
from the natural resource regulated by a set of public policies and property rights
that pursue partially contradictory objectives and do not prevent an overexploitation
of the resource. Although the 2014 revision has resolved some contradictions, the
question of redistribution is more acute then ever.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a set of ecological, legal, economic and political
explanatory factors that constitute the theoretical framework of this research. The
main insights gained through this review of the literature can by synthesised as follows:
1. ecological knowledge on soil displays a lack of consensus in the literature on
how to measure the ecological value of soil, not just because the creation of a
synthetic indicator is highly complex, but also due to the fact that the soil’s
ecological value depends upon the services it provides to humans, which change
over time. Further, certain land use are practically irreversible, because the re-
newable dimension of soil takes place on a completely different time scale than
those of human interactions. However, one rather easy, measurable criteria to
assess the ecological value of soil in a generic/polar way exists: its consumption,
seen through its development or sealing. For polluted soils, the degree of pollu-
tion (according to the legally defined maximum values or the possible spread of
pollution) can function as an assessment tool;
2. the legal basis of property are central to analysing land use, because they reflect
and define how society currently conceives soil, (primarily as a commodity),
and how the use and appropriation of this commodity is regulated, exchanged
(through a market) and valued beyond its use (through a mortgage);
3. economic theory has provided a set of explanations on the specificity of the
resource analysed: the differential and residual attributes of rent make land a
specific good compared to other commodities. In addition to the exchangeable
and mortgageable characteristics of the property title, it confers the capacity to
appropriate rent on its owner. Hedonic pricing models have provided a set of
explanatory variables seeking to justify the price of land;
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4. public policy analysis has shown the emergence and the evolution of the public
problems that regulations on soil intend to solve. The three public problems all
contain redistributive implications, in terms of economic and ecological value,
an angle from which (policy) instruments are considered and possess the two
analytical dimensions that this thesis uses to assess the effects of land use policy
processes. Further, the concept of local regulatory arrangement allows for qual-
ification of the output of the policy process by comparing the results of actors’
games to the legally defined objectives.
5. instrumental theory has shown that the tools are at the core of public and private
action and that the study of their characteristics, of their implementation and
withholding by actors, can provide fruitful insights on actors’ privileged types
or combinations of instruments, and on the effects produced in reality. Further,
their situation in the implementation process – "between" authorities and the
policy’s target group –, constitutes a fruitful field of research for political science,
because it allows for the unveiling of how public policy results are produced;
6. the analysis of the main conflicting issues in the soil’s regulations has shown
that certain contradictions have been reduced over time, but others, more fun-
damental ones, have been brought to the centre of attention: the link between
economic freedom and land use regulations, as well as general redistributive
issues and ecological problems (i.e. the loss of fertile soils, biodiversity and
subsequent climate change);
7. the institutional resource regime framework has proven to be the framework
most adapted for considering the entire legal setting regulating the resource soil:
it combines a property rights approach focussing on the resource’s disposal and
use rights, and a public policy approach that considers all public policies regulat-
ing the studied resource. By adding an analysis of actors’ games, strategies and
the policy instruments they mobilise, and the resources they use and exchange,
I have a robust theoretical setting for formulating hypotheses and analysing the
empirical findings of the case studies.
Having set in place the cornerstones of the analysis, the next chapter presents
the consolidated conceptual framework adopted, and the hypotheses I formulated.
These elements constitute the scaffold for the conduct of the empirical analysis and
the comparison of the results obtained.
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Conceptual framework,
hypotheses and methodology
Answering the research questions defined in the introduction with the help of the
theoretical elements exposed in the literature review (chapter 2) requires the definition
of conceptual framework (figure 3.1), the definition of research hypotheses (section
3.2), and the elaboration of the methodological approach (section 3.3) which guides
data collection and analysis.
3.1 Conceptual framework
A precise definition of the research object requires us to set a starting and an ending
point for the analysis. The research process first consisted of categorising the dy-
namics behind land use policy in distinct steps. Relying on conceptualisations of the
policy cycle (Parsons, 1995; Knoepfel et al., 2011), as well as on existing literature on
Swiss land use planning and environmental policies (Nahrath, 2003; Knoepfel et al.,
2010), I categorised soil related policies in four broad steps: the definition of a public
problem, the programming of a public policy, the implementation of the policy, and
its evaluation.
Second, based on existing research on Swiss land use planning and environmental
policies, I identified past and existing public problems linked with soil (see section 2.3).
Their variety required to concentrate on a reduced number of issues persistent in time,
which would also be present in the different perimeters to be analysed (see section
3.3.1). Based on existing research on land use policy in the Swiss context (Jaeger
et al., 2008; Schwick et al., 2013; Nahrath, 2003, 2005; Nahrath et al., 2009a; Knoepfel
and Nahrath, 2014; Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015), I opted for an analysis focussing
on economic and ecological value redistribution. In a political science perspective,
the focus on redistributive stakes put actors at the center of the analysis, because
redistribution questions the winners and losers of public policy processes (Knoepfel
et al., 2011, 60). Focussing on the redistribution allows to narrow the analysis to
the implementation stage, when public-administrative authorities intervene on target
groups in order to modify their behaviour. Another possibility would have been
to focus on the programming of public policies (Linder and Peters, 1989; Varone,
1998), which would reflect actors’ perceptions on the instruments’ potential effects and
explain the choice of instruments. The perspective adopted here aims to understand
in detail policy instruments’ use in the field and explain the arrangements negotiated
with target groups (see section 2.3.2.3). Consequently, the implementation stage is
the main step to be analysed.
Third, in order to explain the phenomenons to be observed, the analytical frame-
work to be set up has to account for various elements, as the literature review in
chapter 2 suggests: the institutional setting embedding policy processes (Gerber et al.,
2009; Radaelli et al., 2012; Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2013), contextual factors that
condition the uses of land plots (Sirmans et al., 2005; Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005),
actors, their resources and interactions (Knoepfel et al., 2011), and the results pro-
duced by the policy process (Bussmann et al., 1997; Salamon, 2002). The combination
of these elements allow to elaborate a new conceptual framework to be used in this
Conceptual framework, hypotheses and methodology
thesis (figure 3.1). Reading from the right to the left – moving the causal chain up-
wards –, the conceptual framework (figure 3.1) is composed of the following variables:
Dependent variables
In policy evaluation literature (Bussmann et al., 1997; European court of auditors, The LRA as gap between
policy objectives and
outcomes
2015), consequences of the political processes on target groups and end beneficiaries
are often referred to as impacts and outcomes. I consider outcomes or expected
outcomes – in case these only exist in the form of a binding output – in order to
measure the potential gap between policy objectives and the results of implementation
processes (Schweizer, 2015, 142)1. The measurement of this gap has been at the centre
of research using the institutional regime (IRR) framework (Dupuis and Knoepfel,
2015; Schweizer, 2014; Bréthaut, 2012; de Buren, 2014). Referring to R. Schweizer
(2015, 142), the concept of local regulatory arrangements (LRA) is used in order
to qualify this potential gap based on five ideal-types: innovation, concretisation,
passivity, diversion, circumvention.
Beyond the policy implementation outcomes that allow us to characterise the LRA, 6 features of value
redistributionI define the variable "redistributive effects" in order to describe the value transfers
that occur between actors. I classified the redistributive effects into features that
characterise theoretically and empirically identified aspects of value redistribution
(see table 3.1 below): the redistribution among actors refers to the actors identified
by policy analysis, the spatial dimension refers to the geographical implications of
value redistribution, the value dimensions refer to transfers among ecological and
economic value dimensions.
I focus on the economic and ecological dimensions of value, in accordance with the
main public problems linked to land use policy since the 1970’s (see their successive
definitions in section 2.3.1). Other dimensions of value, such as social and cultural
dimensions, are considered indirectly: redistributive effects across actors analyses the
redistribution of economic value, that is to say capital flows, between actors. These
capital flows are then reinvested in order to achieve land use change, which in turn
impact other value dimensions: the provision of housing, employment, and sports
facilities create social value, nature protection or restoration creates ecological value,
public infrastructure such as schools, museums, and theatres create cultural value.
In other words, the behavioural change of actors induced by the analysed land use
policy processes impacts a variety of public problems meant to be solved. Taking
into consideration these behavioural changes (such as the provision of housing, or
the construction of a museum) allows to account for the impacts on the social and
cultural value dimensions.
I hypothesises that for the intermediate variable the redistributive effects create Feedback loop as
anticipated effectsa feedback loop, because actors expect these redistributive effects and negotiate the
arrangement continuously during the implementation process in order to minimise
them. The dashed arrows that connect the redistributive effects with the independent
variables are less observable feedback loops, which represent the redistributive effects’
longer-term influence on the model’s explanatory factors.
The "definition of the public problem" stage is not represented in the conceptual How do tools impact the
program’s functioning?framework, because it is defined prior to the public policies that constitute the in-
stitutional regime of soil. However, for purposes of understanding, it is described in
the case studies (chapters 4 and 5) and sketched in the cases’ summaries (chapter 6).
As suggested by L. Salamon and Lund (1989, 40f), the goal is not to test the theory
behind the program, but to identify whether the program utilises mechanisms that
allow to test the program’s theory.
Intermediary variables
The intermediary variable "actors’ configuration, instruments’ use and strategies" con-
stitutes the core of the analysis, because it determines the implementation of rules
(institutional regime) in a given context (contextual factors). It is composed of three
elements:
1Please refer to chapter 2 for a presentation of policy objectives (section 2.3.2.1) and of the policy
outputs (section 2.3.4).
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1. the actors involved in the implementation of the institutional regime’s public
policies, and their position in the institutional implementation process. Their
configuration varies depending on the implementation process analysed. The
involved actors are: the political administrative arrangement, the target groups,
the third parties (winners and losers), and the end beneficiaries;
2. the strategies of these actors, the objectives they pursue as compared to policy
goals, and how they pursue these objectives. As analogy to the output of each
political process (the local regulatory arrangement), the strategies adopted by
actors can be qualified according to five dimensions;
3. the type of instruments they use and the resources they have (or lack ), mobilise
(or not), and exchange (or not) in order to achieve their goals.
Independent variables
The variable "institutional regime of soil" contains all public and private law regula-Regime as marginally
varying variable tions that apply to the management of the soil natural resource. This "variable" only
marginally varies, because the institutional context is similar in the cases analysed.
However, it serves as a point of reference for variations observed in the local regulatory
arrangements. Further, I put a particular emphasis on the type of instruments used to
regulate the actors’ use and disposal rights on the resource, because these instruments
influence the actors’ games, the local regulatory arrangement and the redistributive
effects of the implementation process. As seen in chapter 2, theory distinguishes four
different types of instruments, depending on their legal basis (public or private law)
and their effects on the use and/or disposal rights of the resource users and owners
(Gerber et al., 2009). The variable is independent, because the institutional regime is
considered a contextual element of particular importance in a political system based
on the rule of law (Gerber et al., 2009). Further, from an institutional perspective,
these rules change marginally over longer periods of time.
The variable "contextual factors" contain various explanatory factors provided byLong time factors
the literature, such as: past demographic evolution, land prices, the ecological value
of soil and its physical structure, available transport infrastructure, travel distances
to centres and locational characteristics derived from hedonic models (Sirmans et al.,
2005). These factors are given elements which either change marginally, or over
periods of time that exceed those of individual policy implementation processes.
The chosen approach focusses on the implementation of instruments and on the gamesChoice of a functional
perspective actors play in the course of negotiating local regulatory arrangements. I opt for a
functional perspective that defines instrument as a tool to achieve policy objectives.
Based on the political construction of the public problem to be solved (the lack of
coordination between the diversity of uses and user groups that hampers a quant-
itative protection of soil), I study in given contexts how public and private actors,
that have specific resources and are embedded in power relations, interact with the
existing institutional regime of soil in order to fulfil, innovate, circumvent, or divert
land use policy objectives. The results of these interactions are summed up in local
regulatory arrangements, i.e. the policy output specific to chosen land use planning
processes. These arrangements produce redistributive effects that I categorise along
a set of theoretically and empirically defined features.
Based on the conceptual framework exposed in figure 3.1, table 3.1 presents anSummary of the
variables’
operationalisation
operationalisation of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Except for the
redistributive features, which are commented on in chapter 6, the variables’ indicators
have already been detailed in the theoretical framework (chapter 2). Therefore, I do
not comment on them further here.
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Variable Indicator
Second dependent variable – redistributive effects
Across actors: Economic value redistributed among political-administrative
authorities, target groups, end beneficiaries, and/or third
parties: who benefited or lost from the added and reduced
values created in by the redistributive process’ LRA
Across policies: Economic value redistributed among policies and property
rights that constitute the institutional regime of soil: what
policy or property right created, reduced, or redistributed
value to what other policy or property right
Across space: Spatial relocation of economic or ecological value, exten-
sion and/or reduction of the perimeter affected by the LRA
(contiguous plots or not, or plots in the same or in another
commune)
Across scales: Capture and/or distribution of economic value between
levels of government
Across time: Duration of the redistributive effects: punctual, for a de-
termined time period, permanent
Across value
dimensions:
Redistribution of economic, ecological or social value to an-
other value dimension(s)
Dependent variable
Local regulatory
arrangement:
Comparison between the institutional regime’s rules and
objectives and the (expected) outcomes of their implement-
ation and qualified according to five ideal-types (Schweizer,
2015): implementation, innovation, passivity, circumvention,
or diversion
Intermediary variables
Actors, coalitions
and oppositions:
Identification of actors with common or diverging object-
ives and/or strategies, providing support to each other or
involved in a conflict
Actors’ strategies: Identification of the means chosen in order to achieve their
objectives
Policy resources: Identified lack, mobilisation, or exchange of one or several
policy resources out of the ten resources defined by Knoep-
fel et al. (2011). In order to avoid the overlap between the
resource "law" and policy instruments, I limit the content of
the resource to opposition and appeal procedures.
Policy in-
struments:
Identification of the instruments mobilised in the policy pro-
cess. The instruments include the implementation of the
resource "law" on the target groups, with the exception of
opposition and appeal procedures.
Independent variables
Institutional
regime of soil:
Public policy and private law regulations that apply to the
resource soil (Gerber et al., 2009) and their incoherences
Instruments type: Classification of available policy instruments according to
their impact on use and disposal rights (Gerber et al., 2009)
Contextual
factors:
Demographic evolution, land prices, ecological value of soil
and its composition, connection to transport infrastructure,
location
Table 3.1: Operationalisation of the conceptual framework’s variables.
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3.2 Hypotheses
Based on the conceptual framework (figure 3.1) and the arrows that connect the
different variables used, I define a set of hypotheses which constitute the scaffold of
the theoretical framework and subsequent analysis.
H1: Effects of the institutional resource regime of soil on the
LRA
The first hypothesis is derived from the classic institutional regime hypothesis drawn Derivate of the IRR’s
main hypothesisfrom Gerber et al. (2009), which conceives that an integrated regime is a neces-
sary condition for a sustainable management of the natural resource analysed. The
hypothesis adopted here focusses on the link between the independent variable "insti-
tutional regime" and the policy output (LRA) produced:
H1: If the institutional regime of soil is simple or complex, then the LRA
consists in a passive implementation, circumvention, or diversion of land
use policy objectives. This can be explained by the high margin of man-
oeuvrability that a simple or complex regime grants to actors in the im-
plementation of existing rules. Actors use this margin of manoeuvrability
in order to achieve their own specific goals that do not match federal
objectives.
Considering the ideal-typical classification of the Swiss institutional regime of soil Solely deviating LRAs?
exposed in the theoretical chapter – a complex regime (Nahrath, 2003), the observed
local regulatory arrangements should predominantly consist of passive implementa-
tion, circumvention, or diversion of the objectives of the institutional regime of soil.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the first hypothesis: it postulates that the margin of man-
oeuvrability possessed by actors is inversely proportionate to the degree of integration
of the institutional regime.
Institutional regime
Margin of maneuverability
-      Integration     +
Figure 3.2: Degree of regime integration and margin of manoeuvrability of actors
(de Buren, 2014, 104).
H2: Effects of contextual factors on the LRA
The second hypothesis aims to assess the general impact of contextual factors (demo-
graphy, land prices, soil pollution, transport infrastructure, and distance to centres)
on land use policy processes. These factors are assessed as a bundle, because I do
not aim to quantify their individual explanatory power, but rather extract relevant
contextual characteristics in the studied processes which potentially play a role in all
processes.
H2: If there is stagnation of demography and land prices in the local con-
text, a low degree of access to transport infrastructure, and a significant
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distance to urban centres, then the LRA consists of passive implementa-
tion, circumvention, or diversion, of the institutional regime of soil. This
can be explained by the limited economic value that authorities can create
through zoning and use in land use policy processes.
Conversely, a local context where demography and land prices increase,
where soil structure is adequate (not steep, stable, and not polluted),
where accessibility is high and distance to centres low, the LRA consists
of an implementation or innovation of land use policy objectives.
H3a: Effects of property structure on instrument use
Hypothesis H3a establishes a link between a contextual factor, the property structure,
and the strategy and instruments’ use by the actors. The idea is that, depending
on the property structure, public authorities and target groups will develop specific
strategies and define the modalities of the instruments they use in specific ways.
H3a postulates a link between the property structure on which the land use policy
process takes place, and the type of instruments that authorities mobilise in order to
implement land use policy goals:
H3a: If the property structure is highly fragmented or unordered, then au-
thorities combine public law and property rights instruments to redistrib-
ute value. This can be understood through the constitutional requirement
to treat all target groups equally.
H3b: Effects of "information" on instrument use
H3b postulates a link between the policy resource "information" possessed by au-
thorities or target groups (and the fact that it may or may not be shared with the
other party), and the elaboration of a joint strategy in order to implement land use
policy goals. This hypothesis has two parts: one hypothesising a joint strategy and
instrument implementation (in case authorities and target groups share information);
the other hypothesising diverging strategies and instrument implementation involving
conflict (in case authorities or target groups do not share information). The hypo-
thesis is formulated as follows:
H3b: If the resource information is shared between authorities and the
target group, then these actors define a joint strategy and establish to-
gether the modalities of the instruments’ use. This can be explained by
the reduced power asymmetry between actors and by the enhanced (pub-
lic) accessibility of the shared resource, which compels actors to find a
compromise.
H3c: Effects of public "infrastructure" on instrument use
H3c postulates a link between the policy resource "infrastructure" possessed by au-
thorities, and the strategy and instruments’ uses adopted by authorities:
H3c: If the resource "infrastructure" owned by authorities is involved in a
land use policy process, then authorities tend to define their strategy and
the modalities of the instruments’ uses in accordance with the resource’s
uses they seek. This can be explained by their double role as both regulator
and owner of the resource soil.
H4a: Effects of sole public policy instruments on the LRA
The third hypothesis goes into greater detail than H1: instead of referring broadly toInstrument mix as
condition of policy
implementation
the institutional regime of soil, it focusses on the type of instruments used by author-
ities. The general hypothesis underlying the instrument types’ effects on the LRA, is
that only a combination of different instrument types allows for the implementation
of the institutional regime of soil. In order to test the hypothesis, the analysed re-
distributive processes are divided among those which involve only type 1 and type 2
instruments (H4a), and those that involve a mix of different instrument types(H4b).
As a reminder:
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− type 1 instruments are public policy instruments that do not impact use or
disposal rights;
− type 2 instruments are public policy instruments that have an impact on use
and/or disposal rights;
− type 3 instruments are property right instruments that impact use and disposal
rights;
− type 4 instruments are property right instruments that impact the distribution
of property titles.
Hypothesis H4a is formulated as follows:
H4a: If authorities only use type 1 and type 2 instruments, then they will
not implement the institutional regime of soil. This can be explained by
the limited strictness and the incoherences of the institutional regime of
soil, which grants to actors a significant margin of manoeuvrability for the
implementation of public policy instruments.
H4b: Effects of instrument mix on the LRA
Based on the distinctions between type 1/2 and type 3/4 instruments referred to, I
now test the effects of the analysed processes that involve a mix of different instrument
types on the LRA:
H4b: If authorities combine different types of instruments, then they will
be able to implement the institutional regime of soil. This can be ex-
plained through the additional restrictions and/or obligations that these
instruments impose on landowners, which allow for the enhancement of the
institutional regime’s strictness and for the reduction of its incoherences.
H5a: Redistributive effects of public policy instruments
The general hypothesis underlying the redistributive effects of policy instruments is
that only a mix of instruments allows for the redistribution of value. In order to test
the hypothesis, the redistributive processes analysed are divided among only those
that involve type 1 and type 2 instruments (H5a), and those that involve a mix of
different instrument types (H5b).
H5a is formulated as follows:
If authorities use solely type 1 and type 2 instruments, then they do not
redistribute value. This can be explained by the complex institutional
regime that does not provide authorities with the necessary tools to impose
value redistribution.
H5b: Redistributive effects of instrument mix
Based on the distinction between type 1/2 and type 3/4 instruments referred to, I now
test the redistributive effects of the analysed processes that involve a mix of different
instrument types:
If authorities use a mix of instrument types, then they can redistribute
value. Value redistribution is only a possibility, because the complex in-
stitutional regime does not provide authorities the tools to impose value
redistribution. However, authorities tend to redistribute value in order to
implement their own strategies.
H6: Effects of expected added economic value on the LRA
The sixth hypothesis focus on the feedback loop drawn in the conceptual framework:
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If a land use policy process is expected to produce redistributive effects,
then target groups successfully use available policy instruments and re-
sources to obtain full compensation for their anticipated loss of economic
value. This can be explained through the capacity of land use policy to
create added economic value that authorities can use for compensation
and redistribution.
In addition to the hypothesised necessity to compensate a reduction or capture ofland use policy as cash
machine value, this hypothesis states that the added value required for compensation is granted
through land use policy instruments, which greatly facilitates compensation, but also
blurs the limits of what is actually to be compensated, and to what extent. The
underlying thought is that the economic levy of land use policy is a cash machine that
actors mobilise in order to solve most land-related problems they might encounter.
3.3 Methodology
Having presented the thesis’ hypotheses, I introduce the methods used for the selection
of the perimeters, as well as the analysed case studies. This is in addtion to those
used for the subsequent data collection and analysis.
Policy research requires an understanding of complex behaviours, needs, systemsA four steps procedure
and cultures (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). The methodological approach I refer to
in this section has been developed in the context of applied policy research, which is
also the domain of research of this thesis. According to Ritchie and Spencer (2002),
applied policy research aims to provide answers to the following objectives:
1. defining the concepts at stake: the review of soil related public problems in
Switzerland (sections 1.1.4 and 2.3), and the choice of a value redistribution
perspective (section 3.1), implied a set of choices concerning the extend of the
concepts used for the analysis. As mentioned in section 2.1, I opted for a narrow
definition of ecological value of soil. This leaves room for the analysis institu-
tional changes, as well as for the analysis of actors’ strategies and resources, as
well as effective land use changes (such as land development, or the recycling of
formerly developed land or soil). Further, the question of the sustainability of
the observed resource uses has not been addressed. I limit the analysis to the
redistributive effects produced by the arrangements analysed. The definitions
of the concepts used across the thesis are listed in the annex;
2. mapping the phenomena: the broad range, nature and dynamics of soil uses
have been described in the introduction. Chapter 2 on the literature review
provided a set of explanations from ecology, economics and political science for
soil uses and the drivers of added and reduced economic and ecological value
creation in land use policy processes. Chapters 4 on Oberaargau and 5 on
Lausanne present the five case studies analysed and explain how the respective
local regulatory arrangements identified are achieved. Each case study considers
the influence of the identified contextual and institutional factors, and combines
their explanatory power with the one of the actors’ analysis in each case study;
3. creating typologies, finding associations and patterns, and providing explan-
ations: in chapter 2, I classified available policy instruments in Switzerland
into two different typologies, one classification aiming to present the variety of
tools available (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004b), and one based on the types
of impact instruments can have on property rights (section 2.5.2 in chapter 2);
this classification has been used for the formulation of the hypotheses H3 and
H4. Chapter 6 synthesises the case studies and subdivides the cases into re-
distributive processes. These processes are then compared and discussed in the
light of the hypotheses formulated in the present chapter. The discussion of the
hypotheses allows for the description of a set of observed patterns, and provides
explanations for the observed phenomena;
4. developing strategies in order to solve the problem studied: this last aspect is
discussed in the conclusion of this work (chapter 7), but it is not an explicit
goal of the thesis.
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In the following sections, I expose the methodology adopted in this research in order
to map the phenomena observed and provide explanations for these observations. The
main research steps are:
1. select the perimeter of study and the case studies within these perimeters (sec-
tions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2);
2. implement the research protocol adopted for data collection and analysis (sec-
tion 3.3.3);
3. based on the adoption of the conceptual framework, identify the variables ex-
plaining the policy outputs observed in each case study. This part of the work
is the main goal of the empirical analysis. The case studies are divided into
two chapters – chapter 4 aggregates the peri-urban case studies and chapter 5
to the urban case studies –, and is then subdivided into redistributive processes
(chapter 6).
3.3.1 Selection of perimeter
Three main types of areas constitute the living environment for a vast majority of Three type of living
environmentsSwitzerland’s population, and generate different, representative land use policy issues
(Nahrath et al., 2012):
− rural peri-urban regions, which face broad low-density building zone extensions,
and where the communes have important building zone reserves;
− urban regions, which face densification challenges, land reconversion and re-
mediation issues;
− mountainous tourist regions: these tend to have a high rate of secondary homes,
vast building zone reserves, and ecological challenges linked to tourism and
sports.
I have analysed one rural, peri-urban region – Oberaargau in canton Berne –, and Consideration of two
types of environmentone urban region – Lausanne in canton Vaud. Although, due to time restraints, the
third perimeter was not addressed, some of the value redistribution issues faced in
mountainous regions are comparable to those of peri-urban ones: reduction of over-
sized building zones, extensive soil use (due to the construction of numerous secondary
homes), and nature protection issues linked with tourism (Canton de Vaud, 2011).
In terms of methodological challenges to be addressed in an infra-national com- Challenges of comparison
parison, C. Dupuy and J. Pollard (2012) identify three main elements. Although the
authors’ publication focusses on international comparisons – which is not the case
here, as all cases are Swiss – these elements are still relevant for the present analysis:
1. the choice and the number of units to be compared: how are they to be selected
without bias? And how are local differences to be accounted for? First, the
regions/perimeters must be defined. I relied on the mobilité spatiale regions
defined by the Federal statistical office (2000), which correspond to "functional
units based on economic interaction and geographical mobility of labour work-
force" (Becker et al., 2010). Within these perimeters, a set of elements was
selected which represent the selected regions:
− the classification used by the Federal statistical office (Schuler and Joye,
2000) and shown in figure 3.3 show that most communes in the region of
Oberaargau are peri-urban, rural, or agricultural communes. In the region
of Lausanne, these are either big centres, secondary centres within big
centres, or suburbs of big centres;
− table 3.2 sheds light on the economic structure and differences between the
two regions: it shows the relative significance of commuter-based revenues
in Oberaargau, as compared with Lausanne: commuter revenues are reven-
ues brought in from the outside by inhabitants who work in another region.
The data also emphasises the size of the agricultural and industrial sectors
in Oberaargau, as compared to both the Lausanne and Swiss averages;
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− the two selected regions belong to different linguistic areas, but the can-
tons to which they belong have significant historic, institutional, geographic
and socio-demographic similarities. Vaud’s inhabitants are commonly con-
sidered French-speaking Bernese;
− these sets of distinctive characteristics in very similar institutional environ-
ments make Oberaargau and Lausanne ideal perimeters for a comparative
analysis. Yet, cantonal and local specificities are taken into account dur-
ing the analysis, as well as (e.g. specific institutional settings, instruments,
and rules);
2. data analysis and the identification of similarities and differences between cases;
how is a generalisation of the cases’ results achieved? These difficulties particu-
larly apply to research involving different nation-States, and therefore different
institutional contexts, which is only marginally the case2. However, the diversity
of land use policy problems analysed, along with the different contextual set-
tings require the definition of a comparable unit of analysis – their subdivision
into redistributive processes, as exposed in section 3.3.4 below;
3. interdependency between cases: the authors underline the importance of policy
diffusion and increased interdependencies in a global world, which reduces the
explanatory power of a comparison, all cases being potentially explained by the
same factors. The conceptual framework minimises this problem by account-
ing for the common explanatory factors (i.e. the institutional regime of soil )
separately. This separation allows precise emphasise on the differences in the
observed cases (contextual factors, actors, used instruments, resources). Fur-
ther, as the next section shows, the stakes inherent in the selected case studies
are distinct.
tourist communes
agricultural communes
peri-urban rural communes
small centres
crown medium centres
medium centres
crown big centres
secondary centres of big centres
big centres
Figure 3.3: Typology of the communes in the regions of Oberaargau and Lausanne.
Data: FSO (2014b). Methodology: Schuler and Joye (2000).
Bases Oberaargau Lausanne Switzerland
Commuter base 8,925 5,976 11,594
Annuitant base 8,704 12,742 9,230
Productive base 7,899 8,149 7,845
Agriculture 1,111 60 908
Industry 4,117 1,329 2,994
Public base 879 3,180 1,334
Tourist base 210 877 3,243
Total (CHF/inhab.) 26,617 30,924 33,246
Table 3.2: Distribution of basic income in francs per inhabitant in the regions Ober-
aargau and Lausanne in 2010. Data: Segessemann (2016).
2Institutional differences and instrumental specificities relevant for the policy processes analysed
are discussed in chapter 6 in the analysis section.
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3.3.2 Selection of case studies
Within the two regions selected, I defined a small number of case studies as the object Qualitative small n
analysisof analysis. The goal is to trace land use planning and land use processes within
narrower perimeters in which policy implementation takes place, over a time period
of approximately three decades. This is meant to allow for the reconstruction of a
causal sequence of events, and to write a narrative for each case describing contextual,
intermediary and dependent variables, as well as their interactions.
The narrower perimeters are defined based on the political-administrative entities Selection criteria
in charge of land-policy implementation (the communes), in canton Bern and can-
ton Vaud. They show land use policy issues characteristic of the studied region,
the interactions between involved actors, and the implementation of land use policy
instruments. The following criteria have been used for their selection:
1. important changes in land use planning and land use over the past 25 years;
2. presence of oversized building zones (see figure 6.5 in section 6.4.3 in chapter
6);
3. different property rights settings (private, public, reshape of plots, etc.);
4. major land use changes;
5. important issues around ecological and economic added/reduced value;
6. presence of conflicts;
7. use of a specific land use policy instrument.
A case law review of land use policy decisions in Bern (Viallon, 2016a) provide an Press analysis
overview of conflictual land use policy implementation processes. A keyword analysis
of national and regional newspaper archives brought up land use policy issues that
attracted media attention. Based on this information, and a review of the land use
policy archives of canton Bern (referring to Oberaargau), I constituted an index of
potential cases.
Based on a set of preliminary interviews and on the selection criteria, I chose Cases’ specificities
the communes of Wiedlisbach, Huttwil, and Niederbipp. Wiedlisbach was of partic-
ular interest, because the commune had recently undergone major land use policy
changes. These changes encountered opposition from inhabitants, attracted media
attention, and involved the implementation of innovative policy instruments. Huttwil
was chosen for their vast building zone reserves, and the conflict that emerged from
their reduction. Niederbipp was chosen, because of the vast building zone extensions
they have made during the last decades, and their reconversion of a former polluted
landfill during this extension process.
Case selection occurred similarly in the region of Lausanne: a case law review, a
keyword analysis of the regional press, and pre-established contacts with the cantonal
spatial planning office provided an overview of potential cases. Further, the list of
criteria used for the case selection had not yet been exhausted, which oriented the
case selection towards Malley. The urban reconversion project offered the opportunity
to analyse a set of joint urban restructuring issues involving public and semi-public
landowners. The case of Cheseaux was determined by the use of an instrument specific
to canton Vaud: the land improvement syndicate. This instrument is of particular
interest, because it intervenes against target groups through the combination of public
policies and property rights, issues at the heart of hypotheses H4 and H5.
The use of the mentioned selection criteria led to a pre-selection of cases oriented
towards the built and constructible environment, rather than agricultural and natural
land uses. First, this is due to the fact that current political debates on soil manage-
ment in Switzerland polarises soil issues on developed land against agricultural land.
The ecological value of agricultural land and natural areas also play a significant role,
but this issue loses some relevance when relying on more simple indicators such as
soil sealing (see section 2.1).
Second, I granted significant attention to the economic dimension of land use
policy processes: the price difference between constructible and agricultural land, the
flow of money between involved actors, as well as value creation and value capture
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issues, pushed me to investigate the direction of capital flows. Of course, there are
also wide flows within the agricultural sector, but these are dependent upon State
subsidies, and are linked to a more complex apprehension of ecological value that I
did not consider.
Further, I did not select any remote rural case with limited land use changes. I
also did not choose any case that focusses on the agricultural zone, or on natural an
recreational areas. Therefore, the representativeness of the described cases hint at a
cautious application of the hypotheses’ results for other land use situations, (such as
those in tourist areas, or in the agricultural sector). Further, the transposition of the
results to cases outside Switzerland will have to be done in simultaneous consideration
of the legal specificities in each country in which the results are used for comparison.
3.3.3 Research protocol
The research protocol for each case consisted of a detailed description of land useCombination of two
tracing techniques policy changes and of the markers of the theoretically induced explanatory factors.
The aim of these descriptions is to identify "trajectories of change and causation"
(Collier, 2011, 823) through the focus "on sequential processes within a particular
historical case" (George and Bennett, 2005, 13). The method used for providing
explanations is a mix between what P. Hall (2006, 25) calls multivariate and theory-
oriented explanation: the former refers to the identification "of a small set of variables
that can be said to cause such outcomes in a general class of times and places"; the
latter tests a theory and attaches special importance in order to "identify the most
important elements in the causal chain generating this class of outcomes".
The aim of the two empirical chapters (4 and 5) is to explain land use policy andCase studies as first level
of observation land use changes within each of the five case studies through the study of contextual
factors, of policy and property rules shaping the output, of actors and the strategies
they pursued, of the instruments and resources they possessed and mobilised, of the
arrangements reached, and of the redistributive effects created in each case. The
case studies constitute the first level of observation: they synthesise, in case-specific,
narratives the results from document research, from the respondents’ answers, and
from the cartographic analysis together with the observations made through the lens
of public policy analysis. The narratives are structured according to the conceptual
framework and the sequential steps of public policy implementation:
1. tracing of land use planning and land use changes over the past decades;
2. identification of contextual factors influencing the local regulatory arrangements
and redistributive effects;
3. presentation of the "constraints of superior law" influencing the output;
4. analysis of the actors’ games, the strategies they pursue, the resources and
instruments they mobilised;
5. description and qualification of the arrangements and of their redistributive
effects.
3.3.3.1 Data collection and sorting
Before starting with the case studies, I proceeded to an analysis of the past andReconstitution of the
soil’s regime present institutional regime of soil. Based on S. Nahrath (2003), I reconstructed the
legal framework (public policies and property rights) applicable to the resource soil
through the lens of the institutional regime framework (Gerber et al., 2009). This
provided an overview of existing regulations, which was completed in a back and forth
process when investigating the empirical field (de Buren, 2015).
Then, for each case study, I conducted document research, consisting of a reviewCross-time document
analysis of all land use policy documents elaborated by the commune over the past 25-30 years.
Among these documents, one could find:
− preliminary exam documents, or planning documents submitted by the com-
munes to the canton prior to any revision of their building regulations. Among
these documents:
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– (preliminary) reports on past and future communal development;
– new building regulations as proposed by the commune (structure plans,
construction prescriptions, zoning plans, landscape and nature protection
plans, equipment plans);
– reports on the new building regulations justifying how the context changes
and how the revised regulations are tackling these changes;
– relevant protocols and presentations of the communal executive body and
legislative body modifying and approving the new documents;
– oppositions raised by landowners, organizations and other persons allowed
to and the relevant protocols of following negotiations (if available);
– reports of the cantonal planning office and other offices involved in the
approval procedure;
– written correspondence between the canton, commune, urban planner and
other actors and notes relating to given phone calls;
– report on public consultation procedure;
− approval documents such as approval decisions or decrees of the cantonal au-
thority, final building regulations;
− potential oppositions and appeals against communal and cantonal decisions;
− grey literature published by communal, cantonal services, or federal offices (spa-
tial planning offices, water protection office, finance department, audit reports,
etc.);
− professional literature, for example, for the evolution of land prices in the ana-
lysed perimeters.
The quantity and level of detail in the documents increased over time: the first First stage of data
collectioncommunal building regulations present in the Bernese archives dated from the end
of the 1970’s and, in most cases, included only a zoning plan. Later revisions in-
cluded reports, as well as correspondence between the actors, and other documents
(listed above). The data analysis provided an overview of the zoning evolution and
instrument implementation in the commune, as well as the main reasons behind the
changes over the considered time period. These documents also named the involved
actors, and allowed for the identification of coalitions in favour of, or oppossed to
the observed land use policy processes. They also named the instruments used and
revealed a portion of the mobilised policy resources.
3.3.3.2 Actors’ interviews
A subsequent step consisted in conducting 35 interviews with persons directly involved Second stage of data
collectionin the planning process, and influencing the local regulatory arrangement’s dynamics:
communal and cantonal actors from the political-administrative arrangement, target
groups (landowners), other stakeholders (NGOs, soil experts), and journalists. These
were mainly:
− the planner contracted by the commune for establishing the local development
plans and revising the building regulations;
− the chief of the communal executive body and/or the communal administrator in
charge of planning and construction, ( general administration of the commune);
− the cantonal planner in charge of approving communal land use planning docu-
ments and her/his co-workers (legal officer, planner from the section dedicated
to cantonal or regional land use planning);
− other cantonal offices involved (office for water protection, economic promotion,
energy, etc.);
− third parties, such as environmental organisations, landscape protection associ-
ations, and journalists.
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The formulation of the questionnaire relied on the methodology of the EuropeanPyramidal structuring of
research questions court of auditors (2015, 25): in order to systematically collect the necessary evidence
from the data at hand, and keep the research within the defined scope, the Court’s
manual suggests subdividing the general research questions into sub-questions, which
are in turn converted into lower level questions. These questions should be "both
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (so that together they are sufficient
to answer the immediately preceding higher-level question)" (2015, 25). The Court
suggests that the questions be posed as yes/no answers in order to focus on the end-
product of research (the response to the general research question) and "enhance a
disciplined approach" to the questions. The elaborated pyramid of questions served
as basis for the elaboration of the questionnaire, and is available in the annexes.
Based on the interviews’ transcripts and/or notes, as well as the administrativeData indexation
documents and reports at hand, I indexed the data according to the research questions.
Then, I grouped the responses and cross-checked answers provided by actors with
other actors’ responses and available written documents.
3.3.3.3 Statistical and cartographic analysis
Available cartographic information and techniques allowed to increase the data usedInclusion of geo-localised
data for the research. Four geographic information systems3 provided various information
on each case study, such as:
− zoning prescriptions (type and size of zone, noise levels, ...);
− type (individual, company, association, etc.) and names of property title holders
(only for canton Vaud);
− the "journey through time" function of swisstopo maps made it possible to trace
the evolution of land use (construction, in particular) in short time intervals
(five to seven years), and thus identify correlations between zoning and actual
land uses;
− soil drilling and soil pollution reports (in some cases, only meta data was avail-
able);
− water protection zones as well as the location of water boreholes, which is par-
ticularly relevant in regard to water protection policy;
− the soil’s potential in terms of geothermal energy (an information relevant in
the case of Malley);
− the measurement of plot sizes or any other perimeter, including distances to
transport infrastructure;
− existence of building rights on a given plot;
− shape files (vector files) of the property structure (land register), which were
used for cartographic production.
3.3.4 Subdivision into redistributive processes
In order to enhance the focus on actors, policy instruments and resources, and in thisSecond level of analysis
way facilitate between-case analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002), I have subdivided
the five case studies into 15 redistributive processes (section 6.1 in chapter 6). These
redistributive processes are the second level of observation: they list the redistributive
phenomena observed through the lens of the variables defined in the theoretical frame-
work. This allows for their presentation and comparison in a compact and systematic
way. As we have seen in the introduction, land use policy processes can be defined
as implementation cases of land use policy, where authorities, in a specific context,
intervene on a target group and mobilise a set of policy instruments and resources, in
order to achieve a specific goal or to solve a specific policy problem. The subdivision
of the analysed case studies in redistributive processes is based on:
3http://geo.admin.ch; http://map.apps.be.ch; http://regiogis.ch; http://geo.vd.ch.
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− the identification of a distinct problem/matter to be solved;
− the involvement of actors and the mobilisation of instruments specific to that
problem;
− the negotiation of an arrangement/solution specific to the problem.
Now that I have presented the theoretical knowledge referred to, built a conceptual
framework based on this knowledge, elaborated a set of research hypotheses framing
the changes we intend to observe, and defined the methodology as applied to the
empirical research, we can turn to the empirical observations made in the five case
studies identified.
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The objectives of this chapter are threefold. First, the aim is to show how the cre-Case studies’ objectives
ation of added and reduced economic and ecological values occur in empirical land use
planning processes and their subsequent impacts on land use value creation processes.
Secondly, to understand and explain actors’ formal and informal instrument imple-
mentation strategies and arrangements in regard to redistribution issues. Thirdly, the
results from these analyses are meant to help us qualify the redistributive capacity
of the Swiss institutional resource regime of soil between 1990 and 2014. In order
to reach these objectives, I analyse three case studies with important and specific
redistributive challenges:
1. A building zone transfer in Wiedlisbach in section 4.1;
2. Oversized building zones in Huttwil in section 4.2;
3. The reuse of polluted soil in Niederbipp in section 4.3.
The three selected cases are located in the peri-urban region of Oberaargau (seeThree peri-urban cases
figure 4.1). Wiedlisbach (1) and Niederbipp (3) are two communes located at the
bottom of the Jura in what is referred to as “Bipperamt.” These communes are on
the east-west axis of the Swiss Mittelland, and are well-connected to transport infra-
structure. Huttwil (2) is located in a hilly landscape, and is more remote than the
two other case studies.
Figure 4.1: Regional overview map highlighting the three selected case studies. Map:
swisstopo (2014a).
Oberaargau
4.1 Transfer of building zone in Wiedlisbach
4.1.1 Introduction
This case study analysis of Wiedlisbach demonstrates how from the end of the 1970s
on, the commune building zones were oversized and badly designed, which contributed
to a disorganised process of urbanisation. After a significant period of demographic
growth during the 1990s, the commune faced a sudden stagnation since the 2000s.
Currently in Wiedlisbach, building zone reserves are fragmented, and land hoarding
is a widespread phenomenon, effectively leaving very few plots available for develop-
ment. Wiedlisbach’s main land use planning challenge was to rationalise its building
zone through the mobilisation of existing development rights. In order to do so, the
commune used an innovative "green zone" in order to temporarily suspend unused and
hoarded development rights. Authorities showed creativity in the combined employ-
ment of existing land use planning instruments: they achieved to spatially relocate
development rights and contractually guarantee their development. Further, they
reduced the amount of hoarded through various strategies: threat of temporary de-
zoning, land service costs recovery through a mortgage, and the use of an emption
right. Communal objectives were countered by landowners, who mobilised policy in-
struments such as building permit and plot ratio and partly managed to circumvent
communal strategies.
The case study is structured as follows:
− section 4.1.2 introduces land use planning and land use changes in Wiedlisbach
over the past 25 years;
− section 4.1.3 presents the contextual factors that influenced land use policy and
land use;
− section 4.1.4 identifies the constraints of superior law that played a role in
determining land use policy outputs;
− section 4.1.5 shows how actors have mobilised policy instruments and resources
in the local context in order to achieve their goals and what arrangements they
have negotiated;
− section 4.1.6 presents the variables’ impact on economic and ecological value
redistribution.
4.1.2 Land use planning and land use changes
Located in the northern part of Oberaargau, called Bipperamt, Wiedlisbach is a small
Bernese commune delimited in the north by the Jura mountains, and the Canton of
Solothurn, and in the south by the Aare river. As shown by figure 4.2, the mountain-
ous northern part of the communal territory is covered with forest and grazing lands
and remains – with the exception of a hospice center and a farm – undeveloped. The
central part of the commune consists of agricultural land and settlement. A train line
connecting Solothurn to Niederbipp and Langenthal crosses the village. Three small
widely-piped brooks converge at the southern limit of the village. From there, the
waters flow towards the Moos, a flat land close to the Aare. The Moos is bisected
by the N1 motorway and a slip road, (this slip road grants access to Attiswil, Wied-
lisbach and Oberbipp in the north and Wangen an der Aare and Herzogenbuchsee
in the south). An important part of the Moos is a military zone designated by the
Canton as a (future) strategic working zone. The communal territory also includes
a widely developed island on the Aare. The south-eastern part of the commune is
covered with forest, whereas the western part is primarily dedicated to agriculture.
The last revision of Wiedlisbach’s building regulations (in 2013) introduced two Conflictual revision
processmain transformations which led to the emergence of conflicts (AGR, 2013b,a): the
temporary suspension of development rights for certain landowners and the planned
extension of the housing zone in two potential locations. Both elements produced con-
troversy among the inhabitants and 34 oppositions were filed. The opponents feared
increased traffic, a obstructed views, and a cost increase born by a tight communal
budget (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2013; AGR, 2013a). Dozens of landowners refused
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Figure 4.2: Main neighborhoods of Wiedlisbach. Dot lines correspond to former
ZPP perimeters. Yellow marked zones are farms; grey zones correspond to zones
dedicated to public use and green zones include forests, agricultural protected areas,
and groups of trees, vegetation, or land temporarily excluded from the building zone.
Map: Commune of Wiedlisbach (2013).
to allow (a portion of) their plots allocated to a green zone which would prohibit
development. This reaction led, in turn, the communal executive body to reduce the
number of plots affected by the temporary suspension of development rights and to
withdraw temporarily the two building zone extension projects. However, these were
inscribed into the non-binding communal structure plan. The revision process was
continued finally approved by the canton in 2013. In 2014, a partial revision was star-
ted in order to realise one of the planned building zone extension. It was submitted
to popular vote, and accepted by the inhabitants in June 2014.
One of the main reasons for selecting Wiedlisbach as a case study is the diversionDiversion of the
instrument "zoning" of the instrument zoning, transformed to meet the local challenges of unused building
zone reserves and land hoarding: a green zone was introduced during the 2013 revision
of the building regulations. This green zone temporarily suspended the development
right from an undeveloped or partially plot located in the building zone. Then, the
reduced surface of building zone reserve was subtracted from the overall communal
building zone reserves, which, according to the cantonal authority, exceeded the upper
limit. This allowed to gain a margin of manoeuvrability towards the canton in order
to create a new building zone in a future revision of building regulations.
In order to understand how the revision of a zoning plan created such a high level of
conflict and how the situation was finally resolved, it is necessary to trace the evolution
of land use and land use planning policy over the last decades. The following analysis
focuses on the core of Wiedlisbach’s village and excludes the previously mentioned
island and hospice center, as these areas were not affected by the issue of building
zone transfer.
Figure 4.3 shows the described land use planning evolution from 1978 to 2013, the
state of land use before 1979, and its evolution from 1978 to 1987 and 1987 to 2011.
The years considered for tracing the evolution of land use were chosen according to
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1979 Revision of the building regulations and repeal of
the provisory protected areas established by emer-
gency federal decree in 1972 (AGR, 1979b)
Partial development
of Büelen and Nider-
feld
1989 Revision of the building regulations: reductions of
building zone (AGR, 1989)
Construction of the
bypass road, devel-
opment of Neumatt
and Riebeli, par-
tial development of
Büelen
1995 Extension of the southern working zone in Niderfeld Progressive develop-
ment of Niderfeld
2002 Partial revision of the building regulations: modi-
fication of the map of protected areas, modification
of the inventory of protected buildings, delegation
of small building permit authorizations to the ad-
ministrative and buildings commission (mentioned
in AGR (2013b)), approval of the local development
plan Stierenweid
Development of
Stierenweid in the
following years, par-
tial development of
Büelen
2010 Partial revision of the building regulations: imple-
mentation of the hazard map, adaptation of build-
ing regulations regarding the old town (mentioned
in AGR (2013b)
–
2011 Launch of the revision process of the building regu-
lations and zoning plan. Conflict over the creation
of a green zone and the extension of the building
zone
–
2013 Approval of the revised building regulations by the
canton: creation of the green zone, and temporary
suspension of development rights (AGR, 2013b).
Refusal by inhabitants and neighbours of two build-
ing zone extensions in December 2013.
–
2014 Partial revision of the building regulations and
zoning plan: adoption of one building zone exten-
sion (Gerzmatt). Approval by cantonal authority
blocked by federal moratorium in April of that year.
–
Table 4.1: Main land use planning and land use changes in Wiedlisbach since 1979.
the Federal Office of Topography’s map actualisations, and as as a way to correlate
with zoning plan revisions. The fine dot line on the right side of figure 4.3 shows the
communal border between Wiedlisbach and Oberbipp. As one can observe, the two
settlements are nearly joined. The following paragraphs refer to the map in order to
describe land use planning and land use changes over time.
4.1.2.1 Major land use planning changes in 1979, and land use changes
from 1979 to 1987/1989
The oldest available zoning plan dates back to 1979. Compared to established con- A sprawl that dates back
to the beginnings of land
use planning policy
struction, the zoning plan shows wide building zones (brown surfaces on the map)
with already scattered buildings. In fact, from the 1960s on, the settlement area ex-
tended significantly, and had already delineated some of the current limits between
developed and undeveloped land. Construction (dark grey on the map) is spread
along the roads and the railway lines, downhill and southwest from the core of the
village and uphill in the Gerzmatt. The working zones of Niderfeld and Einisbüel
were created during the development period of the 1960s.
4.1.2.2 Major land use planning changes in 1989, and land use changes
from 1989 to 2013
With the zoning plan revision of 1989, three building zone reductions occurred simul- One zoning out decision
taneously (marked light purple and numbered "1" on figure 4.3). With the exception
of the zoning outside of the Moosrain (southwards from town in the direction of the
motorway), the size of the building zone did not change substantially. According
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to the scarce available data, 1, the success of law suits and potential compensation
were improbable. At the same time, on the western hillside in the upper Moos, in an
already partially-developed location, the commune zoned a patch of building zone.
However, the owner of two of the plots threatened to file for compensation if his
development rights were removed. The cantonal authority considered the communal
decision "not inadequate" (AGR, 1989, 4).
Additionally to the Moosrain, the cantonal authority suggested, during their pre-One compromise?
liminary exam, an additional building zone reduction in Stierenweid, located on the
hillside at the northern border of the settlement area. However, the plots located on
the west part of the zone (area that is developed today) were already serviced (AGR,
1988), only the eastern land stripe was taken out of the building zone2.
In addition to the building zone extensions, (marked light brown and numbered
"2" on figure 4.3), there are several "filling of gaps" within the existing building zone, a
small extension of the sports zone (up north along the forest) and a rather important
(approximately 2 ha) extension of the working zone east of Weiermatt.
In terms of land use, the main changes up until 2011 (light grey on figure 4.3)
were: the construction of the village’s bypass road, the development of the housing
area Neumatt (at the junction of the piped brooks), the development of Büelen (in
the south western part of the settlement area), and the development of Stierenweid
(on the north-western hillside). All of this housing construction occurred in un-built
building zones.
4.1.2.3 Land use planning changes until 2013
With the last minor revision (1995) and the last major revision (2013) of buildingBuilding zone extensions
that match existing land
use. . .
regulations, a minor extension of the building zone is observable, (marked yellow and
numbered "3" on figure 4.3), but initiated in order to match retroactively the zoning
plan with pre-existing uses. The extension up north of Wiedlisbach at the limit of
the forest was for the sports zone, the extension of Stierenweid (on the hillside) was
due to the recently modified local development plan, and the extension at the western
settlement boundary extended the small, preexisting working zone. In 1995, another
important extension of the building zone occurred in Niderfeld, close to the motorway
(to host a garden centre and a swimming pool).
Of particular interest are the dark purple surfaces numbered "4" on figure 4.3:. . . and reduce building
zone reserves
− two of these purple surfaces correspond to effective zoning (and a return to
an agricultural zone): the slim purple rectangle under the Gerzmatt (north
east) and a smaller purple rectangle from Niderfeld (northwards), the major
industrial zone. Both occurred with consent by the owners and were meant to
reduce match zoning with effective land use and thus reduce "fictive" building
zone reserves;
− another dark purple area in the Neumatt, next to the brooks, is now zoned as
a park;
− all other dark purple areas were part of the building zone and not built on; they
are now, in accordance with the owners, designated part of the newly created
green zone.
One zoning "hole" (numbered "5" on figure 4.3) is present between Weiermatt and
the historical town centre: this plot was never put into the building zone and is now
part of the green zone.
The free plots (beige on the map) include only undeveloped plots (according to the
map elaborated by the communal planner and the commune, and submitted during
the building regulations revision procedure in 2013). All plots have been serviced and
1Archive documents (AGR, VVYY) the original developer wanted to build a giant complex in-
cluding: two 15 story towers, a dozen houses, several flats and around fifty single-family homes.
However, the area was minimally connected to roads, and entirely outside of the settlement area.
2As the recently developed area remaining in the building zone required the construction of an
access road, the communal decision was to zone only some of the plots. This decision does not
appear to have taken into account the eventuality of compensating the landowner for a withdrawal
of rights, but rather on a compromise negotiated to prevent opposition during the building zone
revision process.
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are within the building zone. They do not include the potential for densification on
already developed plots.
4.1.2.4 Gab between zoning and actual land use
The comparison between actual constructions and zoning plans shows that as an in-
strument, zones which separate constructible area from non-constructible area works:
all construction dedicated to housing or working has been built in the building zone.
Further, one can infer an overall will to match zoning with effective land use. How-
ever, a deeper analysis of the 2013 situation is needed to more fully understand the
existing gap between zoning and actual land use.
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4.1.2.5 Progressive fill of the building zone
The cross time comparison shows that development mainly "filled the gaps" between Development that fills
the gapspreviously established settlement limits: land for housing developed during the last
35 years has remained in the building zone, or in other words, no major residential
zoning occurred during this period.
The spread of construction began before data on zoning is available. However, Urban sprawl within the
building zonewith the revision of 1978, the new zoning plan drew a large line around existing
construction, so that huge, oversized building zones were created, (sometimes even
against the landowners will)3. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, only marginal build-
ing zone reductions were made, and portions of the zoned plots were built without
local regulation exceeding the communal zoning prescriptions. The primary form of
construction was the single family home, (with exception of the Neumatt area where
several three floors buildings were erected). The working zone of Niderfeld also ex-
perienced strong development over the last decades.
The remaining un-built portions of the building zone are strongly fragmented, Numerous un-built
surfacesand spread across the entire building zone. Un-built housing plots accounted for
5.7 hectares of the building zone in 20134. According to cantonal calculations, this
corresponds to the upper allowable limit (AGR, 2013a). As the map shows, these
plots are scattered across town5, some of them with unconventional shapes or limited
access hindering their full development. However, this concerns only a minority of
the plots.
The hoarding phenomenon can be explained by different factors. One landowner, Land scarcity as a main
reason for not buildingthe Burgergemeinde, explicitly states their intentions to save land for future gener-
ations. More generally, the organisation conceives land as as a heritage, referred to
as Kulturgut (Burgergermeinde Wiedlisbach, 2014). These plots are located in the
middle of already developed plots, so they cannot be rezoned as agricultural. For the
Burgergemeinde, sale of land occurs in very few cases, the preferred disposal being
long term leasing through the attribution of building rights. During the information
session on new building regulations, inhabitants argued that they save land for future
generations; others consider it their personal retirement fund (Berner Zeitung, 2011).
A 1996 survey of these owners sought to determine whether owners building in- Hoarding behaviour
tentions (Commune of Wiedlisbach, 2011b, 50). A brief look at the un-built plots in
1996 and 2014 shows that the owners who stated their intent to build in 1996, have
still not built. Thus, it appears these owners did have the necessity themselves to
construct a home.
In addition to these considerations, one can also find explanations for undeveloped Urban sprawl within the
building zoneplots within the development process itself: the construction process in the building
zone took the form of a small sprawl of construction: time after time, plots are sold and
houses are constructed. Land service followed the needs of construction and there was
not always a coordination with the land property structure. Consequently, a group
of plots where for example land betterment measures would have been necessary in
order to optimize land uses are now impossible, as some owners have already built their
homes. In certains cases, local development plans have been adopted, but the they
lack of coordination with underlying property rights and thus never implemented6. Non available building
landEven for constructible plots (where no further land betterment measures are ne-
cessary), authorities cannot force the owners to build, and this creates a paradox:
building reserves exist within the current building zone, but they cannot be used. In
order to circumvent this problem of availability, the only option left to local authorities
willing to grow – regardless of their motives7 – is to zone new land.
3R. Grogg, journalist for Berner Zeitung, interviewed in Langenthal 25 March 2014.
4If plots of the working zone are taken into account, this totals 9 hectares
5Here the beige and the dark purple surfaces (with the exception of the cases of building
zone reduction and the creation of a park) should be considered building zone reserves, as both are
un-built and within the building zone.
6The case of the Friedhofsweg is a good example,where several successive development plans were
adopted, but never put into practice. One should take note of the partial construction of the local
development plan Ribeli in the Neumatt (see figure 4.3).
7Press articles mention the contested communal growth strategy aiming to attract new rich in-
habitants in order to higher tax revenues and better the financial situation of the commune (Berner
Zeitung, 2011).
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As federal and cantonal legislation prohibit new land zoning as a “strategy”, the
only solution to the current problem is to transfer unused rights to locations where
landowners are willing to build. This leads to the search for the most appropriate
instrument to solve the problem. As section 4.1.5 below shows, the solution chosen by
Wiedlisbach is quite innovative, but hardly fulfills federal land use planning objetct-
ives. Prior to the in-depth analysis of the used instruments, section 4.1.3 presented
contextual factors, and section 4.1.4 presented the legal constraints that have been
identified as most relevant.
4.1.3 Contextual factors
In regard to the context, I analyse the case of Wiedlisbach in terms of demographic,
economic and topographic aspects.
4.1.3.1 Demographic evolution
Over the last 22 years (1991 to 2013), the commune’s population increased from 1,927Strong demographic
growth in the 1990s to 2,181 inhabitants, an overall increase of 13.2% or 0.6% annualised (FSO, 2015c).
Compared to the surrounding communes, this growth falls between that of Oberbipp,
Niederbipp and Wolfisberg on the east (between 23 and 28% over the same period or
1.3% annualized), and the slight decline in Attiswil or Farnern in the west (around
3% over the total period). Compared to the regional, cantonal and Swiss average,
Wiedlisbach is far above regional and cantonal growth rates (7% and 6.2% respective
total growth or 0.34% and 0.28% annual growth) and near the national average of
17.5% (0.8% annual growth).
Over the last 15 years – the time period considered for the revision of the buildingDemographic stagnation
in the 2000s zone regulations (1997-2012), nominal population growth has equalled 40 inhabitants:
1,8% over the whole period for an annual growth rate of 0.12%. These numbers are
under the regional (3,46% overall and 0.23% per year), cantonal (5,75% and 0.38%)
and national averages (13.28% and 0.89%). From 2001 to 2011, the vacancy rate
remained around 2%. Low construction rates during 1995-2005 contributed to a
stagnation in growth, a pace which persists, as seen in an almost total absence of
housing construction between 2005 and 2011 (swisstopo, 2014b).
4.1.3.2 Economic and fiscal evolution
Compared to other communes of the region, inhabitants of the commune have anMiddle class commune
above average fiscal capacity8 (925CH per month compared to an average of 825CHF
per month). With almost one job for every two inhabitants, the job supply is also
above average (30 jobs for each 100 people regionally). Tax rates for natural persons
corresponds to the regional average (1.59) (FIN, 2014), and the land tax rate is also
slightly above average (1.2 instead of 1.12) (FIN, 2015).
In terms of land prices, no local data is available for Wiedlisbach. I can only relyOverall decreasing land
prices on regional numbers which show an overall price decline of serviced building land
for single family homes from 300CHF/m2 in 1999 to 200CHF/m2 in 2014 (Wüest
and Partner, 2016a). If one considers sale prices of single family homes of 5 rooms,
a price drop from 605,000CHF in 1994 to 539,000CHF in 2012 is recorded (Wüest
and Partner, 2016a). This downturn is put in perspective when compared to other
price data (SRED, 2014): based on transaction prices of single family homes between
2003 and 2014, the SRED data shows a slight price increase (from 620,000CHF to
700,000CHF). These moderate or shrinking prices are one factor in explaining the
blocked construction of single family houses in the commune (single family homes are
the main type of construction on the communal territory). An alternative explanation
provided by the Herdgemeinde is the landowners’ intentions to "keep land for future
generations" (Herdgemeinde Huttwil, 2014).
8I understand fiscal capacity as the potential
119 of 327
Oberaargau
4.1.3.3 Topographic and spatial characteristics
Wiedlisbach has been considered a town since 1386 when it was granted the right Well preserved historical
centreto host a weekly market as compensation for its services during the war of Sempach
against the House of Habsburg (Commune of Wieldisbach, 2014). Its historical centre
is well preserved and its roofs are among the last of the region without any skylights9.
The location of Wiedlisbach is attractive in terms of housing: views are desir- View on the Alps and
good transport
connections
able, in particular for houses on the hillside of the Jura. The accessibility by public
transport is, for a large part of the housing zones, ranked in category C or D by the
cantonal structure plan (meaning most inhabitants have a train connection every half
an hour to Solothurn, Niederbipp and Langenthal). A dedicated motorway onramp
offers connections within less than an hour to Bern, Basel and Zurich.
On a whole, the statistics show Wiedlisbach as a rather attractive location for
middle to upper income families looking for private individual housing.
4.1.4 Constraints of superior law
Another central factor contribute to explain the land use planning process resulted in
such an oversized and scarcely used building zone: the cantonal constraints and their
implementation.
4.1.4.1 Building zone calculus of the 1989 revision
Documents on the 1989 revision of building regulations do not offer any demographic Concious cantonal
approval of oversized
building zones
growth calculations10, mentioning only previous building zone capacity (1,000 in-
habitants) (AGR, 1988). Without further precision in the calculation methods, no
detailed comparison can be made. The lack of data limits the conclusion to the fact
that the effective nominal population growth of 254 persons that took place during
the 15 years after the revision fell well short of the building zone’s capacity. Even with
growing surface needs for individuals and lower occupancy rates of flats, the current
building zone remains oversized.
4.1.4.2 Cantonal building zone calculus in 2013
In the 2013 revision, the following parameters were used in the calculation of the
building zone size. They are combined as follows:
− Current population: the data used in the revision documents differs slightly from
official data (2,227 inhabitants according to the commune, 2,181 inhabitants
according to the canton);
− the current population is multiplied with the cantonal growth factor : According
to the revision documents (Commune of Wiedlisbach, 2011a), the population
growth over the last 15 years is 7.6%, which differs from the growth data presen-
ted above (4.1.3);
− the prognosticated nominal population growth is divided by the average flat
occupancy rate: 1.7 for central communes, 2.1 for all the other communes. This
shows the number of flats needed to absorb growth;
– because statistically the average flat occupancy rate tends to decline (2.28
persons per flat in the year 2000, 2.2 in 2020), additional housing is needed
to maintain current population level. Therefore, the future population per
flat ratio is subtracted from the current population per flat r to obtain the
number of flats needed to maintain the current population;
– both numbers of flats are then added together;
− the number of total flats is then multiplied with the average gross floor area per
flat: 140m2. This gives the overall needed gross floor area;
9In 1974, Wiedlisbach was granted the Wakker price by the Swiss heritage society for its exemplary
care of the historical center site.
10The communal report and calculation elements could not be found in the cantonal archives.
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− the overall gross floor area is then divided by the minimum density coefficient11:
0.3 for rural communes, maximum 0.7 for central and agglomeration communes.
This gives the surface of land that is needed for housing development.
In Wiedlisbach, the calculus results in housing zone needs of 5.7 ha for the nextExceeding reserves block
any further development
process
15 years. From this area, one has to subtract the existing undeveloped housing zone.
Undeveloped surfaces smaller than 500 m2, plots with complex geometry, banks of
trees as well as buildings, are not considered as reserves. In Wiedlisbach, 7.7 ha
of the housing zone is currently undeveloped, of which 2.7 more hectares remain
undeveloped on partially developed plots. This results in an oversized building zone
of approximately two hectares. In this situation, cantonal practice is to match new
surfaces to be zoned in by an equal amount of surfaces to be zoned out (AGR, 2013a).
The other until now unused possibility is to develop these land reserves.
4.1.4.3 Priority development areas
Although located on a cantonal and regional development axis, Wiedlisbach does notNo zoning bonus is
granted by economic
policy
enjoy looser development regulations, as only the centre (Niederbipp) of the priority
development areas do. Only a vast field between the motorway and the Aare, cur-
rently property of the federal army, has been designated by the canton as "strategic
working zone". Nevertheless, the development process in this area is under cantonal
supervision12 and does not concern communal zoning or development restrictions.
4.1.4.4 Cropland protection plan
Cantonal criteria applying to plots that are part of the cropland protection plan
require:
− a justification that the location is the best among others (implies a search for
alternative locations);
− a connection to public transport;
− an economic use of soil e.g. constructions with a minimum density coefficient
of 0.4 for rural communes (Kanton Bern, 2011).
4.1.4.5 Regional planning
The regional landscape protection plan defines landscape protection areas (their exactA rather flexible
landscape protection plan dimensions and location are subject to communal interpretation). These protected
areas can also include regional urbanization limits and corridors for animals. The
current plan includes several landscape protection zones and urbanization limits, as
in the east of the Gerzmatt, precisely where the foreseen extension area of the housing
zone is located. Despite the plan, local authorities have a room to manoeuvrability in
implementing the regional plan (AGR, 2013a): they can adapt the perimeter of the
protected area to fit their development aspirations.
The regional global transport and settlement plan locates regional housing andNo regional compensation
possibilities working centres, but Wiedlisbach doesn’t have any of these. When a commune wants
to create a building zone in such a regional centre, they have the possibility to com-
pensate zoning operations on regional level (another commune has to reduce its build-
ing zone at the same time), an unused opportunity for now13.
4.1.4.6 General considerations regarding constraints of superior law
The two building regulation revisions analysed lead me to formulate the followingCautious cantonal control
remarks: In 1989, the content of cantonal objections concerning zoning and density
was – at least in its written form – strictly advisory.Comments employed the con-
struct, "in our opinion," or diverted responsibility for the decision to the commune by
relying on its discretionary power in terms of land use planning (AGR, 1988, 5). For
11The density coefficient is the ratio between the gross floor area and the total surface of a plot.
A minimum density coefficient of 0.3 requires that for a 500 m2 plot, at least 150 m2 of the gross
floor area are developed
12Use of a cantonal development plan as zoning instrument.
13See regional governance structure in section subsubsec:regional governance.
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example, the prohibition of apartment buildings written in the construction prescrip-
tions (family homes with more than two flats) was criticized but accepted without
further comments. Further, a 50% population growth potential in the building zone
reserves "blasts any demographic growth prognosis" (AGR, 1988, 2), but does not oth-
erwise hamper the approval process; additional artificial reduction of capacity through
the lowering of density, and prohibition of several family homes in certain zones were
criticized, but did not block the review process .
During the approval procedure14, the office of agriculture criticized the size of the No veto from other
cantonal officesbuilding zone, but acknowledged that it is mostly located in already built areas and
thus probably serviced. The office of economic development supported the extensions
of the working zone and pushes to extended zoning close to the motorway as well
as a more "active land use policy" in order to gain control over the effectiveness of
regulations (AGR, 1988).
During the 2013 revision, an extended building zone calculation method was used Increased technicality
with potential for new
loopholes
where (partially) undeveloped plots were individually listed with their respective con-
structible surfaces. The cantonal authority used the results, along with their demo-
graphic prognosis, to approve or reject building zone extensions. Additional criteria,
in particular the connection to public transport, is another means (used by both
sides) to either justify the acceptability or the irrelevance of a new building zone.
However, as the example on building zone transfer in subsection 4.1.5 shows, tighter
criteria for defining building zone reserves leads to more precise building zone defin-
itions, which in turn increases the technicity of the legal process, and opens up new
potential loopholes.
The 2013 preliminary exam of building regulations by the canton provides a set of An involvement with
limited effectivenesselements that contribute to revealing the nature of power relations that exist between
the actors. In the reports of the cantonal offices involved in the procedure, the ag-
ricultural office focussed on the future zoning extension in the Gerzmatt, part of
the cropland protection plan. The office deplored the "very rudimentary balance of
interests" made by the commune, in particular the absence of consideration of agri-
cultural interests and the approximate consideration of federal criteria (AGR, 2013a).
The agricultural office appears resigned to accept the loss of agricultural land: they
do not set any additional requirement (for example in terms of density) nor oppose
the zoning process. The office in charge of economic promotion, part of the same dir-
ectorate, was, as opposed to the 1989 revision process (AGR, 1988), not involved in
the consultation procedure. The nature protection office pushed also towards a more
detailed zoning plan including all types of natural elements worthy of protection such
as hedges, shore groves, individual trees and groups of trees.
4.1.5 Local use of instruments
4.1.5.1 Legal and contractual building obligation
In order to overcome the problem of land hoarding, during the 2013 revision of its Communal
implementation of
contractual building
obligation
building regulations, the commune introduced the notion that the development of
undeveloped plots in the building zone were of public interest15. After a period
of fifteen years, landowners do not have the right for their plots to remain in the
building zone. Using new legal basis, the commune negotiated with landowners who
do not want to develop their plots. In certain cases, a contractual building obligation
arose between the commune and landowners: several owners promised to build their
land within the next ten years. However, the implementation of such a rule has
been contractual; its signature by the two parties relied on the landowner’s will to
cooperate, or accept to be put in the green zone. Some owners, resistant to both
solutions, asked for a building permit in order to keep their plot in the building zone
and gain some time, although they did not intend to build16.
According to communal and cantonal authorities, the building obligation had until Enforcement of building
obligation for previously
zoned plots
the implementation of the revised federal law limited validity in a court, but this is
now very likely to change: according to art. 15a of the federal spatial planning
act, cantonal legislation must, in case of public interest, find a way to ensure that
14Only the offices taking position on building zone issues were mentioned.
15Art. 3 par. 2 of the Building regulations of 30 July 2013 of the commune of Wiedlisbach.
16R. Grogg, journalist for Berner Zeitung, interviewed in Langenthal 25 March 2014.
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a plot is constructed within a defined period of time. In the future, the commune
could rely on the signed contracts in order to force development. But in case the
landowner fights the communal decision, the commune would need to prove that the
plot’s development is of public interest. Despite its communal recognition, is is not
certain to be recognised as such by a court for single plots in Wiedlisbach.
This tricky situation only applies to plots already in the building zone. With plotsBuilding obligation for
plots to be zoned remaining in the agricultural or protected zone, the commune has the possibility to
use an emption right. An example of the exercise of this emption right would be
commune acquisition of land at a predetermined price if it is not developed within a
given time span. In the case of the Gerzmatt perimeter, adopted by the commune
as a new building zone, the commune has negotiated this change of status with the
landowner17.
4.1.5.2 Transfer of building zone
The main instrument studied in the commune of Wiedlisbach is zoning. The commune"On the border of
legality" uses the instrument in an innovative way that aims towards the spatial transfer of
development rights. The cantonal authority qualifies this strategy as “on the border
of legality"18. The strategy behind the building zone transfer is to reduce the building
zone in the inner village on (partially) undeveloped plots and use the “development
credits” gained through this reduction in order to zone an area outside of town.
4.1.5.3 Step 1: Temporary suspension of development rights
Operation of the building zone transfer occurred in two steps. The first step was
to conduct individual negotiations with all landowners who owned undeveloped or
partially developed plots considered building zone reserves by the canton. The aim
of these negotiations was to obtain landowner consent to remove (a portion of) their
unused plot from the building zone19. The owners who agreed to the communal
proposal were placed in what was referred to as a "green space and garden zone"20.
According to the building regulations, this zone aimed to “ensure the existence of
green spaces, gardens and orchards within the settlement area"21. The zone change
was comprised of three main components, all mentioned in art. 54 of the communal
building regulations:
1. a removal of their development rights for a minimal period of 8 to 10 years, or
until the next building regulations revision process;
2. a priority right to be zoned when the commune begins subsequent revisions of
its building regulations;
3. an exemption from the tax on added land value created through zoning when
the plot is put back in the building zone.
The underlying objective of this green zone was to reduce the amount of communal
building zone reserves 22. As mentioned in section 4.1.4.6, the size of the building
zone reserves do not allow for further zoning procedures.
In terms of usage, the green zone allows for underground construction, whereasAn instrument lowering
density temporarily surface construction can only occur if linked to the care and use of a garden or orchard.
The new zone does not affect the use rights of third parties: for example, public access
is not granted to these areas. It merely ensures that very limited development will
take place. In fact, the green zone can be considered a de facto regulation for the
lowering of density. In the future, when the zoning plan will be revised, (at least eight
17M. Allemann, president of the commune of Wiedlisbach, interviewed in Wiedlisbach 24 June
2014; D. Ott, architect and planner, member of the executive committee of Badner Partner AG,
interviewed in Solothurn 1 April 2014.
18A. Schnyder, head of communal and regional planning, S. Bleuel, head of main development
centres, R. Siegenthaler, urban planner, Amt für Gemeinden und Raumordnung, Justiz-, Gemeinde-
und Kirchendirektion of the canton of Berne, interviewed in Berne 24 April 2014.
19One alternative mentioned in the previous paragraph was to make them sign a contractual
building obligation.
20Art. 54 of the Baureglement der Gemeinde Wiedlisbach vom 30 Juli 2013.
21Ibid.
22D. Ott, urban planner, co-director of Baderpartner, interviewed in Solothurn the 1st April 2014.
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to ten years after a zone change), owners of plots in the green zone willing to build
(or to sell) will have rezoning priority over landowners outside the building zone.
The potential consequences for landowners of plots in the green zone should be Trivial consequences for
long term hoarders?addressed. For those whose plot has been placed entirely within the green zone
and have no intention to build or to sell in the medium term, there are almost no
consequences. Subsequent revisions arise every 10 to 15 years, and owners can ask
to be zoned back in and, after modification of the zoning plan, development rights
are restored. In case of communal refusal, owners can oppose the decision during
the revision process and have the possibility of seeking compensation for material
expropriation. However, as this phenomenon has not yet been observed it seems likely
that the landowner will have to prove their intentions to build prior to rezoning.
For the owners of plots located partially within the green zone, their zone change Temporary development
rights reduction traded
against additional
development rights
involved (in most cases) a reduction of the unused development rights. However,
the reduction depended on which part of the plot had been put into the green zone.
In certain cases, the green zone was located where no construction was permissible
(e.g. if accessibility from one side did not meet necessary requirements, or if a forest
or river bordered the plot). Thus, the use right restriction equaled zero. However,
certain owners were effectively restricted in their rights. Among these owners, some
negotiated with the commune for looser building regulations regarding the timeframe
for when their plot could be rezoned23. Thus authority cedes their legal resources
for the landowner consent on and support to the zoning plan revision. The result is
change in the communal building regulations and zoning plan and contracts signed
with the green zone landowners that negotiated specific in kind compensation.
For the communal authorities, the green zone permits influence over the amount Diversion of the zoning
instrumentof building zone counted as reserve. According to current cantonal practice (AGR,
2013a), the number of square meters taken from the building zone and designated
as green zone can then be used to zone in new land somewhere else. Along with
this ability to transfer land, another subtlety has been exploited by the commune:
undeveloped plots or part of plots smaller than 500 m2 are not counted as building
zone reserve. Thus, any reserve bigger than 500 m2 that can be reduced through
green zoning to less than 500 m2 no longer counts as a reserve, which allows for
further reductions of excessive communal building zones (see section 4.1.4.2). This
technique was applied to several owners’ backyards: one owner had, for example, a
700m2 of building zone reserve in his backyard that counted as 700m2building zone
reserve for the commune. The commune put 250m2 of the backyard’s reserve in the
green zone. This left the owner with a building zone reserve of 450m2, but reduced
the commune’s building zone reserve to 0m2.
4.1.5.4 Step 2: Transfer of building credits
In Wiedlisbach, the building zone surface gained through the green zone was then Conflictual transfer at
the settlement bordertransferred to the perimeter Gerzmatt on the northeastern communal border. In fact,
prior to the transfer, a smaller part of the perimeter was already defined as building
zone. But because its shape did not suit proper development (and was not serviced
yet), the communal executive body and the landowner negotiated the definition of
a new, broader perimeter. As the parties could not agree on a compromise prior to
the end of the building regulations revision (ended July 2013), the extension of the
building zone was postponed (AGR, 2013a).
In December 2013, after having signed an agreement with the landowners, the
communal executive body proposed to zone two perimeters: Gerzmatt and Moselen.
But the public inquiry proved too contentious24. In the end, the subject was with-
drawn from the communal legislative body’s agenda.
In June 2014, the communal executive body made a second legislative attempt,
and submitted just the zoning of Gerzmatt for adoption. The communal assembly
23As the analysis of oppositions of individual landowners to the zone change and the transcriptions
of negotiations with the commune have shown (AGR, 2013b), simple persuasion is not always enough
to gain owner approval. Compensation in the form of higher density or a reduction of the perimeter
of the green zone has been conceded by the communal authority.
24Criticisms were made regarding the additional traffic that the new construction would gener-
ate, and on the potential obstruction of neighbours’ views (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2013; Berner
Zeitung, 2014).
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approved the modification – 38 persons in favour, 20 against (Commune of Wieb-
lisbach, 2014). One opposition against the cantonal authority’s decision to approve
the zoning was made, and is currently being examined by the cantonal supervisory
authority.
In the meantime, with the entry into force of the revised spatial planning law, aFederal moratorium
suspends approval federal moratorium on uncompensated zoning decisions has entered into force25. This
moratorium is valid until the cantonal act is revised and the cantonal structure plan
approved by the federal government. Thus, the approval of the zoning operation in
Gerzmatt might be delayed, as federal law requires that any extension of the building
zone must be compensated by an equivalent amount of surface rezoned as agricultural.
In the case of Wiedlisbach, the recognition of the transfer as proper compensation
has been called into question.
One might ask why the commune wanted to put new land in the building zone.Costs reduction through
urban expansion The official response was that the commune intended to overcome the general land
hoarding phenomenon and make land available for development. If one looks at the
numerous negotiations conducted with the landowners during the 2013 revision of
building regulations, (as well as those begun already in the 1990s), this official argu-
ment certainly provides part of the explanation. But then why does the commune
want to make land available for new development? This question can in turn be ad-
dressed with a complementary hypothesis: the commune hopes to raise revenues and
lower infrastructure costs per inhabitant through the zoning of land for development.
The subsequent arrival of new inhabitants will further lower these infrastructure costs
(Commune of Wieblisbach, 2014). As the discussions prior to the adoption of the zon-
ing plan show, Wiedlisbach has had financial issues for several years. According to
the regional press (Berner Zeitung, 2011), Wiedlisbach is not the only commune in
the region to pursue such a strategy. Its fiscal effectiveness has still to be proven, as
new inhabitants also require additional services such as kindergartens, schools and
sports facilities.
4.1.5.5 Implementation of the tax on added land value created through
zoning
Since the 2013 revision of building regulations, the tax on added land value createdNo fixed taxation
percentage through zoning has been part of the communal "tool box". The regulations state that
the communal executive body is obligated to negotiate restitution with the landown-
ers, seeking an "adequate amount" of the added value created through zoning26. As
recommended by the commune’s urban planner27, the legal dispositions do not foresee
a fixed tax level. Thus, the local authority keeps a wider margin of negotiation in the
amount of the added economic value it captures.
The above mentioned transfer of development rights in Gerzmatt was the first oc-Tax on added land value
and land service in one
single contract
casion to apply the instrument. The commune signed an agreement with the landown-
ers (the so called Infrastrukturvertrag) including the amount of tax on added land
value created through zoning and detail land service costs to be paid by the owner.
As foreseen by law (109 BauG), the portion (infrastructure: i.e. roads and pipes) of
the land that has been serviced becomes ownership of the commune once realised. In
order to ensure the development of the new area, a purchase right was also included
in the contract: the commune has an emption right on the land for ten years at a
fixed price. However, the commune’s ability to buy the land if the owner does not
meet their obligations after the fifteen year period remains an open question.
The applied tax rate was 20 % (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2014). It would haveCommune has an
important discretionary
power
been necessary to access the contract in order to see if the land values used for taxation
correspond to market price values and to determine the proportion of land service
costs that has been passed on the landowner. The study of other contracts between
communal land authorities and landowners has shown that even with a fixed tax
rate, the effectively taxed amount is still variable and tends to be in the landowner’s
interest (see section 4.3.5.3). As a matter of fact, the fixation of land price before and
after the zoning operation lies entirely in the discretionary power of the communal
authority and their negotiation partners. Further, as land service costs, and the tax
25Art. 38a of Federal spatial planning act of the 22 June 1979, SR 700.
26Art. 69 of the Building regulations of 30 July 2013 of the commune of Wiedlisbach.
27D. Ott, op. cit.
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on added value created through zoning (in case the instruments are implemented) are
negotiated together, the amount of taxes levied is used to pay for land service that
directly benefits the landowner (see also section 4.2.5.1).
The wide margin of manoeuvrability granted to communes in the implementation Diversion of the tax on
added land value created
through zoning
of both the land service tax and the tax on added land value created through zoning
allowed a diversion of the instrument from the purpose that it was conceived for, that
is the payment of compensations due in cases where a material expropriation took
place. The Bernese cantonal construction act defined two distinct instruments, but
left a wide margin of implementation to local authorities that frequently favoured a
lump sum taxation and simultaneously recovered the costs of land service (Metropol-
itankonferenz Zürich, 2013).
4.1.5.6 Mortgage as payment guarantee for infrastructure
The eastern part of Wiedlisbach called Weiermatt is a rather important working zone Long standing non
serviced working zone(2 hectares) that remains un-serviced and un-built. While the first portion was zoned
in 1979, and a second in 1989, the owner did not service the land in that lapse of
time.
After negotiation with the landowner and approval of the land service plan of the Commune takes over to
unblock situation. . .working zone by the communal legislative body in June 2010, it was agreed that the
commune would finance the land service and be reimbursed no later than ten years,
or in the event of a sale of the land. Currently, further proceedings are temporarily
blocked by opposition (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2013, 2014).
The signed contract between commune and landowner foresees that the public . . . and ensures
reimbursement through
mortgage
authority will, with public money, service the whole area in one go. This will occur
after having recorded in the land registry that the amount of money paid for land
service is due as a first rank mortgage or, at the latest, ten years after the land has
been serviced.
This financing method has advantages for all the involved parties. For the landowner, A win-win situation for
both the commune and
the landowner
it is convenient because there is no need to take care of land service and no money
to disburse. There is also a strong incentive to sell the land, as in the medium term,
a large amount of money is due. Companies are the ultimate beneficiaries of this
policy, because they can move in more quickly and easily; further, they look for
already serviced land28. The commune finances the project through the leverage that
the mortgage they impose on the concerned plots provides. They also have a guar-
antee that they will recover the investment, because the mortgage contract expires in
case of sale, development or at the latest after ten 10 years. Further, the commune
can decide upon the schedule of land service.
4.1.5.7 Revocation of local development plans
The interviewed mayor29 mentions that during the 2013 building regulations revision,
several local development plans were abolished: the development they planned in-
volved a betterment of land that could not be done any more, because some of the
plots they regulated had been developed in the meantime. As a consequence, the
local development plans lost most of their relevance.
In other cases, the abolishment of local development plans aimed to reduce the Low rent as critical
factor?restrictions to development, i.e. on the type or aesthetics of constructions, garden
trees and hedges, specific measures for cars, bikes or pedestrians, etc., because they
were perceived as impeding construction. Officials and planners mention several times
the inadequacy of the types of building considered in the local development plans with
current housing demand30. From the landowners’ viewpoint, the low construction
activity can also be explained by an insufficient added economic value that the sale of
land would grant. As shown in the next case study, solutions to the economic value
issue can be an increase of the land use coefficient in order to gain a higher return –
this has to be in accordance with aesthetic considerations and is subject to approval
28M. Allemann,op. cit.
29M. Allemann, op. cit.
30M. Allemann, op. cit.; M. Jampen, head of the communal administration, and H.-J. Muralt,
mayor of Huttwil, both interviewed in Huttwil the 13 August 2014; R. Suter, head of planning in
Niederbipp, interviewed in Niederbipp 8 July 2014.
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by local inhabitants (section 4.2.5.2), or a reduction of the expected economic return
(section 4.2.5.3).
4.1.6 Impact on value redistribution
The case of Wiedlisbach has shown a value redistribution process that goes againstValue redistribution leads
to urban expansion the constitutional land use planning principle of an economic use of soil. The trans-
formation of undeveloped plots in the village centre into unbuildable green zones,
allows the commune to reduce two hectares of surface counted by cantonal author-
ities as undeveloped building zone. The withdrawn surfaces are either entire plots,
parts of plots, or remaining reserves. Remaining reserves are reduced to surfaces
smaller than 500m2, which allows complete subtraction from the building zone calcu-
lus. As a counterpart to this reduction, additional development rights are negotiated
by specific landowners, including additional constructible surfaces or garages. This
micro-zoning approach leads to a (temporary) crystallization of "construction holes"
within the building zone.
In 2014, the commune has gained through the subtraction of unused buildingReduction of ecological
value in the middle run zones a margin of manoeuvrability towards the canton. Afterwards, it launches a new
zoning process of approximately one hectare outside of the current settlement limits
where it reuses part of the "economised" building zone. Such an operation results in
small scale urban sprawl. The ecological value of non built plots in the village centre
(some of which are orchards) preserved through the green zone is compensated by the
development of agricultural land outside of town.
As seen in section 4.1.3.2, market conditions have been more favourable for theA rather favourable
market after all? construction and sale of individual houses: there has been a significant price drop for
single family homes over the last 20 years. But this value change does not stop the
village’s expansion process, as the landowners concerned by the new zoning process
pressure the commune to be included in the building zone (many are even willing to
sign an emption right on the zoned land). This fact limits the explanation provided
by the supposedly unfavourable housing market.
The economic outcome of the building zone transfer creates two distinct economicCreation of medium-term
economic value effects:
1. a partial and a priori temporary reduction of value on the plots in the green
zone. It is partial, because for some landowners zoning does not modify their
construction potential (no effective reduction of the plot ratio), others have
negotiated a compensation in kind (an effective extension of the plot ratio) that
will apply when their plot will return to the building zone. The value reduction
is temporary, because if the landowners of the green zone want to build in the
future, they can ask the commune to be put back into the building zone when
the next revision of building regulations occurs (approximately every ten years).
2. an increase of economic value in the new building zone of the Gerzmatt: (1
hectare * 260CHF/m2)–20%31= 2,000,000 francs32. Therefore, an overall added
economic value is created.
In terms of ecological value, the building zone extension creates a net loss of 1Reduction of
medium-term ecological
value
hectare of fertile land protected by the cropland protection plan. The effects of the
green zone are considered equal to zero, because the green zone only maintains the
existing ecological value of the orchards. In the middle time frame, part of the plots
in the green zone will be developed and the ecological value of these plots will decrase.
The case has shown an extensive exchange of resources between the involved act-Extensive use of
resources ors (law, consensus, political support): through the negotiations conducted with the
landowners and the instruments created in the 2013 building regulations, a consensus
was achieved on a temporary suspension of development rights. However, the polit-
ical support of the inhabitants was obtained only after a reduction of the commune’s
zoning ambitions. Nonetheless, the commune managed to pass on all land service
costs linked with the extension of its building zone to the landowner and capture part
of the added value they had created.
In order to achieve its building zone extension strategy, the commune combined theCombination of public
and private law
instruments 31Tax on added land value created through zoning applied according to M. Allemann. op. cit.32Land price estimation based on Wüest and Partner (2014); a plot ratio of 0.4 and an initial land
value of 8CHF/m2 are hypothesised; land service costs and benefits are not considered.
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use of public and private law instruments: they traded new legal obligations created
by the green zone against additional development rights and several “guarantees”
(an exemption from the tax on added value, priority zoning rights). The commune
proposed an innovative solution: a "voluntary building obligation" to landowners
reluctant to be included in the green zone. Further, the commune used the added
value created by the building zone extension to ensure payment by the landowner of
(1) the land service and of (2) the tax on added value created through zoning. The
commune also secured the area’s development through the signature of an (3) emption
right.
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4.2 Reduction of oversized building zones in Hut-
twil
4.2.1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years, Huttwil has experienced moderate urban growth and
maintained a high ratio between employment and inhabitants despite a small demo-
graphic decline. The limited regional attraction of Huttwil makes it hard for the
commune to compete with more central locations as well as to retain inhabitants.
Over the past decades, the commune dealt with a lack of available building zones,
a need to reduce oversized building zones, and the difficulty to pass on development
costs to landowners. In fact, for a long time, land service was entirely paid for through
public funds. Landowners expected a higher rent from their land than what the land
market offers33, so they blocked development in existing building zones. Local au-
thorities tried to reduce these oversized building zones, but faced a lack of political
support and had no financial mean to pay a potential compensation. At the same
time, they mobilised public land and reduced expected land rent compared to market
prices. This allowed development, and thus contributed to communal objectives of
fighting demographic decline (Commune of Huttwil, 2009b, 7).
The case study is structured as follows:
− section 4.2.2 shows land use planning and land use changes that occurred in
Huttwil over the past 25 years;
− section 4.2.3 exposes the contextual factors that contributed to land use policy
outputs and land use changes;
− section 4.2.4 presents the legal constraints of superior law that contributed to
land use policy outputs;
− section 4.2.5 analyses how actors have mobilised policy instruments and re-
sources in order to achieve their goals and exposes what arrangements they
have negotiated;
− section 4.1.6 presents the variables’ impact on economic and ecological value
redistribution.
Located in the southern Oberaargau, Huttwil is, along with Herzogenbuchsee and
Niederbipp, one of the three regional centres. It is located in the upper Langete valley,
15 km southwards of Langenthal and at the western border of the Canton of Lucerne.
The communal territory is marked by a river bed, along which the settlement area
is developed, but also by various smaller valleys and other tributary rivers. The hills
around Huttwil do not exceed 750 meters, and are mostly dedicated to agricultural
use. The train line that crosses town connects the commune with Langenthal in the
north, and Lucerne in the east. The canton’s main road connects to Burgdorf in the
west and Sursee in the east.
33C. Schneider, architect and urban planner, Schneider Partner, interviewed in Burgdorf 16
September 2014; M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
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Figure 4.4: Overview map of Huttwil and its neighbourhoods. Map: swisstopo
(2014a).
4.2.2 Evolution of land use planning and land use
4.2.2.1 Zoning changes in 1977 and their effects from 1977 to 1994
The oldest available zoning plan dates back to 1977, and shows a series of slight modi- A farmer’s desire to get
their plots zoned out. . .fications made until 1981. The approval procedure was subject to major negotiations
between landowners, the commune and the cantonal planning office (AGR, 1977),
because important land surfaces at the limits of the urbanized area were zoned out
(not shown on the map). This reduction of building zone happened at the request of a
single landowner who cultivated his land, had no intention to develop it, and therefore
asked the commune to pu this plots out of the building zone. The commune, under
pressure from the canton as well as the Confederation (due to the enactment of the
emergency federal decree in 1972), negotiated a 15 year building prohibition easement
on the plots of several landowners in the building zone.
According to the cantonal planning office, the use of building prohibition easements . . . used as argument to
zone other owners outis limited by the cantonal legislator for the fulfillment of planning purposes. Its use
should remain temporary and exceptional. The cantonal office judged the communal
implementation of the instrument for a 15 year period inadequate and asserted that
a zone change to agricultural zone is more opportune. They removed several plots
at the border of the settlement area from the building zo based on the following two
arguments (AGR, 1977):
1. land in the building zone should be used within the next 10 to 15 years;
2. one of the concerned farmers refuses to keep his plots in the building zone;
for reasons of equal treatment between landowners, other plots in a a similar
situation also have to change zone.
As a counterpart to this decision, the canton cancelled all reserved zones estab-
lished by the federal emergency decree. For the landowners, this meant a removal of
use restrictions on the concerned plots and for the commune, it meant regaining its
planning autonomy.
Despite these important zoning operations, huge building zone reserves still exist Important housing and
industrial development(numbered "1" on figure 4.5). These reserves date back to a time of tight inter-
relatedness between communal and landowners’ interests39. These reserves allowed
34The first trace of a local development actually dates back to 1961 (AGR, 1977), when a common
development plan was established for Sonnhalde and Thomasbode (AGR, 1985, 1998b, 2011).
35Decision of the 18.09.1997 (AGR, 1997)
36Revision dates collected from overview table established by the cantonal planning office. The only
accessible decision was the Decision of the 10.12.2012 (AGR, 2012), which foresees the development
of the still undeveloped upper part of the zone.
37Decision of the 07.08.1998 (AGR, 1998b).
38Revision dates collected from overview table established by the cantonal planning office. Only
accessible decision was the Decision of the 18.09.1997 (AGR, 1997).
39C. Schneider, op. cit.; M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
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When Land use planning changes Land use changes
1977 Approval of the revised building regulations and
repeal of the provisory protected areas established
by the emergency federal decree in 1972. Revision
of the local development plan of Thomasbode34
Part of Dänechnubel
already developed
1979 Adaptation of zoning plan in Chrummacher and
Rüttistalden (AGR, 1979a)
Partial development
of Chrummacher
and Rüttistalden in
the following years
1985 Approval of the revision of the local development
plan Thomasbode
–
1994 Approval of the revised communal building regula-
tions (AGR, 1994a)
–
1995 Extension of the local development plan Dälechnu-
bel;
Development of
Dälechnubel in the
following years
1997 Approval of revised local development plan for
Sonnegg35; approval of revised local development
plan for Sonnhalde east (AGR, 1997); revision of
the the local development plan for Dälechnubel36
Development of Son-
nhalde east in the
following years
1998 Revision of the local development plans of
Sonnegg37, Revision of the local development plan
for Dälechnubel; revision of the local development
plan for Thomasbode
–
2000 Revision of the local development plan of Dälechnu-
bel.
Progressive develop-
ment of Dälechnubel
2001 Approval of local development plan for Sonnhalde
west
–
2002 Revision of the local development plan for Son-
nhalde west38.
Development of Son-
nhalde west
2011 Approval of the revised building regulations; fol-
lowing adaptation of local development plans of
Thomasbode, Sonnegg and Hohlen
–
2014 Revision of the local development plan of Sonnegga –
Table 4.2: Main land use planning and land use changes in Huttwil since 1977.
aThe revision has yet to be approved according to the interview of communal representative M.
Jampen, op. cit.
several developments between 1975 and 1994: one can notice the construction of
the industrial zone that occurred in Rüttistalden. Further, entire housing neigh-
bourhoods were erected in Weieracher, Lochmüli, Neuhuus, Dornacher and between
Rüttistalden and Chrummacher. Most construction was single family homes, except
in Weieracher (east) where single family homes and three storey apartment buildings
are interspersed.Development of building
zones depends on
landowner
Not all building zones are developed, and a gap between zoning and effective land
use persists. This hoarding is seen in the case of four wide housing zones, designated
at the end of the 1970s, and undeveloped at the time of data collection in 2014
(numbered "2" on figure 4.5): Sonnegg, Hohlen and Thomasbode in the centre north;
the fourth area is the Hueb in the centre west of the commune. But this hoarding
is not a general phenomenon: in the area of Weieracher in the east, where the land
is owned by the Herdgemeinde, a semi-public owner, one can observe only a single
undeveloped plot remains – the wider free plots in Weieracher are part of the working
zone.
4.2.2.2 Building regulations revision of 1994 and land use changes from
1994 to 2011
The 1994 revision aimed to coordinate landscape, development and transport infra-Availability already a
central issue. . . structure by "simple land use planning means" such as building regulations and zoning
plans (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 20). As mentioned in the objectives regarding to
land development, the availability of undeveloped building zone is a central issue, as
well as the parsimonious use of land (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 21). Similar to the
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other case studies, the revision is also conditioned by the new cantonal construction
and land use planning law, in particular the mandatory participatory mechanisms40.
Willingness to increase densification was also central, as the occupation coefficients
have been elevated in each zone, and the minimal distances between buildings have
been reduced. The introduction of the ZPP in the new building regulations and
the creation of seven zones alike indicate a shift towards enhanced coherence and
aesthetics, and reduced land consumption of new housing zones.
The Huttwilberg (ZPP Holen, Sonnegg and Thomasbode – numbered "2" on figure . . . that remains
untackled4.5) and the area of Dälechnubel (numbered "3" on figure 4.5) were considered the
most promising locations for future housing, as the land has a low agricultural value
due to its steepness, and immissions (i.e. street noise) are low (Commune of Huttwil,
1992). However, the determining factors remained the willingness of landowners to
develop their land. Although this fact was acknowledged as a central issue in the
revision documents, no remedy was proposed or suggested (Commune of Huttwil,
1992; AGR, 1994a). Nevertheless, the 1994 revision brought the following changes: No extension of the
housing zone
− firstly, the land located in the Allmend/am Berg is unzoned (numbered "4" on
figure 4.5 – light purple). This zone change is similar to the other important
unzoning processes of 1977 where the land was still used for agriculture41;
− secondly, the zoning plan is defined more in detail: protected areas and certain
danger areas along the Langete river are now recorded into the map, and specific
areas less fit for development have been placed within a green zone;
− thirdly, other modifications around the industrial zone were made (numbered
"5" on figure 4.5): the southwest part belonging to the housing zone was unzoned
because it was considered too exposed to noise. Further, important extensions
of the industrial zone were made on land owned by the Herdgemeinde, one of
the town’s statutory corporations.
− fourthly, a wide area in the south west is zoned in as institutional zone for a
school and a sports centre (numbered "6" on figure 4.5);
In matters of construction, when compared to the period 1974–1994, a clear re- The Herdgemeinde as the
only active landownerduction in building activity is observable: only two new neighbourhoods were erected:
Sonnhalde and the first part of Dälechnubel (respectively numbered "7" and "3" on
figure 4.5). All plots are owned by the Herdgemeinde. Three plots currently remain
undeveloped and, at the time of writing, available on the housing market. Further,
several non built plots scattered across the urbanized areas were developed, but there
are still important differences between zoning and land use:
− the extensions of the industrial zone remain undeveloped until 2014 (beige
squares)
− the three zones on the Huttwilberg and the one of Hueb remain not built
(numbered "2" on figure 4.5).
4.2.2.3 Building regulations revision of 2011
During the 2011 revision of the building regulations, several small changes occurred: Limited changes in terms
of zoningThe first was the extension of the industrial zone in Galgemoos (light yellow on the
map). The second change concerned two zoning out procedures (numbered "8" and
in dark purple on figure 4.5): the first zoning out concerned the plot north of the
Langete, that has become part of the institutional zone. The adjacent construction
up north is the town’s hospital. Therefore, no compensation was due. The second was
the a plot in Neuhuus, but no further information could be obtained on this matter.
The third change concerns the local development plans of Thomasbode, Hohlen Local policy change
passing on land service
costs to landowners
and Sonnegg (numbered "2" on figure 4.5). The underlying development plans and
prescriptions for these zones have been revised because communal regulations now
anticipate passing all land service costs on to landowners. Additionally, the ground’s
40Art. 58 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
41However, no information could be found in regard to the underlying negotiations.
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steepness makes land service difficult. Communal authorities raised the density coeffi-
cient of these three zones in order to compensate for the additional costs for landown-
ers and the reduced constructible surface of Thomasbode. This case is analysed in
section 4.2.5.2.Tax for advantages
conceded through zoning The commune is granted the possibility to ask landowners that benefit, via zoning,
from increased land value to contribute to land service costs42. The adopted solution
grants a wide margin of negotiation, as it does not fix a minimal amount, and prac-
tically returns the taxed amount to the landowner in the form of land service and
improvements. The creation of added economic value is contractually redistributed
to the landowner."Voluntary building
obligation" In order to foster land availability, planning documents refer to the possibility
of signing agreements with landowners in anticipation of an emption right if the
landowner does not develop their plot within a certain timeframe (Commune of Hut-
twil, 2007, 21ff).
42Art. 27-4 of the Building regulations of 8 December 2010 of the commune of Huttwil.
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4.2.3 Contextual factors
4.2.3.1 Demographic evolution
The case of Huttwil is of particular interest to the research, because it is a communeSlightly shrinking
population whose demography is in decline, yet whose settlement area continues to grow. Over
the last 21 years (1992-2013), Huttwil’s population has shrunk by 55 inhabitants,
(from 4757 to 4702), a reduction of 1,2% (FSO, 2015c). Compared to the neigh-
bour communes, Huttwil shows stronger resistance to population emigration than
Wyssachen, Eriswil, Rohrbachgraben or Gondiswil (these communes lost, on average,
10% of their population).
Compared to regional, cantonal and Swiss averages, Huttwil is far below regional,Change goes against
regional and cantonal
tendencies
cantonal, and national growth rates (7%, 6.2% and 17.5% total growth or 0.34%,
0.28% and 0.8% annual growth, respectively).
Over the preceding 15 years considered for the revision of the building regulations
(1991-2006), nominal population decline of 108 inhabitants, corresponds to -2,2%.
Over the whole period, this represented an annual decline rate of -0.15%. These
numbers are under regional (3,46% overall and 0.23% per year), cantonal (5,75% and
0.38%), and national growth averages (13.28% and 0.89%).
In terms of housing, the communal vacancy rate between 2001 and 2011 increased
slightly, but remained rather low at 2.3% in 2011 (FSO and Kanton Bern, 2015). This
low occupancy rate contrasts with the demographic decline, and may be explained
through the progressive vacancy of existing homes, as well as a lower occupancy rate
of new homes. As shown for the case of Wiedlisbach (see section 4.1.4.2 and section
4.2.4.1 below), the cantonal building zone calculus takes into account the increase of
gross floor area used per inhabitant over time.
4.2.3.2 Economic and fiscal evolution
Compared to other communes of the region, inhabitants of the commune have fiscal ca-High concentration of
jobs pacity above regional average (910CHF per month compared to an average of 825CHF
per month). With approximately one job per two inhabitants, the job supply is also
far above average (30 jobs per 100 persons regionally). Huttwil hosts the electric bike
producer Biketec, which accounts for 125 jobs.
Tax rates for natural persons is slightly above the regional average (1.65 in HuttwilTax level above regional
average and 1.59 on average), like the rates of the other communes in southern Oberaargau
(FIN, 2014). Land tax rates are also slightly above regional average (1.2 instead
of 1.12) (FIN, 2015). Despite the fact that Huttwil has lowered both the revenue
tax (from 1.89 to 1.65) and the land tax (from 1.5 to 1.2) over the last decade, the
commune’s rates remain above regional average, which points to a lower competitive-
ness43.
In regard to the evolution of land prices, only a region wide analysis can be made.Relatively low land prices
Interviewees have confirmed the relatively low land prices estimated by Wuest and
Partner (2014): between 180 and 300CHF/m2 for serviced land intended for single
family homes. If I refer to other price data (SRED, 2014) that uses transaction prices
of single family homes, (between 2004 and 2013), there is a slight price increase from
620,000CHF to 700,000CHF.
4.2.3.3 Topographic and spatial characteristics
Located in a hilly landscape, Huttwil’s shape is profoundly marked by the LangeteA rather hilly landscape
valley in which it is located. The Huttwilberg marks the northern border of the
settlement area with a altitude difference of 100 meters between the river and the
plateau uphill. The slope on the southern side of town is less steep, and grants access
to two hills of similar height as the Huttwilberg.
In terms of access, Huttwil is crossed by a regional train line that connects toLonger commuting
distances than in
northern Oberaargau
Langenthal (20 minutes ride) every half an hour and to Lucerne (1 hour ride) almost
every half an hour. Thus, the center of Huttwil is classified as “C” in the cantonal
public transport access categories. In terms of individual transport, distance to the
closest motorway entry is about 30 km, which, compared to the other regional centres
43M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
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of Oberaargau, is far. Driving to Berne takes approximately an hour, Lucerne 50
minutes and Solothurn 40 minutes.
4.2.4 Constraints of superior law
4.2.4.1 Cantonal building zone calculus
The revision documents of 1994 (AGR, 1994b) mentions a growth objective of 0.75% Optimistic growth
objectiveper year, which corresponds to 36 additional inhabitants. This objective is based on
the population difference between 1960 and 1970, the difference being extrapolated for
the estimate (Commune of Huttwil, 1992). The 1980s were a decade of stagnation for
the commune, with the years 1988, and 1989, constituting an exception (2% growth
both years).
The building zone calculus of 2011 and 1994 are similar. Nonetheless, two elements Same building zone needs
as 20 years ago. . .change: the population growth estimate now relies on a canton wide estimate which
unifies the regional demographic disparities. Secondly, there is now a zoning bonus
granted to regional centres (such as Huttwil) designated as "strategic growth factor"
if they are willing to raise the minimum plot ratio of their building zones.
In 1994, the building zone needs were estimated between 11.7 and 12.8 ha with
a population growth of 11.25% over 15 years, which corresponds to a yearly growth
of 0.75% (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 26). Calculated with today’s formula (4%
population growth over 15 years, centrality bonus and higher gross floor surface per
inhabitant), the size of the needed building zone is approximately 11 ha, a surface
very similar to the results provided by the old calculation formula (11.7 ha). In other
words, if Huttwil were a rural commune, and had no higher density requirements, and
no centrality bonus44, it would be allowed almost as the same surface of new building
zone than 20 years ago. Consequently, the evolution of the calculation method has
only had a marginal impact on the Huttwil’s building zone quota, (between 0.7 to 1.8
ha less building zone is now allowed) despite an actually shrinking population.
In 2011, the building zone needs were still around 11 ha, despite a population . . . despite a shrinking
populationlevel corresponding to the one of 1988 (Commune of Huttwil, 2006; FSO, 2015c) and
moderate construction activity (light grey surfaces on figure 4.5). The land that
has been developed between 1994 and 2004 corresponds to approximately one third
of existing building zone reserves (Commune of Huttwil, 2007, 12)45.
4.2.4.2 Position of the cantonal offices
Similar to the first Case study analysed, cantonal offices involved in the building Limited intervention in
communal policyregulations procedure rarely question the relevance of communal policy. As an ex-
ample, the agricultural office remarks that some building zone extensions (working
zone in Rüttistalde and cantonal sports centre in Schwarzenbach) occur on protected
cropland. Further, the office of economic development’s main purpose is to service
plots in the building zone and lower building restrictions in the working zone in order
to foster its development. The cantonal planning office notices that the commune’s
growth prognosis is optimistic and that the calculations in regard to building zone
capacity "are characterized by important imprecisions" (AGR, 1994b, 5f), but does
not interfere in the definition of the zoning perimeter.
In the 2011 revision, the other cantonal offices involved in the revision procedure
did not comment on building zone capacities or calculation (AGR, 2011).
44According to the cantonal structure plan (measure C02), the regions define so called regional
centres of fourth level. These centres have the task of attracting employers, be multifunctional
suppliers (in terms of public services for the surrounding communes), and become central traffic
junctions (Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012, 5). These responsibilities usually lead to
them being granted a "wider margin of manoeuvrability while determining the size and location of
zones" (Kanton Bern, 2011, measure C 02) which is then implemented in the form of a strategic
development factor part of the building zone needs calculus.
45The planning report of 1992 estimates 18,6 ha of housing zone reserves (Commune of Huttwil,
1992, 50). According to the 2007 planning report (Commune of Huttwil, 2007), 5.5 ha have been
built since then.
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4.2.5 Local use of instruments
4.2.5.1 Implementation of the tax on added land value created through
zoning as land service tax
In the initial works linked to the revision of the building regulations of 2006, the mainConflict between growth
objectives and rent
capture
problem for communal authorities is the availability of building land (Commune of
Huttwil, 2006, 14). As interviewees46 and planning documents mention, communal
priority is to foster development, growth and construction (Commune of Huttwil,
2007, 21).
Interviewees argue that the introduction of a tax on added land value created
through zoning would have been a threat to these objectives, because it would have
placed additional financial constraints on the landowners (who are already resistant
to land service costs) 47. This difficulty is due to the fact that until the 2000s, land
service costs were fully paid by tax money. However, the worsening of communal
finances led to a change of practice: newly approved local development plans have
been accompanied by a contractual agreement (Infrastrukturvertrag) that passed on
part of the land service costs to the landowners. Further since the revision of build-
ing regulations in 2011, article 27 par. 4 states that the communal executive body
can require financial participation in land service from landowners who benefit from
planning measures. The commune uses added value created through zoning in order
to require landowners’ financial participation to land service they benefit from.
This formal transfer of costs required the elaboration of new local development
plans for all remaining undeveloped perimeters. As the costs division between com-
mune and landowners are transcribed into a contract that both parties have to sign,
some of the landowners simply refused to approve them if they judged the conditions
of the new agreement not favourable enough48.
As the case of Thomasbode shows (see section 4.2.5.2 below), it is only through theChange of plot ratio to
ensure the pass on of
service costs
adoption of a higher plot ratio that certain landowners agreed to carry a major part
of the land service costs. But in order to lower the land service costs to be carried,
commune and landowner have agreed in two recently signed contracts that part of
the roads foreseen in the local development plans would remain in private property.
This allowed for the application of lower and thus cheaper construction norms than
if they were to be transferred to the public domain after development49.
4.2.5.2 Land hoarding and the case of Thomasbode
A central challenge for the commune was and is to deal with the availability of land
in the building zone (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 11). The area of Thomasbode
illustrates the problem at stake. The areas of Sonnegg and Hohlen further west are
characterized by the same hoarding issue: land kept in the building zone for decades
and their owners making little effort to improve or develop it.
Located on the southern hillside of the Huttwilberg, at the northern border ofNo will to pay for land
service the settlement area, the area of Thomasbode was zoned in the 1970s. Since then, at
least two local development plans were approved, one in 1985 and one in 1998 (AGR,
1985, 1998a)50. The plan from 1998 was linked to a land service contract signed
between the commune and the landowners. The contract stated that the commune
would finance the major part of the land service. However, the landowners did not
engage in any planning measure until 2006, where one of the three owners launched
a planning procedure and formally asked the commune to fulfill its obligations and
service the land.Transfer of plots into
medium danger zone The land’s development was subject to two major difficulties. First, nine water
catchments (to which private and public use rights are attached) were located within
the designated perimeter, and the construction of the connecting road might have
destroyed several of them(Kellerhals and Haefeli AG, 2010). Second, upon imple-
mentation of the communal hazard map in 2009, the entire zone was defined as a
medium hazard area (level 2 out of 3) where construction is fundamentally allowed,
46M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
47M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
48C. Schneider, op. cit.
49C. Schneider, op. cit.
50It could not be confirmed that no previous plan existed.
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but subject to protection measures ensuring the safety of humans, animals, and major
valuables (art. 6 BauG). Therefore, the area of Thomasbode could not be developed
solely based on the local development plan from 1998.
As the revision of the communal building regulations went on, uncertainty on Potential zoning out
how to deal with Thomasbode persisted: the canton stood in favour of taking the
area out of the building zone, arguing that no compensation would be due because
of the hazard zone in which it was located. The local planning revision committee
disagreed: despite the legal restrictions imposed by the danger zone or the difficulty
to service the land, the commune had an obligation to compensate landowners for
their rights(Commune of Huttwil, 2011). The communal executive body, initially in
favour of removing the area from the building zone (Commune of Huttwil, 2009a), was
stuck in between the local planning committee and the cantonal authority’s opposed
positions.
In order not to delay the ongoing building regulations revision process, the com- Establishment of a
reserved zonemunal executive body decided, in 2009, to transform the building zone into a reserved
zone51. This zone change allowed to suspend planning and land service activities in
the concerned perimeter for a minimum of two years. This delay granted the commune
the necessary time to mandate a constructibility study that would confirm or infirm
the technical feasibility of developing the area of Thomasbode (Commune of Huttwil,
2011, 2). When the report was handed to the comune in 2010, the constructibility of
the perimeter was confirmed and the zoning out option vanished.
In 2011, the reserve zone was replaced by a smaller building zone with modified Third local development
planproportions adapted to the new future construction – conceived as so called Ter-
rassenhäuser. This new zone facilitates development, and guarantees a similar level
of return on investment, even with a new contract between commune and landowner
where the latter bears all land service costs52. The plot ratio has been raised in order
to compensate the surface loss, and transfer the costs of land service fully to the
landowner. What I observe here is the use of the commune’s legal authority to com-
pensate for the economic reduced value carried by the landowners and the commune’s
executive body aversion for fights with elected representatives and landowners, an at-
titude that is can be observed frequently in the canton of Berne when it comes to
building zone reductions53.
The underlying third local development plan is currently being elaborated, and
uncertainty about the actual development of Thomasbode remains. Indeed, no build-
ing obligation applies and the commune has no legal remedy to force the owner to
build.
4.2.5.3 Building rights
The case of the Herdgemeinde is an example showing landowners’ rent expectation as An important part of the
commmune’s territory in
semi-public hands
a factor of land development. The Herdgemeinde is a major landowner of the com-
mune and one of Huttwil’s two Burgergemeinde54. The Herdgemeinde has ownership
titles on the entire eastern part of the city, namely the entire industrial zone, the
neighbourhoods of Weieracher and Dälechnubel, and on most of the fields and forests
located north of town (for a total of approximately 300 hectares, of which 38 hectares
are part of the building zone) (Herdgemeinde Huttwil, 2014).
The land use policy of the Herdgemeinde is to keep formal property rights on land Cheap building land
availableand to issue 60 year building rights on plots (Herdgemeinde Huttwil, 2014). This is
true for agricultural land as well as building zones. In terms of housing, current rent
price for single family homes and apartment buildings is around 3.25CHF/m2 per
year, adapted every five years to the Swiss consumer price index. The building right
holder can sell and transmit their rights to a third person. At the end of the contract,
if not renewed, the landowner buys the construction erected by the right holder at
approximately 80% of the average of capitalized income value55 and real value con-
51A reserved zone is a non constructible zone used for a limited period of time in order to ensure
the fulfillment of planning objectives. See also art. 62 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
52According to M. Jampen, op. cit.
53S. Ghioldi, lawyer, communal and regional planning, Amt für Gemeinden und Raumordnung,
interviewed in Berne 27 July 2014.
54Basically a commune without territory
55Capitalized income value is the potential return in the form of rent that can be obtained from the
buildings; real value corresponds to the value of buildings over time, in addition to their improvements
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sidered jointly. For industrial land, rent price is 3.15CHF/m2 per year, adapted every
five years up to 80% of the Swiss consumer price index. The contract is signed for
a renewable period of 60 years. If zoning plans have changed or new construction is
anticipated, building destruction costs are subtracted from the purchase price of the
house, (effectively carried by the building right holder/home owner).
However, the risk of a price drop, in case the house is sold, is carried by theLimited price fluctuations
landowner and not the building right holder, because the building right holder only
sells the produced part (the house and the land service) based essentially on effective
construction costs and not on land prices56. Table 4.3 shows the differences between
the acquisition of a building right and of a formal property title:
Building right Formal property right
Land property tax Paid by the Herdgemeinde Paid by land/home owner
Land service Paid by building right
holder/home owner
Included in total price if
plot is serviced
Land No transfer of property
title
Property title included in
price
Construction Paid by building right
holder/home owner
Paid by land/home owner
Duration of
ownership
60 years renewable Unlimited
Disposal Transferable and inherit-
able
Transferable and inherit-
able
Property
transfer tax
1.8% 1.8%
Rental costs/benefits
for 10 years
landownership
(based on a 500 m2
plot in Huttwil from
2004 to 2014 without
construction and
land service prices)
-16,300CHF, thus an
annual rent of 1.625%a
Based on regional land
prices (Wüest and Partner,
2014): -44,200CHF b
Based on constant land
prices: -9,200CHF c
Based on lake Geneva
prices: +516,8000CHF d
Table 4.3: Legal and economic comparison of the cost of land based on building rights
and formal property rights in the case of Huttwil from 2004 to 2014. Data: Commune
of Huttwil (2014); Wüest and Partner (2014). Own calculations. Calculations do not
consider building deprecation.
aBased on a land price of 195CHF/m2. This corresponds to the accumulated rent over the
60 years of the building right. It also corresponds to current land price estimates by Wüest and
Partner (2014).
b 95,000CHF (sell price 2014: 190CHF/m2*500=95,000CHF) minus 130,000CHF (ac-
quisition price 2004: 260CHF/m2*500=130,000CHF) minus 1,600CHF (land property
tax: 130,000CHF*1.2%*10 years=1,600CHF) minus 1,700CHF (property transfer tax:
95,000CHF*1.8%=1,700CHF) equals -38,300CHF
c 130,000CHF (acquisition price 2004: 260CHF/m2*500=130,000CHF) minus 130,000CHF
(sell price 2014: 260CHF/m2*500=130,000CHF) minus 1,600CHF (land property tax:
130,000CHF*1.2%*10 years=1,600CHF) minus 2,300CHF (property transfer tax:
130,000CHF*1.8%=2,300CHF) equals -3,900CHF.
d 825,000CHF (sell price 2014: 1,650CHF/m2*500=825,000CHF) minus 275,000CHF
(acquisition price 2004: 550CHF/m2*500=275,000CHF) minus 3,300CHF (land prop-
erty tax: 275,000CHF*1.2%*10=9,300CHF) minus 14,900CHF (property transfer tax:
825,000CHF*1.8%=14,900CHF) equals 516,800CHF.
Taking into consideration the lowering of land prices over the past ten (or twenty)Building rights as an
opportunity for middle
class families?
years in Oberaargau, the building rights model is economically more profitable than
the full property rights model. However, as soon as land prices stabilise, the full
property rights model is slightly more profitable. In comparison with the evolution of
land prices from around Lake Geneva, the instrument provides a good counterexample
of how the instrument building can neutralise rent. With the building right price of
(Federal Chancellery, 2014).
56In a central highly asked location, building right prices will also grow according to the demand,
but this growth will be more limited than in a full property model, because the building right ends
in the medium/long term, but not the property title.
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3.25CHF/m2, the Herdgemeinde offers cheaper housing possibilities for middle class
income families that can afford a 500,000 francs loan in order to build their house but
not a 630,000 francs loan. Further, the building right model is also financially more
stable and predictable, because it is unaffected or marginally affected by land price
variations. In the full property model, land prices can turn a household’s investment
into a financial black hole or a winning lottery ticket.
But perhaps more relevant are the different housing costs of various housing models Small price increase
favours the capital
intensive model
as shown in table 4.4: for a ten year period, without considering capital requirements
for contracting a loan, the building rights model as it is structured in Huttwil is the
cheapest solution. As soon as land prices slightly increase – the 1% price growth
chosen here is purely hypothetical, the full property model becomes economically less
costly. In comparison to the property models, the rental model is among the costliest
way of housing, but the only one that people with low savings can afford; renting is
the most prevalent form of housing in Switzerland (FSO, 2016).
Housing model 10 years housing costs
Full property
(Oberaargau prices)
158,300CHF a
Full property
(1%/year price increase)
59,200CHF b
Building right 94,500CHF c
Rental housing 130,000CHF d
Table 4.4: Comparison of housing costs in rental, building right and full property
models over the 10 years between 2004 and 2014 in Huttwil. Data: Commune of Hut-
twil (2014); Wüest and Partner (2014); FSO (2016); FSO (2016). Own calculations.
a 630,000CHF (acquisition price) minus 105,000CHF (mortgage interests based on a
420,000CHF mortgage (2/3 of 630,000CHF – 1/3 owner’s capital, 2/3 mortgage), which is com-
posed of the price of land (130,000CHF) and of the house with land service (500,000CHF),
at an average interest rate of 2.5%) minus 10,700CHF (property transfer tax 1.8%) minus
7,600CHF (land property tax 1.2%) plus 595,000CHF (sell price) equals -158,300CHF.
b 630,000CHF (acquisition price of land (130,000CHF) and of the house with land service
(500,000CHF)) minus 105,000CHF (mortgage interests based on a 420,000CHF mortgage (2/3
of 630,000CHF – 1/3 owner’s capital, 2/3 mortgage) at an average interest rate of 2.5%) minus
12,500CHF (property transfer tax 1.8%) minus 7,600CHF (land property tax 1.2%) plus
695,900CHF (sell price) equals -59,200CHF.
c 500,000CHF (acquisition price of the house with land service) minus 83,800CHF (mort-
gage interests based on a 335,000CHF mortgage (2/3 of 500,000CHF – 1/3 owner’s capital, 2/3
mortgage) at an average interest rate of 2.5%) minus 10,700CHF (property transfer tax 1.8%)
plus 500,000CHF (sell price) equals -94,500CHF.
dAverage 10 year rent for a five rooms flat in a rural commune of the canton of Berne between
2000 and 2014 (FSO, 2016).
Through the ex-course on the emphyteutic lease, I wanted to show that a demand Various explanations for
land hoarding?for housing in the region of Huttwil can exist, as the land of the Herdgemeinde’s
building land has been largely developed. Therefore, if the landowners in the other
parts of town do not develop their land, other interests prevail, such as the will to
save land for their children (see Burgergemeinde of Wiedlisbach in section 4.1.2.5, or
the expectancy of a higher financial return57.
4.2.6 Impact on value redistribution
The case of building zone reduction in Huttwil illustrated the limited margin of man- Local factors as main
explanationoeuvrability of the communal executive body when it comes to decide upon a with-
drawal of development rights. The communal executive body used the commune’s
obligation to establish a hazard map in order to suspend the planning process. It
then depoliticised the zoning issue by delegating the decision on the land’s construct-
ibility to external experts. Despite the legal feasibility of the outzoning operation –
the plots were not serviced, a withdrawal of development rights without compens-
ation is not acceptable for local actors. The communal authority does not risk to
decide against its planning committee (and the communal legislative body?) on the
57M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. Cit.; C. Schneider, op. cit.
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removal of the building zone in Thomasbode (or Sonnegg, Hueb or Hohlen), despite
the canton’s support on the issue.
The result of the building zone reduction is that a limited value redistributionDensification as value
compensation mechanism takes place where the commune resorts to an external expert in order to decide on
the land’s constructibility and elaborate an additional plan for the development of
Thomasbode. This renewed legal document brings two advantages to the commune:
the local authorities’ participation in land service costs is reduced and allows a reduc-
tion of approximately one third of the constructible perimeter (10,000m2), whereas it
increased the economic value on the landowners’ side. Rough estimations show that
the plot ratio changed from approx. 0.15 to 0.6458. In a future local development
plan, there will be a an ecological gain compared to previous plans, as a smaller sur-
face will be developed and part of the water catchments potentially preserved from
destruction.Collectivisation of private
costs An element that highlights the tight margin of manoeuvrability for the commune,
concerns the implementation of the land service tax and the tax on added land value
created through zoning. The shrinking land prices over (at least) the past fifteen
years59 worked against the landowners’ ambitions to value their property, despite the
communal financial support. For a long period of time, the commune financed the
land service.
But as the building rights model has shown, a morose land market does not excludeLow rent favours cheap
housing development. It only reduces the rent that landowners can obtain from land. As
semi-public landowner, the Herdgemeinde managed to create an amount of added
economic value they deemed sufficient (annual rent of 1.625% of a land value around
200CHF/m2) as well as attract new inhabitants into town.
58As it was not possible to access the architectural plans, I can only provide a rough estimate based
on the specifications from the local development plan. The perimeter’s size is of 220*45 meters) and
the distance between buildings has to be more than 4 but less than 8 meters (Commune of Huttwil,
2011). According to the local development plan, each house has a maximal size of 35*35 meters and
consists of 2 floors. Consequently, five houses can be built in the perimeter. Each house totals a
surface of 2*35m*35m = 2,450m2. If one takes into account the difference between size of building
and gross floor area (reduction coefficient of 0.8 (Ordre des architectes de France, 2012)) and reduces
by one third the gross floor area due to the structure of construction (Terassenhaus), the density
coefficient can be estimated as follows: 5*2,450*0.8*0.66/10,000 = 0.64.
59I could even argue that prices have been constant or slightly declining for the past 25 years,
because of the real estate crisis in Switzerland during the 1990s.
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4.3 Reuse of polluted soil in Niederbipp
4.3.1 Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, Niederbipp has experienced significant growth in terms of
both population and jobs. It is one of the three regional centres of Oberaargau (Region
Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012). The development of a regional industrial zone
is, in this thesis, of particular interest, because it involves the case of a polluted
field – a former communal landfill – transformed into an important logistics centre
almost without public financial support. The fact that it does not require remediation
turned out to be the determining factor for the project’s success. Further, Niederbipp
provides another example of implementation of the Bernese tax on added land value
created through zoning, which is of particular interest, as it shows that the applied
land price is of central concern to the tax’s effective implementation.
The case of Niederbipp is structured as follows:
− section 4.3.2 shows land use planning and land use changes over the past 25
years in Niederbipp;
− section 4.3.3 presents the contextual factors that shaped land use policy outputs
and land use changes;
− section 4.3.4 presents the legal constraints of superior law that shaped land use
policy outputs;
− section 4.3.5 analyses how actors have mobilised policy instruments and re-
sources in order to achieve their goals and exposes what arrangements they
have negotiated;
− section 4.3.6 presents the previously exposed variables’ impact on economic and
ecological value redistribution.
4.3.2 Evolution of land use planning and land use
4.3.2.1 Zoning changes in 1984
Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of zoning and actual land use. The first revision 1984 revision hardly
documentedtaken into consideration is from 1984, the previous one from 1956. According to the
canton (AGR, 1984, 3), main drivers for the revision are the reduction of the building
zone and the definition of a new industrial zone, the latter linked to the commune’s
connection to the N1 motorway. However, the only planning documents available
do not show where and how the building zone reductions occurred. Furthermore,
there is no calculus concerning the availability and needs of building zone60 nor in
the negotiations or opposition documents. The cantonal decree approves the zoning
plan without specific comment and only mentions that areas marked for placement
into the building zone in the future are "generous" in comparison to the existing
building zones (AGR, 1984, 6): the extension of the industrial zone is planned in two
different locations, in the north where the existing industrial zone is located, and in
the south-east, along the motorway. Important extensions of the working zone in the
south-west are also foreseen. Besides the extension of institutional zones (hospital,
kindergarten), no important changes are discussed or subject to contest, which implies
that the previously mentioned reduction of the building zone has been settled during
the revision process.
4.3.2.2 Land use changes between 1984 and 1993
Land use evolution during the following decade is rather modest (dark grey on the
map), although the time period considered is short compared to the other two case
studies61. Changes occur mainly in terms of public infrastructure (schools, retirement
homes), light industry up north, as well as individual housing construction scattered
across the existing settlement.
60By the time of approval of the building regulations, the Bernese spatial planning act had not
been revised according to the federal act yet.
61The time periods are based on the time maps provided by swisstopo (2014b).
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Figure 4.6: Overview map of Niederbipp. Data: (AGR, 1984; Commune of Nieder-
bipp, 1993b). Map: swisstopo (2014a).
4.3.2.3 Zoning plan revision of 1993
The building regulations revision of 1993 faced important issues: several perimetersSeveral zoning operations
were zoned, only one of the anticipated building zone extensions was realised, and
numerous opposition was formulated by landowners against the commune’s zoning
projects. Another important hurdle was the implementation of the cropland protec-
tion plan, a central concern for Niederbipp and its wide, flat agricultural plots.
The zoned areas, (light purple, numbered "1" on the map), consist of several
plots in Sandacher close to the motorway, one important plot in Grundacher up north,
four developed plots close to the Spital in the north west, a bigger plot in Hofacher
(centre south) and three smaller plots in the west.
The justification for placing the plots around Sandacher were put into the agricul-Outzoned plots hardly
constructible tural zone was that they are traversed by high voltage lines, which severely restrict
their development. There were two opponents to the decision. One opponent sought
only the reimbursement of the land tax paid in excess, and the other did not justify
his position, so the procedure came quickly to an end. The plot in Grundacher was
designated as agricultural zone after the canton inserted it into the cropland protec-
tion plan. As the owner had no intention to develop it, their opposition was rejected.
The plot in Hofacher is part of the institutional zone (extension of the cemetery) in
the former plan. It was therefore designated as agricultural zone without any demand
of compensation. The partially-built plots close to the Spital are part of an actual
farm, which makes their zone change unproblematic. In regard to the three smaller
plots in the west, one of the owners did not object to the decision. The two others,
who own plots on the boundary of the building zone, do not have the right to oppose
the communal decision, as their plots are not serviced and their lower constructible
parts towards the road have been already developed and sold in the past.
In matters of building zone extension (light brown, numbered "2" on the map),Minor adaptations and
first extension of the
industrial zone
one can observe several small peripheral extensions, mostly created to adapt planning
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1966 Construction of the
Tela Papierfabrik AG,
only industrial plant of
Niederbipp until 1997
1984 Approval of the revised building regulations, the old
ones dating back to 1968 (AGR, 1984)
Few housing and indus-
trial constructions
1993 Approval of the revised building regulations: minor
building zone reductions (AGR, 1993)
1996 Approval of extension of the industrial zone Indus-
triezone Ost (Commune of Niederbipp, 1996)
Progressive development
of the industrial zone.
Accidental fire and de-
struction of the paper
plant. Reconstruction of
the plant.
2004 Partial revision of the building regulations: intro-
duction of the tax on added land value created
through zoning and extension of the industrial zone
Development of hous-
ing, industrial and ag-
ricultural constructions
(greenhouses)
2005 Construction of the
Dentressangle logistics
centre
2007 Construction of the
Galexis logistics centre
2012 Approval of the revised building regulations (Com-
mune of Niederbipp, 2012)
Extension of the green-
houses
2014 Extension of the Galexis
logistics centre
Table 4.5: Main land use planning and land use changes in Niederbipp since 1984.
to actual use and release building and renovation restrictions in the given areas. In
fact, the construction changed from a protected zone with tight regulations into a
regular building zone. Wider extensions concern the industrial zone in the north,
which intends to welcome an additional building of the existing paper company Tela
(AGR, 1993, 10), and Geerenacher – close to the recently built school, which is zoned
as institutional.
4.3.2.4 Land use changes from 1994 to 2014
Between 1993 and 2014, construction in Niederbipp increased significantly: major Important development
of housing and industrydevelopment occurred in the northern part of the industrial zone (see section 4.3.5.1).
In terms of housing, entire neighbourhoods were erected: eight homes hosting several
apartments in Breitsteiacher, over 40 single family homes in Widenacher, about 20
single family homes around Galgacher, twelve double-family homes in Sagimatt, and
around 20 single family homes in Moosacher.
4.3.2.5 Zoning plan revisions between 1996 and 2014
Besides the massive extension of the industrial zone described below, there is no other
significant zoning change, except a slight reduction of the building zone in Stockacher
(dark purple on the map) – which was excluded from the local development of
Widenacher – and a minor extension near Scharnageln (yellow, numbered "3" on the
map). Further, the important changes linked to the creation of industrial zones were
made in specific procedures.
4.3.2.6 Gap between zoning and land use
Similar to Wiedlisbach, the building regulations revision of 1984 was approved with
a huge building zone reserve, which explains a significant remaining gap between the
use foreseen by regulations, and the actual land use. Construction occurs almost ex-
clusively within the building zone, demonstrating the efficacy of zoning as a means
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of delimiting constructions. There are two wide grey squares in the east of the set-
tlement area (numbered "4" on the map): these are greenhouses used for hydroponic
agriculture, considered an agricultural land use.
4.3.2.7 Sudden fill of the building zone
Niederbipps development occurred in a shorter time span and more abruptly than
the previous two cases. In the 1980s until the end of the 1990s, nohousing investors
appeared. Between 1995 and 2000, Widenacher and Galgacher started to develop,
whereas the other construction essentially began in 2005 and is still ongoing. Accord-
ing to the communal head of administration of constructions62, a construction boom
began in 2008 and has not subsided.
4.3.2.8 Remaining not built plots
As one can read from the map, significant building zone reserves (in terms of housing)Hoarding remains an
significant phenomenon still exist. The most important reserves are in Stockacher and Hofacher, both attrib-
uted to a mixed zone, the latter being part of a local development plan. With excep-
tion of the remaining undeveloped plots in Breitsteiacher, meant to host single-family
homes, most of the other building zone reserves are zoned as two or three storey res-
idential zone. The fact that construction activity recently experienced growth speaks
against the hoarding behaviour of landowners.This evidence alone, is not enough to
justify the remaining important gaps: discussions led by the communal executive
body to convince the landowners to develop were not followed by behavioural change.
Vehement opposition by landowners dissuaded the commune to take further legal
action against them63.
62R. Suter, op. cit.
63R. Suter, op. cit.
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4.3.3 Contextual factors
4.3.3.1 Demographic evolution
Over the last 20 years (1993-2013), Niederbipp experienced a population growth of25% population growth
over 20 years 25.5% (from 3,482 to 4,371 inhabitants), an average annual growth rate of 1.28%
(FSO, 2015c). Compared with the neighbouring communes, it is in the upper tier
of growth. Over the same period, only Oensingen (5850 inhabitants) in Canton So-
lothurn, and Schwarzhäusern (500 inhabitants) experienced high growth. Between
1993 and 2013, Oensingen experience a population increase of 43.8% (2.19% per year
on average) and Schwarzhäusern 28.1% (1.4% per year on average). Oberbipp (1650
inhabitants, 18.0% growth or 1.0% growth per year) and Kestenholz (1750 inhabit-
ants, 20.7% growth, 0.9% growth per year) in canton Solothurn are also fast growing
communes. In comparison to these communes, other surrounding communes have a
slow growth: Balsthal 2.7% (5836 inahbitants), Laupersdorf 2.7% (1682 inhabitants)
and Bannwil 0.9% (691 inhabitants).
Compared to regional, cantonal and Swiss averages, Niederbipp is far above re-1.28% yearly growth in
Niederbipp, 0.84% in
Switzerland
gional, cantonal and national growth rates (respectively 4.9%, 6.4% and 16.8% total
growth or 0.25%, 0.32% and 0.84% annual growth).
In terms of flat vacancies, the available data does not allow us to draw any con-
clusion, as there has been high construction activity over the last decade. In 2011,
the vacancy rate was around 3%.
4.3.3.2 Economic and fiscal evolution
Inhabitants of the commune have a fiscal capacity above regional average (932CHF perHigh job supply
month compared to an average of 825CHF per month). Since 2001, the number of jobs
increased from 1,450 to 2,250. With slightly more than one job for two inhabitants,
the job supply is also far above average (30 jobs per 100 people regionally).
Tax rates for natural persons have been lowered over the last ten years and areLow taxes
among the lowest in the region (1.35 in Niederbipp and 1.59 on average) (FIN,
2014). These rates compete with those found in Schwarzhäusern (1.39) and Lan-
genthal (1.38). The land tax rate is also below average (1 instead of 1.12), as in
Schwarzhäusern and Langenthal (FIN, 2014). The communes further west (Ober-
bipp, Wiedlisbach) however, have a higher rate. It is difficult to directly compare the
tax levels with the neighbour canton of Solothurn. However, according to Brülhart
(2014a), combined cantonal and communal taxes are, on average, higher in Solothurn
than in the canton of Berne. Nevertheless, as the commune of Oensingen has a tax
rate clearly under cantonal average (Amt für Finanzen, 2003, 2013), it has a higher
fiscal attractiveness than the neighbouring Bernese communes (Brülhart, 2014a).
In regard to land prices, it was not possible to find data specific to industrial land,No price data available
which is the type of land use that is studied in the present case study.
4.3.3.3 Topographic and spatial characteristics
Located further east of Wiedlisbach, the commune is on the border of the canton ofAgricultural land ideal
for construction Solothurn. The commune’s northern border is delimited by the Jura mountains, and
its southern border by the Längwald forest. While the central and biggest part of
the communal territory is flat land of high quality, principally devoted to agriculture
(swisstopo, 2014a), it is also where settlement and the entire industrial complex is
located.
In terms of transport, the train network grants direct connections to Olten (22
minutes away; departing every twenty minutes) and to Solothurn (15 minutes away;
departing four times per hour). Travel time to Zurich or Berne is approximately one
hour with connections every half an hour to Zurich and four times an hour to Berne.
In terms of individual transport, the N1 motorway crosses, approximately, the middle
of the commune, and has an interchange granting access to Berne in approximately
40 minutes and to Zurich in an hour.
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4.3.4 Constraints of superior law
4.3.4.1 Cantonal land use planning policy
Starting with the building regulations revision of 1993, the main constraints of super-
ior law become evident. In order to implement the federal cropland protection plan
and protect Niederbipp’s high quality agricultural land, the canton defined several
reserved zones on the the commune’s agricultural land zoned as building zone. The
removal of the reserved zones required the commune to revise their zoning plan and to
reduce their building zones in the most sensible areas (light purple, numbered "1"
on figure 4.7). Despite these building zone reductions, the building zone dedicated to
housing remains massively oversized (AGR, 1993, 8f). The commune has 16 hectares
that are zoned as housing zone an remain not built (in regard to a maximum of 11
hectares allowed), whereby the needs are calculated generously:
− maximum plot ratio of 0.4 – despite the fact that several local development
plans foresee higher ratios (up to 0.85);
− mixed use of the housing zone with up to 40% of non-housing uses, whereas
usual calculation standards foresee 20
− an average flat size corresponding to the 2014 standards;
Reasons mentioned for the difficulty to reduce the building zone are the numerous Limited zoning out
procedures"holes" within the settlement area. In the long run, agricultural production on nu-
merous plots is not sustainable. Further, the fact that part of these plots are serviced
hampers the zoning process. In addition, part of the landowners’ objections to the
cropland protection plan had been accepted by the canton in 1987. For matters of
legal consistency, the 1993 building regulations revision that implemented the cro-
pland protection plan, had to take into account the objections formulated in 1987.
Despite more than 40 oppositions voiced against the new building regulations, no
objection was filed against the planned extension of the industrial zone (AGR, 1990).
With the creation of the cantonal priority development areas program in 1989, the Economic development
about to beginindustrial zone of Niederbipp was about to become a cantonal priority. This policy
allows the canton to grant planning subventions to the designated areas, and facil-
itates specific measures and derogations to authorized street capacities, noise, and
pollution levels (ARE, 2003, 14). During the 1993 building regulations revision, the
office of economic development supported the first small extension of the industrial
zone (light brown, numbered "2" on the map) and underlined the cantonal polit-
ical support that the planned industrial development benefits. The future idustrial
development is extensively mentioned in the cantonal decision approving Niedrbipp’s
building regulations. Further, the cantonal decision approving the communal building
regulations is signed by the Minister of the Department to which the spatial planning
office belongs.
4.3.4.2 Remediation of contaminated sites policy
Because our case involves polluted soil, I briefly explore the main constraints set Extended ground
analyses requiredby environmental legislation in regard to these sites. Legally64, the remediation or
redevelopment of a brownfield is conditioned by the type of pollution, the level of
pollution of soil and by its spread through the nearby soil and groundwater. If the
legal pollution levels of soil are exceeded, extended analyses have to be conducted
to establish need for further intervention. If the toxic material is spreading and the
legal maximum values for one or several toxic substances is exceeded in the immediate
downstream of the plot, remediation becomes mandatory65.
The technical ordinance on waste66 distinguishes three types of landfills: landfills
for inter materials, land fills for stabilized residues and bioactive landfills. The landfills
have to be registered and an inventory of their content (types and quantities of waste
stored) must be kept up to date. In the case of the landfill Müllergrube presented
64Art. 16 of the Federal ordinance of 26 August 1998 on the remediation of polluted sites, SR
814.680.
65Art. 9, 10, 11, 12 of the Ordinance of 26 August 1998 on contaminated sites CSO, SR 814.680.
66Art. 22 of the Technical ordinance on waste TOW, SR 814.600.
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in section 4.3.5.4, the content of the land fill was partially unknown and extensive
analyses had to be conducted to establish its content.
Remediation can be achieved in two ways (art. 16 CSO): either through remedi-Monitoring obligation
ation, (elimination of the environmentally hazardous substances), or through securit-
isation of the site, (the prevention and monitoring of the diffusion of environmentally
hazardous substances). In order to further secure the site, the pollution level around
the contaminated site (e.g. nearby soil, groundwater up- and downstream) must be
monitored. This obligation is part of the confinement prescriptions (art. 16 CSO).
4.3.4.3 Regional coordination of development
In terms of regional planning, the communes of Wiedlisbach, Oberbipp and Nieder-Regional policy
bipp, since the 1990’s, have been in the perimeter of the priority development area
policy, which means that the canton can subsidise planning activities, grant funds to
development projects and offer travel credits (AGR, 2000)67. Since 2007, under the
supervision of the cantons of Berne and Solothurn, an intercantonal study between
Oberbipp and Oensingen was launched, later extended to Wangen an der Aare. This
study led to the signing of an agreement between the five communes and the two can-
tons to coordinate development and establish a list of criteria that allows to evaluate
future settlement areas (Solothurner Zeitung, 2014). The agreement’s effects on the
implementation of land use planing policy, namely the inter-communal definition of
new housing, commercial and industrial zones could not be observed yet. In 2012,
Niederbipp was defined as a working area of regional importance by the regional struc-
ture plan, which obligated the commune and the canton to make land available for
development by the means they deem appropriate (Region Oberaargau and Kanton
Bern, 2012).
4.3.4.4 Building permit prescriptions
The central issue for the development of a polluted site that is not undergoing remedi-Length limit for piles
ation, is to prevent the spread of the hazardous substances.Prevention is especially
important during the construction phase, considered the most sensitive (AWA, 2005).
The nature of contaminated sites can make them a challenging place for construction,
particularly for landfills. The landfill ground consists of different types of wastes,
of various solidity, density and toxicity, all of which stands in contradiction to solid
basement requirements. In construction, a frequently used technique to ensure the
stability of a building is to put pillars in the ground to prevent movement. In the case
of a polluted site, this pillar technique is problematic, as it might pierce the waste
deposit, and facilitate the exfiltration of toxic liquids.
The building permit required an emergency plan in case pollution spreads duringAdditional planning
measures the construction process (Prefecture of Wangen, 2005). Further, a plan in regard to
the reuse of the excavated ground during the construction process must be submitted
(FOEN, 1999). In addition, an adequate permanent gas drainage system must be set
up in order to safely evacuate ascending landfill gas (Prefecture of Wangen, 2005).
4.3.5 Local use of instruments
4.3.5.1 Context of development and actors’ positions
Until the major extension of the industrial zone Industriezone Ost, one single fact-An industrialisation wave
coming from the east ory existed in Niederbipp: the Tela paper plant. However, the adjacent commune of
Oensingen, part of Canton Solothurn, has established a growing industrial zone over
the past decades. The success of their neighbour may have provided Niederbipp the
will to develop, and the will to shed their rural status. Interviewees68 mention a tem-
poral shift between the construction of the motorway in the 1960’s and development
pressure coming from the east, (Aarau, Olten and Oensingen), a transformation that
progressively takes over the Bipperamt.
67Travel credits are part of the Bernese Fahrleistungsmodell which is not presented fur-
ther here. Please refer to http://www.vol.be.ch/vol/de/index/luft/luftreinhaltung/verkehr/
fahrleistungsmodell.html for further information.
68R. Suter, op. cit.; R. Wyss, heritage and landscape activist, interviewed in Attiswil the 26 March
2014.
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The Industriezone Ost project was born in the mid 1990’s when the commune, Environmental
requirements induce
wider industrial
development
petitioned by Tela for their proposed expansion69, decided to extend the industrial
zone by 2 hectares. However, in order to comply with the requirements of the exten-
sion’s underlying environmental impact assessment, the construction of a new road,
and an underpass crossing the train tracks was required70. As these costs were high,
a general extension of the zone was put on the table by the commune and, which
would make it possible to divide land service costs among the different landowners71.
Ongoing discussions between the commune, the planning authority, and the can- Separation between
regular building
regulations revision and
industrial extension
tonal office of economic development on the current project’s maturity (negotiation
with landowners, land service plan, costs division, approval by the communal legislat-
ive body) lead to a separation between the ongoing revision of building regulations,
approved in 1993 (AGR, 1993), and the future extension of the industrial zone, ap-
proved in 1996.
Within the cantonal administration, the office of economic development strongly Political and
administrative supportsupported industrial development, and offered a credit of 1.5 million francs for ser-
vicing the zone, reimbursable within 10 years (AGR, 1990). The office of economic
development cited the high degree of commune accessibility to the motorway, prox-
imity to the existing industrial zone of Oensingen and Tela’s desire to expand, as
justification for the industrial development. The department of the cantonal spatial
planning office supported the development through the priority development areas
program mentioned in section 4.3.4.
As the totality of land taken into consideration is part of the cropland protection Agricultural
considerations politically
out weighted
plan, the agricultural office was opposed to any extension. However, the agricultural
office shares the same directorate with the office of economic development and was
aware that their opposition would not be supported by the responsible cantonal min-
ister72. In fact, the minister offered a 1.5 million francs credit for the land service
of the new zone and personally signed the support letter addressed to the commune
(Commune of Niederbipp, 1993a)73.
4.3.5.2 First stage of development of the industrial zone
The perimeter considered is composed of 15 plots located at the eastern border of Property fragmentation
the commune: they consist of flat agricultural land and include the former communal
landfill. Twelve plots are privately owned, one plot is owned by the Canton of Berne,
and one by the commune of Niederbipp. Another plot is property of the Flurgen-
ossenschaft Niederbipp, a cooperative composed of all landowners of the commune,
whose main function is to maintain roads and paths across the communal territory.
This cooperative is financed by the rent obtained from member’s properties. In re-
gard to the privately owned plots, the biggest is owned by Tela, the paper company
already present on site. Six further plots were bought by the company before the
actual development.
The total constructible surface is approximately 16 ha, the part north of the rail Wide, flat and optimally
connected areatracks 6 ha, and the southern part 10 ha (the site of the Tela factory). The SBB
tracks connect Solothurn to Olten (Jurasüdfuss line) and the Aare-Seeland-Mobil
tracks connect Solothurn to Oensingen and Langenthal. The nearest motorway access
(N1 Berne – Zurich) is less than 2 km away.
At the heart of the development operation was a land service contract74 (Planungs- A detailed land service
contractund Infrastrukturvertrag) signed between the commune and the landowners. It pre-
ceded the zoning operation. In order to ensure that the zoned land will be effectively
developed, and that the commune does not bear all development costs, an agreement
defining the financial contribution of each landowner to the service of the perimeter
and ensuring the payment of these contributions was signed. The contract contained
69Tela is a paper company employing 300 people in Niederbipp since the 1960’s.
70Art. 2 of the Draft contract Planungs- und Infrastrukturvertrag zwischen der Einwohnerge-
meinde Niederbipp und den Grundeignetümern im Perimeter der Überbauung "Industrizone Ost".
71The contract signed between the commune and the different plot owners estimates road and
underpass construction at 4.5 million francs in total.
72It is not the same minister who approved Niederbipp’s building regulations!
73Letter of the 3 August 1993 from public economy directorate of the canton of Berne addressed
to the executive of the commune of Niederbipp concerning "Industriezone Niederbipp / Erweiterung
und Erschliessungshilfe".
74Contract of civil law, as defined in the Code of Obligations, SR 220.
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the following main elements:
− the local development plan (Überbauungsordnung) with building restrictions
such as type of use75, maximal building sizes, minimal distances to other build-
ings, a minimal "green coefficient" as well as the detail land service plan of the
plots;
− the amount charged to each landowner in regard to planning costs, base land
service costs and detail land service costs;
− the date of payment of these fees;
− the payment guarantee through first rank mortgages;
− the party bearing exceeding and additional costs (notary, geometer, land re-
gistry) which is in the present case the commune.
The contract foresaw that 100% of the detail land service costs would need to beTotal land service
amounts to
500,000CHF/ha
paid by landowners. These costs amounted to approximately 7.4 million francs and in-
cluded land service in terms of electricity, table water, sewer, rainwater drainage, and
the construction of small streets. The basic land service costs amounted to approx-
imately 3.6 million francs. Eighty percent of these costs were paid by the landowners
(20% by the commune); this percentage corresponds to the legal maximum76. The
planning costs amounted to 180,000 francs; 2/3 were paid by the commune, and 1/3
by the landowners (divided proportionally according to the amount of land they own).
Divided by the entire surface (approximately 22 hectares) that was serviced, the total
land service costs amounted to approximately 500,000CHF/ha.
4.3.5.3 Second stage of development of the industrial zone and tax on
added land value created through zoning
In 2007, the industrial perimeter was extended by 11.2 hectares on the northern side ofContractually defined tax
amounts to 30% the railway tracks. For the first time since the partial revision of building regulations
in 2004, the tax on added land value created through zoning was implemented on a
large scale. The formula was as follows: the original land price is set at 15CHF/m2,
the new land price at 90CHF/m2, which results in an added value of 75CHF/m2.
This added value is taxed, according to the signed agreement, at a 30% rate, which
amounts to 22.5CHF/m2.
Communal building regulations do not specify the percentage of added value toVague regulatory
specifications be taxed. They mention that "equality in front of the law" and "specific cases" have
to be taken into consideration, and further, that the taxed amount should be "appro-
priated"77.
The zoned plots have basic service, but no detail service78. Based on the costEffective tax rate is
closer to 21% calculation made for the first part of the industrial zone, detail land service costs of
approximately 3.5 million francs would apply79, i.e. 35CHF/m2. If more realistic
land prices before and after the zoning process are taken into consideration – e.g.
5–10CHF/m2 for agricultural land and 150CHF/m2 for industrial land80, the actual
added value is as follows: 150CHF (new value) - 10CHF (old value) - 35CHF (land
service) = 105CHF. Therefore, the actually applied rate is more around 21%.
The calculation method for the tax on added value created through zoning presented
above shows the degree of manoeuvrability that the commune had in implementing
their new instrument. It also shows that the implementation of the instrument is
75Commercial centres exceeding 500m2 are prohibited. Certain areas closer to housing areas are
exclusively dedicated to tertiary uses (Commune of Niederbipp, 1998)
76Art. 112 par. 1 let. 2 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
77Art. 47, Building regulations of 11 June 2012 of the commune of Niederbipp.
78R. Suter, op. cit.
79As no access to the land service contract was given, I apply the detail land service costs per
hectare calculated for the development of the first part of the industrial zone.
80The industrial land price is the one applied to land during the development of the first part of
the industrial zone.
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recent. With its introduction in 2004, the commune seized the opportunity to capture
over 2.5 million francs while adopting the second extension of the industrial zone.
If the instrument would have been implemented earlier, it could have been applied No earlier
implementation of the
tax possible
solely to the first extension of the industrial zone (no other extension of buliding zone
has taken place since the introduction of the instrument in cantonal legislation in
1985). But the instrument’s use would have either required a specific revision of
building regulations in order to adopt the necessary legal basis, or its implementation
during the 1993 revision. Given the short time span between the building regulations
revision of 1993 and the elaboration of the land service contract in 1996 as well as
the high controversy of the last building regulations revision (on the implementation
of the cropland protection plan), both options seem highly improbable.
4.3.5.4 Development of the polluted plots
Several companies established themselves in the new industrial zone which served
to raise awareness of the location81. Different buyers were interested to develop
the former communal landfill, but their projects were checked by geotechnical and
financial constraints. The development of the plot could be authorized by the cantonal
waste and water office (AWA) only after detailed ground analyses were made (paid
by the future developer) and the definition of a precise construction technique set.
The cantonal land registry provides the following information in regard to the Entry into registry of
polluted soilspolluted site: the Rotboden/Müllegrube, object number 09810014, is currently divided
into six plots82 for an approximate surface of 79,003 m2. The volume of the contam-
inated material buried in the ground is estimated to 1,550,800 m383. The landfill was
opened in 1960, and closed in 1992; the first presumptions that the site was polluted
were reported in 1995 (AWA, 1995); the entry in the registry of polluted sites was
made on 29 September 2005. As sample analyses show, the site contains (in addi-
tion to excavation residues and rubble), the following toxic elements: organochloride,
chemicals, solvents and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (AWA, 2014).
According to the AWA and the Geotest AG (AWA, 2005), several development Unstable soil structure
and proximity of a water
catchment
projects were already in line before, but cancelled for financial and geotechnical reas-
ons. In fact, two issues are problematic for the development of the site: the soil
structure and the proximity of a water catchment:
− the soil structure is unstable in the sense that the deposited waste varies in
terms of density and consistency within the deposit volume. The litter is some-
how dispatched across the landfill and subsequently threatens the construction’s
stability;
− the proximity of a major water catchment84 (700 meters) makes potential drain-
age of waste liquids into the groundwater highly problematic, as this would
pollute the water and severely restrict the catchment’s use. Two main external
factors can lead to such infiltrations: the drainage of water from the surface
through precipitation, and a physical intervention into the landfill through the
construction of foundations, particularly deeply-rooted pillars, greatly facilitate
the spread of liquids, as they hold the potential of piercing the entire mass of lit-
ter (which would greatly facilitate the spread of toxic liquids into the ground)85.
From a legal point of view, the owner has no obligation to remediate a plot, as Cover to prevent future
infiltrationslong as the thresholds of pollutants in nearby waters do not exceed legal boundar-
ies. Therefore, in order to minimize changes in the deposit’s structure and prevent
infiltration into groundwater, one solution is to cover the concerned perimeter, ren-
dering it impermeable to potential infiltration. As no intervention is legally required
81According to the communal planner, Zellstoff-vertriebs-GmbH, Ophardt, and Ducati were the
first companies to establish themselves in the industrial zone.
82Plots number 282, 984, 2108, 2092, 2091 and 2072 (AWA, 2014).
83For a gross comparison, the landfill Kölliken in canton Aargau contains approximately 475,000
m3 of contaminated material. It is currently being entirely remediated. Overall costs are estimated
to 800-1000 million francs (FOEN, 2016).
84The catchment provides an important part of the drinking water for Oensingen; between 1,000
and 5,000 liters per minute are subtracted from the groundwater.
85J.P. Clément, Head of the Research Department on groundwater and contaminated sites, inter-
viewed in Berne 14 Max 2014.
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Figure 4.8: Constraints of construction on the landfill Müllergrube. Own representa-
tion.
by the current situation, the construction of a cover would only be effective in case
of development.
In 1998, first analyses were conducted by the cantonal water protection officeLimited risk of
exfiltrations showed a low level of pollution in the groundwater downstream of the landfill (AWA,
2005). In 2000, further analyses produced similar results, once even exceeding the legal
limits, qualifying, in theory, for remediation. In order to determine if there is an actual
need for remediation, and if the plot could potentially be developed, an extensive study
had to be conducted including dozens of boreholes and various sounding techniques
(AWA, 2005, 66). Further, an exfiltration model was conceived in order to calculate
the probability of exfiltrations in case of development. These analyses showed that
the risk of pollution was low, and that the chances for groundwater contamination
were rather low and temporary.
The construction of a logistics centre on top of the landfill is a suitable cover forA logistics centre as lid
the waste pit, as its surface (30,300 m2) covers more than a third of the landfill’s
estimated surface. The weight it has to support and the depth of the pillars can be
problematic: the pillars cannot exceed the height of the buried waste, as otherwise
toxic liquids would drain through and spread. The cantonal office sets a minimum of
5 meters between the bottom of the pillar and the bottom of the landfill (AWA, 2005).
Contrary to other, higher precision industries, soil instabilities are less important for
a logistics centre. In order to support the building weight, 8,000 pillars of concrete,
combined with gravel columns on top, are drilled into the ground.
In order to reduce risks in case of groundwater contamination, an emergency10 years financial
guarantee against
potential contamination
plan with intervention measures had to be elaborated by the new owner. As the
groundwater is located at a depth (25-30 meters from the surface), and the aquifer
is composed of significant quantities of water (the standing water can reach a height
of 40 meters), intervention measures are technically and financially limited to the
securitization of the existing catchment. For this purpose, the developer deposited,
for ten years, a significant financial guarantee (AWA, 2005, 66). If contamination does
occur after the 10 year warranty, or within the 10 year warrants, and the remediation
costs exceed the owners deposit, public authorities bear the additional costs.
The analyses conducted to assess and minimize risks, the boreholes and soundingAnalyses and additional
construction costs passed
on in transaction price
techniques used and the additional construction costs that the developer had to sup-
port were passed on to the former plot owner through a discount on the land price.
Instead of a price approximating 150CHF/m2 as for the other plots of the industrial
zone, the price of the landfill was set at approximately 120CHF/m2. The difference of
30CHF/m2 was supposed to cover the additional expenses supported by the logistics
company and the fact that the plot was not sold but leased through a building right.
The initial sale price of 150CHF/m2 has been recommended by the commune to the
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various owners in order to ensure a quick development of the area86.
4.3.6 Impact on value redistribution
Considering the analysis of the past sections, I can draw a set of conclusions, specific- Costs of analyses as
hurdle to developmentally regarding the value redistribution process implied by the polluted site’s develop-
ment.
Conducting in-depth studies to assess the risk of contamination is a hurdle for The costs of analysis as
hurdle for redevelopmentthe reuse of polluted soils, as potential developers bear additional costs of analyses,
impact assessments, and further securitisation and prevention measures and pass on
part of it to landowners. This follows the general legal principle that the polluter
should bear the costs of their pollution87, but can block the site’s redevelopment.
The potential reuse of a polluted plot is tightly linked to both the remediation Either everything or
nothingobligation and the underlying costs: if there had been an obligation to remediate the
landfill, the remediation costs would greatly exceed any profit use88. In the case of
the landfill, the creation of a lid on the landfill solved the cost issue via a 20% price
reduction on the lease (compared to other land sale prices in the industrial zone). This
reduced transaction price only reflects the costs linked with the ground analyses, the
financial guarantee in case of pollution spread, and the development of the plot, but
is minimal compared with what a a remediation would cost. In the end, the added
economic value created through zoning remains mostly in the hands of the landowner.
In matters of ecological value, the lid reduces the probability of water infiltration and
limits potential future value loss, but also limits any future remediation measure, as
it seals a wide part of the area.
Local geophysical constraints make the management of the each contaminated site Specificities of the case
determinanta specific case: the case of Niederbipp is particularly sensitive, because of groundwater
and the nearby water catchment’s proximity. The water pollution act of 1972 forbade
the establishment of landfills close to catchment locations (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015,
93), but the Müllergrube was already in use by that time. The fact that the maximum
legally allowed value for ammonium was only exceeded once seems fortuitous. If other
exceeding values would have been measured, remediation would have been mandatory,
and the private redevelopment of the site would not have been possible.
The present case has shown how development of polluted soil can be a good deal Land sold four times
for both the buyer (if willing to bear a temporary risk), and the seller (who keeps the
major part of the added value). Reflecting on the land’s uses over time, it is possible
to state that the seller is paid by the land in four ways: they rented the land surface
to a farmer for agricultural production, they sold the gravel excavated from the soil,
they sold the storage volume for the landfill, and finally they leased the plot itself to
the logistics company.
Further, the obligations set by the environmental assessment report required im- Environmental legislation
leads an extension of the
industrial zone
portant investments in land service. In order to reduce the land service costs (that
would otherwise exceed the value of the land intended for zoning), the commune de-
cided to extend the perimeter of the industrial zone, distributing the costs among a
wider number of landowners. This decision shows how the constraints set by envir-
onmental legislation have contributed to an extension of the industrial zone.
The fact that the main employer (who is also the main landowner) planned to ex- Emergence of a growth
coalitiontend their activities was, for the commune, a sufficient reason to orient its communal
strategy towards industrial development. Together with the canton’s legal and finan-
cial support for economic development, a growth coalition which included communal
and cantonal authorities, as well as the landowners was created. The land sale price
negotiated between commune and landowners made rapid development of the indus-
trial zone possible. A noticeable fact is, at the time of writing (2014), the plots that
the paper company initially intended to develop, the starting point of Niederbipp’s en-
tire industrial development, remain undeveloped. One explanation could be the 1996
paper plant fire. This fire likely had a financial impact on the company’s strategy.
Additionally, the company was bought by Kimberly-Clark in 1999 (Kimberly-Clark,
1999). The change of ownership from a Swiss company to a multinational owner likely
led to organisational changes.
86R. Suter, op. cit.
87Art. 2 of the Federal act of 7 October 1983 on the protection of the environment, SR 814.01.
88J.P. Clément, op. cit.
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5.1 Urban reconversion in Malley
5.1.1 Introduction
The urban reconversion process in Malley is of central interest for the study of valueObjectives of the case
study redistribution, primarily because it provides an example of the creation and appropri-
ation of rent by public authorities; in fact, this case study involves almost exclusively
public actors in the planning stage. Secondly because it deals with soil pollution,
transport and energy issues (the latter having become highly relevant in recent land
use planning policy1) that all have important effects on land value.
This case study is structured as follows:Structure
− section 5.1.2 presents the major land use planning and land use changes that
have taken place over the last three decades in order to provide a temporal and
spatial overview on the case study;
− section 5.1.3 presents the contextual factors specific to the studied perimeter
that forge the project’s environment;
− section 5.1.4 deals with the general constraints of federal and cantonal legislation
on the local regulatory arrangement negotiated between the actors;
− section 5.1.5 shows how legal instruments have been used by the involved actors,
looking at their influence on local regulatory arrangements;
− section 5.1.6 analyses the previously presented factors’ impact on economic and
ecological value redistribution.
The present analysis focusses on two of the four local development plans displayedTwo local development
plans at stake in figure 5.1: the Malley-gare (10,600m2) located on the southern side of the train sta-
tion along the railway tracks, and the wider Malley-gasomètre (approx. 60,000m2)2,
also in the southern part of the master plan’s perimeter. Local development plans are
areas where building regulations diverge from the commune’s general development
plan. The resulting constraints become binding for landowners.
The two local development plans on the northern side of the train tracks (the
construction of a new ice rink and sports complex, and the development of further
tertiary and housing activities) are of less interest to the present study, because they
imply more limited land use changes and redistributive stakes – the ice rink of the
first plan is transformed into a wider sports complex – and in the second plan the
negotiation process is still in an early stage.
5.1.2 Land use planning and land use changes
Table 5.1 shows the main steps of Malley’s renewal process. To understand the case’sPlanning context
1On cantonal level, since the energy law’s revision in 2014, the planning authorities are obliged
to consider and coordinate energy issues during planning processes (art. 3 of the Loi cantonale du
16 mai 1996 sur l’énergie, RS-VD 730.01).
2As the development plan is not yet published, its surface has been approximated with the help
of the GIS software used to make figure 5.1.
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context, one must know that during the 1980’s and 1990’s, a rather uncoordinated
wave of development took place in the eight communes constituting the western part
of the agglomeration of Lausanne (SDOL, 2003). With the federal Ordinance on
air pollution control3 coming into force in 1995, the communes adopted a set of
urbanisation measures that aimed to reduce the amount of pollutants in the air, which,
in response to the pressure exercised by cantonal authorities, was followed by a general
moratorium on construction in 2000. The aim of the moratorium was to gain some
time to coordinate the area’s future urbanisation prior to any further development. An
intercommunal planning unit named schéma directeur de l’Ouest lausannois (SDOL)
was commissioned to elaborate an intercommunal master plan (also named SDOL)
for the eight western communes and the western parts of Lausanne’s territory.
During the transitional period of the 1990s, the slaughterhouse, public infrastruc- Land use context
ture owned by Lausanne and rented to butchers and larger meat processors, faced
a decline of its activities. The cost reduction policy of the Swiss sector’s domin-
ant actors – Bell, Migros and Suter – led to an overall concentration process of the
slaughter industry and to a dismissal of secondary activities (i.e. the processing of
intestines, fat and skins) 4. What was in the 1940s the most modern slaughterhouse
of Switzerland had by the end of the 19990s to be renovated in order to comply with
European standards (Commune of Lausanne, 1998), a process that the commune was
ready to finance5. Despite cost reduction efforts, the slaughterhouse’s major clients
transferred their activities to their own respective houses and left the public slaughter-
house without work6. Despite the reduction in clients, a new animal waste processing
center was necessary for the commune to fulfil its public duties, and was built on the
site of Malley’s future train station.
Shortly after the closure of the slaughterhouse, the first intercommunal master A 15 year planning
processplan was signed by the authorities and published. This established the first milestone
of a planning process that is currently unresolved. In fact, the chronology (table 5.1)
shows that fifteen years have passed between the first study conducted on the area and
the approval of the first local development plan. In order to deepen our understanding
of the planning process, it is necessary to interrogate which factors have contributed
to the process’ time span. The interviews conducted and the documents analysed
suggest the following explanations:
1. One explanation is linked to the separation of landownership and planning au-
thority: Lausanne’s property is located outside of its political ground, on the
territory of the communes of Renens and Prilly (see figure 5.1 below). There-
fore, the area does not yield any political reward to the landowner (i.e. votes).
This explains also that Malley is the historical location of necessary but un-
wanted activities. The area is considered as Lausanne’s "backyard"7 and as a
"playground for the industrial works of Lausanne"8.
2. The use conflicts that arise in the planning process provide a complementary
explanation: Lausanne’s industrial works enjoyed for more than a century ex-
clusive use rights9. As one can imagine, the societal and political will to develop
housing and tertiary activities in Malley will at some point clash with the in-
dustrial interests already present on site:
− the industrial works of Lausanne, one of the seven departments of the city’s
administration, represented by two of their units:
– the Office for electricity10;
– the Office for gas and district heating;
− the Office for sanitation through the waste sorting centre;
3RS 814.318.142.1
4J.-L. Grivet, former employee of the slaughterhouse, member of the executive of the Commune
of Etagnières, interviewed in Etagnières 21 May 2015.
5However, the city’s slaughterhouse Office collects a tax on each animal killed and checked for
sanity and weight which, until this day, has entirely financed the slaughterhouse’s maintenance and
renovations
6J.-L. Grivet, op. cit.
7P. de Almeida, architect of the commune of Renens, interviewed in Renens 15 May 2015.
8A. Baillot, head of the planning office of the commune of Lausanne, interviewed in Lausanne 28
May 2015.
9The first gasworks were established in 1911 (Fantoli, 2006, 18).
10An electrical transformer is located alongside the communal logistics centre.
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− the Office for purchases and acquisitions through the logistics centre.
Referring to the chronology (table 5.1), we see that some part of these interests
have been present on site for a long time and have managed to implement
the construction of the thermal plant (located between the logistics centre and
the theatre) and the waste sorting centre despite the moratoriums in force at
the time. The thermal plant will be expanded in the near future11. Several
interviewees have pointed to a reluctance by established users to share their
space and allow the industrial zone to become a residential and commercial
zone12.
3. An additional factor : it was only with the construction of the train station
(whose 50% funding was approved by the Confederation in 2006 as "urgent
project") that the effective planning works began. In fact, the elaboration of the
first master plan started in 2007 and was followed by the first financial analysis
and by an agreement between landowners on the future property structure of
the area. A factor that strongly encouraged the site’s development was the
development of regional infrastructure by the canton (Canton de Vaud, 2005,
12). This point was also underlined by several interviewees13.
4. Conflicts that the division of land service costs and remediation costs among
the actors have created offer further explanations. These issues are discussed in
sections 5.1.4 and 5.1.5.
The industrial vocation of Malley has not vanished, but has adapted to the agglom-
eration’s changing needs, which in the case of the slaughterhouse and the gas works,
are largely conditioned by the industry’s rationalisation processes, with the substitu-
tion of polluting, dangerous and morbid industries for essentially urban activities: a
bus depot, a thermal plant, a waste sorting and a logistics centre. Having examined
the main land uses and land use planning changes, the next subsection will deal with
contextual factors such as property structure, soil characteristics, centrality, and their
impact on the policy output.
11A. Bartolomei, Head of the western district heating network, interviewed in Prilly 21 August
2015.
12C. Jemelin, head of supply development and member of the directorate of the Transports lausan-
nois, interviewed 29 July 2015 in Renens; E. Krebs, head of office for housing and real estate man-
agement, interviewed 17 July 2015 in Lausanne; P. de Almeida, op. cit..
13N. Wisnia, project manager of Malley at the SDOL, interviewed in Renens 20 May 2015; T.
Maystre, member of the communal executive body of the commune of Renens, interviewed in Renens
28 July 2015.
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1977 Closure of Lausanne’s gasworks
(Fantoli, 2006, 18).
1979 Inauguration of the theatre
Kléber-Méleau.
1994 Construction of the communal
logistics centre.
1995 Implementation of the Ordinance of 16
December 1985 on Air Pollution Control
via an agglomeration wide action plan
Construction of the Transports
lausannois (TL) bus depot of the
.
2000 Intercommunal moratorium on construc-
tions, launch of analyses for a master plan
of the west of Lausanne, planning of a new
thermal plant for distance heating.
2001 Inauguration of the commercial
centre Malley lumières; construc-
tion of a thermal plant.
2002 Closure of the slaughterhouse;
commissioning of a new animal
waste processing center.
2003 Approval of the intercommunal master plan
SDOL, city council of Lausanne adopts
moratorium on constructions, except for
the waste sorting centre, Europan 7 archi-
tecture competition on Malley.
2004 Formal agreement between Lausanne, Ren-
ens and Prilly on the site’s future develop-
ment, begining of urban analyses for sector
2 of the SDOL.
2005 Federal inquiry on urgent agglomeration
projects (i.a. station of Malley), approval of
guidelines for sector 2.
2006 Approval of test analysis for Malley, ap-
proval of urgent agglomeration projects by
the federal Parliament.
Construction of the intercom-
munal waste sorting centre.
2007 Elaboration of first local master plan
(PDL).
2008 First financial analysis, convention on land
sell for station by Lausanne to CFF, pro-
spective analyses on distance heating, risk
analysis on major train accidents (MAO)
Beginning of the construction
of the train station, destruction
of the animal waste processing
center, end of exploitation of gas
storage station.
2009 – Excavation of polluted soils (car-
casses) close to future train sta-
tion.
2010 First report on soil pollution, second finan-
cial analysis.
2011 Second report on soil pollution, creation
of an intercommunal corporation for dis-
tance heating, convention on land exchange
between Lausanne and CFF.
2012 Results of architectural competition on
public spaces and approval of modified
master plan (SDIM).
Partial destruction of former
slaughterhouse and soil remedi-
ation, opening of the train sta-
tion.
2014 Preliminary exam of the local development
plan Malley-gare; Adoption of the cantonal
energy law
2015 Adoption of the extended land service tax
in Renens
Destruction of the former
slaughterhouse.
2016 Approval of the local development plan
Malley-gare by the territorial communes
To
come
Approval of the local development plans
gasometer and viaduct
Extension of the thermal plant.
Table 5.1: Main land use planning and land use changes in Malley since 1995.
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5.1.3 Contextual factors
5.1.3.1 Property structure
Figure 5.1 shows the property structure of the area, the type of owner (and the type Redevelopment of public
landof land use), and the main infrastructure and buildings. The overall displayed plots
correspond roughly to the perimeter of the master plans elaborated in 2007 and 2012.
As one notices, the perimeter subject to urban renewal is considerably reduced relative
to the scope of the master plans: whereas the latter’s initial perimeter included a net
surface of 390,000m2, the four local development plans being elaborated only consider
96,000m2 (Bauart and Raderschall, 2012, 36ff). A second salient element is that
the public (commune of Lausanne) and semi-public (Swiss railway company SBB)
ownership represents an important part of the neighbourhood’s area, and precisely
the one that is designated to be redeveloped in the following years.
In comparison with the more scattered ownership as is the case in the west of Limited number of actors
involvedMalley, this specificity implies a reduction of the number of actors involved, which
simplifies the negotiation around the planning and development processes as well as
the land exchange procedure (described in section 5.1.3.1.1 hereafter). Both the SBB
and the commune of Lausanne are familiar with major construction projects, possess
internal expertise and share joint interests in cost reduction.
Lausanne’s executive has "minimal profit rates below which it does not proceed"14. A powerful and unified
ownershipFor the SBB, such type of transactions fit entirely in the company’s strategy and
mandate, as the federal government obliges the SBB to generate profit from its prop-
erties15. The fact that the SBB’s decisions, in particular those of SBB Real estate
(the company’s department in charge of the management of its land and real estate
properties), is not bound to a council’s approval eases the operation for the owner
(Nahrath et al., 2009a, 118).
Lausanne and the SBB position themselves as developers in the sense that they
budget the entire cost linked with the plots’ development, as well as propose leaseholds
on their land which allow them to maximize their gains while remaining attractive for
private developers (see section 5.1.5.4 for more details). Lausanne fulfils the role of
the planner by proposing a detailed plan of the future neighbourhood including the
precise shapes and sizes of the public spaces and buildings, the type and location of
services and infrastructure, etc.
This case study shows the tight interweaving of public actors: Lausanne and the
SBB combine the functions of landowner, planner and developer. These roles and
relationships transform Malley’s development into a public-public partnership where
public landowners act and negotiate in the manner of private actors, negotiating with
planning authorities who are, in fact their public counterparts.
5.1.3.1.1 The land deal Over the last decade, the property structure has been A new cantonal cultural
centresubject to one major change, central to the achievement of the area’s redevelopment:
a land exchange worth 34 million francs between the commune of Lausanne and the
SBB in the perimeter of the local development plan of Malley-gare. As it turns
out, this exchange is conditioned by a quite external factor (Commune of Lausanne,
2011b): Lausanne’s desire to provide a home to the new cantonal cultural complex
(composed of the cantonal museum of fine arts, the museum of photography, the
museum of applied arts and further cultural activities).
The construction of this vast cultural complex is intended to enhance the national Free land as facilitating
factorand international reputation, increase the cultural offerings, and foster economic de-
velopment (Commune of Lausanne, 2011b). As the future museums’ site selection
process put Lausanne in competition with other locations in the canton (Canton of
Vaud, 2009a), it was necessary for the commune to put forward good reasons to be
chosen. The provision of free land was a strong argument16. However, Lausanne’s first
proposed museum location along the lake was rejected by referendum (Conseil d’Etat
du Canton de Vaud, 2010, 6), thus requiring the proposal of another outstanding site
in its ownership.
14E. Krebs, op. cit.
15Art. 6 par. 4 of the Convention sur les prestations entre la Confédération suisse et la société
anonyme des Chemins de fer fédéraux, pour les années 2013 à 2016.
16Y. Deillon, head of the coordination and land registry office of the commune of Lausanne,
interviewed 16 June 2015 in Lausanne.
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This is where the SBB stepped in: its locomotive depot located aside Lausanne’sA central plot with major
development constraints rail station was unsuitable for the new train maintenance process which had been
relocated outside of the city17. This turned a 21,000m2 of land in a most central
location out of use. Still, its redevelopment for housing or commercial purposes is
highly difficult:
− the hall is part of the patrimonial inventory and considered of regional import-
ance, which requires the integration of outstanding physical elements of the hall
(such as the vaults) into the future construction. If the SBB wants to redevelop
new building for financial purposes, it would require the hall’s removal from the
patrimonial inventory, a long and complex procedure;
− the plot’s location (stuck between a row of residential buildings located directly
above it and the noisy train tracks immediately before Lausanne’s main station)
and limited access (only two small roads, also stuck between existing buildings
and connecting to the station’s already overcrowded roundabout) limit its future
use and overall economic value18. Therefore, no density comparable to Malley
can be reached.
These elements are development constraints and the SBB seizes the opportunityA well timed land
exchange of the future cultural complex is an ideal opportunity to get rid of this problematic
plot and obtain a better suited one that allows high financial returns. However, these
constraints are not problematic for the commune of Lausanne, because noise, height or
access constraints have less relevance to the future museums than for housing. Further,
the patrimonial obligations that were initially considered as a financial burden have
become a challenge for the museums’ architects. Thus, after having estimated the
plots’ values, the SBB and the commune of Lausanne agree to a land exchange. The
transaction is effective once the local development plans that secure the building rights
on the respective plots are approved. A cash transfer balances the difference of value
(Commune of Lausanne, 2011b).
Resources such as the concentration of ownership (infrastructure) and expertise can
provide a decisive advantage in a land use planning negotiation process. Combined
with what appears to be a coincidence of the calendar, Lausanne manages to turn
a defeat due to a referendum into the successful establishment of a cultural centre
through fine-tuned land management. Having seen the main aspects linked to the
property structure, the next section turns to the territorial dimension of Malley.
5.1.3.2 Territorial structure
An additional specificity of the neighbourhood is that both the local developmentA communal border that
crosses the perimeter plans ofMalley-gare andMalley-gasomètre span two different communes – Renens and
Prilly19. This complicates the negotiation process, because two communal executive
bodies are involved in the planning process and two communal legislators must vote
on these plans. The double territorial affiliation of the plans brings up two matters:
− the first one concerns the localisation of the different buildings on one commune
or the other’s territory. In order to prevent the division of single buildings among
two different communes and thus two different fiscal regimes, the communal
borders that cross the two local development plans have to be adapted to the
area’s new urban configuration (Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2015a).
− the second matter is linked with the type of residential buildings and the local-
isation of public spaces. Despite contrasting political views20, both communes
17M. Béguelin, former Member of Parliament and member of the Swiss delegation to the European
Parliament, interviewed 17 November 2015 in Lausanne.
18The financial reports estimate the 25,768m2 of the locomotive hall plot at 33.36 million francs
(1,295CHF/m2), the 10,060m2 of the local development plan of Malley-gare at 34.4 million francs
(3,419CHF/m2) (Commune of Lausanne, 2011b).
19The ice rink development plan is of cantonal rank and therefore subject to cantonal approval
only.
20Prilly is a proportionately more right wing and wealthier commune than Renens, a left wing
bastion with a particularly high proportion of foreigners.
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are interested in retrieving fiscal income from the future inhabitants and the
creation of jobs. Future subsidized housing will yield less fiscal revenues than
freehold apartments. This point is further discussed in section 5.1.5.3.
5.1.3.3 Soil structure and view
Linked with the territorial aspect are the soil structure and pollution present in it. Limited view
The location (as detailed on figure 5.1) is of unstable nature, because it consists
of glaciolacustrine silts from a former lake located between two moraines (Nägeli,
2006, 12): one located along Longemalle street and the other along the main train
line. These two moraines make the studied perimeter comparable to a flattened basin
where the view is partly blocked on both sides. In particular, there is no view further
south on Lake Geneva. The basin was flattened in the 1940s prior to the construction
of the slaughterhouse (Fantoli, 2006, 21).
The location to be developed has geothermal potential (Nägeli, 2006, 35), but Major soil pollution
several areas of the soil are polluted with numerous remainders of hydrocarbons dating
back to the former gas cracking plant (CSD SA, 1999)21. Two of the main plots are
classified as requiring remediation in case of development (State of Vaud, 2015). This
classification implies important additional costs in terms of soil remediation and use
restrictions that are one of the main elements of negotiation; they are discussed in
section 5.1.5.2. But most importantly, the actors exclude from the beginning the
development of the area where the former gas plant was located. Already in the
master plan published in 2012 (Bauart and Raderschall, 2012, 86f), the park – or as
one interviewee called it the "green area" – has been located precisely on the most
polluted site, because of the excessive costs a remediation process would imply.
An additional element related to the soil are the district heating pipes that the Existing heating
infrastructureindustrial works of Lausanne installed from the 1990s onwards to service all plots
owned or used by Lausanne in Malley (Commune of Lausanne, 2011a). They furnish
energy to the surrounding buildings displayed on figure 5.1, but also to housing units
owned by Lausanne’s pension fund on the southern side of Longemalle street22. The
pipes also run through Chablais street, the south-north axis in the eastern part of the
perimeter and important extension projects exist in the west and the north (Commune
of Lausanne, 2011a). This energy network is of crucial importance for the future
development of the area for two reasons:
1. Lausanne invested more than 12 million francs23 in the pipes and 4 millions
francs in the heating plant whose capacity will double in the near future (see
section 5.1.5.1). Such investments are aligned with a long term strategy that in-
fluences most major land use planning projects of the commune and, potentially,
those of the agglomeration;
2. In 2011, the communes created a common ownership company for the pipes
and any future extensions of the network. The process seems to have been
initiated by Prilly’s original connection request to replace their old communal
buildings’ gasoline heating system (Commune of Lausanne, 2011a). Only when
enough clients requested to be connected did the industrial works agree on the
network’s development.
What I observe here is that the district heating system became part of the land Heating as land service
service, but a service of particular nature, namely one conceived to generate profits. In
fact, the investments made by the three communes became a commercial service sold
to customers. Relying on the air pollution plan elaborated with the agglomeration
plan in 2005, its extension was pushed forward by Lausanne’s industrial works whose
financial plan for district heating forecast a yearly consumption increase of 3.5% for
the next ten years (Commune of Lausanne, 2000) and additionally promised dividends
to the shareholders (Commune of Lausanne, 2011a). Through the creation of the
21As no access was granted to the two pollution reports, the available information is limited to
earlier drilling results published in the cantonal cadastre of geology (State of Vaud, 2015).
22A. Bartolomei, op. cit.
23The invested amount is based on the value of the district heating society created in 2011 and
have therefore been written off
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common company, Prilly and Renens could push for the development of the district
heating to make their investment profitable24.
As it was briefly shown, energy infrastructure is heavily developed in Malley and the
presence of industrial works makes it an important actor in the area’s redevelopment.
As the next section shows, existing and future transport facilities are an additional
structural factor shaping Malley’s future.
5.1.3.4 Accessibility
In regard to motorised private transport, Malley has privileged access to the motorwayOutstanding accessibility
(1.3 km away from the closest entrance and exit) and thus can be easily accessed by car
from the entire Lake Geneva region as well as more remote areas. In matters of public
transport, figure 5.1 shows the presence of vital rail infrastructure in and around
the area. In contrast with the northern tracks (mostly used for waste transport) the
central tracks are part of the national east-west rail connection. Since the inauguration
of the train station of Malley in 2012, they also have served as the backbone of public
transport within the agglomeration of Lausanne and along Lake Geneva. A train
currently stops every 25 minutes in each direction and is set to stop every 15 minutes
in the near future (SBB, 2014, 6). The trains grant access to Lausanne’s central
station within 4 minutes and to Renens’ within 3 minutes. The southern tracks (the
locus of Lausanne’s first metro line) grant access to Flon, Lausanne’s second public
transport hub, (within 6 minutes) and to the University of Lausanne campus (within 9
minutes). Three bus lines currently cross the area, but the frequency will be extended
along with the area’s development: a tram line will pass along the northern limits of
the area, and the bus supply will be broadened25.
The contribution of the train station to the neighbourhood’s redevelopment playsCantonal initiative
a pivotal role, but leads to the question of the initiator of the station’s construction.
The chronology elaborated in table 5.1, I note that first urban analyses on a wide
perimeter (approximately 5 kilometres length and 500 metres width) along the train
tracks between Lausanne and Renens that includes Malley started in 2004 (see also
table 5.1). When the federal enquiry on urgent agglomeration projects was launched
in 2005, the canton pushed forward the project of building a train station in Malley in
order to obtain federal funding. This required its integration into the cantonal trans-
port strategy and the station’s mention in planning documents. The first evidence
of the station is found in a preliminary version of the cantonal structure plan (Can-
ton de Vaud, 2005), published shortly before the application to federal funding. It
then integrated into the agglomeration’s planning documents – the above mentioned
urban analyses on sector 2 analyses published the following year (SDOL, 2005). As
several interviewees mentioned26, it was the canton’s development strategy of the
regional express network that allowed the construction of the station and its sub-
sequent development. Neither the SBB nor Lausanne initially believed in the area’s
redevelopment.
Despite an initial lack of general support, the waste sorting centre was still toTemporal shift of land
uses be built (2006), thus creating a temporal shift between transport planning works
on cantonal level and surrounding land uses planned on communal level that still
correspond to the existing industrial zone. This shift is also made evident by the
2002 construction of the animal waste processing center (subsequently dismantled in
2008 when the train station’s construction began).
Property, territorial, soil structures, as well as accessibility have demonstrated several
elements that should be kept in mind for the rest of the analysis:
24A. Bartolomei, op. cit.
25C. Jemelin, op. cit.
26P. Hassler, Head of the planning office of the commune of Prilly, interviewed in Prilly 19 May
2015; N. Wisnia, op.cit.; Y. Deillon, op. cit.
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− concentrated public ownership is managed as private property by Lausanne and
the SBB, and considered as such by the the planning authorities (Renens and
Prilly);
− the site’s industrial vocation has not vanished, but is becoming a mixed area
where housing, secondary, and tertiary activities coexist;
− the territorial split among two different authorities led to the anticipation of
future revenues as well as constraining the distribution of building rights;
− the importance of the existing energy infrastructure and of the industrial works’
investments and forecasts;
− the development constraints created by the pollution of soils;
− the outstanding accessibility to the entire area.
5.1.3.5 Demographic evolution
Between 1991 and 2013, the district of Ouest lausannois27 experienced a population
growth of 21% (from 57,700 to 69,900 inhabitants), an average annual growth rate of
0.96%. Compared with cantonal growth rates, the district, as well as the commune
of Lausanne, are in the lower tier of growth. Over the same period, canton Vaud
experienced a population increase of 27% (from 577,500 to 734,350), an average annual
growth rate of 1.23%. However, population growth in the district is above national
average growth rate (18.9% total growth, or 0.86% annual growth).
5.1.4 Constraints of superior law
This section deals with the impact of legislation on the local regulatory arrange-
ment/policy output. It synthesises the major constraints that apply to the redevelop-
ment project, and shows how they shape the implementation process and illustrates
the final arrangement negotiated between the actors.
5.1.4.1 Cantonal approval procedure
Several cantonal offices are involved in the elaboration of the master plan, either Strong initial involvement
by the cantonas members of the executive committee approving the plan, or as members of the
technical committee elaborating it28. As there is no formal procedure for the master
plans’ elaboration and approval, it is difficult to trace specific elements put forward by
the cantonal authorities. Nevertheless, a concomitant evaluation of the first master
plan’s elaboration mentions the proactive role of the canton in regard to environ-
mental and security norms as wells as in regard to the division of land service costs
between the involved public authorities, be it as planning authorities or landowner
(Lawrence et al., 2009a). As the negotiations on service costs are still ongoing six
years after the mentioned report, I note that the financial issue has been trickier than
initially expected. And as this is a matter to be solved between landowners and plan-
ning authorities, the financial involvement of the canton withdraws in the following
procedural stages29.
In the preliminary exam, as well as the approval stage of the local development plan Transportation and land
service costs as main
issues
of Malley-gare, the administrative arrangement is slightly modified: the consulted
27The district is composed of eight communes that form the western part of the agglomeration
of Lausanne: Crissier, Prilly, Renens, Bussigniy-sur-Lausanne, Chavannes-près-Renens, Ecublens,
Saint-Sulpince and Villars-sainte-croix.
28These entities are the office for communes and housing (service des communes et du logement),
the office for mobility (service de la mobilité), the land use planning office (service du développement
territorial), the office for economy and tourism (service de la promotion économique et du tourisme),
the office for environment and energy (direction générale de l’environnement), the office in charge of
roads (service des routes) and the service in charge of architecture, patrimony and logistics (service
immeubles, patrimoine et logistique).
29J-P. Dind, project manager for the cantonal land use planning office and the office for economy
and tourism, interviewed 13 July 2015 in Lausanne.
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offices change30. As neighbour of the plots to be developed, the SBB is involved in
the consultation. The agglomeration’s public transport company is also consulted in
regard to the future buildings’ connection to the agglomeration’s transport system.
Both companies’ positions are fully backed by the office for mobility (SDT, 2014).
Main aspects underlined during the preliminary exam were linked to:
− the obligation to elaborate the financial plan that divides the service costs among
the actors’ plan before its final approval by the communes;
− the enlargement of access roads to both the waste sorting centre and the logistics
centre;
− the coordination of planning with the public transport network, in particular
the location of bus stops and bike parks;
− the definition of public spaces and the inscription of legal guarantees for their
open access;
− the time horizon for the construction of a tunnel crossing the railways, whose
financing depends on the financial plans of the two local development plans;
− security aspects involved in both access and air vents linked to the Ordinance
on protection against major accidents31;
− the organization of a public information session32.
The oppositions to the local development plan led to two main conflicts:
1. financial issues between landowner and planning authorities on two points of
contention: the lack of a financial plan, the approximate definition of public
spaces and the railway crossing;
2. use conflicts between the former industrial uses and the forthcoming residential
and commercial uses: preliminary planning by the spatial planning office of the
commune of Lausanne did not consider the road requirements of the waste sort-
ing and logistics centre, even though these offices are in the same department.
By law33, the approval of a local development plan is conditioned on the elab-Additional delay for the
submission of a financial
plan
oration of a financial plan dividing land service costs among the landowners and
planning authorities. In the case of Malley-gare, the cantonal authority makes an
exception, citing financial aspects intrinsically linked to the second development plan
of Malley-gasomètre, still under negotiation. They explain that the costs division has
been one of the main sources of conflict since the elaboration of the first master plan
(Lawrence et al., 2009a, 125). As this issue had to be solved between landowners
and planning authorities, which are both public authorities, an additional term was
granted (expiring prior to the plan’s final adoption by the communal councils).
5.1.4.2 Air pollution ordinance
As mentioned in section 5.1.2, one of the causes leading to the elaboration of the
master plans for the western part of Lausanne’s agglomeration was the implementa-
tion of the Air pollution ordinance34. By the end of the 1990s, the threshold set by
the ordinance were blatantly exceeded by far and the air quality was so poor that
authorities agreed on a moratorium on construction in order to try to solve the prob-
lem. Thus, the redevelopment of Malley was partially initiated by the air pollution
problem. It is designed as a remedy: its central location, its density and the high
30Neither the office for economy and tourism, nor the office for communes and housing are involved
in the procedure, although they were consulted prior to the master plan’s approval. The cantonal
office for insurance against fire and natural hazards and the office for consumption and veterinary
affairs take part in the approval procedure of the local development plan of Malley-gare, but do not
formulate any specific comment.
31SR 814.012.
32Art. 3 LATC, SR-VD 700.11.
33Art. 49, 50 and 55 of the Loi du 4 décembre 1985 sur l’aménagement du territoire et les
constructions LATC, SR-VD 700.11.
34RS 814.318.142.1.
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connectivity to public transport and the reduced number of parking spaces (compared
to Swiss standards: see section 5.1.5.1) limit the use of individual motorized vehicles.
This implies a modal shift that goes beyond Malley’s redevelopment and extends to
the creation of the regional train network launched in 2004. The expected effect is
a reduction of local CO2 emissions despite an expected increase of 4,100 inhabitants
and jobs and a potential overall increase in the entire of Malley of 16,100 inhabitants
and jobs (Bauart and Raderschall, 2012, 36).
5.1.4.3 Energy policy
According to the cantonal legal provisions adopted in 201435, authorities now have Mandatory coordination
of planning with energy
provision
the obligation to plan and coordinate energy provision and use together with land use
planning procedures. Both Lausanne and Renens aim to develop new neighbourhoods
that comply with the 2000 watts society (Commune of Lausanne, 2013; Commune
of Renens, 2013)36. In the case of Malley-gare, a document analyses two possible
scenarios of energy provision and consumption, the latter depending on the share
of housing in the overall project. However, this is not a binding document. The
building regulations applicable to local development are binding, and they stipulate
that the communal executive bodies, within their competencies, take all measures
that encourage the development of zero energy buildings (Communes of Prilly and
Renens, 2015b). This leaves the door open to a wide range of possible applications.
The cantonal energy law37 further mentions that new buildings (and those whose Mandatory connection to
district heatingboilers are slated to be renewed) are obligated to connect to the district heating
network if they are located within the network’s coverage area, and do not already
use mainly renewable energies (this point will be discussed in section 5.1.5.1). Addi-
tionally, it grants a 5% bonus of development rights if the anticipated construction
exceeds the energy standards fixed by law. As this bonus is only granted when the
building permit is submitted, it is not known if this development bonus will be used
or not.
5.1.4.4 Priority development areas
The fact that Malley is one of the priority development areas defined by the Canton Financial support for
planninghas led, beside the central involvement in the train station’s development, to the
financial participation of the canton in preliminary studies and master plans. The
canton’s focus is on the provision of initial, mainly financial, support in order to
launch a development project38.
The law says39 public authorities are granted an expropriation right on areas of An instrument limited to
economic activitiespublic interest, a criterion which applies to priority development areas. As Malley’s
landowners are public entities, it could only be used to expropriate two leasehold
lands in the local development plan of Malley-gasomètre (see figure 5.1). According
to interviewees, this instrument only applies to those parts of the priority development
areas where economic activities are developed40.This is due to the fact that current
cantonal legislation does not recognize housing as a matter of public interest. The
surfaces of Malley-gasomètre where the leases are located will host housing and/or
parking lots, so the expropriation right cannot be used and a compromise will be
negotiated with the lease holders41.
5.1.4.5 Remediation of contaminated sites policy
As mentioned in section 5.1.4.1, the impossibility of access to pollution reports means
that I cannot see the analyses’ results, nor assess the costs linked with the land’s
development. According to the cantonal cadastre of polluted soils (State of Vaud,
2015), the polluted plots do not require remediation, as the pollution does not spread
to nearby waters. However, one plot requires surveillance. In any case, the area’s
35Art. 16a of the Loi du 16 mai 2006 sur l’énergie LVLEne, RS-VD 730.01.
36For a presentation of the concept, please refer to http://www.2000watt.ch/.
37Art. 25 LVLEne, RS-VD 730.01.
38J-P. Dind, op. cit.
39Art. 76a of the Loi du 4 décembre 1985 sur l’aménagement du territoire et les constructions,
SR-VD 700.11.
40A. Baillot,op. cit.
41Y. Deillon, op. cit.
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redevelopment necessitates the treatment of excavated soils and possibly prohibits
drilling through the polluted layer of soil to prevent exfiltrations (Viallon, 2016a,
103). The use of geothermal energy might be limited. As there is no obligation
to remediate the site, the amount of soil to treat depends on the depth of future
construction (soil depth is not regulated in the local development plan).
5.1.4.6 Protection against major accidents
The federal ordinance on the protection against major accidents42 has led to severalRestrictions on use and
thus value restrictions in regard to land service and the type of land use:
− creation of a safety access between buildings and railways, and construction of
building exits only on the opposite side of the railways;
− prohibition of land use causing high traffic (i.e. commercial centres, cinemas
and schools) and limited to a maximum of 13% of the overall gross floor area
dedicated to sales;
− prohibition of land use dealing with vulnerable persons such as retirement homes
and daycare centres, because of the additional difficulties to evacuate the occu-
pants in case of emergency;
− maximum of the overall gross floor area dedicated to housing – at most 40%.
These restrictions translate into a land use conflict within the SBB: on one hand,Conflicting interests
within the SBB the company’s function is to transport passengers and freight (some of which consists
of dangerous goods) and must fulfil a set of safety obligations in order to prevent and
minimize risks. On the other hand, it should maximize the economic output of its
properties43 and thus foster their efficient development. This conflict has translated
into practice as follows:
− the current publication of the report which assesses ordinance implementation
has led to development restrictions on the landowners just before the first master
plan was to be approved and has subsequently led to its suspension (Lawrence
et al., 2009a, 132);
− the report’s results have been contested by landowners, who did not want to
lose part of their building rights. The SBB’s representatives44 argued that the
calculation method used in the report ordered by the canton would apply stricter
norms than the one used in their own report (Lawrence et al., 2009b, 88).
This interruption of the planning process shows that the SBB’s double conflictualA stricter
implementation over time role has been solved internally since the ordinance’s approval in 1991. The former
cantonal lack of expertise left until recently a rather wide margin of manoeuvrability
to the railway company in the ordinance’s implementation process. The inconsistency
of the canton’s implementation is apparent in the northern side of Malley’s station:
the commercial centre and cinema built in 2001 are exactly the type of uses that
the environmental impact assessment (Ecoscan, 2015, 44) and the regulations of the
local development plan of Malley-gare (Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2015b) now
advise against.
5.1.4.7 Agglomeration policy
In June 2006, the federal Parliament approved the creation of a 6 billion francs fundFederal subsidy for the
train station for transportation projects in agglomerations, among which 2 billion francs were ded-
icated to projects listed as urgent (Federal Council, 2005). Supported by the gov-
ernment of the canton of Vaud, the station of Malley was among the chosen projects
(see also section 5.1.3.4). It was granted a 50% subsidy (40 million francs) for the
construction of the train station of Malley, which gave in turn a major push to the
area’s redevelopment.
The remaining four billions francs were dedicated to other transportation measuresOther federal subsidies
linked to urbanisation
measures 42SR 814.012.43Art. 6 par. 4 of the Convention sur les prestations entre la Confédération suisse et la société
anonyme des Chemins de fer fédéraux, pour les années 2013 à 2016.
44One representative of the Real estate department, one representative of the Infrastructure de-
partment (Lawrence et al., 2009b, 111).
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within agglomerations. In order to compete for federal funding, Swiss agglomerations
had to elaborated a master plan that developed the agglomerations’ transportation
networks (foot, bicycle, public transport, motorised vehicles) and coordinated them
with urbanisation measures (constructions dedicated to housing and activities). In
the case of Lausanne, the canton wrote the first draft of the agglomeration’s master
plan in 2005. In 2006, the communes’ executives approved and signed the master
plan. In 2008, the federal and cantonal transport ministers signed the agreement in
order to finance the planned measures. The link between the agglomeration policy
and the redevelopment of Malley is indirect, because it is the canton that signed the
agreement, but the communes that have to modify their building regulations and
development plans according to the master plan they signed. In the case of Malley,
the agglomeration policy subsidised the railway crossing for pedestrians and bicycles
and part of the land service of the two streets to be created in the neighbourhood.
Confederation and canton paid 5.92 million francs out of 25 million francs (Communes
of Prilly and Renens, 2016). Table 5.3 in section 5.1.6 sums up the different costs and
benefits linked with Malley’s redevelopment.
An additional condition to which the federal subsidies were linked are the realisa- Territorial communes
under time pressuretion of the infrastructure within a fixed time period. The first agglomeration program
approved by the Confederation in 2008 planned the end of realisation of all measures
by 2020, and fixed the end of planning works by and the beginning of development
for Malley in 2010 (Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008, 80). The schedule of the
second agglomeration program delayed the end of planning works to 2014, and be-
ginning of development to 2017, leaving two years for the detailed planning of the
project (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012a, 45). In their evaluation report on the
second agglomeration program, the Confederation insisted on the importance to re-
spect the delays mentioned in the program, as otherwise their financial support might
be reduced (ARE, 2014, 27). This factor put local authorities under pressure, as they
possibly lose part of the federal funding associated with the project.
5.1.4.8 Master plans
The master plans45, because they analyse the locational and topographic contexts Definition of density
criteria(i.e. in terms of view), make suggestions in terms of future uses and point out specific
locations for these uses. Additionally, they set overall density values in accordance
with existing and future connections to public transport. Sector 2 studies consider
densities above 400 inhabitants and jobs per hectare for the plots adjacent to the
station as desirable (SDOL, 2005, 27), an objective that is very well achieved despite
the legal constraints. In fact, the local development plan of Malley-gare reaches a
density of 519 inhabitants and jobs per hectare.
These plans are theoretically not binding, because they are not formally part of Change of planning scale
the land use planning policy implementation process and are not approved by legis-
lative bodies, unlike zoning and local development plans46. However, during the legal
check47 of zoning and local development plans by the cantonal supervisory authority,
the latter requires the zoning or local development plans’ conformity to the agglom-
eration’s master plan (SDT, 2012). This procedural subtleness allows the communal
executive bodies (and the cantonal heads of administration) to fix a set of elements
such as foreseen density and land use that communal legislative bodies have to adopt
later on in binding local development plans. This entails a redefinition of the political
administrative arrangement: the communal legislative bodies’ margin of manoeuv-
rability is reduced in favour of the inter-communal assembly of communal executive
bodies that pre-defines the density and land services in specific zones that are to
be renewed. When the communal legislative body modifies zoning and development
plans and submits them to the canton for approval, the cantonal authority reject the
local development plans that do not meet the master plans’ criteria.
45The master plans of the western part of the agglomeration (SDOL, 2003), the master plan on the
industrial areas along the train tracks (SDOL, 2005), the agglomeration’s master plan (Agglomération
Lausanne-Morges, 2008; Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012b) and the master plan specific to Malley
(Bauart and Raderschall, 2012).
46Art. 58, SR-VD 700.11.
47Art. 56, SR-VD 700.11.
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In order to sum up the content of the present section, one can list the following ele-
ments of cantonal and federal law that have an impact on the redevelopment project:
− the air pollution ordinance, which initiates reflection on the areas of the western
part of the agglomeration that should can be redeveloped;
− the agglomeration policy, which co-financed the train station’s construction and
thus shaped Malley’s redevelopment;
− the ordinance on polluted soils, which restricts the development of the area’s
underground due to the costs the soil’s remediation implies;
− the ordinance on protection against major accidents, which restricts the types
of possible uses for constructions close to the train tracks;
− the obligation to elaborate an energy concept, although its realization is de-
cided only at the stage of the building permit, which leaves a wide margin of
manoeuvrability to the landowners and developers.
Some of these regulations have provided an incentive for the area’s redevelopment,
and some of them have created constraints. The next section, dedicated to the local
regulatory arrangement shows how these restrictions have clearly not impeded the
urban renewal process.
5.1.5 Local regulatory arrangement
5.1.5.1 Energy supply
Energetic aspects play an important role in the transformation of Malley. One factorHigh energy objectives
set by the master plan are the high energy standards set into the local master plan: these require a careful
examination of the energy sources used for the construction and operation of the new
neighbourhood. In fact, the master plan sets forth an objective of fulfilling the stand-
ards of the 2000 watts society (Bauart and Raderschall, 2012, 66). Elaborated by
the Federal polytechnic schools in the 1990s, this has been committed to by the com-
munal authorities of Lausanne and Renens (Commune of Lausanne, 2013; Commune
of Renens, 2013).
The current input sources for district heating are: 60% burned waste, 33% gasLack of renewable energy
source for district heating or gasoline and 4% sewage sludge (Commune of Lausanne, 2011a). Since the energy
source determines the sustainability of the district heating system, a dilemma appears
between the utilised energy inputs and the further extension of the network (a network
in which the current input of renewable energy sources are limited). The search for
alternative sustainable energy sources has been a political issue since the 1990s. An
example of proposed alternatives is the substitution of gas by wood for district heating
(Commune of Lausanne, 2005b, 2014a). Wood heating has not seemed feasible until
recently.
Important investments have been made over the last decades to foster districtPlanned extension of
district network heating (with more to come). The thermal plant of Malley itself is an important
energy provider for the heating system and its capacity will be doubled in a near
future48.
Another issue is that with the evolution of technology and construction stand-Reduced energy needs of
new buildings ards (better isolation of buildings and alternative energy sources such as geothermal
energy), the heating needs of new buildings have been drastically reduced. This
threatens the network profitability, because it requires the industrial work to provide
heat to a higher number of clients and thus lay more pipes in the ground, which
increases the network’s development costs.
Further, the obligation to take energetic aspects into account in the elaborationMore transparency in
energetic planning of local development plans (as in the case of Malley: see section 5.1.4.3) contribute to
make decisions such as the choice of energy source more visible and further upstream
in the decision process. Possible alternatives have to be considered and a public report
is written. Until recently, these were mostly in the discretionary power of developers
48A. Bartolomei, op. cit.
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and/or the industrial works, who even benefit from a legal obligation to connect to the
district heating network if no other renewable source of energy is used49. Today, the
underlying rationale in reducing the emission of pollutants and heat losses generated
by individual heating systems through a centralized source is not questioned, but the
temporal shift between long term investments in district heating, the recent evolutions
of technological possibilities, and the legal obligations to coordinate planning with
energy provision lead to an intra-policy conflict that is hard to resolve.
Several other elements exacerbate the tensions between the provision of future Gas as a privileged
source of incomebuildings with a more sustainable energy source and the development of the district
heating:
− Lausanne’s monopoly on gas distribution along the entire coast of the Geneva
lake from Nyon to Lausanne (SIL, 2012, 22);
− the important revenue gas provides to the commune: sell price to final individual
consumers by the industrial works of Lausanne is at least 25% more expensive
than the Swiss average (Price surpervisor, 2012).
− the absence of a boiler and other heating equipment in the connected building
(only a heat exchanger is required) allows the developer or landowner to reduce
installation and maintenance costs linked to heat provision;
− the supply of an all inclusive offer (installation, provision of heat, maintenance)
by the industrial works of Lausanne simplifies the installation process for the
developer or landowner and allows him to pass on these costs to the final captive
consumer;
− with the creation of an intercommunal district heating company with Prilly,
Renens called CADOuest, Lausanne has included two of its territorial neigh-
bours as shareholders of the heating distribution company (in the western part
of the agglomeration). These neighbours participate in the investments, and
have a share of the rent that is limited to the network’s profitability, i.e. around
3-4% over 60 years (Commune of Lausanne, 2011a, 9). In this way, the com-
munes themselves have become captive clients.
The achievement of nearly zero energy buildings is linked with the reduction of Costs passed on captive
end consumersenergy consumption and with the local provision of energy (from the sun, the air, the
soil or nearby waters). In the local development plan of Malley-gare, the energetic
concept written in accordance with new regulations (see section 5.1.4.3) anticipates
only a limited use of geothermal power (Commune of Lausanne, 2014b). The act-
ors’ preferences are for district heating, which, combined with solar power and the
buy of electricity from renewable sources and heat exchangers around the foundation
works, does not incentivise the drilling for additional geothermal energy (Commune
of Lausanne, 2014b, 19). Nevertheless, the sustainability of the energy concept relies
on the purchasing of electricity from renewable sources, a condition that might be
difficult to impose on developers (made particularly difficult because the regulations
in the local development plan do not address it) and consumers. Further, it considers
district heating as a partially renewable source, but its share of renewable energy is
precisely going to be reduced because of the network’s extension.
The actors do not intend to make Malley an example of a sustainable neighbour- Inclusion of neighbour
communes in the district
heating coalition
hood. The SBB focus on the price of alternative energy sources as opposed to district
heating and emphasizes the "illogicality" of not using available power50; Lausanne, in
particular the industrial works, wants to ensure the profitability of the investments
made in the thermal plants and heat distribution pipes. Renens and Prilly originally
claimed a connection to the district heating: they anticipated economic and ecological
gains compared with old, oil-fired boilers that serviced their communal buildings and
would need to be replaced soon. The development of district heating and the under-
lying financial investments seemed, at the time, the best option. However, Lausanne
initially refused to fulfil Prilly’s request to extend the network further west, arguing a
lack of potential clients. Only due to the interest shown subsequently by Renens and
49Art. 25 of the Loi du 16 mai 2006 sur l’énergie LVLEne, SR-VD 730.01.
50G. Dekkil, project manager at SBB Real estate, interviewed 8 June 2015 in Lausanne.
170 of 327
Urban reconversion in Malley
the upcoming redevelopment of Malley is the network’s extension back on the negoti-
ation table and the intercommunal district company created (Commune of Lausanne,
2011a).
Through the monopoly on heat provision and the establishment of a district heat-Adding up of rents
ing network, the district heating company links the rent due from zoning with the rent
due from energy supply, and more specifically from the provision of gas. The rent due
is secured by captive customers, a phenomenon already observed in a recent study by
Nicol and Knoepfel (2014). The energy rent is divided amongst the district heating
company’s shareholders (the three communes involved in the redevelopment of Mal-
ley) and the industrial works of Lausanne, who distribute and burn the gas, produce
and sell the heat to the district heating company. From an ecological perspective,
the landowners’ choice to use gas as a primary energy source offers reduced ecological
benefits when compared with renewable sources. Its ecological advantage was relevant
mainly in comparison with heating oil (which has not been considered). However, the
choice of heat source has also been determined by the heating pipes already present
on site. Further, geothermal energy is associated with higher costs that developers
are reluctant to carry. In the case of Malley, a geothermal energy source would have
been additionally problematic because of the existent soil pollution.
Linked with the air pollution regulations (see section 5.1.4.2), an additional levyLimited use of fossil
energies through a
reduced number of car
spaces
that the actors use to reduce energy consumption is the reduction (compared to Swiss
standards) of planned parking spaces for motorized vehicles (Communes of Prilly and
Renens, 2015b). Coupled with high public transport connectivity, this limitation
reduces the proportion of inhabitants using or having a car and thus reduces the
share of fossil energy used by future inhabitants.
The energetic dimension is characterised by a path dependent behaviour of the landowner
who fulfils simultaneously the functions of energy and heat provider. The owner has
managed to integrate clients as shareholders of the heating network to share the
network’s development costs and ensure the future extension of the service. These
intertwined economic interests reinforce the existing inertia (Goldthau, 2014) and ar-
gue against the actors’ will to foster the use of renewable energies and to implement
the 2000 watts society (Bauart and Raderschall, 2012; Commune of Lausanne, 2012;
Commune of Renens, 2013)51.
5.1.5.2 Pollution of soils
Soil pollution causes other restrictions in terms of development. According to theA central cost linked to
redevelopment interviewed actors52, the financial costs of excavating the polluted soil and treating it
according to legal prescriptions was one of the major elements influencing the location
and shape of buildings in the case of the local development plan Malley-gasomètre.
In the case of soil excavation, polluted soil requires transport and treatment (whichTransfer of development
rights within the local
development plan
implies important financial costs), and generates non-negligible amounts of grey en-
ergy. The solution negotiated by the actors minimizes excavations, soil transport and
treatment and thus reduces costs and energy consumption.53: Underground floors are
minimised, surfaces that would normally be used for commercial or housing purposes
are partly dedicated to car parking spaces (parking spaces will thus be on the ground
floor and in a dedicated four stories building in the middle of the neighbourhood).
In order to compensate the loss housing surfaces induced by the parking spaces, the
amount of surface dedicated to parking is “transferred” to adjacent buildings in form
of additional floors54.
In regard to public spaces, the winning project in the competition on public spacesA pond as sales
argument? includes a park and a rainwater collecting pond serving the entire neighbourhood
(Bauart and Raderschall, 2012). These two elements (the park and the pond) will
51As a counter example, one can refer to the future neighbourhoods of Les plaines du loup and
Blécherette, which could have also been connected to the district heating network but for which a
geothermal solution has been chosen (Commune of Lausanne, 2012).
52G. Dekkil, op. cit.
53E. Krebs, op.cit.
54E. Krebs, op.cit.
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be located on the site of the former gas cracking plant, gasometer and gas pressure
reducing station. Various old and new gas pipes as well as district heating pipes are
still present. This area is highly polluted and thus considered non constructible55.
It seems quite astonishing that the competition’s results only marginally consider
this element in their planning mandate. The suggested plan is likely to be severely
modified by the financial constraints (due to pollution) that neither the landowner nor
the territorial commune wants to carry. The pond’s future seems rather compromised.
The policy of polluted soils steers the creation of economic value in the sense that Soil pollution determines
the location of
constructions
remediation costs are too high to be borne by landowners. This fact leads the actors
to follow a cost minimization strategy that limits the amount of remediated soil to
a strict minimum. Further, soil pollution is a determinant of the location of future
construction, the park being located where the most polluted soils are. From an
ecological perspective, this represents a low added value and impossibility to provide
additional goods and services such as a clean park, deeper basements and in an ideal
situation even a pond. However, this low ecological added value is not likely to change,
because of the high distance of underground waters and the soil’s composition (Nägeli,
2006) that limits the spread of pollution.
Another element on which soil pollution has an impact is energetic provision of the Restriction of energy
sourcesneighbourhood. If the new construction is intended to be self-sufficient, this autonomy
requires a wider remediation process in order to capture geothermal energy. Without
proper remediation, ecological value creation through renewable energy is impeded.
But these questions have never been asked in such terms, because the district heating
infrastructure is already on site.
5.1.5.3 Spatial distribution of building rights
Another important element in the negotiations regarding the pollution of soils (pre- Anticipation of future
inhabitants’ incomevious section) and the territorial structure (section 5.1.3.2) is the spatial distribution
of building rights. The communal borders cross-cut the planning perimeters and thus
add an additional constraint on the distribution of rent. The owners, as well as the
territorial communes have financial claims in regard to the future land use and users.
Additionally, it is worth noting the rental differences between offices, commercial
activities and housing56, but also between the types of housing. In fact, the expected
fiscal revenues or subsidies to be paid vary drastically depending on the category of
housing that will be built (i.e. condominium apartments, apartments rented accord-
ing to market prices, regulated or subsidized housing). Thus, the future location of
the different uses as well as the respective proportions of different housing types were
an important element in negotiations. As I had no access to the convention specify-
ing these elements, it is not possible to provide an overview of the expected financial
returns for each actor.
However, following elements can be mentioned in regard to the contract that will Land development
through leaseholdbind the landowners (SBB and Lausanne) and the developers: in accordance with
communal practice (Cour des comptes du Canton de Vaud, 2011b; Nahrath et al.,
2009a) and the subjects of interviews 57, the development of Lausanne’s and the
SBB’s land will be subcontracted to a developer in the form of leasehold land. The
price of the future building rights will probably equal 4–5% per year of the land’s
market value, a rate applied by Lausanne and the SBB for most of their leases (Cour
des comptes du Canton de Vaud, 2011b, 29). The Court auditor’s report further notes
that rent discounts can be granted during the first years for specific reasons such as
the compliance with specific environmental criteria or additional costs linked to the
terrain’s structure. As the contracts have not yet been established, it is not possible
to quantify the effective redistribution of value, but it can be stated that Malley’s
development will be an important source of revenue for Lausanne (see table 5.3).
In regard to the type of housing, landowners argue that the neighbourhood’s par- Limited future land rent?
tial industrial use and its overall location might be less suitable for freehold apartments
and thus limit future rents. Therefore, the project’s profitability might be lower than
in an exclusively residential neighbourhood. Recent studies on French agglomera-
55P. de Almeida, op. cit.
56In 2013, average sell price for a square meter of office in the region of Lausanne is 3,080 francs
and housing 2,500 francs (Wüest and Partner, 2016b).
57E. Krebs, op. cit.; A. Baillot, op. cit.
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tions (Boulay, 2011; Guérois and Le Goix, 2009) show an homogenisation of the rent
between neighbourhoods of the same agglomeration: a general catch-up phenomenon
is observed, with a particularly strong price increase in neighbourhoods with initially
low rents. Nonetheless, a reduced price gap between the neighbourhoods remains. At
this stage of the project, it is only possible to speculate on the future evolution of
prices. I do not possess land or real estate prices for neighbourhoods within the ag-
glomeration, and I do not know the developers’ contractual obligations regarding the
proportion of apartments that can be sold or which must be rented (nor do I know the
future duration of these rental agreements). Assuming that the neighbourhood’s price
increase only takes place five to ten years after the development is finished (Boulay,
2011, 295ff), it might be more profitable to initially rent most of the apartments and
then sell them once the rent gap is filled.
One has to keep in mind the contractually defined duration of the subsidised andImpact of subsidised and
regulated housing on rent regulated housing regimes. These contractual durations impact the future rent: for
example, the leasehold might restrict the period during which subsidies are paid for
subsidised housing to twenty years, or the leasehold might restrict the period during
which the rents are regulated to ten years; after that, the flats are rented on the
regular market. This aspect also plays an important role in the calculus of the future
financial return of the buildings. Thus, the amount of expected rent is used by the
communes in order to attract the most profitable uses, but also by the landowners who
tend to minimize future income that they can obtain from the developers through the
leasehold land. In this way, another element that plays a key role in the negotiations
are the land service taxes detailed in the next section.
5.1.5.4 Land service costs
In the negotiation and approval process of the local development plans, the main con-Three types of land
service taxes flict between landowners and territorial communes is over the extended land service
tax (the amount of money that the landowners pay to the authority in order to fin-
ance the territorial communes’ public infrastructure also beyond the neighbourhood’s
borders). Table 5.2 shows the different taxes linked to land service.
Tax Description Costs division
Connection tax: Costs of connection between private buildings
and local infrastructure like roads, energy, wa-
ter and sewage system (entirely paid by the
landowner)58
100% of effective
costs paid by the
landowner
Land service tax: Costs of construction of local infrastructure
which is publicly accessible, but primarily bene-
fits a neighbourhood (local roads, local energy
and water provision and sewage system).
50% of effect-
ive costs paid
by landowner,
50% by planning
authority
Extended land
service tax:
Insurance value of socio-cultural infrastructure
(non-financial assets) that a commune requires
in order to fulfil its general obligations like edu-
cation, health, public transports, parks, etc.
divided by the number of inhabitants divided
by the average surface use of one inhabitant
(50m2)
Up to 50% paid by
landowner
Table 5.2: Types of taxes linked to land service in Canton Vaud.
Both the land service tax and the extended land service tax are of contractualDisagreements on land
service nature and capture an additional part of the added economic value created by land
service and general communal infrastructure. In the case of Malley, its application is
the source of four main problems:
− it is unclear if a public owner has to pay the tax or not: the legal basis59 specifies
that public authorities and private entities working in the public interest are
exempted from the tax. However, the fact that the public owner acts as a
58Art. 50 of the Loi du 4 décembre 1985 sur l’aménagement du territoire et les constructions
LATC, SR-VD 700.11.
59Art. 90 of the Loi du 4 juillet 2000 sur les impôts directs cantonaux, RS-VD 642.11.
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private owner on another commune’s territory is subject to debate. After both
the owner and the territorial commune received contradictory legal advice60,
it was agreed to negotiate the amount that would be paid instead of going to
court.
− the amount of tax depends on the future use of the building: according to Ren-
ens’ communal regulations (Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2016), the territ-
orial commune is owed an amount of 144CHF/m2 for housing and 33CHF/m2
for commercial use. However, as the actors negotiate other elements with finan-
cial implications (i.e. the proportion of housing in the future buildings, public
spaces, remediation costs and other use restrictions), the effective sum due in
land service tax and extended land service tax remain part of the whole deal;
− the delay of payment: most landowners want to pay once the permit has been
delivered and stagger the development process in order to maintain control over
the process and to temporally divide the amount of money handed out for
service costs. However, the territorial communes want to get paid when the
local development plans are adopted, so they have to dispense a lower amount
of money to service the land;
− the spatial distribution of the tax: though the tax’s aim is to finance general
public infrastructure within the entire communal territory, the landowners con-
test the absence of a link between the amount of money levied and the public
infrastructure costs induced by the neighbourhood’s redevelopment.
As both authorities and landowners bare costs, the redistribution of economic Asymmetric information
on remediation costsvalue created by the redevelopment process is the main issue for the process’ actors.
However, the planning authorities do not know exactly how much profit they leave
to the landowner and future developer, because they do not have the resources to
calculate all costs and benefits of the negotiated solution (particularly in regard to
the remediation costs). This lack of the resource "personnel" lends to the landowners
an advantage in the negotiations61. In order to overcome this complex situation,
several solutions have been considered:
− one proposed solution was the creation of a society with territorial communes
and landowners as shareholders62. This society holds the land of the two local
development plans, borrows money from the bank, and pays for all infrastruc-
ture. This model is comparable to the land improvement syndicate presented
in the case study of Cheseaux (Viallon, 2016b). The complexity of the process
that the creation of such society would involve (its approval by the communal
legislative body, the time it involves) has led to the abandonment of the solution;
− another possibility was to dispatch the different development tasks between
the involved actors and their respective contractors63: each landowner and
commune takes the responsibility for some construction (roads, parking lots,
squares, park, etc.) and compensation is made for the extra amount paid by
one or another actor based on the financial agreement reached;
− the solution adopted in the end is to share the payment for some elements of the
land service (road works and and railway crossing) according to the cantonal
legal dispositions64 and leave other elements (squares) to the landowners. As
shown in table 5.3, the amount paid by landowners are estimated around 12.6
millions francs for the land service tax and 700,000 francs for the extended land
service tax (Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2016, 24f). The former covers
the costs of the railway crossing (see section 5.1.4.1) and of the adjacent roads,
the latter is the result of negotiation and depended upon the share of housing
60Interestingly, one of the commune’s advisors is the cantonal deputy who brought the motion to
parliament which led to the introduction of the tax.
61E. Krebs, op. cit.; T. Maystre, op. cit.
62N. Wisnia, op. cit.
63G. Dekkil, op. cit.
64Art. 129 of the Loi du 25 novembre 1974 sur l’expropriation, RS-VD 710.01.; art. 4b of the Loi
du 5 décembre 1956 sur les impôts communaux, RS-VD 650.11.
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included in the future buildings65. Once the first building permit is delivered, a
five year delay is granted for the payment of the above mentioned contributions
(Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2016, 24f).
Further, as mentioned in section 5.1.4.7 on the federal agglomeration policy, theTime pressure
approval of the local development plans could not be delayed much longer, as the
territorial communes might have lost part of the funds granted by the Confederation
for the realisation of the infrastructure. Further, the plans adoption processes had to
be coordinated between the two communal legislative bodies that had to approve the
plan in the same time frame.
5.1.5.5 Transport
The canton has a leading role in Malley’s redevelopment, as seen through their finan-Cantonal subsidy for
planning cing of the the train station construction (see section 5.1.3.4). In the ensuing planning
steps, the cantonal authority intervention is limited and decreases over time66: des-
pite the creation of an office dedicated to redevelopment projects67, cantonal actions
are confined to the supervision of the plans’ elaboration and to the co-financing of the
project manager’s salary (employed by the intercommunal coordination office SDOL).
The project manager is responsible for development projects in the western part of
Lausanne and the implementation of the 2012 master plan for Malley.
The supervision of the plan’s approval led, in 2008, to a major conflict linkedConflict on the
implementation of the
risk ordinance
to the implementation of the ordinance on protection against major accidents: the
commissioned report severely reduced future use rights. This led to a clash between
landowners and the report’s writers. The central object of contest was the method
used to calculate risks. In the end, the canton, responsible for the ordinance’s imple-
mentation, solved the issue by granting additional building rights that corresponded
to approximately 15% of the projected building rights in Malley-gare68 (see table
5.3 in section 5.1.6 below). Thus, the reduced value resulting from limited uses was
compensated for by additional gross floor area.
All actors agree that Malley’s development must ensure a high proportion of publicMutual benefits from
public transport transport users in the neighbourhood. This allows both the railway and the agglom-
eration’s public transport companies to fulfill their financial objectives, and caps the
subsidy that the communes pay to supply a public transport service. For the ag-
glomeration’s public transport company, the division of costs among the communes
is calculated on the basis of:
− the number of inhabitants in the commune;
− the number of kilometres driven by the transport company’s buses on the com-
mune’s territory;
− if the total sum paid by a commune exceeds 8 tax points (the case for Lausanne)
the amount in excess is paid by the communes and the canton through a trans-
port fund at agglomeration scale.
The consensus on the transport matter is due to the mutual benefits that publicAn opportunity to
recover costs transport provides to public actors: Malley’s redevelopment not only provides ad-
ditional passengers for the train lines operated by the SBB and for the buses and
trams run by the agglomerations’ public transport company, but it provides addi-
tional freight to the SBB via the waste sorting center. The transport company plans
to double the number of users using public transport in newly developed neighbour-
hoods compared to the average percentage of users in existing neighbourhoods 69.
Thus, Malley is the ideal location to recover some of the major investments that
65The local development plan sets the share of housing between 25 and 40% of the gross
floor area. A minimal amount of extended land service tax is due if the proportion of hous-
ing equals 25%. As a consequence the minimal amount of tax due in a "regular" case would be:
(37,300m2*25%*144CHF)+(37,300m2*75%*33CHF)=2.27M CHF.
66J.-P. Dind, op. cit.
67The so called groupe opérationnel des pôles is composed of representatives from the spatial
planning office and the office for economic development, see Canton de Vaud (2011) for additional
information.
68E. Krebs, op. cit.
69C. Jemelin, op. cit.
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the communes make in transport infrastructure, but also in operating costs. The
neighbourhood is designed in a way that the future inhabitants are compelled to use
the public transport system. In cooperation with real estate corporations, the public
transport company will set up a widget on their websites showing the travel times
from the inhabitant’s potential future home to their work in order to show the value
of the site’s ideal location70.
This section shows the multiplicity of factors that affect land values: zoning, plot Emergence of a public
oligopolyratios, transport infrastructure, district heating or soil pollution. Lausanne and the
SBB have created a public oligopoly. Due to their additional policy resources in terms
of expertise and infrastructure, this allows them to capture the added values created
by other actors: the station financed by the canton and the Confederation, and the
zoning operations done by Renens and Prilly. Most of the economic value lost due to
contextual factors or legal constraints is compensated by additional building rights.
The conflicts analysed in the case study are observed not only between public author-
ities, (one of them being the owner), but also between the different organisations that
compose the commune of Lausanne, owner of the plots. Figure 5.2 shows a visual
synthesis of the various problems that emerged during the planning process, namely:
− energy supply;
− security provisions against major accidents;
− pollution of soils;
− spatial distribution of building rights;
− division of land service costs and extended land service costs;
− the end of Lausanne’s industrial services former land use monopoly.
70C. Jemelin, op. cit.
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5.1.6 Impact on value redistribution
The redistributive aspects underlying the entire redevelopment of Malley can be Environmental outcomes
of redevelopment
counteracted by economic
growth
broadly synthesized as follows: the redevelopment of an industrial brownfield loc-
ated in the centre of an urban area creates economic value, because various plots
of the area had lost most of their uses and were converted to economically valuable
uses. This is mostly due to the limited and economically cheap remediation process
that took place. Some industrial and secondary activities are still present and feel
threatened by potential relocation due to the area’s reconversion into housing and ter-
tiary activities71. The ones that get evicted either disappear, or relocate elsewhere. A
brief check on these relocated uses shows that they contribute to the urban expansion
process: the Bobst factory up north moved to Mex (5 km away) into a new bigger
building on former agricultural land; the slaughter activities moved to Cheseaux (5
km away) and Oensingen (in Oberaargau, see also Viallon (2016a)); they are now in
bigger factories built on agricultural land. The public transport’s network expansion
requires a third depot that might be built outside of town72; train maintenance is now
taking place in Yverdon73. All these moves take place on open land and contribute
to urban growth and therefore reduce the ecological value of soil at regional scale.
In order to appraise more precisely the project’s relative outcome, one could com- Limited evaluation of
ecological value changepare the sum of soil surfaces built in Malley with the sum of soil surfaces that would
have been necessary for the realisation of the same uses in a peri-urban area. But
because the industries located outside of town have simultaneously increased their
production (Bobst) or merged their activities with other sites (the slaughterhouse)
that are now closed, it becomes tricky to evaluate the overall outcome. If I add up
the plot ratios of Malley before and after its redevelopment as well as the newly built
areas outside town, it would be possible to set up a density index before and after
the changes and thus evaluate the overall density change. Nevertheless, this would
not take into account the changes in terms of uses (from industrial to housing and
tertiary activities). Therefore, I limit the costs and benefits in table 5.3 to a tally of
the surfaces, densities, costs and values of the local development plan of Malley-gare
only (Malley-gasomètre is still in negotiation). As one can notice, the sum paid for
the extended land service tax corresponds to approximately 19CHF/m2, a rate that
is far below the minimal rate of 33CHF/m2 that would apply in case only commercial
activities would be located in the new construction74.
If I focus on the actors’ intentionality, I can state that Malley’s housing and Local actors’ interests
awakened by cantonal
and federal incentives
tertiary development was not anticipated by the communes and the landowners. The
construction of the waste sorting centre in 2006 supports this statement and shows
the frictions that have stemmed from the proposed land use changes, by users within
different public bodies contesting the site’s new vocation. Industrial, residential and
commercial uses will coexist in the same neighbourhood, a fact that corresponds to
the master plan’s objective of fostering mixed uses. In regard to the landowners,
I conclude that their initial intentions were not proceed to an important land use
change. This reversal is due to the canton’s original intent to construct a train station
and to the federal funds that greatly accelerated the process. The waste sorting centre
was to be built on the southern side of the train station and it was only in anticipation
of the future station’s location that it was constructed further west on a property
of the SBB (Commune of Lausanne, 2005a). The SBB had planned to establish a
transfer station for freight trains, which in the end was not built. Lausanne could have
developed its plots in Malley without the SBB, but it needed land for the new cantonal
museum of fine arts, which led to the land exchange between Lausanne and the SBB.
However, once the redevelopment of the area was considered, financial aspects became
central to the entire process and landowners engaged anticipating a monetary return.
In table 5.3, the overall initial costs borne by the landowners (planning, connection
and land service taxes) are covered after roughly 6 years (construction costs are not
taken into account). This corresponds to a quarter of plot’s added value (24.4M
francs). From this perspective, the value capture mechanism only seizes a small part
of the added economic value.
71C. Jemelin, op. cit.
72C. Jemelin, op. cit.
73M. Béguelin, op. cit.
74Art. 8 of the local development plan regulations (Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2015b) foresee
a minimum surface of 5,000m2 for housing, for which a tax rate of 144CHF/m2 would apply.
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Surfaces and densities Malley-gare
Ground surface 10,600m2
Old GFA 15,200m2
New GFA 52,500m2
Added GFA 37,300m2
New plot ratio 4.95
Values and costs
Old land value 10M
New land value 34.4M
Added value 24.4M
Planning -0.30M
Depollution -2.4M
Connection tax -0.7Ma
Land service tax -5.6Mb
Extended land service tax -0.7M
Estimated annual rentc 4.5%*34.4M=1.55M
Table 5.3: Financial summary of Malley-gare’s planning and pre-development process
from the landowner’s perspective.
aEstimation based on Renens’ connection tax of 5.8CHF/m3 (Commune of Renens, 1995).
bThe initial sum of 25.2M (Communes of Prilly and Renens, 2016) has to be divided propor-
tionately to the added gross floor area of the two development plans (Malley-gare and Malley-
gasomètre), because the infrastructure they finance (railway crossing and roads) apply to both.
The calculus is as follows: 25.2M/2=12.6M. 45% of the added gross floor area being located on the
development plan of Malley-gare, 45%*12.6M=5.6M.
cThis estimation is based on the average rent adopted by the SBB for leaseholds (Cour des
comptes du Canton de Vaud, 2011b, 51).
Another element is that legal constraints reducing added economic value added upAdding-up of regulations
over time: the MAO restrictions were negotiated until 2009, then the energy planning
obligations were introduced in 2014, and the extended land service tax was put on the
negotiation table in 2016. The modest financial impact of these successive regulations
show that landowners resisted successfully to a reduction of rent.
Malley’s redevelopment is not characterised by the eviction of industrial uses. ItMalley, a truely mixed
neighbourhood stands rather for the initiation of a cohabitation between industrial, housing, and
tertiary uses. The "playground" of the industrial works is now shared with more
contemporary urban uses. It remains to be seen if and when the entire perimeter des-
ignated in Malley’s master plan will be subject to further usage changes. Only about
20 out of 80 hectares have now been allocated to new uses, which leaves an important
discrepancy between the original perimeter of the master plan and the much smaller
area subject to current redevelopment. The rest of the plots are rather fragmented
and a vast majority of them are in private hands. These plots are still predominantly
used for industrial purposes and until recently, have not directly been concerned with
the neighbourhood’s changes. Therefore, it is probable that the planned urban re-
newal and accommodation of 16,000 additional jobs and inhabitants (Bauart and
Raderschall, 2012, 36) will be accomplished over a long time period.
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5.2 Land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux
5.2.1 Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, an urban development above cantonal and national average
took place in Cheseaux. Its close location to the agglomeration of Lausanne and good
public transport connection led the canton to define it as one of the local centres of
the agglomeration. The successive use of policy instruments like land readjustment,
land improvement syndicate, zoning, and plot ratio allowed the commune to achieve
the following results:
− the property shape and property structure of the intermediary and agricultural
zone have been entirely reorganised;
− the intermediary zone has been reduced and development has been defined in
dense building zones (plot ratio of 0.6) compared to communal standards;
− the property shape and property structure of the new building zones are defined
based on the building zones’ requirements;
− despite the initial lack of communal property in the centre of the village, the
commune has managed to place its public infrastructure (school) there;
− a wide part of planning and land service costs have been passed on private
landowners;
− the absence of control on land value over time has lead to a threefold increase
of prices in ten years.
This case study analyses the implementation of the land use policy instrument
land improvement syndicate (LIS) in the commune of Cheseaux, Canton Vaud. The
instrument consists of both joint and coordinated use of land readjustment and zoning.
The conditions for the instrument’s implementation are of central importance to this
thesis, because the LIS is one of the few intrinsically redistributive instruments in
Swiss land use planning legislation. This case is structured as follows:
− section 5.2.2 provides a description of the instrument and its functions;
− section 5.2.3 presents the land use planning and land use changes in the com-
mune over the past 25 years, in particular, changes within the LIS’ perimeter;
− section 5.2.5 presents contextual factors which help explain the previously ana-
lysed changes;
− section 5.2.6 explains which legal constraints have played a role in the evolution
of land use planning and land uses; it focusses particularly on the procedural
factors that condition the LIS’ functioning;
− section 5.2.7 analyses how the involved actors have utilized available rules in
order to influence the local regulatory arrangements observed during the instru-
ment’s implementation process.
− section 5.2.8 summarizes the instrument’s value creation and distribution capa-
city, its compatibility with other value capture instruments, and its possibilities
and limits for solving redistributive issues on a regional scale.
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5.2.2 Presentation of the LIS
Based on the terminology used by Weber et al. (2011), I define the land improvementCoordination through the
creation of added
economic value
syndicate (LIS) as a process of coordination between zoning, land readjustment and
land service, financed through the creation of added economic value within a defined
perimeter. The LIS pursues two main goals:
1. reorganise land property according to a planned zoning operation that creates
added value on land;
2. realise land service (roads, water adduction, sewer, public spaces, landscape,
etc.).
Initially, the LIS was created to overcome contentious situations (such as: dis-An instrument meant to
overcome redistributive
issues
agreements between landowners, an irregular property shape, financial risks in the
redevelopment of brownfields), and ensure the equitable redistribution of added and
reduced values between landowners (for example, a building zone or intermediary zone
which has been oversized, or badly located and should be reduced and/or relocated)
(Prélaz-Droux, 2008). The LIS, as Derrière-le-château analysed here, combined a
property shape inadequate for development with a wide intermediary zone that had
been undeveloped for over 20 years (see section 5.2.2.1).
5.2.2.1 Uses of the LIS in the Canton of Vaud
Since the 1950’s, land readjustment has been used widely in Vaud (as well as greater
Switzerland) for agricultural purposes. The aim was to make agricultural land fit
for machinery and increase food production through increases in the size of plots, by
burying rivers, and by covering paths with concrete (Courdesse, 2014).
More recent uses in the canton of Vaud focus on urban development and on theAn instrument to solve
the problem of
"intermediary zones"
coordination between zoning plans and the property structure. More specifically, the
LIS has been used to reduce the intermediary zone. In fact, a high number of Canton
Vaud’s zoning plans elaborated in the 1970’s featured wide surfaces zones as an inter-
mediary. The zones’ existence dates back to the 1960’s, a period in which communes
defined huge building zones (the constructibility of these zones was suspended by the
Federal urgent decree in 1972). Subsequently, in order to satisfy federal prescriptions
without removing the landowners’ potential rights, the commune zoned vast parts
of the zones affected by the federal decree as intermediary zones (Nahrath, 2003,
347,351). These zones were defined as unbuildable and intended as the future build-
ing zones of the commune. Over the years, wide parts of these intermediate zones
remained unchanged, together with the landowners’ expectations that these zones
would be developed at some point. In the case of Cheseaux, the contributions of the
LIS Derrière-le-château have reduced a portion of the commune’s intermediary zone.
5.2.2.2 Main procedural steps of the LIS
The core element of the LIS is the coordination and joint redefinition of property rightsJoint redefinition of
property rights... and public policies applying to a given perimeter. The property rights dimension is
addressed through a public law assembly composed of all landowners in the adopted
perimeter75. This assembly seeks to approve (by majority vote) a set of elements that
are presented in more detail in section 5.2.6.1:
1. the approval of the feasibility study;
2. the definition of the perimeter;
3. the modification of property lines;
4. the redistribution of property surfaces;
5. the redistribution of the use rights linked to the plots;
6. the modification, creation, and elimination of easements;
75If certain plots within the perimeter are already developed, these landowners are frequently
"neutralized" (withdrawn from the perimeter) and do not pay for the LIS’ costs, nor benefit from
additional development rights.
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7. the service of land and underlying costs;
8. operational costs of the LIS.
The zoning plan or local development plan defines and locates the landowners’ ...and public policies
use rights in the considered perimeter in accordance with public policies such as:
location of constructions, building type, usage type, plot ratio, aesthetics, financial
contributions, etc. Both the property rights transfer and the local development plan
must be approved simultaneously by the cantonal authority.
In order to guarantee the financial viability of the process and ensure the landown- Elaboration of a
feasibility studyers’ approval, a feasibility study is conducted by a geometer, urban planner and notary
(i.e. the experts’ commission) mandated by the landowners76. This feasibility study
consists of a gross evaluation of the landowners’ existing properties (physical con-
straints on land, easements, etc.) and their economic value. Taken into consideration
as well, is the possible future state of property, as based on:
1. communal plans in terms of future land use;
2. the wishes of the landowners (land for development, agricultural land, financial
compensation);
3. the future land value, which is based on the potential of development and on
additional constraints given by communal building regulations.
Once the feasibility study is approved by the landowners, a local development Detailed examination of
future land use, costs and
benefits sharing
plan is established that defines plot ratios, estimates land service costs, and provides
a more detailed analysis of the available options in terms of development. Based on
landowner wishes, and their existing properties, the experts commission suggests a
new property structure and negotiates with the landowners on the location and the
constraints linked to their future properties, as well as the landowner’s contribution
to land service costs. The cost of land service should be proportionate to the surface
and value of the initial property structure.
When an agreement is reached, the local development plan and the proposed prop- Property transfer,
approval of zoning
regulations and land
service
erty structure are submitted to the communal legislative body for adoption. When
both documents are approved by the cantonal authority, the property transfer is
effected, and the land is serviced. Once the infrastructure is built, a final cost break-
down is made, distributing payments equally between landowners. The syndicate is
dissolved after the distribution of payments.
Having provided a brief outline of the instrument, the next section analyses the his-
torical context of the implementation of the LIS in Cheseaux Derrière-le-château. It
becomes evident that the situation had been blocked for decades due to the poten-
tial establishment of an airfield in the neighbour commune of Etagnières. With the
removal of the project (that a group of local inhabitants perceived as a threat to
the region’s quietness and rural character), major successive land reforms have been
initiated.
5.2.3 Land use planning and land use changes
Present development cannot be understood without looking at the past events that Two stages of communal
planninghave shaped communal planning decisions over the last decades. Between 1978 and
2016, the story of Cheseaux’s land use planning and land use changes can be separated
into two broad overlapping phases:
1. the first phase comprises the planning, adoption and realisation of the com-
mune’s bypass road (Zuppinger, 1986);
2. the second phase consists of the communal agricultural land readjustment ne-
cessary for the realisation of the bypass road, and of the two land improvement
syndicates Derrière-le-château and Nonceret that followed the road’s construc-
tion. The temporal succession of the three land readjustment procedures is
76Art. 85 of the Loi du 29 novembre 1961 sur les améliorations foncières, SR-VD 913.11.
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central to the understanding of the dynamics of communal land use policy. The
LIS Derrière-le-château is studied in detail in this case study, whereas the LIS
Nonceret is still in an early stage and currently blocked by the federal morator-
ium subsequent to the revision of the federal land use planning act in 2014.
5.2.4 Land use planning and land use changes
The first communal building regulations and zoning plan were adopted in 1978. At
that time, the commune defined three main building zones as the sites of future devel-
opment (whose development plans were to be elaborated in separate plans) (Commune
of Cheseaux, 1978). Wide surfaces of agricultural land in the east, west and north of
the village were zoned "intermediary", i.e. meant to be developed over a longer time
frame then standard building zones. At that time, the intermediary zone’s precise
shape and uses were uncertain, because development depended upon two elements:
1. the potential construction of an airfield: this regional infrastructure construction
would have had a significant impact on the neighbouring communes, and would
have required a road service coordinated with existing infrastructure;
2. the construction of a bypass road for Cheseaux and possibly the neighbour
communes, which was politically linked to the construction of the airfield. In the
zoning plan of 1978, the shape of the intermediary zone was defined according to
one of the possible routes that had been elaborated for the commune’s bypass77.
At the end of the second world war, the canton of Vaud was looking for a siteAn airfield looking for a
location that could host a new airfield. The sites considered by the authorities were located
in the communes of Ecublens (west of Lausanne) and Etagnières (a neighbour of
Cheseaux, north of Lausanne), but two cantonal popular votes (in 1946 and 1966)
rejected proposalsto finance the project.
In parallel, from the 1960s onwards, the canton tried to reduce the traffic over-Solution to traffic issues
blocked... load on the cantonal road between Lausanne, Echallens and Yverdon. The portion
of road intersecting both Etagnières and Cheseaux, experienced a large part of the
traffic overload and its subsequent negative effects. In 1967, the cantonal legislative
body adopted funding for the construction of a bypass road that would have circum-
vented Cheseaux and several other villages by the east. However, in-depth studies
of the traffic at the regional scale (other roads connect in the immediate southern
and western border of Cheseaux) as well as the anticipated extension of Cheseaux’s
building zone in the east, called this choice into question, and in 1970, led the canton
to propose a new bypass road that circumvented the villages through the west.
This proposal was fought by the opponents to the airfield, who considered the..due to the threat of an
airfield road to be a "disguised cantonal support" that would have serviced the future airfield
(Zuppinger, 1986, 13). After a popular vote on the road’s credit in 1974, the project
was abandoned and the canton opted for a smaller bypass alternative limited to the
sole commune of Cheseaux. In 1978, the new plans were submitted to public hearing,
opponents attacked them, and the plans were temporarily blocked from approval.
The same year (1978), the first communal zoning plan was adopted. The planAdoption of the
communal zoning plan contained western limits to future development, as defined by the border between the
intermediary and agricultural zone (see figure 5.3. These limits were set at that time
according to the projected plans for the small bypass road for Cheseaux.
With the motorway between Lausanne and Yverdon put into service during thatFive new bypass solutions
considered time, the canton revised its plans for the bypass road and conducted further studies.
When it presented the bypass project to the communal authorities in 1983, the oppon-
ents to the airfield had withdrawn, because the federal concession for the airfield had
expired. However, other opponents appeared, concerned about the western bypass’
ability to reduce the traffic in the center of Cheseaux. These opponents promoted a
plan for a tunnel straight through the village. This solution was meant to minimise
the length of the bypass, and thus incentivise use by commuters. Communal funds
were supposed to finance a comparative study of the two possibilities, but the ne-
cessary funding was refused by the communal legislative body in 1984, leaving the
77R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, geometer and urban planner, interviewed in Echallens 14 Janu-
ary 2016.
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canton to pay for the study. Ultimately, five solutions were considered: one bypass
by the east, two bypasses by the west, one bypass under the village center and one
solution involving only improvements to the existing roads.
According to U. Zuppinger (1986), the initial discrepancy between the planning Compromise between
cantonal and local
proposal
objectives the bypass road was meant to achieve (among which the service of the
airfield), and the political stakes these objectives represented, limited the acceptab-
ility of the bypass road for a long time. The first comparative study was mandated
relatively recently, in 1983. Prior studies considered only one solution at a time, and
neglected unsettled political matters such as the airfield, the traffic provided by the
other roads crossing near Cheseaux, and the planned urban expansion in the east.
In 1990, two solutions were discussed: construction of a tunnel under the city
centre or construction of a western bypass road relatively close to the village (that
approximately met the limits of the intermediary zone defined in 1978), the bypass
being supported by the canton. The final solution decided by the canton in 1991
consisted of a blend of both options: the bypass road circumvented the village, but
was buried at the demands of the inhabitants.
Between 1978 and 2001, existing building zones in the north, as well as parts of Mandatory land
readjustmentbuilding zones in the south and in the east were developed. The eastern and western
intermediary zones of the village remained undeveloped until the definitive plans of the
bypass road were adopted in 1991. The same year, the canton launched a mandatory
land readjustment78 on a perimeter of approximately 85 hectares. At the request of
the involved landowners, the land readjustment’s perimeter was extended in 1993 to
cover almost the entirety of the commune’s agricultural zone. It was extended further
in 1994 to adjacent plots in Morrens, the neighbour commune (Besson and Courdesse,
1999).
The problem of the bypass road addressed, the commune could consider the defin- Simultaneous redefinition
of public policies and
property rights
ition of building zones in the east and west of the village. In order to do so, the com-
munal executive body launched the revision of building regulations in 1994 (Baud,
2016, 62), at the same time the agricultural land readjustment took place. The sim-
ultaneous redefinition of zoning and of the property structure granted the commune
the opportunity to elaborate a strategy combining both dimensions.
The communal plans to extend the housing zone made the issue of the deprecated Derrière-le-château as
ideal location for future
school
and soon to be undersized primary school salient (Baud, 2016, 69). The perimeter
of Derrière-le-château appears as the best suited location for the development of the
new school, because it is the most central, undeveloped zone of the village, and the
location of the current primary school.
Based on the population growth previsions and on the imminent development in Combined use of three
land use policy
instruments
the east of the village (a.o. the area of Cologny), the matter of the future school should
be solved quickly. Advised by the communal planner and the geometer in charge of
the bypass road’s land readjustment, the commune conditioned the development of
Derrière-le-château to the creation of a land improvement syndicate, an instrument
that would redefine property rights and zoning in the intermediate zone close to the
village centre. To expedite the implementation of the instrument, the communal
executive body mandated a feasibility study79 for the future LIS Derrière-le-château
in 2000, before the new building regulations were approved and the land readjustment
procedure from the bypass road entirely finished (Leroy, 2008).
5.2.4.1 Land use planning changes in 2001
The new communal building regulations were adopted by the communal legislative Revision of communal
structure planbody in 1999, and approved by the canton in 2001. Studied changes relevant to the
value redistribution process:
− zoning in the eastern part of the village was suspended: several hectares of
intermediate zone converted to agricultural zone;
78In order to build a cantonal road, cantonal law foresees a mandatory land readjustment within
30 meters of the road’s future trace (art. 14 and 36 of the Loi sur les routes LRou, RS-VD 725.01).
79Art. 19a of the Loi vaudoise sur les améliorations foncières LAF, RS-VD 913.11.
184 of 327
Land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux
− the intermediate zone in the west of the village was enlarged slightly in order
to match the existing property shape ( the boundaries of some plots traversed
the intermediary and the agricultural zones).
− the western intermediary zone was divided into two smaller perimeters: Derrière-
le-château and Nonceret;
− within the two perimeters, zoning and development of the plots within were
conditioned upon the creation of a land improvement syndicate.
In 2000, a local structure plan specifying the commune’s intentions regarding thePlanning of the future
LIS ongoing perimeter near Cheseaux’s castle entered into force, and the feasibility study was
approved. At this time, there was no further planning regarding the second perimeter
of Nonceret.
Once the feasibility study had been approved by the landowners, the shape of the
property within the LIS perimeter was redesigned, and new use rights were defined
by a 2003 local development plan. The intermediary zone within the LIS perimeter
was substituted by approximately 3/5 agricultural zone and 2/5 building zone. Land
service and development of the new building zone were initiated in 2005.
Since 2001, other areas have been developed: several hectares of building zone
reserves in the southeast (Cologny area, near the sawmill) and southwest (Sorécot,
Sorécot ouest). As of 2016, building zone reserves are within the legal limits (see
section 5.2.6.3).
After close to 30 years of political uncertainty, the adoption of definitive plans for
the bypass road allowed the commune to redefine planning documents in the west of
Cheseaux and lay the foundations for the creation of two successive land improve-
ment syndicates. The temporal overlap between the use of the instruments allowed
the commune to quickly act to reduce the intermediate zone and define an optimal
location for its future school. As the next section shows, the simultaneous land read-
justment due to both the bypass road and the LIS Derrière-le-château also granted
the commune the possibility to acquire, exchange and relocate its land properties, key
factors that allowed public authorities to achieve their development goals.
5.2.5 Contextual factors
5.2.5.1 Property structure
Prior to the land readjustment initiated by the construction of the bypass road, anLand use no longer
corresponded with
property structure
important discrepancy existed between the effective rights granted to users and the
property structure (shape and owners of plots). A third of the property title holders
were no longer farmers (Besson and Courdesse, 1999): they had inherited the land
and were renting it. In addition, farmers had proceeded with various land exchanges
that had not been entered into the land registry, so the shape of plots did not fit
actual land uses. The initial perimeter (85 hectares based on the bypass road’s trace)
was transformed into a 317 hectare voluntary land readjustment area, including the
almost the entire agricultural territory of Cheseaux, and parts of Etagnières and
Morrens (Dubauloz and Courdesse, 2004).
The process of redefining the property structure, combined with the commune’sSimplification of the
property structure and
shape
intentions to develop land close to the village (from 1999 onwards), contributed to a
rise in the local land market. Figure 5.3 shows that between 1993 and 2001, the formal
property structure was greatly simplified to meet the actual uses: the number of plots
was reduced from 31 to 21 and the number of owners within the future perimeter of
the LIS Derrière-le-château shrunk from 15 to 7. Throughout the perimeter of the
land readjustment, there were initially 417 plots owned by 102 persons, and after the
readjustment, there were 93 owners, and 162 available remaining plots (Besson and
Courdesse, 1999).
Another element shown in figure 5.3 is the anchor of the urbanisation limits. BeforeAnchor of urbanisation
limits the land readjustment in 1993, these corresponded to the limit between intermediary
and agricultural zones (based on the initial bypass road plans designed from 1978).
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1974 Popular vote rejecting cantonal financial support for
the construction of a bypass road for Cheseaux
1978 Adoption of the communal zoning plan separating agri-
cultural, intermediary and building zone
1980s Study of different options for the bypass road of Che-
seaux
1991 Cantonal authorities chose the western bypass option.
Launch of a mandatory land readjustment procedure in
the future road’s perimeter
1993 At the request of the landowners, extension of the land
readjustment perimeter for the entire agricultural zone
of Cheseaux and neighbour commune Morrens
1994 Public hearing on land values
1996 Examination of future property shape and values by
cantonal authorities
public hearing on future land service works
1999 Consultation procedure of the new communal zoning
plan
Public hearing on the new shape of plots and their
ownership, new land values and modified future land
service works for the land readjustment contournement
Entry into force of the communal structure plan and
the local structure plan Derrière-le-château
2000 Court decision on the future land service works of the
land readjustment
Entry into force of a local structure plan corresponding
to the perimeter of the future LIS Derrière-le-château
Elaboration of a feasibility study on the perimeter of
the LIS Derrière-le-château
2001 Entry into force of the new communal zoning plan
2002 Property transfer of the land readjustment contourne-
ment
Public hearing on public and private land service works
for the land readjustment contournement
Creation of the LIS Derrière-le-château
2003 Negotiations and public hearings on the perimeter,
land value and the future shape of plots within the LIS
Derrière-le-château
Land service works
for the land readjust-
ment bypass
2004 Adoption of the local development plan Derrière-le-
château by the cantonal authority
Approval of easements on future property shape by
landowners
Property transfer and entry into force of the local de-
velopment plan Derrière-le-château
Public hearing into land service for the LIS Derrière-le-
château
Final cost breakdown and dissolution of the land read-
justment contournement
2005 Cantonal authorisation on foreseen land service works Initiation of the land
service works for
the LIS Derrière-
le-château, first prop-
erty developments
2007 Arrival of first resid-
ents in Derrière-le-
château
2009 End of land service
works of the LIS
Derrière-le-château
2012 Public hearing on modified easements; cost breakdown
between landowners and realised land service works
2014 Final cost breakdown and dissolution of the LIS
Table 5.4: Main land use planning and land use changes in Cheseaux since 1993.
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After the readjustment in 2003, the path has been physically anchored by the bypass
tunnel: in fact, construction on top of the tunnel are prohibited.
The 2003 map (figure 5.3) shows the property structure after the LIS: the sep-Quick development after
the LIS aration between agricultural and building zones has been clearly set and the plots
formatted for development.
The commune did not own a small portion of a plot that belonged to landowner
3. The commune bought it once the zoning and land readjustment had been done.
As of 2016, most of the plots have been developed, only the commune and landowner
3 still have some undeveloped building zone reserves.
It is notable that this quick development was accompanied by skyrocketing landExplosion of land prices
prices. Whereas a square meter of serviced land was estimated around 250CHF/m2
in 2003 (Marti and Courdesse, 2003), it is now estimated around 800CHF/m2 80.
80F. Blanc, former member of the communal executive body in charge of land use planning and
construction, interviewed in Cheseaux 24 February 2016.
187 of 327
Lausanne
0
75
15
0
22
5
30
0 m
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l z
on
e
int
er
m
ed
iar
y 
zo
ne
ca
nt
on
ﬁn
an
cia
l
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 2
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 3
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 4
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 5
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 6
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 7
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 8
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 9
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
0
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
1
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
2
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
3
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
4
Le
ge
nd
19
93
0
75
15
0
22
5
30
0 m
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l z
on
e
int
er
m
ed
iar
y 
zo
ne
co
m
mu
na
l
ﬁn
an
cia
l
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 2
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 3
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 4
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 5
Le
ge
nd
20
01
0
75
15
0
22
5
30
0 m
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l z
on
e
int
er
m
ed
iar
y 
zo
ne
co
m
mu
na
l
ﬁn
an
cia
l
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 2
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 3
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 4
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 5
Le
ge
nd
20
03
0
75
15
0
22
5
30
0 m
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l z
on
e
co
m
mu
na
l
ﬁn
an
cia
l
joi
nt
 ow
ne
rsh
ip
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 1
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 2
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 3
lan
d 
ow
ne
r 4
pr
iva
te
Le
ge
nd
20
16
Fi
gu
re
5.
3:
Ev
ol
ut
io
n
of
zo
ni
ng
an
d
pr
op
er
ty
st
ru
ct
ur
e
in
th
e
pe
rim
et
er
of
th
e
la
nd
im
pr
ov
em
en
t
sy
nd
ic
at
e
D
er
ri
èr
e-
le
-c
hâ
te
au
in
C
he
se
au
x.
188 of 327
Land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux
The ability of the LIS to simplify the property structure and reduce the number ofA land development
machine owners are among its most outstanding features. This allows it to fit property to land
use planning needs, and to elaborate plans without being constrained by existing
private law constraints. Further, the LIS plays a decisive role in the negotiations
that authorities and landowners conduct on land development, such as valuation,
the modalities of land service and development, and other financial aspects. The
underlying explanatory causes for this simplification are further researched in section
5.2.6.4.
5.2.5.2 Demographic evolution
Demographic changes contribute to the evolution of land uses. These changes areDemographic explosion
since 2002 particularly significant in Cheseaux. From 1980 to 1990, population grew from 2,393
to 2,806 (FSO, 2015c). Between 1990 and 2002, the commune’s population was rather
constant, it grew by approximately 100 inhabitants per year, reach 4,080 inhabitants
in 2014 (+1,300 inhabitants or +45% growth between 1990 and 2014). In comparison,
the rural district of the Gros-de-Vaud in the north of Cheseaux has grown from
27,000 to 42,100 inhabitants (+15,200 or +56%). The urban district of Lausanne (to
which Cheseaux belongs) has grown from 146,000 to 158,700 inhabitants (+12,700 or
+8.7%) over the same time period. The regional comparison shows that the majority
of the region’s population growth took place outside of the agglomeration. Further,
the region’s demographic growth is far above cantonal (31%) and national (22%)
population growth rates.
The demographic growth, combined with the old and progressively undersizedThe need of a new school
primary school building, helped the commune to develop its infrastructure. Looking
for a location to establish the new school, officials concluded that the best location
would be next to the existing primary school81.
From 2006 onwards, this growth was partially absorbed by the construction in theGrowth leads to more
growth LIS’ perimeter, whose capacity, in theory, is estimated at 800 inhabitants (Commune
of Cheseaux, 2003). However, as two plots remain unbuilt82, the effective capacity in
2016 is estimated at 500 inhabitants. The agglomeration’s master plan foresees the
arrival of additional inhabitants and jobs (1,600 cumulatively) within the commune
by 2020 (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012a, 87).
5.2.5.3 Accessibility
Transport connections are particularly salient in accounting for the growth of Che-Intersection of five
cantonal roads seaux. Its location outside of the urban agglomeration, yet only 9 kilometres from
the core of Lausanne creates a complex situation for Cheseaux. In terms of motor-
ised transport, Cheseaux is at the intersection of five cantonal roads that connect the
Gros-de-Vaud with the urban south. Cheseaux’s location at the point of connection
with the urban south contributes to heavy traffic. The bypass road alone was not able
to alleviate the traffic situation, and has led policymakers to reorient transit towards
the motorway (SDNL, 2015). There are two motorway exits about five kilometres
away from the village centre – one in the direction of Yverdon-les-bains or Geneva,
and the other at the northern limit of Lausanne’s agglomeration, in the direction of
Montreux or Berne.
In terms of public transport, Cheseaux is served by a train (every 15 minutes)Direct train to the
agglomeration’s core which takes 19 minutes to reach Lausanne’s centre. The frequency of service doubled
in 2015, to increase the line’s transport capacities. The train line is considered a
structural element in the agglomeration’s public transport network, and Cheseaux is
considered a local node (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012b, 87). The large part of
part of the commune’s settlement is located within 500 metres or less from the train
station. Various unbuilt areas still remain within this perimeter. The proximity to
the agglomeration’s center, the existing transport infrastructure and the existence of
unbuilt plots point towards an important development of the commune (SDNL, 2007;
81François Blanc, op. cit.
82As figure 5.3 shows, the commune and landowner 3 still have a building zone reserve on their
plot.
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Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008). As noticed by the agglomeration’s master
plan (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012b, 55), a weakness of the current infrastructure
is the lack of tangential connections that would make it possible to commute to other
parts of the agglomeration without passing through the centre.
The contextual factors presented provide an overall explanation of land use changes in
Cheseaux: the quick and effective preparation of land for development, the important
demographic growth of the region, the good connection to transport infrastructure
and booming land prices position Cheseaux as a small growth machine. A closer look
at one of the causes of this change, the transformation of the property structure,
unveils a set of legal constraints intrinsic to the LIS that have allowed such quick
and effective changes. The role of soft law can be observed, along with the minimal
density obligations tacitly introduced into the land use plans’ approval process.
5.2.6 Constraints of superior law
5.2.6.1 Procedural constraints of the land improvement syndicate
Among the legal aspects that shape the LIS’ functioning, five key elements contribute
to its successful implementation:
1. the definition of a perimeter83: the LIS’ initial perimeter is usually predefined by
a communal and/or local structure plan. This plan is non-binding for landown-
ers, i.e. does not grant them any additional rights apart from what the zoning
plan foresees. This point is crucial, because the future building rights are gran-
ted only when the land is readjusted, providing an incentive to go through the
LIS process. Further, the perimeter of the LIS itself creates an impermeable
border that binds involved actors and excludes third party interference. A club
is constituted that benefits from a new property structure and new development
rights;
2. the mandatory conduct of a feasibility study84: the study determines how many
plots are included into the perimeter, and thus, how many landowners are
involved. The study also estimates the rough added economic value created
through the additional development rights granted by the LIS. Further, the
landowners’ reactions to the study and its subsequent approval or rejection is a
first test which can reveal the owners’ preferences. This can indicate not only
their will to cooperate (or not), but also the type of value they expect to derive
from the LIS (essentially land for development or agricultural land);
3. the coordination process as the temporary joint production of a new property
structure and of a local development plan: the land readjustment plan and the
local development plan are examined simultaneously by cantonal authorities and
together submitted for public hearings. The approval by cantonal authorities of
both plans is conditioned on their adoption by the respective parties (communal
authorities or landowners) and the resolution of potential opposition85. Without
coordination, the property structure and the zoning plan would be out of sync,
a recurrent problem in the classical implementation of land use planning policy
through zoning plans (Gilg and Kelly, 1997);
4. the equal treatment of landowners86: the added economic value that is created
must be shared among all involved landowners according to the surface of land
they possess and the initial value of their land (mainly dependent on zoning).
The added economic value transferred to landowners can consist of additional
land (mostly likely agricultural land without development rights), additional
building rights or monetary compensation, depending on their wishes (see sec-
tion 5.2.7.4). Further, the value redistribution process has to include all nearby
83Art. 30, SR-VD 913.11.
84Art. 85, SR-VD 913.11.
85Art. 4, SR-VD 913.11; art. 58, SR-VD 700.11.
86Art. 8, SR 101.
190 of 327
Land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux
landowners whose land might be developed in the future. The law speaks of a
"geographical unit"87. Communal planning documents and the existing urban
morphology serve as references to the definition of theunit. This legal condi-
tion reduces the risk of successful legal action by landowners against decisions
taken by the LIS’ assembly or the LIS itself. In the case of the LIS Derrière-
le-château, the equal treatment constraint was determined by the intermediary
zone. It requires the inclusion of all contiguous owners of land in this zone.
5. the simple majority rule (one landowner, one vote) that applies to decisions of
the landowner’s assembly fosters land use changes for two main reasons:
(a) prior to the creation of a syndicate, landowners are not actively pushed to
develop their land: despite the attribution of new rights (e.g. development
rights), they continue to use it as they did before (e.g. for agriculture).
Once the commune has expressed its intentions to develop a new neigh-
bourhood, and convinced a majority of landowners to agree, the other
owners are bound to follow the majority’s decision, which, together with
the subsequent costs (see section 5.2.7.1), provides momentum for land use
change.
(b) when the new property lines, use rights, easements, compensations and
future land service are discussed, the pressure of majority voting applies
to all landowners. This pressure is not absolute, because landowners can
legally oppose the assembly’s votes. Rather, it is a constraint that drives
landowners, advised by the experts’ commission, to seek compromise, and
reduces the probability of opposition by landowners.
Through the simultaneous redefinition of public (zoning) and private law (prop-Minimisation of existing
legal constraints erty) regulations, the LIS minimizes existing legal constraints within a chosen peri-
meter and thus allows to entirely rethink future land use. Accompanied by chosen
experts, the majority rule grants every owner the possibility to influence the decision
process without allowing them to dominate or block it.
5.2.6.2 Cropland protection plan
Since the introduction of the federal cropland protection plan in the 1990s, the cantonsObligation to compensate
have been obligated to preserve a certain quota of their most valuable agricultural
soil.
In the canton of Vaud, the entire intermediary zone was part of the cropland pro-
tection plan. As mentioned in section 5.2.2.1, former building zones were zoned into
intermediary zones in order to implement the federal urgent decree of 1972. If the
canton had defined only the agricultural zone as part of the cropland protection plan,
they would not have been able to reach the quota imposed by the Confederation. In
order to maintain the quota, any development of intermediary zone required compens-
ation, that is to say the definition of new surfaces as part of the cropland protection
plan. Otherwise, the proof that a new development meets an important cantonal ob-
jective that could not have been appropriately reached without using cropland has to
be made by communal (or cantonal) authorities. In such a case, the canton subtracts
cropland reserves from its reserve quota88.
The urbanisation projects of the two LIS Derrière-le-château and Nonceret tookA posteriori compensation
place on cropland, and therefore required compensation. In the case of the LIS
Derrière-le-château, the commune justified their compensation measures, stating that
during the zoning plan revision of 2001, several areas zoned as intermediary had been
zoned as agricultural. Thus, the loss of agricultural land used by the LIS Derrière-le-
château had already been compensated for during the revision of building regulations.
This delayed compensation was accepted by the canton.
Due to the 2014 federal moratorium prohibiting any extension of the building zone,LIS Nonceret suspend by
federal moratorium the delayed compensation cannot be applied to the LIS Nonceret for now89. Until
the cantonal structure plan is approved by the Confederation, zoning operation must
be compensated by an equivalent building zone converted to agricultural zone. The
87Art. 52, SR-VD 913.11.
88See also art. 30 of the Spatial planning ordinance of the 28 June 2000, SR 700.1.
89U. Zuppinger and R. Courdesse, op. cit.
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federal spatial planning office’s logic is that oversized building zones from peripheral
communes without transport connections would have to be transferred to more central
locations prior to any new development. For growing communes like Cheseaux, this
can represent an incentive to cooperate with rural communes struggling to reduce
their building zones.
5.2.6.3 Master plans
According to Lausanne’s agglomeration master plan (Canton de Vaud and ALM, Cheseaux as strategic
sector2012b, 93), Cheseaux and Romanel, (two communes close and well connected to the
city centre), are part of a strategic sector intended for urbanisation. In Cheseaux, this
future urbanisation is meant to take place in the west and east areas of the village,
for continuity with existing construction (Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008, 71).
The intercommunal master plan for the northern part of the agglomeration (schéma
directeur du Nord lausannois – SDNL) sets urbanisation limits in the west along the
tunnel of the bypass road (SDNL, 2007, 117), on the new agricultural zone set by the
LIS Derrière-le-château.
In terms of population density, the agglomeration’s 2008 master plan sets the ob- Minimal density
requirementsjective of 200 jobs and inhabitants per hectare within strategic sites, primarily along
Cheseaux’s train line (Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008, 71). The intercom-
munal master plan SDNL has planned, on average densities of 165 inhabitants and
jobs per hectare (SDNL, 2007, 85). The revised agglomeration’s master plan expects
the development of several parts of Cheseaux by 2020 with an average density of 160
inhabitants and jobs per hectare (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012a, 87)90. In order
to ensure the realisation of such densities, the cantonal authority examines all zoning
plans for compliance with the benchmarks in the agglomeration’s master plans (SDT,
2012). Unlike any other zoning plan defining such densities, these master plans set
criteria despite never having been adopted by a legislative body.
5.2.6.4 Financial incentives
One central aspect that contributes to the ability of the LIS to redistribute value are How land becomes
valuablethe financial incentives provided by the instrument’s use: the granting of additional
rights aids the LIS implementation of land use planning policy goals. The value
creation process can be divided into five steps, (the first two being in reality one
single procedure):
1. the first step consists in, if necessary, the reduction of (potentially) constructible
surface through the local development plan part of the LIS process;
2. next, the experts commission suggests an allocation of new development rights
or higher plot ratios on the (reduced) surface of the perimeter to be developed.
A sufficient amount of added economic value must be created to make the
operation profitable for all landowners;
3. the new rights are granted to the new plots: the local development plan enters
into force and the new property structure is entered into the land registry;
4. these new rights allow the landowners to collectively (via the LIS), or individu-
ally mortgage their land to cover future land service costs;
5. once the land is serviced, landowners can either sell their plot to, or contract a
developer.
Figure 5.4 shows that the economic value created by the LIS can be significant, in The value multiplying
coefficientrelative (difference between initial and final land value), and in absolute terms (net
gains). The difference between the initial and final land values principally depends
on:
− the type of zone that pre-exists within the perimeter;
− the quantitative amount (surface) of new building zone;
90These areas are to be developed through the local development plans of la Rochette, Est-
Cheseaux, Nonceret-la Croix, route d’Yverdon and Grand-pré Lacuessière.
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Figure 5.4: Land value change in a land improvement syndicate over time. Source:
SDT (2005).
− the plot ratio of the (old and) new building zone.
The difference between initial and final land values are referred to as the value
multiplying coefficient, i.e. a ratio that quantifies the value change and allows each
landowner to calculate the proportionate share of added value due to them. Table
5.5 in section 5.2.8 presents this ratio more in detail.
The financial aspects of the LIS provide incentives for the landowners to fulfill the in-Initial costs to be carried
directly by the owners strument’s goals, but they also constitute a hurdle : the financial investment required
from the landowners (many having inherited the land), constitutes a barrier that,
in practice, reduces the number of actors involved. The LIS needs to cover running
and planning costs, which means that prior to the entry into force of a new property
structure and zoning plan, the actors will have already made financial contributions.
Combined with the subsequent land service costs, these elements constitute a finan-
cial hurdle that landowners need to overcome. The initial costs must be paid directly
by the landowners, whereas once the property transfer and zoning changes have oc-
curred, they have the option to use a mortgage to pay for the land service, planning
and (a portion of) development costs.
As a consequence, some landowners, rather than participating in the full LISHow value crowds owners
out process, prefer to sell or exchange their land prior to the syndicate’s creation. In
this case of early sale, the price is at an intermediate level, between the initial and
final value (estimated value at the end of the process). As figure 5.3 shows, between
1993 and 2001, the number of owners has been significantly reduced. Section 5.2.7.1
provides a more detailed explanation of these changes.
The legal characteristics of the LIS instrument permits the creation of a closed group
of equally-treated, development-friendly landowners benefiting from facilitated de-
cisional rules and minimised legal constraints which allow them to achieve their land
use planning policy goals. As I have shown, the added value created through the
attribution of new rights provides a strong incentive to cooperate. The next sec-
tion presents how the land readjustment and zoning operations work in practice, and
the value distribution arrangements made by involved actors in the case of the LIS
Derrière-le-château.
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5.2.7 Local regulatory arrangement
5.2.7.1 Active communal land use policy
Looking into the involved actors’ strategies, I examine how the commune, who did The best location
not own any land within the LIS perimeter (see figure 5.3), managed to acquire
17,353m2 of land on the most central plots. As presented by the interviewees91, com-
munal motives for this precise land acquisition were clear: the construction of a new
primary school. The old building required an extensive renovation, and had become
too small for the expected needs. After looking for the various potential locations92
and discussing possible options with the contracted planner93, the commune decided
to establish the new primary school close to the old school and to reuse the old school
for the communal administration. Further, the optimal location of the entire area,
located in the heart of Cheseaux, just behind the castle and only 200 metres from the
train station, lent itself well to wider development.
The projected surface of development and the fragmented property structure Crowding out of
landownerswould not have allowed each small owner one individual plot in the final property
state. They would have been obliged to become co-owners. Further, (Commune of
Cheseaux, 2001), several owners did not intend to develop, nor take part in the LIS
which involved costs prior to any monetary gain. These costs led to a "crowding out"
of the owners not willing to pay for them, either because they did not intend to develop
their future property, or because they simply did not want to engage in a complex,
cooperative financial operation whose benefits are collected later on. The fact that
most of these persons inherited the land they own makes many of them unaware of the
price of land and hampers their will to pay for something they have always owned94.
This financial hurdle not only led to a reduction of participants and simplified future
negotiations, as the remaining owners were willing to invest in and proceed with the
LIS. It also strengthened the power of the remaining, more entrepreneurial landowners
within the LIS. This "crowding out" effect presented an opportunity for the commune.
The land from these small owners was sold to the commune at the attractive price
of 35CHF/m2. In addition to these acquisitions, the commune also exchanged plots
with owners unwilling to sell, for larger agricultural plots (these plots, though within
communal property, were outside of the perimeter)95. These exchanges preceded the
zoning and property changes made by the LIS Derrière-le-château. They took place
when both the agricultural land readjustment and building regulations revision were
still in progress. These simultaneous revision processes allowed the commune and
the landowners in the intermediate zone to anticipate future changes and elaborate a
strategy based on their interests:
− the landowners had the possibility to remain in the intermediate zone, increase
their agricultural land property by exchanging their ideally located plots with
the commune for larger ones further away from the settlement, or sell their plot
in the intermediary zone96;
− the commune could, at the same time, acquire land property in the intermediary
zone, reduce the fragmentation of the existing property structure and, through
the LIS, redesign the property shape and use.
5.2.7.2 Communal development under stress
As argued by the member of the communal executive body97, Cheseaux was under Feasibility study as a lift
for changepressure to build its new school, and was thus interested in the quick realisation of
the LIS. The communal executive body pre-financed the feasibility study, fostering
91F. Blanc, op. cit. R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit.; G. Conus and D. Villiger, urban
technician and urban planner of the commune of Cheseaux, interviewed in Cheseaux 12 January
2016.
92Free available plots next to the secondary school as well as other communal plots close to a
major road were also considered, but in the end the former was kept for a potential extension of the
secondary school and the latter were considered too dangerous.
93Until 2005, the commune did not have any internal planning staff, but worked for several decades
with the same planner.
94R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit..
95F. Blanc, op. cit.
96R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit.
97F. Blanc, op. cit.
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discussions among landowners regarding upcoming decisions. After the feasibility
study confirmed the probable success of the operation, the communal executive body
requested a credit to its legislative body (Commune of Cheseaux, 2002). According
to the interviewees98, this commitment lent momentum to the LIS process.
TheIt commune could not afford to wait too long to find a compromise with theTime as main constraint
for the commune other landowners on elements such as the location of the owners’ future property,
the plot ratio and the constraints of the local development plan (location and type
of roads, division of land service costs, creation of a green corridor, subterranean car
parks, playgrounds). The location of the commune’s future plots was an (almost)
non-negotiable element: the commune wanted to build the school in the most central
location, adjacent to the existing institutional zone where the old school was located.
As a consequence, in order to keep on schedule, but also to minimise implementation
gaps that it potentially faced when negotiating with the other landowners, it agreed
to the following elements:
− the plot ratios had to be set at a level providing a sufficient financial levy for the
involved parties. The maximum plot ratio ever applied on communal territory99,
0.6, was used for a third of the construction in the LIS perimeter;
− the creation of an east-west green corridor crossing the northern part of the
perimeter was heavily contested by the concerned landowner, because it oblig-
ated him to bury the car parks and invest additional funds in the corridor’s
realisation. Therefore, the commune agreed not only to carry the associated
production and maintenance costs, but also extract from the LIS’ redistributive
process a thin (non-valuable) strip of land along the road in the west, and to
pay for the trees (and their maintenance). Additionally, the former communal
representative pointed out the absence of a playground in the green corridor,
despite this being an obligation for the landowner (according to the local devel-
opment plan).
− the commune also agreed to designate their land reserves as building land
(190CHF/m2) and not as public land (95CHF/m2) like the school ground, al-
though its intentions for it are not settled for now. In case of development, these
land reserves would require additional service costs (such as a road) beyond what
the costs that have been covered by the LIS.
− another concession linked to the previous ones is the small plot of land in the
center east (see the 2003 map on figure 5.3). The commune had to buy this plot
from one of the owners after the LIS procedure had ended in order to possess a
plot shape fit for development. Because the commune had already covered its
value claims in the LIS, it had to acquire the plot separately.
The commune had to make concessions in regard to the valuation of its land, to
cover the costs of the development obligations set by the local development plan, and
the uncovered land service costs of its undeveloped land reserve.
5.2.7.3 Car parks
In regard to the car parks, several different positions have bee advocated by the
urban planner, the communal executive body, the communal technical services and
the landowners. The urban planner argued that since the future construction would
be within walking distance of the train station, the number of parks could be reduced
below the official norms foreseen by the VSS. For this reduced number of parks, the
excavation of soil and the parks’ burial was not needed, and would unnecessarily
degrade the soil. The communal executive body was convinced by the necessity
to bury the parks, but unsure about their quantity. The communal administration
insisted on the fulfilment of the official norms, regardless of the proximity of the train
station. The landowners were divided on the question of the car park burial. This
mixture of opinions left the matter unsolved in the local development plan, which in
turn led to the construction of numerous car parks, mostly above ground.
98R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, F. Blanc, op. cit.
99F. Blanc, op. cit.
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5.2.7.4 The role of the experts commission
The experts’ commission is hired by the landowners. They have the urban, legal and Chief negotiators
economic expertise needed to meet the landowners’ objectives. Their position between
the syndicate and the commune, as well as their professional knowledge grants them
the capacity to anticipate future constraints (e.g. during the site’s development or
effective use), moderate (if necessary) the owners’ wishes, balance the commune’s and
the owners interests, ensure their equal treatment, etc. But at the same time they
fulfill two purposes that can be contradictory: any additional obligation of constraint
defined in the zoning plan lowers the profit margin of the landowner and is subject
to contention, because the experts commission is hired and paid by the landowners.
At the time of the LIS Derrière-le-château, the commune did not have internal plan-
ning expertise and therefore relied solely on the LIS’ experts who, as it was shown
for the car parks, were in conflict against both the landowners and the communal
administration. Thus, in the present case, the experts commission defended both the
public administrative authorities and the public policy’s target group, (this includes
the commune).
These arrangements show that the lack of internal expertise, time, and property
on site led the commune to grant an extended share of the economic value created
through the LIS to the landowners. This term, "extended share," indicates how the
"equal treatment" constraint was applied in a way that favoured the landowners.
5.2.8 Impact on value creation and redistribution
Table 5.5 shows the different surfaces and values before and after the implementation Threefold value increase
of the LIS, as well as the land value in 2016. It also shows the value multiplying
coefficient of the LIS Derrière-le-château: 2.84. It is the ratio between the final land
value (without land service costs) and the initial land value. This almost threefold
increase in value was a strong argument for landowners with financial interests to
participate in the LIS.
Considering land prices in 2016100, I can see that the land value has almost tripled Time factor central to
the control of land valueagain. However, the actors could have only marginally anticipated such a price in-
crease. This value change is attributed to regional market conditions during that
specific period, as the LIS does not regulate value in time, but only redistributes its
amount and location at one precise moment.
The initial price of the intermediary zone (20CHF/m2) is set tacitly by the experts Actual land value even
highercommission of the LIS101. It can be considered artificial for two reasons:
1. the zone is defined by law as unbuildable, and therefore not worth more than
regular agricultural zone. As the revision of Cheseaux’s zoning plan in 2001
showed, the risk that authorities will have to compensate the "value loss" in
case of zone change from intermediary to agricultural zone is almost non-existent
because agricultaral land is not serviced,and under the purview of the cropland
protection plan (see section 5.2.6.2);
2. the perimeter initially considered includes the entire perimeter of the LIS. But
if the intermediary zone is valued the same as agricultural zone, then one should
only include the surface effectively dedicated to development in the calculation.
Therefore, I propose an alternative way of calculating the land’s actual economic An added economic value
of 8.7 millions francsvalue based on agricultural land prices and the perimeter that has effectively been
zoned. In comparison to the first (official) method that shows a value increase of 6.1
million francs, the second method shows an added value of 8.7 million francs (see
table 5.6). This second calculation method can be criticised, because it assimilates
the intermediary zone to a regular agricultural zone (it is in fact part of the cropland
100800CHF/m2 according to M. Blanc, op. cit.
101R. Courdesse, geometer and U. Zuppinger, urban planner, interviewed in Echallens 14 January
2016.
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protection plan). Further, it neglects the equal treatment constraint that is a neces-
sary condition of the LIS use, because it excludes from the part of the plots in the
intermediary zone from syndicate’s perimeter (see section 5.2.6.1). However, the non
considered agricultural land remains in the hands of the landowners and therefore
imparts (future) added value. It is reasonable to believe that, in the medium term,
some portion of these surfaces will be developed (SDNL, 2015).
An important element is the learning effect on the involved actors after havingLearning effect
experienced a land readjustment and two land improvement syndicates. The second
land improvement syndicate Nonceret is still active, but the involved landowners, some
of whom were present in the first LIS Derrière-le-château, pushed for the realisation
of the second. The commune wanted to stagger both LIS in time, because they did
not have the organisational means, nor, possibly, the political support, to initiate two
development projects at the same time. But once the LIS Derrière-le-château was
finished, the commune hired a professional planner and they launched into agreement
with the concerned landowners, the LIS Nonceret. A safe assumption is that all
parties had learned the benefits they could gain from the first LIS.
The actors’ interests in using the LIS instrument can be linked to the coalitionSmall growth machine
of actors created by the LIS’ coordination mechanism between the landowners’ as-
sembly and the local development plan: factors such common objectives between the
commune and (at least part of) the landowners to develop the land, the definition
of an impermeable perimeter where all actors share proportionately the gains they
create, the resources that actors share (infrastructure, money, information), and the
wide margin of manoeuvrability they are granted in the definition of plot ratios, land
service and type of construction, creates a community of interests whose production
results in a huge amount of added value, (see table 5.5) primarily to the benefit of
the landowners.
State Surface CHF/m2 Absolute value Zone
2001 158,031m2 20CHF/m2 3,160,620CHF Intermediary
2003 43,092m2 189CHF/m2 8,164,000CHF Building zone
105,565m2 3.83CHF/m2 404,300CHF Agricultural zone
8,136m2 95CHF/m2 772,900CHF Institutional zone
1,238m2 7CHF/m2 8,700CHF Green zone
9,349,700CHF Total
Table 5.5: Land values in the LIS Derrière-le-château in 2001 and 2003s. Data: Marti
and Courdesse (2003, 2012). The surfaces considered do not include public domain
nor the "neutralised" plots.
Absolute value Description
9,349,700CHF Final land value
-3,160,600CHF Initial land value
6,189,300CHF Added value
8,945,400CHF Final land value without
agricultural zone
-200,900CHFa Theoretical initial land value
8,744,500CHF Theoretical added value
Table 5.6: Added land value in the LIS Derrière-le-château. Data: Marti and Courd-
esse (2003, 2012). The surfaces considered do not include public domain nor the
"neutralised" plots.
a(Surface of perimeter - argicultural zone)*agricultural land price: (158,031m2-
105,565m2)*3.83CHF/m2=200,900CHF
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Estimated surfaces and values
Gross floor areaa: 24,600m2
Construction volumeb 98,400m3
Construction costsc: 68.5M
Land service costs: 2.6M
Table 5.7: Estimated surfaces and values of the land dedicated to development in the
area Derrière-le-château.
aThe estimated gross floor area has been calculated based on a plot ratio of 0.35 for 5,000m2 of
building zone and 0.6 for 38,100m2 building zone (Marti and Courdesse, 2003).
b24,600m2/3 = 8,200m2 of used ground surface. For three floor dwellings with 4 meters height
per floor: 12*8,200m2 = 98,4000m3.
cBased on a price of 580CHF/m3 + 20% for additional costs and landscape modelling (Unknown,
nd): 696CHF/m3*98,400m3=68.5M
Estimated benefits and costs
Gross rental income per yeara: +4.7M
Operational expensesb: -0.95M
Gross annual financial return on total investmentsc: 5.9%
Mortgage interestsd: -3.2M
Net annual financial return on capitale : 6.8%
Net yield per year: 0.48M
Table 5.8: Estimated benefits and costs of the development of the perimeter Derrière-
le-château.
aBased on an occupancy rate of 0.85 and a rental value of 19CHF/m2/month. The price hypo-
thesis is one of the values used for the real estate calculation including car parks made for the LIS’
assembly (Unknown, nd).
bThis sum corresponds to 20 % of the gross rental income. Based on https://d-l.ch/fr/
articles/les-rendements-brut-et-net.
c4.7M (gross income) / (70.1M (value of construction and land service) + 8.1M (value of land))
= 5.9%
d4.5% is the rate of reference for the canton of Geneva in 2001. See http://www.asloca.ch/
evolution-des-taux-hypothécaires-de-référence-canton-de-genève. I assume that the entirety
of construction and land service costs are financed via mortgage. Therefore: 70.1M*4.5%=3.2M
e(4.7M (gross rental income) - 0.95M (operation expenses) - 3.2M (mortgage interests) / 8.1M
(invested land value)) = 6.7%
5.2.8.1 Limits of the LIS to a more extensive redistribution
The capacity of one tenacious landowner to substantially lengthen the process shows Limit of the number of
landownersone of the weaknesses of the instrument: despite the removal of the double major-
ity rule102 in 1997, the inclusion of landowners who systematically opposed the LIS
process, such as in the case of the LIS of Bussigny or Le Mont, can noticeably slow
down the instrument’s implementation103. Experts recommend not to exceed 10 to
15 different owners within one LIS104.
An additional element that the LIS does not anticipate is the common develop- No common real estate
developmentment of land. The LIS process stops once the land is serviced. The various interests
of landowners and their respective financial capacities, leads to separate development
processes. Common aesthetic criteria depend solely upon communal or local building
regulations. In the case of Cheseaux, the owners preferred to fully control the devel-
opment of their own land, according to their own financial capacities and the planned
type of occupation (rental, freehold).
With the revision of the federal spatial planning act in 2014 and the re-introduction 1 million francs potential
revenues from the tax on
the added land value
of the tax on added land value created through zoning, the mandatory tax of 20% of
the added value will impact the value multiplying coefficient (the gains) for landown-
ers. Reading from table 5.5, the sole gain created through zoning is the difference
between the value of the building zone105 and the value of the intermediary zone:
102Majority of the landowners and of the landowners that represent the majority in terms of surface
103D. Leroy, Land readjustment engineer, cantonal spatial planning office, interviewed in Lausanne
25 September 2015.
104U. Zuppinger and R. Courdesse, op. cit.
105The tax does not apply to land dedicated to public infrastructure.
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amounting to 4.87 million francs. A 20% tax could have captured roughly one mil-
lion francs and lowered the value multiplying coefficient from 2.87 to 2.54. Based on
these estimations, the introduction of the new tax will, in my opinion, not impact the
functioning of the instrument in future implementation processes that have a similar
value multiplying coefficient.
However, since 2013, the communes in Vaud have also had the possibility to applyPotential 2.58 million
francs of extended land
service tax
the extended land service tax, which Cheseaux did in 2013 (Commune of Cheseaux,
2013). The tax amounts approximately to 82CHF/m2 for housing surfaces. In the
case of the LIS Derrière-le-château, the tax could have amounted to 1.51M francs106.
If both taxes had been combined, a net gain of approximately 2.39 million would have
remained for the landowners, which corresponds to a taxation of 72% of the added
land value created through zoning. According to the Federal Tribunal107 and to a
report of a commission from the cantonal parliament (Canton of Vaud, 2014), such a
taxation would not be considered confiscatory.
Referring to the land value estimation calculation elaborated by mandate of theAnnual revenue of
480,000 francs landowners’ assembly (Unknown, nd), the yearly gross rental income of the building
zone in the perimeter of the LIS Derrière-le-château can be estimated at around 3.6M
francs. If I estimate operation expenses of 720,000CHF (see table 5.8), and a mortgage
interest rate of 4.5%, the annual gain can be estimated at around 480,000CHF for the
entire building zone of the LIS, which corresponds to a net financial return on capial
(land value) of 6.8%.
The comparison between the financial gain generated by the properties to theTaxed added economic
value recovered within
seven years
sum of the taxes, (on added land value and of the extended service tax), shows the
importance of time as a factor when dealing with land value and its redistribution.
Taking into consideration what landowners invested, they should recover the taxed
added economic value within seven years. I deduce that these two value capture
instruments are only able to grasp a limited amount of the economic value when
a zone change occurs, a very specific and unique moment in time. The effectively
created economic value, (the rent), is paid every month and year. The two taxes
are only marginally able to seize the value added over time. In fact, the land price
referenced for the calculation of the tax on added land value created through zoning,
reflects the land rent over time, but only up to a certain point (application of lowered
market prices) and not as a perpetual factor, as opposed to the financial return from
landownership.
5.2.8.2 LIS on multiple sites?
One of the main problems that land use policy currently faces is the relocation of
oversized and undeveloped building zones from small peri-urban communes where
no development takes place and where access by public transport is inadequate to
more central urban communes that drive development. Until now, most LIS have
been used on limited portions of the territory (with exception of the LIS Le Mont),
within one commune or across two communes. In order to address the problem of the
location of undeveloped building zones, it would be necessary to broaden the scale
of implementation of the instrument and stretch the instrument’s perimeter across
two or more geographically distinct locations. Based on the findings from this case
study, and the advice of the experts interviewed108, one should pay attention to the
following elements:
− the number of landowners involved has to remain small, otherwise the chances
of finding a suitable compromise is diminished. More specifically, the values
attributed to the different plots becomes an issue for the owners: they contest
the equal/unequal valuation of their land, (the principle of equal treatment
is a central constraint that has to be fulfilled for the implementation of the
LIS). Optimally, the perimeter of a multi-site LIS should consider only parts of
communal territories that belong to a restricted number of owners;
− the definition of a "sending area" in one commune and of a "receiving area"
in another commune requires both communes to cooperate, for example by
10618,450m2*82CHF/m2.
107ATF 105 Ia 134.
108R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit.
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"synchronising" the transfer: both zoning plan revisions would have to take
place (be approved by the canton) at the same time in order to be recognised
as an effective transfer. But more importantly, the communes should both
be interested in doing the deal. In 2015, various communes with undeveloped
oversized building zones appeared reluctant to transfer these rights (24 heures,
2015a,b). Further, in the rights transfer process, the desired profits of the
sending owners might not align with expectations of profit for those receiving.
On the side of the "receiving area", the commune that augments its building zone
or plot ratio (in case of densification) needs to show an interest in development,
which depends, for now, upon the communal legislative body’s opinion on the
matter109;
− The heterogeneity of the landowners’ interests facilitates the realisation of a
LIS: if all landowners want agricultural land or all want building zone, then
the landowners’ wishes cannot be satisfied, either because there is not enough
(agricultural) land surface available, or because the property structure would
become too fragmented to be developed. The same thought would apply to a
multi-site syndicate: exchange of development rights is only possible between
communes with different demographic and economic dynamics and between
landowners with different interests (agriculture v. development).
109However, those communes part of Lausanne’s agglomeration master plan have minimal density
criteria that they need to fulfil. See also section 5.2.6.3.
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Test of hypotheses and
comparison
Now that I have presented the results from the case studies’ analyses (chapters 4 and
5), the next step is to provide short syntheses of the empirical findings in light of
the fifteen redistributive processes identified in the case studies (section 6.1). The
description of these redistributive processes in a subsequent step (section 6.2) allows
for cross-case testing of the research hypotheses.
As mentioned in the methodological section 3.3, I define redistributive processes
as land use policy processes where authorities tackle a specific problem, intervene
against the target group through one main, and several secondary policy instruments,
in order to achieve a specific goal. The instruments and problems in the centre of
each redistributive process are the following:
1. building zone transfer (Wiedlisbach): use of zoning in order to operate a spatial
relocation of development rights from the centre of the commune to agricultural
land outside of the village;
2. building obligation (Wiedlisbach): use of zoning, contracts and mortgages in
order to fight land hoarding in three different land use policy and property
rights scenarios;
5. building zone reduction (Huttwil): use of zoning and plot ratio for reducing the
available building zone reserve;
6. building right (Huttwil): use of zoning and building rights in order to supply
cheap land for development;
7. polluted soil (Niederbipp): use of zoning, building permit specifications (im-
plementation of the contaminated sites ordinance) and a financial guarantee in
order to develop a former landfill without contaminating underground waters;
8. tax on added land value (Niederbipp): first implementation of the tax on added
land value created through zoning (TALV) a new industrial zone;
9. land exchange (Malley): exchange of plots between the target groups involved
in the urban reconversion in Malley;
10. MAO restrictions (Malley): implementation of use restrictions imposed by the
major accidents ordinance and use of zoning in the urban reconversion of Malley;
11. polluted soil (Malley): implementation of the contaminated sites ordinance, use
of zoning and reshape of plots in order to transfer development rights;
12. extended land service tax (Malley): implementation of the extended land service
tax (ELST) in order to finance communal infrastructure;
13. energy planning (Malley): implementation of energy planning in order to de-
termine future energy supply;
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14. land exchange (Cheseaux): acquisition and exchange of plots in order to become
member of the future land improvement syndicate;
15. land improvement syndicate (Cheseaux): use of the land improvement syndicate
(LIS) in order to define new building zone, remove intermediary zone, reshape
plots and redefine their owners;
Once the redistributive processes have been presented, I provide, in section 6.1.6
two tables (tables 6.16 and 6.18) which sum up the different variables relating to the
redistributive processes, and assess the redistributive effects of these processes. These
two tables constitute the main research results of the thesis.
In a subsequent step, I test the hypotheses on the research results (section 6.2),
which then allows for the identification of a set of factors determining land use policy
outputs and value redistribution (section 6.4).
In the last section (6.5) of the chapter, I confront the theoretical material mobilised
for the thesis, and the results obtained from the research.
6.1 Cases’ synthesis
The aim of the syntheses of the cases is to reread the fifteen redistributive processes
identified in the empirical work through the lens of the variables selected in the
conceptual framework. Each synthesis presents the following elements (each examined
in a specific section):
1. the local public problem, sets the local context, exposes the location-dependent
(contextual) factors in which the redistributive process occurs, and summarises
the problems faced by authorities;
2. the configuration of actors, which is the first intermediary variable defined in
the conceptual framework in chapter 3;
3. the strategies chosen by actors (second intermediary variable);
4. the instrument types and the policy resources mobilised by the actors, (the third
and fourth intermediary variables, respectively). These are classified according
to the typology presented in table 2.14 in chapter 2;
5. the local regulatory arrangement, the first dependent variable; it compares the
output of the process with the institutional regime and land use policy object-
ives;
6. the redistributive effects produced by the arrangements as the second dependent
variable.
At the end of the section, tables 6.16 and 6.18 provide a synthesis of the re-
distributive processes. They gather the main results of the empirical research, and
constitute the basis for the test of the hypotheses.
6.1.1 Wiedlisbach
6.1.1.1 Local public problem
Since the adoption of their first zoning plan in 1978, Wiedlisbach has had wide,
undeveloped building zones. With the entry into force of the federal land use planning
act in 1980, the building zones intended for development were obligated to align
with the commune’s development needs over the subsequent fifteen years. Local
efforts to reduce building zones were countered with threats of compensation claims
by concerned landowners. Further, scattered construction blurred the boundaries
of urbanisation, and undermined the consistent reduction of building zones. Over
time, the situation became problematic due to the underused infrastructure financed
by authorities, and due to increased fiscal competition with neighbour communes.
The situation was such that the commune was unable to gain sufficient revenues. In
order to overcome this, local authorities sought to attract new inhabitants, and thus
augment their fiscal revenues. However, the existing undeveloped building zone was
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not available for development, because numerous landowners hoarded the land and
refused to develop it. Further, the commune could not open new land for urbanisation,
because their zoning plan did not meet the federal requirements in terms of the size of
the undeveloped building zone, and because any building zone extension was blocked
by the canton.
Further, numerous landowners in the building zone hoarded their property: they
did not develop it, did not sell it, or they asked for a price that no buyer was willing
to take. In recent years, hoarding behaviours became more problematic, because
the commune had exhausted its quota of building zone reserves and its development
was blocked. In addition to the scattered undeveloped plots, the commune zoned 2
hectares of industrial land in 1989. This land was intended to attract companies and
jobs on communal territory. As of 2013, the landowner did not launch the planning
and land service procedures, and the plots remained undeveloped.
6.1.1.2 Configuration of actors
The actors intervening in the building zone transfer are: the communal executive body
(which wants to increase communal revenues), landowners in the building zone (willing
to build, not willing to build and resisting, willing to be put in the green zone), who are
the target of the green zone, landowners outside of the building zone (willing to build)
who are the target of the building zone extension, neighbours and inhabitants who
want to keep their view and limit the additional traffic that a building zone extension
would create. In addition, the communal planner advises the communal executive
body on the proceedings and supports the local authorities in the negotiations with
landowners.
The actors involved in the building obligation processes are:
− The communal executive body wants to make building land for housing and
industry available;
− Landowners who are inactive, or hoard their land;
− Communal planner advising the communal executive body.
6.1.1.3 Actors’ strategies
In order to overcome this blocked situation, the first strategy pursued by the com-
munal executive body from Wiedlisbach was to transfer existing undeveloped building
zone (unused development rights) to a new perimeter to be zoned outside of the vil-
lage. This required a zone change for the undeveloped plots in the centre of the
village. This process induced a reduction of the undeveloped building zone, and a
relocation of these rights on agricultural land to be zoned as building zone.
On the landowners’ side, the group targeted by the green zone tried to either main-
tain the status quo (no zone change), or to obtain compensation (through additional
development rights).
On the inhabitants’ side, a coalition against development emerged that contested
the first zoning plan proposed by the communal executive body by opposing the
revision, voting against it, and mobilising the press.
In regard to the building obligations, three distinct situations were found:
1. the situation of serviced land in the building zone hoarded by landowners;
2. the one where industrial land is already zoned but not yet serviced;
3. and the situation where land is not yet serviced or zoned.
In the case of already zoned and serviced land, the green zone was used as a means
of pressure to gain the landowners’ consent to develop. These landowners reacted in
different manners:
203 of 327
Test of hypotheses and comparison
− some refused to sign the building obligation and be put in the green zone, and
asked the commune to deliver a building permit, thus hindering the zone change
on their plot;
− others agreed to a zone change and negotiated additional development rights
when they are rezoned as building zone (a process described previously in the
building zone transfer);
− some unsuccessfully opposed the communal decision and voted against the build-
ing regulations revision;
− others signed a "voluntary building obligation" on their plot as response to the
communal threat of green zone.
In the case of zoned but non-serviced land (industrial land), the commune decided
to pay for all planning and land service costs, and created a mortgage in favour of the
commune on the plots concerned. This provided local authorities the financial levy
to pay for the planning and land service works. Additionally, a repayment obligation
with a ten year delay was signed with the landowner, ensuring the plots’ availability
on the market and the recovery of the investments made.
In the case of the building zone extension, the commune used the added economic
value created through zoning as a levy, in order to negotiate an emption right with
the landowners. The emption right granted authorities a right to buy the land at a
pre-determined price for 10 years if the landowners did not develop it.
6.1.1.4 Instruments and policy resources mobilised
During the first time span, local authorities used zoning, rezoning priority (time), plots
ratio and exemption from tax on added land value created through zoning in order
to obtain the landowners’ consensus on a temporary removal of their development
rights. Landowners who opposed communal intervention used legal means to contest
the decision. Other landowners agreed on a "voluntary building obligation" to avoid
their plots zoned into the green zone. Neighbours and inhabitants utilised the law
(opposition to zoning plan) in order to oppose the building zone extension.
During the second time span, after the failure of the first vote on the communal
zoning plan, the commune reduced the surface of a new building zone that was to
be created. Inhabitants and neighbours agreed to the changes, and adopted the
communal zoning plan (political support). Prior to the extension of the building
zone, the commune was promised by the concerned landowners that they will develop
the zoned perimeter within a specific time horizon (emption right), bear all land
service costs (land service tax), and pay the tax on added land value created through
zoning.
In regard to the building obligations, the three processes involved the following in-
struments and resources: in the case of the existing serviced building zone, local
authorities used the green zone as a threat in order to force landowners to develop
their land. Certain landowners agreed to sign a "voluntary building obligation"; oth-
ers fought against it and asked the commune to deliver a building permit they did
not intend to use; others agreed to the green zone, some of them negotiated addi-
tional development rights or derogations to building regulations. Those who signed
the voluntary obligation and those who agreed to the green zone provided consensus
to one of the commune’s strategies, whereas the others mobilised the law to fight off
implementation.
In the case of the industrial land, landowners’ consensus was also mobilised and
traded against a legal mortgage associated with a delay of payment, resulting in a
facilitated planning and land service procedure, as well as a quick realisation of gains
for the landowners.
In the case of the building zone extension, the levy created through zoning, and
the local authorities’ will to push development forward was traded against an emption
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right at a pre-determined price on the land and the payment of the tax on added land
value created through zoning;
In all cases, but particularly in the case of the building zone extension, polit-
ical support was mobilised for the votes on the revised building regulations. The
communal executive body relied on personnel and information provided by the hired
planner for assistance in the negotiations with landowners and the definition of the
instruments to be used (as well as of their modalities).
6.1.1.5 Local regulatory arrangement
Initially, the commune exceeded its quota of undeveloped building zones. Local au-
thorities gained a margin of manoeuvrability in the cantonal building zone calculation
scheme through a diversion of zoning: the commune created a new non-constructible
zone (the green zone) that removed unused development rights, which allowed a re-
duction in the amount of undeveloped development rights considered in the cantonal
calculation scheme. The commune negotiated individual compensations (zoning pri-
ority, additional development rights (plot ratio) with the concerned landowners, ex-
emption from the tax on added land value created through zoning), and transferred
the "gained" development rights outside of the village into a new building zone.
The arrangement represents a diversion of land use policy objectives, because it
uses the zoning instrument, conceived as a means of separating constructible from
non-constructible areas, in order to blur the separation between zones. The use of
zoning (green zone and building zone extension) created a scattered urbanisation
pattern and expands the limits of urbanisation beyond those previously considered as
already exceeding communal needs.
The processes involving the building obligations produced the following arrange-
ments.: for the serviced building zone, the commune innovated by elaborating and
implementing "voluntary building obligations" for the landowners that did not want to
have their plot in the green zone. However, the effects of these voluntary obligations
remain unproven. Local authorities tried to overcome a lack of coherence in the soil’s
institutional regime by developing a new rule to overcome the land hoarding problem
.
For the industrial land, the communal executive body innovated by signing an
agreement with the landowners transferring the planning and land service activities to
the commune, and writing a mortgage on the landowner’s plot to ensure the payment
of the land service. They set a repayment obligation of 10 years to expediate land
development, once serviced.
For the building zone extension, the commune implemented land use policy ob-
jectives by mobilising all legal measures available to capture some of the added land
value they had created through zoning, and to ensure the land’s development.
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6.1.1.6 Redistributive effects
Features Explanation
Across actors: Transfer of development rights from a group of landowners to an-
other group of landowners (target group 1 to target group 2)
Across policies: Added value created by land use policy is transferred to the
landowners’ property rights (both in case of green zoning (ad-
ditional development rights) and building zone extension), and
part of it is captured for land use policy (tax on added land value
created through zoning)
Across space: Value/rights transfer operates within one commune from
scattered plots in the commune’s centre to contiguous plots at
the urbanisation limits
Across scales: Commune withdraws development rights, which allows them to
reduce their oversized building zone (under supervision of the
canton), and redistribute these rights to other plots
Across time: Green zone linked with rezoning priority when building regu-
lations are revised (at least 10 years); emption right on newly
zoned plots limited to 10 years. Beyond these dates, no redistri-
bution of value
Across value
dimensions:
Once the newly zoned plots are developed, the reduced ecological
value (development of at least 4,000m2 of gross floor area with
a plot ratio of 0.4) will be substituted for added economic value
(estimated value of new building zone: 1.5M francs + recovery
of past development rights + additional negotiated development
rights for landowners in the green zone). Part of the added eco-
nomic value of the new building zone (approx. 290,000 francs) is
captured for land use policy purposes (land service and tax on
added land value created through zoning)
Across policy
resources:
In case the building zone extension is not developed in a 10
years time frame, then the commune may use the emption right
and substitute the target group’s infrastructure for the resource
money
Table 6.1: Redistributive effects of the building zone transfer in Wiedlisbach.
Features Explanation
Across actors: None
Across policies: None
Across space: Within plots: developed will be more valuable than undeveloped
plot
Across scales: Between commune and landowners: the former obliges the latter
to make available the value distributed through zoning
Across time: "Voluntary building obligations" have a duration of 15 years
Across value
dimensions:
Future construction due to the "voluntary building obligations"
induce a reduced ecological value and an added economic value
Table 6.2: Redistributive effects of the building olibgations on serviced land in Wied-
lisbach.
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Features Explanation
Across actors: Value transfer from landowner to commune solely due to land
service
Across policies: None
Across space: Within plots
Across scales: Between commune and landowners only
Across time: Land mortgage on plot has a delay of 10 years
Across value
dimensions:
Reduced ecological value (future development of 2ha of industrial
land) is substituted by an added economic value (development
and service of land)
Table 6.3: Redistributive effects of the building obligation on non serviced land in
Wiedlisbach.
Features Explanation
Across actors: Commune captures part of the added economic value created
through zoning through the instrument tax on added land value
created through zoning on landowners’ plots. In addition, it
charges land service costs through the land service tax and
provides land service in return
Across policies: None
Across space: None
Across scales: Between commune and landowners only
Across time: Emption right on new building zone is limited to 10 years
Across value
dimensions:
Reduced ecological value (future development of 1ha of new
building zone) is substituted by an added economic value (de-
velopment and service of land)
Table 6.4: Redistributive effects of the building obligations on future building zone
in Wiedlisbach.
6.1.2 Huttwil
6.1.2.1 Local public problem
Since the adoption of their first zoning plan in 1977, Huttwil had wide undeveloped
building zones. In order to match federal requirements, the building zones intended
for development needed to match the commune’s development needs over the sub-
sequent fifteen years. An initial reduction of undeveloped building zones took place
through the revision of the building regulations in 1994. But four additional perimet-
ers of 1 to 4 hectares each remained undeveloped in the building zone, maintaining
the commune’s building zone reserves at the upper end of the legal limit. Further,
contractual agreements signed with the landowners in these perimeters anticipated
that the commune would bear all land service costs. Since the 1990’s, Huttwil has
witnessed a progressive demographic decline. The commune struggled to encourage
the development of housing and thus, to attract new inhabitants, it faced shrinking
revenues, and the existing construction did not meet contemporary living standards.
Despite successive agreements between the commune and the landowners on the devel-
opment of the hoarded perimeters, the status quo prevailed, hindering the fulfilment
of communal growth objectives.
6.1.2.2 Configuration of actors
The actors involved in the process are the communal executive body, which is suppor-
ted by the canton in the building zone reduction process. The local planning commit-
tee, together with the landowners, oppose the executive body in their strategy. The
construction experts and the report they produce are third parties paid by the com-
mune to determine the perimeter’s constructibility. Neighbours who own water rights
are third party losers whose rights will potentially be destroyed with the development
of the plots (they oppose the development process).
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In the process "building right", the commune and the Herdgemeinde shared a set
of common interests, and could gain benefits from cooperation: the wide properties
of the Herdgemeinde (target group) and the zoning powers of the commune could
be joined to attract new inhabitants to Huttwil. This redistributive process also
involved future homeowners (end beneficiaries): those who look for a cheaper way to
buy property and for a quiet place outside of the bigger urban centres, homeowners
who are not interested in full ownership on their home or do not have sufficient funds
to buy both land and house.
6.1.2.3 Actors’ strategy
The communal executive body aimed to reduce unused building zones and pass on
land service costs to landowners to gain a margin of manoeuvrability with the canton
and reduce communal expenses created through zoning. Further, in order to limit
the rural exodus and attract new contributors, communal authorities decided upon
new, cheap building land for construction, by zoning and selling building rights on
the Herdgemeinde’s properties.
Landowners and third party losers aimed to maintain the status quo: keep their
rights without additional obligations or costs (land service costs, destruction of water
catchment).
6.1.2.4 Instruments and policy resources mobilised
Once the 2008 elaboration of the hazard map placed the perimeter of Thomasbode in
the medium risk zone, the communal executive body considered the information an
opportunity to zone the perimeter of Thomasbode back to agricultural land. However,
the local planning committee used its political support and, together with opposing
landowners (lack of consensus), pressured the communal executive body: they refused
the communal executive body’s consideration to withdraw development rights without
compensation.
In order to circumvent the information provided by the instrument hazard map,
the planning committee asked the communal executive body to mobilise the instru-
ment constructibility assessment (resource information), which would confirm or in-
firm the perimeter’s constructibility, and thus the necessity to pay or not a compens-
ation to the landowners. Once the study was published, the communal executive
body submitted to the demands of the landowners and the local planning committee,
who interpreted the report’s results as a confirmation of the landowners’ development
rights.
In the process "building right", the commune used zoning to extend the building
zone on the land owned (infrastructure) by the Herdgemeinde. The Herdgemeinde
leased the plots through building right to home owners who built on it. The commune
used the land service tax on the plots leased to the home owners in order to recover
land service costs.
6.1.2.5 Local regulatory arrangement
Once the report confirmed the plot’s constructibility, the communal executive body
elaborated, in accordance with the landowners, a new local development plan. This
plan allowed for the partial implementation of land use policy objectives: authorities
reduced the size of the building zone (use of zoning), reduced the impact on existing
water rights through the concentration of constructions, defined a higher plot ratio,
and passed on part of the land service costs to landowners.
In the process "building right", the commune implemented land use policy by
making building land available at reduced costs. Through the “building right”, they
enlarged the group of end beneficiaries and reduced the financial costs of buying a
home. The lease rate that was chosen, allowed the Herdgemeinde to recover the full
economic value of land (at the current price of 200CHF/m2) by the end of the contract
(60 years), and at the same time, keep possession of the land.
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6.1.2.6 Redistributive effects
Features Explanation
Across actors: Commune uses the levy provided by the higher plot ratio granted
to landowners in order to pass on part of the land service costs
and the ownership on the future infrastructure
Across policies: Building zone reduction achieved through value creation by land
use policy; capture of the added value by land use policy and
property rights
Across space: Redistribution between parts of contiguous plots
Across scales: Pass on of part of land services costs from commune to landown-
ers
Across time: Value distribution only
Across value
dimensions:
The added economic value created through the high plot ratio
allows for reduction of the surface of the building zone to be de-
veloped as well as a reduction of the future development’s impact
on water catchments (reduction of the reduced ecological value
created by land development)
Table 6.5: Redistributive effects of the building zone reduction in Huttwil.
Features Explanation
Across actors: Target group offers a reduced rent to end beneficiaries and con-
tributes to communal objectives
Across policies: Reduced rent collected by landowner (through its property right)
allows for access to cheaper home ownership (housing policy)
Across space: —
Across scales: Commune distributes economic value to the Herdgemeinde and to
lease holders (plot users)
Across time: Duration of the lease: 60 years, renewable
Across value
dimensions:
Development induces a reduction of the ecological value of land,
which is substituted by a moderate added economic, and thus
social, value generated by the leasehold (1,630CHF/year)
Table 6.6: Redistributive effects of development through building right.
6.1.3 Niederbipp
6.1.3.1 Local public problem
From the 1960’s until 1992, a landfill operated in Niederbipp. Eventually, it accumu-
lated over 1.5 million m3 of partially toxic waste. After its closure, it was covered with
fertile soil and used as agricultural land. In 1996, a regional industrial zone which
included the former landfill was planned and progressively developed. However, the
former landfill was not reused, due to soil instabilities which reduced possible land
use, posed additional development constraints, and increased financial risks for the
developer. In 2004, the second extension of the building zone was planned, and the
question of the costs linked with the zone’s extension had to be settled.
6.1.3.2 Configuration of actors
The main actors were the cantonal office of economic development, who politically and
financially supported the industrial zone’s development, the cantonal office of water
and waste, in charge of implementing the federal water act and the ordinance on
polluted soils, the prefecture of Wangen, which delivered the building permit for the
logistics centre, the commune of Nieberbipp, which zoned the land, the landowners,
the developer, and soil experts.
For the process "tax on added land value", involved actors were the commune, who
wanted to extend their industrial zone, and landowners ready to sell their plots. One
single land buyer had already been found. The promise was to provide fiscal revenues
and jobs to the commune’s inhabitants (end beneficiaries).
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6.1.3.3 Actors’ strategy
The public objective was to foster the development of the industrial zone and find a
developer willing to build construction on the former landfill’s perimeter to reduce the
risks of water infiltration and prevent the exfiltration of toxic waste. The absence of
obligation to remediate the site and the initial difficulty to find a developer willing to
bear additional costs and take the risk of disturbing the site (and thus take part of the
responsibility in remediating it) reduced the conflict potential between the involved
actors.
Further, the commune aimed to recover part of the added land value it created
through zoning by implementing the tax on added land value created through zoning.
6.1.3.4 Instruments and policy resources mobilised
The cantonal office of economic development lends 1.5 million francs (money) for
land service, the cantonal office of waste and water sets various requirements to the
construction plans and technique (construction requirements) and requires a finan-
cial guarantee, the prefecture signs the building permit, the commune provides land
service and contributes to it (infrastructure and money), the landowners pay for land
service and monitoring costs (money) and agree to a reduced sale price (money), the
developer deposits a financial guarantee for 10 years (money) and fulfils the specific
construction requirements (infrastructure), the soil experts provide knowledge on soil
composition and structure and make recommendations on type of construction and
monitor toxic exfiltrations (information).
In the process "tax on added land value", the commune mobilised zoning and tax
on added land value created through zoning in order to recover part of the value
created. It increased the consensus of landowners by using outdated land values for
the calculation of the tax rate and passing on detail land service costs to the land
developer.
6.1.3.5 Local regulatory arrangement
The canton implemented the economic development policy and soil protection policy
by authorising the construction of a lid in order to limit the infiltration of water
and the exfiltration of pollutants from a landfill whose remediation costs would have
required massive public investments. The developer agreed to bear the financial risks
linked with the landfill’s redevelopment and in return benefited from a reduced land
sale price, because they managed to pass on the additional costs – except those of the
financial guarantee – to the initial landowners.
The process "tax on added land value" resulted in an implementation of the vol-
untary tax on added land value created through zoning. No percentage was fixed
in the building regulations. The commune defined the percentage of taxation in its
decision: 30%. However, the land prices were favourable to the landowners and led
to an effective taxation of 21%. The delay of payment for the tax was set at 90 days.
Further, in order to pass on the land service costs to the land developer and ensure
the recovery of the investments made, the commune conditioned the payment of the
land service costs on the delivery of the building permit.
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6.1.3.6 Redistributive effects
Features Explanation
Across actors: Commune zones land and distributes value to landowners, canton
imposes restrictions, monitoring obligations (part of which bene-
fits the soil experts) and the payment of a temporary financial
guarantee, which then returns to the developer
Across policies: Value created by land use policy is used to finance the imple-
mentation of soil and water protection policies
Across space: —
Across scales: Developer deposits a financial guarantee, which is under control
of the canton in case pollution spreads
Across time: Duration of the financial guarantee: 10 years
Across value
dimensions:
Part of the added economic value created through zoning (2.37M
francs) is used to create an added ecological value: limitation of
water infiltration through the construction of a specific lid on the
landfill, as well as monitoring of the site
Table 6.7: Redistributive effects of the process polluted soil in Niederbipp.
Features Explanation
Across actors: Commune distributes value to landowners through zoning and
captures part of it through the tax on added land value created
through zoning
Across policies: —
Across space: within communal (and cantonal) territory
Across scales: Between commune and landowners and canton, who recovers part
of the taxed amount (2.4M francs in total)
Across time: One time value capture
Across value
dimensions:
Reduced ecological value induced by land development is substi-
tuted by added economic value created through zoning (approx.
16M francs for 10ha industrial land). Part of the added economic
value created through zoning is captured and used by authorities
for other land use policy processes
Table 6.8: Redistributive effects of the tax on added land value created through zoning
Niederbipp.
6.1.4 Malley
6.1.4.1 Local public problem
Over the past decades, the expansion of urban areas has been a growing public con-
cern. However, unused or underused brownfields and former industrial fields had the
potential to limit such expansion. Initially, these areas were located on the limits of
urbanisation, but over time, they have been absorbed by urban growth. Some of these
fields, such as the one of Malley, were located close to major transport infrastructure
and already surrounded by urbanisation. In the end of the 1990’s, the industrial
activities present in the area of Malley had decreased. They left wide surfaces of
land in the core of Lausanne’s agglomeration partly unused. Their redevelopment
constituted an ideal opportunity for urban renewal and expansion without "consum-
ing" open land, as well as for improving the coordination between urbanisation and
transport infrastructure.
6.1.4.2 Configuration of actors
The Confederation launched the agglomeration policy and co-funded the train station
of Malley. The canton obtained funding, co-funded the train station, and financed
a portion of the planning works. They also supervised the implementation of the
measures planned in the agglomeration program. They were also responsible for the
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implementation of the major accidents ordinance (MAO), and of the contaminated
sites ordinance. Further, they supervised the land and energy planning procedures.
The intercommunal planning office SDOL (third party) suggested the future urban
shape of the neighbourhood and set future urban densities. Architects and planners
(third parties) designed public spaces and suggested the location of different uses
within the perimeter. Together with the landowners, the communes (Prilly and Ren-
ens) elaborated the local development plans. Separately, they approved the local
development plans, implemented the extended land service tax and set communal en-
ergy goals. The landowners (Lausanne and SBB) leased their land for development.
They also managed train infrastructure (SBB infrastructure), train operations and
the company’s properties (SBB real estate), distributed gas to numerous communes,
and managed the agglomeration’s waste (Lausanne).
The intercommunal heating company, owned by local authorities and landowners,
constructed the district heating network in the western part of the agglomeration and
distributed heat produced by the industrial services from Lausanne (third party). The
industrial services were the main adjacent land users; they built a new heating plant
adjacent to the new local development plan. The agglomeration’s public transport
company owned a nearby bus depot and ensured the future neighbourhood would be
provided with public transport other than the train.
6.1.4.3 Actors’ strategies
By co-funding transport infrastructure projects that were ready to be realised, the
Confederation intended to foster the redevelopment of plots close to public transport
axes and thus steer development towards already (partly) urbanised areas. The canton
co-funded the train station of Malley in order to increase the accessibility of the area
and induce the redevelopment of unused or underused properties surrounding the
station. These new uses needed to be compatible with risk considerations (due to the
proximity of the train line), and had to consider energy provision (due to the new law).
The communes intended to provide additional housing, attract new inhabitants – some
of them with above average revenues –, and minimise costs linked with redevelopment.
The landowners’ strategy was to maximise high development rights on their land
in order to generate revenues from their property. In addition, they exchanged a plot:
Lausanne’s goal was to host the new cantonal museum of modern arts, SBB’s goal
was to develop their property for profit.
6.1.4.4 Instruments and policy resources mobilised
The canton and Confederation mobilised infrastructure by developing the train station
and set an incentive for local authorities to use planning instruments in order to ensure
the area’s redevelopment. They also provided money (co-funding of railway crossing)
towards infrastructure (construction of the crossing) provided by the target groups.
In regard to the five redistributive processes observed, the following instruments
and resources have been identified:
1. land exchange: both landowners exchanged land (infrastructure) in order to (1)
reuse the former locomotive hall near Lausanne’s central station in a way that
better fit its location and development constraints; (2) ensure the profitability of
the other plots surrounding Malley station. The lack of money on both sides for
buying land, the political support behind the museum, the consensus between
the two parties, and the opportune time schedule made the deal possible;
2. MAO restrictions: the implementation of the MAO by the Canton led to a re-
striction on the type of future construction use. Landowners mobilised informa-
tion (studies provided by the SBB minimising existing risks and use restrictions)
and consensus (their approval of the development and financial plans), and time
(they left the negotiation tables for two years) in order to obtain compensation;
3. polluted soil: local authorities and landowners transferred development rights
within the perimeter of the local development plans and reshaped the plots in
order to reduce soil excavation, and thus, remediation costs, while maintaining
the same overall plot ratio, a satisfactory financial return for the landowners,
and tax revenues for local authorities;
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4. extended land service tax: both landowner and communes exchanged the re-
source law, i.e. legal advice regarding the necessity for public authorities to
pay the tax. This exchange blocked temporarily the negotiation. However, the
personnel available to the landowners allowed them to precisely calculate the
overall costs of the project (remediation costs in particular), which gave them
a strategic advantage over local authorities. In addition, landowners argued
that existing development rights would be used as such, if no agreement was
found. Further, local authorities had limited available time for negotiation, as
part of the infrastructure constructed in the neighbourhood was linked to the
agglomeration program development schedule;
5. energy planning: landowners created a coalition with local authorities by cre-
ating a co-owned company (organisation) in charge of constructing the district
heating system (infrastructure) and distributing the energy. This allowed for the
exchange of infrastructure (district heating) for the resource money, reducing
development costs, and passing on maintenance and other related costs linked
to energy goals on the end beneficiaries (future home owners and renters).
Inhabitants provided political support in favour of an increased proportion of
housing during the adoption stage of the first local development Malley-gare by the
communal legislative bodies.
6.1.4.5 Local regulatory arrangement
The local regulatory arrangements of the five redistributive processes observed are as
follows:
1. land exchange permitted the implementation of two distinct policy objectives:
Lausanne succeeded in hosting the future museum on their territory in a cent-
ral location, fulfilling culture policy objectives; the SBB ensured the financial
profitability of their properties;
2. MAO restrictions: the value loss induced by the restrictions (due to risks of
major accidents) were fully compensated through additional development rights
negotiated by landowners (circumvention).
3. polluted soil: the remediation costs (obligation to remediate excavated, polluted
soil) induced by the soil pollution led to a transfer of development rights to
adjacent plots (implementation).
4. the legal uncertainty surrounding the necessity for public landowners to pay the
extended service tax, as well as the lack of time, led communes and landowners
to a lump sum agreement on the amount of tax to be paid, constituting a
circumvention of land use policy objectives.
5. the landowners and communes co-owned the company distributing the heat
to the buildings, which allowed for the creation of a coalition agreeing on the
source of energy to be used for the constructions in Malley, increase the number
of clients and ensure the profitability of the network’s extension (circumvention
of energy objectives).
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6.1.4.6 Redistributive effects
Features Explanation
Across actors: Target groups exchange between each other two plots
Across policies: The added value created through land use policy in Malley allows
Lausanne to exchange one plot against a larger plot close to the
train station and develop a cultural complex
Across space: Change of ownership between two very central plots, across two
communes
Across scales: Between commune (Lausanne) and landowner (SBB), both acting
as private landowners
Across time: —
Across value
dimensions:
Economic value created in Malley benefits the social value of the
museum in Lausanne
Across re-
sources:
Exchange of infrastructure for infrastructure
Table 6.9: Redistributive effects of implementation of land exchange in Malley.
Features Explanation
Across actors: The canton, which is responsible for the implementation of the
ordinance on major risks, approves additional development rights
in order to compensate for the reduced economic value due to use
restrictions imposed by the ordinance
Across policies: land use policy is used as a levy to compensate for reduced eco-
nomic value due to the ordinance on major risks
Across space: —
Across scales: Canton allows higher plot ratio on plots
Across time: —
Across value
dimensions:
Compensation of economic reduced value through added eco-
nomic value
Table 6.10: Redistributive effects of implementation of MAO restrictions.
Features Explanation
Across actors: Communes and landowners negotiate a relocation of development
rights
Across policies: The location of development rights granted by land use policy
minimises the costs induced by soil protection policy
Across space: The redistribution occurs across reshaped plots within the local
development plan
Across scales: Canton to landowners
Across time: None
Across value
dimensions:
The added economic value created through zoning is used to re-
mediate the excavated soils and create added ecological value.
The minimisation of the amount to be excavated limits the added
ecological value created
Across re-
sources:
Initial plot shapes are exchanged against a new plot shapes with
added economic values (money)
Table 6.11: Redistributive effects of soil protection in Malley.
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Features Explanation
Across actors: Communes distribute economic value to landowners through zon-
ing (37,300m2 GFA) and accept a reduced amount of tax in re-
turn (700,000 francs)
Across policies: —
Across space: The tax revenue is redistributed within the communes’ territory
Across scales: The tax applies to the local development plan and is spent on the
communal level
Across time: One time value capture
Across value
dimensions:
The tax’ revenue is used for communal infrastructure. The re-
mainder of the rent is distributed to the landowners who nor-
mally negotiate a 4.5% return rate on building rights they lease
(approx. 1.55M francs annual return for Malley-gare). The ad-
ded social value is created through the potential rent reduction
granted to the building right holders (cooperatives) in Malley-
gasomètre
Table 6.12: Redistributive effects of the extended land service tax in Malley.
Features Explanation
Across actors: The choice of a renewable source of energy by end beneficiaries
is meant to cover the energy goals set by the communes and the
landowners
Across policies: The obligation set by energy policy to plan energy provision for
a neighbourhood, together with land use policy, does not impact
the type of energy chosen
Across space: The rent generated by district heating is split among communes
and landowners, the latter benefiting from a higher amount of
rent due to the fact that they provide the energy sources used for
district heating
Across scales: —
Across time: —
Across value
dimensions:
Less ecological and more economic energy sources are privileged
over less ecological and economic ones
Table 6.13: Redistributive effects of energy planning in Malley.
6.1.5 Cheseaux
6.1.5.1 Local public problem
Since the 1960’s, traffic management and communal development in the east and west
of Cheseaux has been blocked by uncertainty regarding the outline of the planned
bypass road. Past, and planned demographic growth, as well as an outdated school
building, required the construction of a new school, which the commune planned
to locate in the village’s centre. Once inhabitants and political authorities found
a solution to the outline of the bypass road, it became possible to revise planning
documents and adapt them to the commune’s development objectives.
6.1.5.2 Configuration of actors
The process included various actors at various stages: the commune as planning
authority, the planner contracted by the commune, as well as a dozen of landowners
were all present along the entire process. Various landowners, primarily farmers,
were only present during the land betterment procedure and the land acquisition
and exchange process conducted by the commune. During the land improvement
syndicate, only the landowners included in the perimeter were present, (including the
commune). Together they formed the landowners’ assembly, approving the relocation
of rights, and the new plot shapes proposed by the expert commission of the LIS,
a third party of the process (composed of a planner, a geometer and a notary).
The planner had a dual role, he counselled landowners involved in the LIS, and
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elaborated the structure plan and local development plan of Derrière-le-Château for
the commune. The canton supervised the process and validated the plans and the
LIS’ results.
6.1.5.3 Actors’ strategy
Once the bypass road plans were adopted, the canton initiated a mandatory land
betterment along the future route, of a 100ha surface for the building of the road. Both
the landowners and the commune used the opportunity to extend the instrument’s
perimeter to the entire agricultural and intermediate zones of the commune (300ha)
in order to align the property structure with use rights that had changed over time
and had not been registered.
The commune used the extension of the land betterment’s perimeter to acquire
plots on the border of the settlement area, anticipating a future change of zone. In a
parallel procedure, they launched the revision of the communal building regulations.
Once the commune had exchanged and acquired several plots close to the settlement
area and within the future LIS’ perimeter (as defined in planning documents), the LIS
was constituted in a perimeter including the entirety of the intermediate zone close to
the village centre. The shape of plots and use rights on these plots were redefined in
accordance with the communal structure plan. Once the procedure was completed,
the commune was able to build its new school in the centre of the village, and the
landowners were able to develop and/or sell their land.
6.1.5.4 Instruments and policy resources mobilised
The commune managed to extend and relocate its properties on a consensual basis
through the acquisition and exchange of plots with landowners. The participation
costs linked with the LIS (combined instrument of type 2 and 4), the procedure’s
complexity, the small amount of land owned by the selling owners, and the public
interest underlying communal land acquisition (political support), led to a reduction
in the number of landowners and concentrated landownership due to sale of land by
the landowners.
6.1.5.5 Local regulatory arrangement
The commune anticipated future development, and successfully relocated its prop-
erties within the perimeter of the LIS to meet development goals (implementation).
The commune implemented federal and cantonal land use planning policy object-
ives, as well as the agglomeration policy objectives, by extending the settlement area
close to existing development, by coordinating development with the public transport
infrastructure and by defining high plot ratios (compared to communal standards).
In order to achieve quick implementation of the instrument and build the school
(lack of time), authorities took over a larger part of the infrastructure and maintenance
costs than required by their share of land. The land assembly’s expert commission
provided qualified personnel to the commune and other landowners for implementing
the instrument and achieving development goals.
The commune had the obligation to compensate the surfaces that the LIS trans-
ferred to the building zone as part of the cropland protection plan. This was achieved
by invoking other land surfaces put under protection of the cropland protection plan
during the revision of the communal zoning plan in 2001.
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6.1.5.6 Redistributive effects
Features Explanation
Across actors: Commune exchange plots they own with landowners and buy
plots from landowners.
Across policies: —
Across space: The titles exchanged and bought are all located in the commune’s
territory. The plots acquired or exchanged are within the future
LIS’ perimeter, while those sold are located further away
Across scales: The exchange takes place between commune and landowners
Across time: Permanent relocation of property titles and exchange of their fu-
ture value
Across value
dimensions:
Transfer of economic value
Across re-
sources:
Exchange of infrastructure for infrastructure, and of infrastruc-
ture for the resource money
Table 6.14: Redistributive effects of the land exchange in Cheseaux.
Features Explanation
Across actors: Commune and landowners relocate and reshape their properties
Across policies: —
Across space: The relocation and redefinition of land value takes place within
the LIS’ perimeter, which consists of contiguous plots
Across scales: Among plots/landowners and commune
Across time: Punctual redistribution only
Across value
dimensions:
Permanent substitution of reduced ecological value by added
economic value (development rights worth 8.2M francs) and the
plots’ development; substitution of ecological reduced value by
social added value due to the construction of a school
Across re-
sources:
Initial properties (infrastructure) are exchanged for new proper-
ties with other plot shapes (infrastructure) and higher economic
value (money)
Table 6.15: Redistributive effects of the land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux.
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6.1.6 Cross-case synthesis of the variables
Tables 6.16 and 6.18 provide a synthesis of the 15 redistributive processes identified
in the five case studies. The process "building obligations" sums up three processes,
therefore 13 processes figure in the tables.
The "building zone transfer" process can be accounted for in two different manners:
as a whole, the process analyses the communal strategy of building zone transfer. One
can also consider solely "green zoning" as a process that allows for the reduction of the
building zone reserve – the second part of the process, "building zone extension," is
accounted for in the "building obligations" process section. I opted to emphasise the
building zone transfer process, because it best reflects the politics of growth pursued
by the commune.
The variables summed up in the tables 6.16 and 6.18 correspond with those iden-
tified in the conceptual framework (figure 3.1) in chapter 3 and, during the previous
two chapters, are used throughout the analysis:
− contextual variables: these are synthesised through four indicators: demo-
graphy, land prices, location, soil structure. These indicators reflect trends
during previous decades. These tendencies can take five values: from very neg-
ative (– –), over neutral/no impact (0), to very positive (++). The value of the
variables from one case are relative to the values of the same variables from the
other cases;
− instruments: I classified the instrument used in each redistributive process based
on the source of law (public or private), and impact on property rights. These
are the instruments used by local or cantonal authorities. Cases where target
groups mobilised an instrument are mentioned in brackets (TG). If no instru-
ment of that type is used, a zero is input;
− policy resources: from the ten policy resources identified in the literature, I
summarised with a + cases where authorities mobilised resources they had or
they obtained from the target group. A – means that authorities lacked the
resource. Cases where target groups (or both authorities and target groups)
mobilised the resource are mentioned in brackets (PAA&TG);
− actors: coalitions and oppositions between actors identified in the process are
mentioned here. Members of a coalition are linked with a +, whereas opponent
parties are separated by a –;
− LRA: the policy output is qualified according to their type of (non) deviance
from land use policy objectives. The categories used rely on the typology Sch-
weizer (2015) and can take five values: innovation, implementation, passivity,
circumvention, and diversion;
− redistributive effects: the redistributive effects produced by the processes are
summed up in seven empirically identified features:
– actors who create economic value, or from whom economic value is cap-
tured, to actors who benefit from the economic value. These actors are
those constituting the triangle: political administrative authorities, target
groups, end beneficiaries, and third parties;
– policies that create value which is transferred to other policies or to the
property right title owner (PR);
– space is meant to characterise the initial and target location of the value
that is captured. In cases where the target location of value redistribution
is not defined, I mention the entity that captures the value (for example
the commune);
– scales allow for the identification of the level of government involved in
the value creation, reduction, exchange, and capture process. The unit of
capture and/or distribution are plots;
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– time seizes the duration of value creation, reduction, retention, capture
processes. Only process-specific time aspects of instruments’ use are men-
tioned, as, most instruments studied did not produce redistributive effects
in time (with exception of the building right);
– the value dimensions refer to the transfers from one value dimension to
another. The types of value considered are the three value dimensions
defined in the concept of sustainable development policies (Brundtland
et al., 1987);
– the feature resources captures the possible changes in terms of property
titles induced by type 4 instruments. The significant aspect is a change in
the nature of the resource (substitution from “infrastructure” to “money”
or vice versa).
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6.2 Test of hypotheses
Now that the variables’ values have been summed up for each of the 15 redistributive
processes identified, I proceed to the verification of the hypotheses. I have defined
three different possible results for each hypothesis: confirmed, partly confirmed, and
disproved. For each hypothesis, I first individually discuss the results of each case
and process, and then summarise the results of each hypothesis in a section entitled
"general discussion". These sections are accompanied by a table synthesising the
results. The tables provide the reader a systematic overview of the results, but are
not intended as a quantitative analysis of their confirmation or disproval.
6.2.1 H1: Effects of the institutional resource regime of soil
on the LRA
In chapter 3, I formulated the following hypothesis:
H1: If the institutional regime of soil is simple or complex, then the LRA
consists in a passive implementation, circumvention, or diversion of land
use policy objectives. This can be explained by the high margin of man-
oeuvrability that a simple or complex regime grants to actors in the im-
plementation of existing rules. Actors use this margin of manoeuvrability
in order to achieve their own specific goals that do not match federal
objectives.
As defined by Gerber et al. (2009) and Nahrath (2003), and discussed in chapter
2 introducing the IRR framework, the institutional regime of soil is defined as a
complex regime. Until 2014, no mandatory compensation mechanism existed, and
authorities lacked the necessary funds to reduce oversized building zones. Further,
the conflict between the principles of economic freedom, economic promotion, and
sustainability, creates incoherences in the soil regime. As a consequence, according to
H1, the observed LRAs should consist of passive implementation, circumvention, or
diversion of land use policy objectives.
6.2.1.1 Wiedlisbach
Through the subdivision of the existing building zone into building and non-building Building zone transfer
confirms H1zone, Wiedlisbach adopts a micro-zoning approach that opposes the fundamental
legal distinction operated by zoning: the commune diverts the instrument zoning
from land use policy objectives such as the "economic and appropriate use of soil"
(art. 75 Cst). By applying a green zone (a temporary suspension of development
rights) to non-developed plots, the commune creates temporary non-constructible
"holes" in the urban framework, and uses the "building zone credits" it obtained to
extend the building zone outside of the village. The combination of these two steps
induce a relocation of development rights from the village’s centre to the agricultural
periphery and an increase of the overall building zone surfaces over time. I observe
that local authorities create incoherence during the implementation process through
the use of the instrument "green zone" for the temporary reduction of existing building
zone reserves.
Further, one can argue that the institutional regime of soil lacks strictness, because
the regime aims to separate building zones from non building zones – an aim blurred
by the present transfer process – and implicitly prohibits development rights transfers
outside of the settlement area, because such transfers create a sprawl pattern and thus
a non-economic use of the resource soil. The canton’s strictly legal interpretation of
local zoning intentions – the commune respects its maximum quota of building zone
reserves –, results in an acceptance of the transfer. Hence, H1 is confirmed for the
process "building zone transfer".
Compared to the other redistributive processes analysed, a specificity of this di-
version strategy is that it was initiated by local authorities, and did not result from
the target group’s strategy.
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In the three processes dealing with building obligation, the commune tries to reduceBuilding obligation
strategies disproves H1 the "zoning gap" induced by land hoarding or land unavailability, i.e. they try to
overcome a lack of strictness of the institutional regime. To this end, authorities
established three strategies – including the creation of new instruments –, with various
rates of success:
1. In the case of previously zoned and serviced land: the commune combined the
use of two instruments – threats of placement in the green zone, and voluntary
contracts signed by landowners – in order to tackle the land-hoarding problem.
This represented an innovative solution for pushing landowners to build within
15 years. Some landowners signed the obligation, which allowed authorities to
overcome the gap between zoning prescriptions and actual land uses, and thus
increase the strictness of the regime. As opposed to the building zone trans-
fer process, local authorities in this case, used the green zone as a means of
increasing regime coherence and strictness, and limiting actors’ margin of man-
oeuvrability in terms of effective land uses. This result disproves H1, because
despite the complexity of the soil’s institutional regime, authorities managed
to elaborate ad hoc solutions that partly overcame the land-hoarding problem.
However, the commune also faced resistance from the landowners: some asked
for building permits (although they did not intend build), thus exploiting the
regime’s lack of strictness (conformity of effective land use to zoning). Other
landowners agreed on the green zone, which, as discussed in the building zone
transfer process, consists of a diversion of land use policy objectives (incoher-
ence between communal planning autonomy and land use policy), and confirms
H1. Therefore, the use of the green zone produces ambivalent results that allow
for the qualification of what the LRA observed simultaneously as a diversion
and an innovation of the institutional regime. Hence, in the building obligation
on serviced land process, H1 is partly confirmed.
2. The second building obligation process concerns the un-serviced industrial zone
in Weiermatt: the commune paid directly for the land service, and used a
mortgage on the plots, combined with a 10 year delay of payment, in order
to ensure the land’s availability and recover their investment over a maximum
period of ten years. In this case, landowners possessed reduced means to fight
the decision because the land was not serviced: this made, for example, the
request of a building permit impossible, or, theoretically, permitted building
zone reduction without financial compensation (a solution contrary to the com-
munal growth strategy). The consensus reached with the landowners allowed
the commune to implement an innovative solution for financing land service
and guaranteeing land availability. Thus, despite a complex regime that did
not obligate landowners to develop their land, local authorities and landowners
reached an agreement that achieved both land service and development. As
a consequence, in the process "building obligation on non-serviced land", H1 is
disproved.
3. The third situation regards the new building zone in the Gerzmatt: the added
economic value created through zoning, which benefited the landowners, granted
authorities a sufficient negotiation power to contractually apply the tax on added
land value created through zoning, implement the land service tax, as well as
an emption right allowing the commune to buy the land within in ten years
if not developed. The results of this process go beyond the existing rules of
the institutional regime of soil: they include a redistribution of economic value
created, and guarantee land availability. Consequently, in the process "building
obligation on new building zone", H1 is disproved.
All three instrument mixes meant to achieve the development of building zones in
Wiedlisbach relied on:
− local authorities’ creativity, which, combined with the support of the hired plan-
ner, led to a set of singular arrangements that have not been observed in other
processes;
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− local authorities’ capacity to implement instrument mixes: the communal ex-
ecutive body created and used instruments like "green zone" or "zoning out"
as means of pressure, but also created compensatory mechanisms to ease their
implementation (additional or new development rights, tax exemptions, priority
zoning right);
− some landowners’ cooperativeness, and the political institutions’ relative sup-
port. The large number of landowners, representing high fragmentation of prop-
erty (i.e. of the target groups – see H3a), allowed authorities to achieve a mixed
success rate: some landowners fought against the communal strategies, some did
not, and others negotiated with the commune. If local authorities would have
faced a single (or a few) landowner(s), then the process’ results would have
been more polarised: the complex institutional regime of soil would have resul-
ted either in an innovative LRA, or in a circumvention of existing objectives.
6.2.1.2 Huttwil
In the case of the reduction of building zone in Huttwil, the soil’s complex regime Failed building zone
removal confirms H1(allowing for a discrepancy between plan and effective land uses, and lacking a com-
pensatory mechanism) hindered the commune’s zoning of hoarded land located at the
border of the settlement area in the agricultural zone. Hence, in the process "building
zone reduction", H1 is confirmed.
The increased plot ratio economically compensated for the reduced surface avail- Future land use remains
uncertainable for construction. It also limited the ecological impact on land and on the water
catchments, and allowed the commune to pass on part of the land service costs to the
landowners (initially, these were born entirely by the commune). Further, the new
LRA has not yet produced any impact: the development of the land is not completed,
and, as opposed to the building zone extension in Wiedlisbach, the LRA did not in-
clude an emption right or another means of imposing development within a given
time period. This process showed that in a process where landowners have political
support, withdrawal of development rights can be difficult to achieve.
In the process of land development through the instrument building right, the com- Building right process
disproves H1mune creates a coalition with the Herdgemeinde that owns the land (target group),
and agrees to lease it to future home owners (end beneficiaries) for a reduced rent –
compared to local land market prices. This coalition mobilises public land (resource
infrastructure), in order to achieve communal growth objectives and implement land
use policy. This strategy overcomes the land hoarding problem, a central regime in-
coherence faced by the commune. Consequently, the process building right disproves
H1.
6.2.1.3 Niederbipp
The development of polluted soil in Niederbipp mobilises rules and procedures spe- Development of polluted
soil disproves H1cific to soil protection policies, which are partly incoherent, due to the limited funds
available for remediation and the limited capacity to collect these funds (Dupuis and
Knoepfel, 2015). However, as no remediation of soil is required, authorities opt for
the development of the polluted plots in order to restrain water infiltrations and
thus prevent future environmental damages. The LRA consists in an implementation
of various obligations defined by the institutional regime and in the achievement of
water pollution standards. Hence, H1 is disproved in the process "polluted soil in
Niederbipp".
One central factor that conditioned the process’ success was the absence of a re-
mediation obligation, which made profitable development of land possible. Further,
finding a risk-taking investor ready to deposit a financial guarantee had been a prob-
lematic element since the first development projects were discussed.
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In the process "tax on added land value", H1 is disproved: the commune used theirInnovation through
compensation mechanism
disproves H1
margin of manoeuvrability, granted by the complex institutional regime of soil in
order to enhance the local regime’s coherence, and successfully implement the tax.
This implementation of the institutional regime can be explained by several elements:
− the zoning operation created an important added economic value for landowners;
− landowners did not pay for land service, because the basic land service had
been paid six years earlier during the creation of the industrial zone. This was
perceived and used as an opportunity for the commune to capture a portion of
the added economic value they created.
− detail land service costs were paid by the land buyer. In order to ensure the
payment of the land service costs, the delivery of the building permit was con-
ditioned on the payment of these fees by the new landowner;
− in order to ease the landowners’ consensus on the tax on added land value,
the commune granted them a "discount" on the tax rate: land prices used for
the implementation of the tax were under-assessed. This discount was not
considered a circumvention of the IRR, because no formal tax rate is mentioned
in communal building regulations;
− in addition, the commune gained political support for the zoning operation
through the mobilisation of end beneficiaries (inhabitants), who would benefit
from one major employer offering jobs and fiscal revenues.
6.2.1.4 Malley
The land deal process mobilised the property rights side of the regime, land use policyLand exchange disproves
H1 and culture policy (through the spatial impacts produced by the museum). The
double role of Lausanne (landowner and local authority defining land use planning
regulations) allowed them to adjust the value of one of the exchanged plots and thus
reduce the amount of cash involved in the property transfer. Thus, in the process
"land exchange in Malley", H1 is disproved.
In the process of the major accidents ordinance, the incoherence between densificationImplementation of MAO
restrictions disproves H1 objectives in land use policy and use restrictions imposed by the MAO, is overcome
through an increase of the plot ratio (which induces higher densities) and a prohib-
ition of specific land uses. Actors used their margin of manoeuvrability in order to
implement the objectives of the institutional regime. Hence, in the process "MAO
restrictions", H1 is disproved.
Similar to the process "polluted soil" in Niederbipp, polluted soil in Malley was facedImplementation of soil
protection ordinance
disproves H1
with incoherence in terms of financial means allocated to remediation. As only the
excavated soil was to be remediated, authorities and the target group agreed on
a relocation of development rights to the least polluted areas, thus minimising the
amount of excavated soil to be remediated. The obligations set by the institutional
regime were fulfilled and H1 is disproved for the process "polluted soil in Malley".
The legally unresolved issue of payment of the extended land service tax by a publicCircumvention of
extended land service tax
confirms H1
landowner called into question the extent of the tax’ target group, and thus the
extent of the institutional regime of soil. The conflict between local authorities and
landowners resulting from this uncertainty led actors to mobilise several resources.
The reduced amount of taxation shows the results obtained through the resistance of
the target group to the instrument’s use, and characterises the circumvention of the
LRA. Thus, in the process "extended land service tax", H1 is confirmed.
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In terms of energy provision, the incoherence of the institutional regime of soil lies in Circumvention of energy
objectives confirms H1the discrepancy between cantonal and local (communal and master plan’s) objectives
for providing energy from renewable sources: the former sets a goal of 20 %, while the
latter targets the 2000W-society, requiring 75 % of energy stemming from renewable
sources (Commune of Lausanne, 2014b). This discrepancy led to a circumvention
of local energy goals both by local authorities, and landowners who privileged their
energy production and distribution infrastructure, over alternative energy sources. As
a consequence, target percentage of renewable energy source were not met, and, in
the process "energy planning", H1 is confirmed.
6.2.1.5 Cheseaux
In the land exchange process in Cheseaux, local authorities overcame the limited
compensation mechanisms of the institutional regime of soil through the mobilisation
of their own resources in order to exchange and acquire land. The regime’s coherence
is partial, because local authorities do not have the funds that the tax on added land
value would have allowed to constitute in order to compensate for land use planning
measures (such as removal of intermediary zone, or land acquisition). Hence, in the
process "land exchange in Cheseaux", H1 is disproved.
In the case of a highly coherent regime, authorities would have relied on a dedicated
fund from the tax on added value, in order to finance the land acquisitions prior to
the syndicate.
Another possibility could have been the use of expropriation as an alternative
means of value compensation. For consensual, time, and monetary reasons, local
authorities favoured the voluntary exchange and sale procedures over expropriation.
As publicly announced and implemented procedure, expropriation would have been
highly visible, strongly ideologically connoted, and time consuming. Further, it is
uncertain to what extent expropriation would have made it possible for authorities
to pay a higher land price then the negotiated land prices of the intermediary zone
(35CHF/m2 instead of 20CHF/m2).
The implementation of the land improvement syndicate (redefinition of property Land improvement
syndicate disproves H1shapes and titles, modification of the zoning plan) allowed for the simultaneous cre-
ation of a significant amount of added economic value, reduction of the intermediary
zone, and financing of land service within the perimeter to be developed. Through
the value induced by the new building zone, the instrument allowed for compens-
ation of the reduced value on the plots due to transitioning from intermediary to
agricultural zone. The instrument also partly substituted to a building obligation,
because landowners facing a strong incentive to develop the land in order to be able
to pay for the LIS’ functioning and for the land service. Thus, the soil’s institutional
regime was implemented. Although the implementation process involved specific con-
cessions on the communal side (regarding to the zone of their land, to the land service
costs division, and to the maintenance of green spaces), the regime’s objectives were
implemented. Hence, in the process "land improvement syndicate", H1 is disproved.
6.2.1.6 General discussion
The complex regime of soil grants actors (both public authorities and target groups)
a significant margin of manoeuvrability in the implementation process. The verific-
ation of H1 can be synthesised as follows: despite a complex institutional regime,
characterised by multiple incoherences and a lack of strictness, authorities tended to
use the available margin of manoeuvrability in order to implement local policy goals
compatible with the regime’s objectives. Therefore, H1 is mostly disproved.
Despite the hypothesis’ rejection, its test allows for the identification of a set
of factors that contribute to the regime’s implementation or circumvention. First,
local authorities can use the function of incentive or threat of policy instruments in
order to implement land use policy. The process of imposing a building obligation
on landowners by threatening placement in the green zone in Wiedlisbach, or the
process of implementing MAO restrictions in Malley by granting a high plot ratio
to landowners, these examples display this threat and incentive function. The levy
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provided by land use policy instruments is intrinsic to the concept of instrument (see
table 2.7 on chosen typologies in chapter 2). A notable element is that rules and
obligations (use rights) defined by zoning can simultaneously have a control and an
incentive function. This blurs the distinctions drawn by typologies such as those
elaborated by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) or Bemelsman-Videc et al. (1998).
Second, the existing margin of manoeuvrability in the implementation process,
possible interpretations in the definition of policy instrument modalities when applied
to individual concrete situations, can play a decisive role. Implementation processes
considered a success can quickly become failure, and vice versa:
− in Wiedlisbach, the zoning of constructible plots into a green zone allowed for
the extension of the building zone beyond legal limits. If no new building zone
had been created, the green zone would have facilitated a partial mobilisation
of building zone reserves, consistent with land use planning objectives;
− in Niederbipp, despite a temporary excess of limit values in groundwater, the
redevelopment of the polluted soil took place without remediation. If the limit
values had been exceeded over a longer period of time, remediation would have
been necessary, and the process’ success far from certain;
− in the case of the MAO restrictions in Malley, the flexibility approach taken by
authorities in redefining the plot ratio led to a reopening of negotiations;
− also in Malley the uncertainty of extend of the extended land service tax (unclear
targeting) eased landowners possibility to fight the instrument and reduced the
amount of value captured by the instrument.
Third, the hypothesis highlighted the importance of initial coherence between prop-
erty rights and public policies (in particular land use planning policy) for the imple-
mentation processes to succeed. The building zone reduction in Huttwil was only
possible because the size of the reduced building zone on each plot (each belonging
to a different owner) was proportionate to each landowner’s property (see also H3a).
The relocation of development rights in Malley could be done without changing the
property structure, because the local development plan involved only one landowner.
In case no initial coherence existed (Cheseaux), specific instruments had to be used
to reshape the plots, relocate development rights, and make subsequent construction
possible.
The fourth factor, the presence of public infrastructure, can either foster the re-
gime’s implementation, or hinder it. In the building right process in Huttwil, public
property allowed to adapt the land rent to housing demand. Regarding the process
of tax on added land value in Niederbipp, existing land service provided authorities
the opportunity to apply a new tax. In Malley, the train station fostered the redevel-
opment of the entire neighbourhood. In Cheseaux, public land allowed the commune
to exchange for more central plots, and thus build its school. However, public in-
frastructure can also hinder the implementation of policy objectives, as the district
heating system in Malley has shown. Hypothesis H3c discusses the importance of
public infrastructure in the elaboration of public strategies further.
Fifth, communal autonomy in land use planning and fiscal matters, which are
linked to the federalist nature of Swiss institutions, create incoherences between public
policies, and thus produce effects opposed to the institutional regime’s objectives.
This has been shown in Wiedlisbach’s building zone transfer, and more generally, in
the wide expansion of urbanisation in Huttwil and Niederbipp – despite demographic
decline. The fight over territorial attractiveness pushes tax rates down, and provides
incentives to communes to make cheap building land with loose building regulations
available.
Sixth, the absence of compensation mechanism (such as a tax on added land value
created through zoning) reduces the margin of manoeuvrability local authorities have
in the implementation of the soil’s institutional regime. This issue is specific to the
Swiss regime of soil, where economic losses due to zoning changes are, under certain
conditions, to be compensated (Nahrath, 2003; Jomini, 2008). It has become salient
in the case of Huttwil, where the threat of landowners claiming compensation for
material expropriation and the absence of funds in case of effective compensation
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made the removal of the hoarded building zone impossible. This regime incoherence
contributes to the previous point: the implementation of value capturing instruments
at the communal level faces high resistance, because it directly confronts local interests
of both the landowners and the communal authorities, the latter placed under pressure
by fiscal competition and territorial attractiveness.
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building zone transfer: Confirmed Communal planning autonomy leads
to the creation of "holes" in the build-
ing zone
Building obligation
on serviced land:
Partly con-
firmed
Absence of building obligation induces
resistance through building permits,
and the negotiation of additional de-
velopment rights. Others sign the
building obligation (implementation)
Building obligation
on un-serviced land:
Disproved Absence of building obligation is over-
come through consensus between
parties
Building obligation
on new building zone:
Disproved Absence of building obligation is over-
come through mobilisation of zoning
and emption right
HUTTWIL
Building zone reduction: Confirmed Absence of compensation mechanism
prevents the removal of the oversized
building zone
Building right: Disproved Infrastructure and reduction of land
rent are used in order to foster land
development
NIEDERBIPP
Polluted soil: Disproved Potentially high remediation costs and
limited funds are overcome through
land development
Tax on added land value: Disproved Margin of manoeuvrability is used to
enhance the institutional regime’s in-
coherence and implement the com-
pensatory instrument "tax on added
land value"
MALLEY
Land exchange: Disproved Mobilisation of own resources and
zoning allow for the implementation
of the regime’s objectives
MAO use restrictions: Disproved Incoherence between MAO restrictions
and cantonal planning is overcome
through zoning
Polluted soil: Disproved Potentially high remediation costs and
limited funds are overcome through
relocation of development rights
Extended land service tax: Confirmed Unclear extent of the tax’ target
group leads to the circumvention of
the amount to be paid
Energy planning: Confirmed Incoherence between cantonal and
(inter-) communal energy goals lead
local actors to circumvent local ob-
jectives and privilege the owned infra-
structure
CHESEAUX
Land exchange: Disproved Absence of value compensation mech-
anism compensated by mobilisation of
own resources
Land improve-
ment syndicate:
Disproved Absence of value compensation mech-
anism and building obligation over-
come through land improvement syn-
dicate
Table 6.22: Synthesis of the verification of H1.
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6.2.2 H2: Effects of contextual factors on the LRA
The second hypothesis aims to assess the general impact of contextual factors (demo-
graphy, land prices, soil pollution, transport infrastructure, and distance to centres)
on land use policy processes. These factors are assessed as a bundle, because I do not
aim to quantify their individual explanatory power, but to extract relevant contextual
characteristics in the studied processes which potentially play a role in all processes.
H2: If there is stagnation of demography and land prices in the local con-
text, a low degree of access to transport infrastructure, and a significant
distance to urban centres, then the LRA consists of passive implementa-
tion, circumvention, or diversion, of the institutional regime of soil. This
can be explained by the limited economic value that authorities can create
through zoning and use in land use policy processes.
Conversely, a local context where demography and land prices increase,
where soil structure is adequate (not steep, stable, and not polluted),
where accessibility is high and distance to centres low, the LRA consists
of an implementation or innovation of land use policy objectives.
6.2.2.1 Wiedlisbach
In the case of Wiedlisbach, contextual factors play an ambivalent role:
− stagnant demography and growth induce a building zone transfer and various
building obligation strategies. The former result in a diversion LRA, the latter
in an innovation LRA;
− the role of land prices cannot be assessed with sufficient precision, because I lack
proper data. However, prices are sufficiently high to allow for the implementa-
tion of the tax on added land value in the process of building zone extension;
− compared to the other cases, access to transport infrastructure and distance to
urban centres is rather low, but sufficient to achieve development and allow local
authorities to capture part of the added economic value induced by zoning.
Consequently, contextual factors play a rather mixed role leading to a partial
confirmation of H2 in the process “building zone transfer”, disproved in the three
processes "building obligations".
6.2.2.2 Huttwil
In the case of Huttwil, population is shrinking, land prices are lower than in the centre
and north of the region, and the accessibility of urban centres is rather low (long travel
distances and time required). Low land prices explain part of the hoarding behaviour
of landowners in the process "building zone reduction", as well as the lowered rent
required for the building rights. The passive implementation LRA in the case of
Thomasbode is only partly explained by the unfavourable context faced by actors. In
the process “building right”, authorities manage to overcome the contextual factors
and implement the institutional regime of soil. In the case of Huttwil, H2 is disproved.
6.2.2.3 Niederbipp
In the case of Niederbipp, connection to transport infrastructure influenced the cre-
ation of the industrial zone, because it was considered a necessary factor for the
development of industrial land uses by cantonal authorities. In the process "polluted
soil", soil structure and pollution have a negative impact on the economic value of
soil (additional construction requirements), which is entirely compensated for by the
added land value induced by zoning. In the process "tax on added land value", the
implementation of the instrument is conditioned by the existing basic land service
(contextual infrastructure), leading to the absence of land service costs for landown-
ers, and in turn, allowed for the implementation of the tax on added land value.
Consequently, in the case of Niederbipp, H2 is confirmed in the process "polluted
soil", and partly confirmed in the process "tax on added land value".
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6.2.2.4 Malley
In the case of Malley, demographics, connection to transport infrastructure and im-
mediate proximity to centres influence land prices in two ways: despite high land
values, local authorities were unable to implement value redistributive instruments
(circumvention of LRA in the process "extended land service tax"). However, the
plots’ location led to a land exchange between landowners.
The adjacent train lines also reduce possible land use due to the MAO restrictions
and impacts land value negatively. However, this is not reflected in the circumvention
LRA, because the "lost economic value" is compensated for with additional develop-
ment rights.
Soil pollution (and the obligation to remediate excavated polluted soil) induces a
concentration of development rights on less polluted grounds (implementation LRA).
Further, available and planned heating infrastructure (district heating system) limits
the implementation of inter-communal energy objectives (circumvention LRA).
Consequently, in the case of Malley, H2 is confirmed for the processes "land ex-
change", and disproved for the processes "MAO restrictions", "polluted soil", "extended
land service tax" and "energy planning".
6.2.2.5 Cheseaux
In the case of Cheseaux, demographic growth, and the subsequent need to create a
new school, facilitated the acquisition (and to a certain extent, the exchange) of land
between commune and landowners. Transport infrastructure and proximity to the
agglomeration of Lausanne contributed to the definition of land use policy objectives
oriented towards land development. The commune’s demographic growth – the most
significant among the cases studied – contributed directly to the need of a new school,
which was the central motivation of the commune to launch the development project
and thus achieve its local, in addition to the agglomeration’s and cantonal’s land use
policy objectives. Consequently, in the case of Cheseaux, H2 is confirmed in both
processes.
6.2.2.6 General discussion
The results of H2 show that demographics, land prices, connection to transport in-Proactive land use policy
reduces the influence of
contextual factors
frastructure, and distance to urban centres, influence the implementation of land use
policy goals, particularly when these concern land development.
In the cases of Wiedlisbach and Hutwill, where there is a stagnation or decline of
demography and/or land prices, as well as moderate to low connection to transport
infrastructure and moderate/low proximity to urban centres, I observed that the
implementation of the institutional regime of soil required a proactive communal
land use policy: the extensive use of policy instruments, and the mobilisation of
policy resources (like infrastructure) were necessary to achieve land development.
This becomes salient in the process "building right" in Huttwil: the case has shown
that despite a context of stagnant prices and declining demographics, development is
still possible, as long as landowners are willing to reduce the rent on their property.
In the unfavourable socio-economic contexts observed, landowners had the possibility
to absorb the reduced rent, but authorities were not in the position to systematically
force them to do so. In the cases analysed, this has three explanations:
− a lack of regime strictness and coherence: local authorities did not have the ne-
cessary instruments to implement the regime, such as a building obligation prior
to the last revision of the spatial planning act, or a compensation mechanism
that would allow for the removal of oversized building zones;
− local authorities face asymmetric power relations that circumvent instrument
use (e.g. zoning operations based on local interests, payment of land service by
local authorities);
− the low to moderate rent expected from land development provides an incentive
to landowners and investors to wait for prices to rise.
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Further, transport infrastructure played a less important role in the peri-urban
than in the urban context: its presence provides a limited levy for the development of
housing, as the generalised hoarding behaviours in the three peri-urban cases show.
This statement applies less to industrial uses, as demonstrated by the logistics hub
established in Niederbipp. In fact, industrial uses depend more on the immediate
proximity to the infrastructure itself, rather than on the proximity to urban centres,
which is of greater importance for housing.
The situation is different in the urban context, where demography and land prices
have risen over the past fifteen years, and connection to transport infrastructure is
determinant: landowners and investors are willing to develop in proximity to mass
public transport stations. However, without a financial return deemed sufficient, land
use change processes can also be easily blocked – at least until the 2014 revision of the
spatial planning act. This becomes particularly salient when landowners, (also public
or semi-public), rely on action plans or master plans with predefined densities to de-
fend the added economic value they expect from the project (such as in Malley when
the MAO restrictions were imposed), and impose their veto in case their expectations
are not met. In the urban context, authorities have a wider margin of manoeuvrability
for adjusting the plot ratio and using it as a levy to maintain the financial attract-
iveness of land development. However, the threat of third party users (neighbours,
renters association, neighbourhood association, etc.) deploying referendums against
local development plans is a factor to consider.
As a consequence, in the cases studied, actual land use does not solely depend on Redistribution of rent as
central issueland price, but on the landowner’s willingness to absorb the difference between the
land’s market value and the financial return of the asset. Referring to the economic
theory explaining land value exposed in chapter 2, the processes studied show that
rent does not claim the remainder of the value, once labour and capital have been
remunerated, but becomes a central issue to land use policy negotiation processes:
target groups expect a minimum financial return, sometimes a return above market
prices (absolute rent in case of district heating in Malley). The rent issue plays a
reduced role in peri-urban contexts, where authorities are willing to reduce it in order
to achieve local goals (Huttwil). Such expectations become evident in the cases of
major landowners applying the same rate of return for all building rights (commercial
leases and cooperative housing leases) they grant on their land (Cour des comptes du
Canton de Vaud, 2011b). The minimum rate of return is the expression of a power
relation in which the landowner tends to have the upper hand. This power relation is
observable in various contexts: the circumvention of the extended land service tax in
Malley, the disproportionate land service costs carried by the commune in the case of
the LIS in Cheseaux, and the compensation claims against the building zone reduction
in Huttwil, all of whichshow the ambivalence of land prices on the implementation of
the soil’s institutional regime.
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building zone transfer Partly con-
firmed
Stagnant demographics induce an
extensive urban growth strategy,
diverting land use policy object-
ives, but capturing a portion of
the added economic value created
through zoning
Building obligations Disproved Stagnant demographics induce
mobilisation of hoarded land, ex-
ceeding land use policy objectives
(innovation LRA)
HUTTWIL
Building zone reduction Disproved Limited influence of contextual
factors on LRA
Building right Disproved Reduced land prices induce an
implementation of LRA through
a reduced land rent
NIEDERBIPP
Polluted soil Confirmed Accessibility and land prices
cover additional costs linked to
soil pollution. LRA implements
the institutional regime
Tax on added land value Partly con-
firmed
Implementation of the institu-
tional regime of soil conditioned
by market demand for industrial
land and existing land service
MALLEY
Land exchange Confirmed Similar land values allow actors
to exchange plots
MAO restrictions Disproved Reduced value induced by prox-
imity to rail tracks is com-
pensated by additional develop-
ment rights (circumvention LRA)
Polluted soil Disproved High land values are partly used
to cover soil remediation costs
(implementation LRA)
Extended land service tax Disproved High added land value induces
an LRA circumventing policy
objectives
Energy planning Disproved Additional costs due to high en-
ergy requirements are circum-
vented through the use of the
district heating system (circum-
vention LRA)
CHESEAUX
Land exchange Confirmed Experienced demographic growth
and need of a new school facilit-
ated the acquisition of land (im-
plementation LRA)
Land improvement syndicate Confirmed Experienced demographic growth
and proximity to transport in-
frastructure and urban centre
induce an implementation of land
use policy objectives
Table 6.23: Synthesis of the verification of H2.
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6.2.3 H3a: Effects of property structure on instrument use
H3a: If the property structure is highly fragmented or unordered, then au-
thorities combine public law and property rights instruments to redistrib-
ute value. This can be understood through the constitutional requirement
to treat all target groups equally.
To test this hypothesis, I compare land use policy processes that involve different
levels of property fragmentation and order (for example, different numbers of plots
and landowners involved, sizes and shapes of the plots): the building zone transfer in
Wiedlisbach (high level of fragmentation), the land improvement syndicate in Che-
seaux (moderate level of fragmentation), the building zone reduction in Huttwil (low
level of fragmentation), the relocation of development rights based on soil pollution
in Malley (no fragmentation).
6.2.3.1 Wiedlisbach
In the process “building zone transfer” in Wiedlisbach, the property structure was
highly fragmented, involving dozens of landowners. Local authorities did not aim
to redistribute development rights, but only to reduce existing unavailable building
zone reserves, so that they could extend their building zone elsewhere. In this case,
the location of the building zone reserves intended for reduction was not important
for authorities; only the quantitative reduction of the reserves was relevant. In this
way, authorities targeted (through the use of the zoning plan (type 2)), all plots that
were considered building zone reserves, and placed them into the green zone. Due
to the various circumvention strategies adopted by landowners, only certain targeted
plots were effectively moved to the green zone (see figure 6.1). For the building zone
transfer to succeed, a zone change for a portion of the targeted plots was sufficient
(2ha out of 7ha building zone reserves – 2ha corresponding to the new building zones
to be created). The strategy allowed authorities to discriminate "accommodating"
from "virulent" landowners, and to quantitatively and temporarily reduce building
zone reserves.
Alternatively, local authorities could have employed property rights instruments as
well as negotiate temporary non-constructibility easements with landowners. A prop-
erty rights approach would have required a systematic agreement with the landowners,
whereas local authorities could, in the strategy adopted, impose their decision through
majority vote of the communal legislative body. Consequently, H3a is disproved in
the process building zone transfer.
According to the Constitution, landowners are entitled to receive the same advant-
ages and disadvantages resulting from land use planning measures, as long as their
situation (in terms of surface owned, of soil quality, and of location) is comparable,
and as long as "the zoning decision relies on objective grounds"1. Regarding whether
or not the building zone transfer in Wiedlisbach fulfils the equal treatment condition
is unclear: some landowners have obtained advantages from the zone change, whereas
others remained in the building zone. These (non-) changes occurred based on the
willingness of landowners to fight the implementation of the green zone. However,
such potential unequal treatment is temporary.
1ATF 101 Ia 502.
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Development
Plot
Green zone
Building zone
Figure 6.1: Redistribution of development rights in Wiedlisbach.
6.2.3.2 Cheseaux
In the process land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux, there was a moderately frag-
mented property structure involving dozens of landowners. Local authorities’ aim
was to relocate the plots they owned to the east of the perimeter, as it is the most
central and appropriate place to build the new school. In this case, location mattered,
and so did the landowners within the LIS’ perimeter: it was necessary to redistrib-
ute property titles in order for the commune to obtain the well-located ones. The
commune could have used the property rights path and buy the plots from each indi-
vidual landowner. The property rights path was indeed chosen for the land exchange
in order to acquire plots in the LIS’ future perimeter. However, it did not allow to re-
shape the plots for development and change their zone. The commune could also have
negotiated one to one with landowners in order to define new plot limits. But such
a procedure would have been extremely time consuming and any disagreement from
even one landowner would have called the entire arrangement into question. Further,
solely using public law instruments, (for example zoning the plots as "public zone"),
would not have changed the plot shapes which were inadequate for development, and
it would have possibly required them to expropriate the landowners of the targeted
plots. Local authorities required a meso-level tool that made the simultaneous use of
PR instruments (such as conventions redefining plot limits) possible (see figure 6.2).
Through the land assembly, (which makes majority based decisions), and the pro-
portionate distribution of development rights among all involved landowners, the LIS
was used to relocate rights and redefine the property shapes. Hence, H4 is confirmed.
T2
Plot
Agricultural zone
Intermediary zone
T1
Building zone
Figure 6.2: Redistribution of development rights in Cheseaux.
6.2.3.3 Huttwil
In the process of building zone reduction in Huttwil, there is a low fragmentation
of property structure involving three landowners. The communal aim was to reduce
building zone reserves, so that the legal obligation of correct building zone dimen-
sioning was fulfilled. In this case, location was a given, with the reserves located
at well-identified places. The concentration of development rights within a smaller
perimeter occurred through the elaboration of a new local development plan (type 2).
This, however, was only possible through the proportionate reduction of constructible
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surfaces and the allocation of new development rights on all plots. A necessary condi-
tion allowing for the proportionate relocation of development rights without modifying
the property titles, was the striped property structure, which allowed a proportionate
distribution of development rights among landowners (see figure 6.3). In other words,
the existing property structure reflects the implementation of a local development
plan that fulfils the principle of equal treatment. If the property structures had been
more jumbled (as in the process LIS in Cheseaux), then a land betterment procedure,
or conventional negotiations on plot limits, would have been necessary. Hence, H4 is
confirmed.
Plot
Agricultural
zone
Higher density
building zone
Figure 6.3: Redistribution of development rights in Huttwil.
6.2.3.4 Malley
In the process” polluted soil” in Malley, there is a unified property structure involving
two landowners, one of whom owns the entirety of the land targeted by the local de-
velopment plan Malley-gasomètre. The aim is to relocate development rights, so that
soil remediation costs are minimised. The location does matter, because pollution
is more acute in certain areas than in others. But the property rights structure is
not a condition of implementation, because for the landowner, as long as the amount
of rights remains the same, the location of the development rights do not matter.
Consequently, authorities can relocate development rights relying entirely on the soil
pollution criteria, which allows for the landowner to obtain a tailor-made local devel-
opment plan which minimises soil excavations and underlying remediation costs (see
figure 6.4).
Plot
Green zone
Higher density
building zone
Figure 6.4: Redistribution of development rights in Malley.
6.2.3.5 General discussion
The results show that overall, the hypothesis is confirmed. In the processes of Huttwil
and Malley, property rights did not impede the spatial redistribution of value, either
because the plots were shaped in a way that allowed them to transfer the same amount
of value to all landowners, or because there was one single landowner. In the process
of Cheseaux, value redistribution through zoning occurred jointly with the reshaping
and relocation of property titles, which allowed for equal treatment for all parties.
For the building zone transfer in Wiedlisbach, value redistribution occurred based
on landowners’ willingness to contest the green zone. In this case, the disproving of
the hypothesis, and the non-utilised property rights instrument, is explained through
the communal objective to reduce temporary quantitative building zone reserves. The
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process result is tightly linked to the Swiss legal obligation to dimension the building
zones according to the needs of the next fifteen years. Without such obligation, local
authorities could simply have created a new building zone such as in Huttwil, Malley,
and Cheseaux.
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building zone transfer Disproved Fragmented property structure does not
impeach value redistribution without
the use of property rights instruments
HUTTWIL
Building zone reduction Confirmed Ordered property structure allows value
redistribution without the use of prop-
erty rights instruments
MALLEY
Polluted soil Confirmed Single landownership allows value redis-
tribution based on criteria independent
from land property
CHESEAUX
Land improvement syn-
dicate
Confirmed Fragmented property structure induces
the use of the LIS (type 2 and type 4
instrument)
Table 6.24: Synthesis of the verification of H3a.
6.2.4 H3b: Effects of "information" on instrument use
H3b: If the resource information is shared between authorities and the
target group, then these actors define a joint strategy and establish to-
gether the modalities of the instruments’ use. This can be explained by
the reduced power asymmetry between actors and by the enhanced (pub-
lic) accessibility of the shared resource, which compels actors to find a
compromise.
Out of the 15 redistributive processes analysed, I identified four processes (building
zone reduction in Huttwil, polluted soil in Niederbipp and Malley, and land exchange
in Malley) where information was shared between actors. In two other processes, an
information asymmetry between authorities and the target group prevailed: the MAO
restrictions and energy planning in Malley. In order to test H3b, I analysed if and
how shared information contributed to the definition of a joint strategy, and helped
define the modalities of the implementation of policy instruments.
6.2.4.1 Huttwil
Starting with the process of the building zone reduction in Huttwil, the initial data
received was a report on risk zones, which classified the area of Thomasbode as a
medium danger zone. The report was used by the commune as an argument for the
removal of the undeveloped building zone. However, the elaboration of a second re-
port on the land’s constructibility was mobilised by landowners as a justification of
the need to pay compensation if the land were zoned as agricultural. In this way the
second report contributed to the failure of the initial communal goal to utilise zoning
to entirely remove the building zone. However, once the site’s constructibility was
confirmed, it allowed authorities, in accordance with the landowners, to redesign a
local development plan that would correspond with the types of construction (Ter-
rassenhäuser) suggested by the report, which in turn allowed the authorities to reduce
the size of the building zone.
Ultimately, the information and reports shared between authorities and target
groups serve as common ground for modifying local authorities’ use of the instrument
zoning. Hence, H3b is confirmed.
6.2.4.2 Niederbipp and Malley
In the process of the polluted soils in Niederbipp and Malley, the pollution reports
provided data on the type and spread of pollution, and on the risks of exfiltrations.
It is only because both authorities and target groups knew the pollution’s location
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and the risks of exfiltrations that they were able to design a building permit con-
ciliating remediation obligations, prohibition of exfiltrations, and development goals.
Consequently, H3b is confirmed.
6.2.4.3 Malley
In the process of the land exchange in Malley, both parties ordered a financial report
of their plots’ value in order to assess the relevance of an exchange. The uncertainty
linked with the plots’ values (due to zoning regulations that had not yet been ap-
proved) was reduced through contractually defined cash payments between landown-
ers, intended to compensate for the potential difference of value between the plots.
Without shared financial information, the parties would not have agreed to such an
exchange. Thus, H3b is confirmed.
In the process of MAO restrictions where an information asymmetry existed, the
canton did not initially know how to assess the risks targeted by the MAO, and
delegated their assessment to the target group (SBB). The absence of information
exchange between the parties (on the methodology used for the risk assessment) led
the canton to later produce on another financial report, which excluded a set of land
uses on the concerned plots, and opposed the first report produced by the target group.
The contradictory reports blocked the negotiations, and prevented the definition of
zoning regulations in the concerned perimeter. Hence, H3b is confirmed.
In the process energy planning, local authorities lacked information on the com-
patibility of district heating with defined energy goals. However, the target group
promoted district heating as a renewable source of energy, and sold shares in the
district heating network to local authorities, including local authorities in a coalition
favourable to district heating. When district heating was shown incompatible with
the defined energy goals, local authorities faced reduced choices in terms of energy
provision, as the choice of an energy source other than district heating would have
directly impacted the investments they had made. Hence, H3b is confirmed.
6.2.4.4 General discussion
Summarising the hypothesis’ results, I confirm the relevance of (un-) shared inform-
ation in the processes analysed, and thus the hypothesis H3b: I observe that shared
information – experts’ reports on the soil structure or on financial elements – created
a common basis for the definition of a joint-strategy, and the joint definition of the
instruments’ modalities such as density, type of use, etc. On the contrary, information
asymmetry led to a temporary block in the implementation process, or restrained the
obligations defined by the instruments (such as the source of energy to be used) and
resulted in privileging of the informed actor’s interests over those of the other actors.
Based on the cases analysed, complementary resources have been identified in
determining the power position of actors:
− resource personnel can be necessary to exploit available information and gain
an advantage over other actors ( as in the case of polluted soil in Malley);
− resource time can be mobilised by landowners to threaten to interrupt negoti-
ations (like in the process MAO restrictions);
− infrastructure can reflect a past investment whose costs have to be born in
the present, and thus limit actors’ consideration of potential options (as in the
energy planning case in Malley – see H3c).
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Cases Verification Explanation
HUTTWIL
Building zone re-
duction
Confirmed Soil constructibility report induced the aban-
donment of building zone removal and its
substitution through a reduction of the build-
ing zone
NIEDERBIPP
Polluted soil Confirmed Soil structure and pollution report permitted
to set a detailed prescription for the building
permit and define obligations in regard to
rain water drainage
MALLEY
Land exchange Confirmed Shared information on the plots’ financial
value allowed to exchange plots
MAO restrictions Confirmed Information asymmetry prevented a common
understanding of risk norms to be applied,
blocking the process
Polluted soil Confirmed Soil pollution report helped define the priv-
ileged areas for construction according to ef-
fective soil pollution
Energy planning Confirmed Information asymmetry led to the creation
of a dominant coalition containing predeter-
mined energy prescriptions in the local devel-
opment plan
Table 6.25: Synthesis of the verification of H3b.
6.2.5 H3c: Effects of public "infrastructure" on instrument use
H3c: If the resource "infrastructure" owned by authorities is involved in a
land use policy process, then authorities tend to define their strategy and
the modalities of the instruments’ uses in accordance with the resource’s
uses they seek. This can be explained by their double role as both regulator
and owner of the resource soil.
Out of the 15 redistributive processes analysed, local authorities mobilised infra-
structure through six processes: the process “building right” in Huttwil, existing land
service in the process “tax on added land value” in Niederbipp, “land exchange” and
“district heating infrastructure” in Malley, land plots exchanged and then subject to
the “land improvement syndicate” in Cheseaux. In order to test H3c, I analyse how
local authorities mobilise their infrastructure to support communal strategy or define
the modalities of land use policy instruments.
6.2.5.1 Huttwil
The process "building right" in Huttwil shows that through the mobilisation of the land
of the Herdgemeinde, local authorities could make building land effectively available,
and thus contribute to the achievement of demographic growth on communal territory.
Hence, H3c is confirmed.
6.2.5.2 Niederbipp
In the process of the tax on added land value in Niederbipp, local authorities provided
basic land service during the initial creation of the industrial zone. When the indus-
trial zone was expanded, they did not have to service the land again. However, they
could still charge landowners for the added value of the land service, and thus recover
the investments made in land service during the initial creation of the industrial zone.
Such value recovery occurred through the implementation of the tax on added land
value created through zoning. Hence, existing infrastructure allowed authorities to
use the tax instrument on added value. Hence, H3c is confirmed.
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6.2.5.3 Malley
Through the exchange of their plot with the SBB, the commune of Lausanne mobil-
ised their infrastructure to obtain a plot well suited for the future cantonal museum,
achieving their strategy of hosting the museum on communal territory: H3c is con-
firmed.
In the process of the energy planning, local authorities were co-owners of the
district heating company, financially constraining their choices in implementing energy
provision goals. Hence, H3c is disproved.
Further, the decision to minimise the excavation of polluted soil, and locate con-
struction where soil was less polluted, is explained by the costs involved with the
remediation of the infrastructure they own. This cost minimisation strategy occurs
without impacting the planned amount of gross floor area. Consequently, H3c is
confirmed.
6.2.5.4 Cheseaux
In the processes of land exchange and the land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux,
local authorities mobilised infrastructure for the relocation of their properties closer
to the centre, and then used the land improvement syndicate, allowing them to make
land available for the construction of the new school. Hence, H3c is confirmed.
6.2.5.5 General discussion
Summarising the results of the hypothesis, the relevance of the resource infrastructure
in explaining communal strategies and instrument use has been shown, which allows
for confirm the hypothesis H3c. Infrastructure was mobilised to support communal
objectives (demographic growth, finance of land service, creation of rent, construction
of public facilities), and the modalities of land use policy instruments were defined
according to the policy resource infrastructure (existing land service legitimises tax
on added land value, energy planning shows compatibility of district heating system
with 2000W society).
The case of Malley shows how the financial costs linked with the mobilisation of in-
frastructure can play a prominent role: if infrastructure involves additional costs that
stand against past policy decisions (such as the substitution of of the district heat-
ing system with geothermal energy), or simply involves non-mandatory, additional
costs linked to specific land uses (such as the excavation and remediation of soil for
underground construction), then infrastructure is mobilised in a way that minimises
financial costs, or, said otherwise, maximises financial gains.
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Cases Verification Explanation
HUTTWIL
Building right Confirmed Plots owned by the Herdgemeinde allowed for
the planning of a new neighbourhood in ac-
cordance with the communal growth strategy
NIEDERBIPP
Tax on added land
value
Confirmed Land service built and owned by the com-
mune allowed them to charge landowners for
the benefit of added economic value
MALLEY
Land exchange Confirmed Plot owned by Lausanne allowed them to ex-
change it, and thus host the future cantonal
museum
Polluted soil Confirmed Large land surfaces owned by Lausanne al-
lowed them to relocate development rights to
where soil is less polluted, and thus minimise
development costs
Energy planning Disproved Heating infrastructure owned by the com-
mune reduced the possibilities of defining fu-
ture energy sources
CHESEAUX
Land exchange Confirmed Plots owned by the commune allowed for the
exchange of plots for plots located within the
future perimeter of the LIS
Land improvement
syndicate
Confirmed Plots owned by the commune enabled their
development of public infrastructure
Table 6.26: Synthesis of the verification of H3c.
6.2.6 H4a: Effects of sole public policy instruments on the
LRA
The general hypothesis underlying the instrument types’ effects on the LRA is that
only a combination of different instrument types allows for the implementation of the
institutional regime of soil. In order to test the hypothesis, the analysed redistributive
processes are divided among those that involve only type 1 and type 2 instruments
(H4a), and those that involve a mix of different instrument types(H4b). As a reminder:
− type 1 instruments are public policy instruments that do not impact use or
disposal rights;
− type 2 instruments are public policy instruments that have an impact on use
and/or disposal rights;
− type 3 instruments are property right instruments that impact use and disposal
rights;
− type 4 instruments are property right instruments that impact the distribution
of property titles.
Hypothesis H4a is formulated as follows:
H4a: If authorities only use type 1 and type 2 instruments, then they will
not implement the institutional regime of soil. This can be explained by
the limited strictness and the incoherences of the institutional regime of
soil, which grants to actors a significant margin of manoeuvrability for the
implementation of public policy instruments.
Based on the type of instruments used in each redistributive process (as identified
in tables 6.16, 6.18, and 6.20), I test H4a for the processes building obligation on
serviced land, tax on added land value, and MAO restrictions. H4b is tested for all
other processes.
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6.2.6.1 Wiedlisbach
Responding to the communal threat of the green zone (type 2 instrument), several
landowners with plots in building zone, requested building permits (type 1 instrument)
in order to maintain the status quo, and preserve existing rights. This circumvention
of the institutional regime confirms H4a, because the sole use of zoning prevented
authorities from achieving land use policy objectives.
A second LRA that resulted from the implementation of the building obligation
on serviced land, consisted of the effective use of the green zone (type 2 instrument)
combined with a higher plot ratio (type 2 instrument) and various derogations of
building regulations (type 1 instrument). The policy output is a diversion of the
institutional regime of soil, the settlement area more fragmented with development
holes. As a consequence, H4a is confirmed.
6.2.6.2 Niederbipp
The implementation of the tax on added land value created through zoning for the
extension of the industrial zone in Niederbipp disproves H4a, because the LRA consists
of an implementation of the institutional regime, and no type 3 or type 4 instrument
is used. Four factors contribute to explaining this arrangement:
1. basic land service was already available, because it had been paid for by other
landowners and realised when the industrial zone was initially created. This
reduced overall land service costs, and removed all costs due to basic land service
for the landowners (to whom the tax on added land value had applied);
2. detail land service was paid by the developer (land buyer) – its payment was
tied to the delivery of the building permit (type 1 instrument)–, which further
reduced costs for the initial landowners (a pass-on of land service costs);
3. the effective tax rate applied did not correspond with effective land prices, res-
ulting in a tax rate reduction 30% to 21% of the added value created through
zoning;
4. communal and cantonal interest in the extension of the building zone was strong,
the host of a major health care distributor, the creation of jobs and the increase
of tax revenues (involvement of end beneficiaries) were used as arguments in
favour of the project.
6.2.6.3 Malley
The negotiations on the use restrictions imposed by the ordinance on major risks
led to divisions among authorities and target groups, as well as divisions within the
target groups (infrastructure and real estate department of the SBB). The process’
results are a set of construction specifications (type 1 instrument) and a prohibition
of specific uses (type 2 instrument), which, in terms of reduced economic value, were
fully compensated through an increase of the plot ratio (type 2 instrument). Hence,
the resulting LRA is characterised by a circumvention of the institutional regime.
However, it is unclear if the use of type 3 or type 4 instruments would have
allowed for implementation of the institutional regime. In fact, the use of type 3 or
type 4 instruments – such as a financial guarantee or an emption right – ifor the
implementation of the MAO restrictions, may even have induced perverse effects: for
example, in cases where the target group would have circumvented the restrictions
by implementing forbidden, but economically more profitable uses, authorities could
have benefited from this circumvention via the financial guarantee. Therefore, the
type of instrument does only provide part of the explanation of the policy output
obtained and H4a is only partially confirmed.
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6.2.6.4 General discussion
Summarising the results of H4a, and using counter-factual reasoning, it is unclear
how the use of property rights instruments could have allowed for the implementation
of the institutional regime of soil to better conform to policy objectives. In the
case of Wiedlisbach, the choice of instruments was dependent on the authorities’
strategy to suspend the building zone. In Niederbipp, local authorities substituted
the costs landowners would have born through the implementation of a redistributive
instrument. In Malley, there were limited reasons to believe that the outcome (for
example the non-negotiation of additional development rights by the landowners)
would have differed with the use of a property rights instrument.
Nevertheless, two general observations specific to H4a can be made (additional
results applying to H4a and H4b are presented in the general discussion of H4b).
First, the initial implementation of instruments induced a margin of manoeuvrability
which benefited both public authorities and target groups:
− the process of "building obligation on serviced land" in Wiedlisbach demon-
strated a variety of reactions by the landowners, ultimately resulting in dif-
ferent LRAs. Local authorities dealt with the resulting outputs, because they
could achieve quantitative reduction of building zone reserves as well as the
subsequent building zone transfer. The most "virulent" landowners could opt
for a rejection strategy, asking the commune to deliver a building permit, or
negotiate additional development rights, without threatening the achievement
of communal goals;
− in Niederbipp, the tax on added land value created through zoning was im-
plemented, because local authorities and other landowners had paid for basic
land service in the past, which in turn created a "margin of taxation" on newly
zoned land. In turn, the discounted tax rate granted by the commune benefited
landowners.
Second, the instrument building permit (type 1 instrument) can be used both by
public authorities to ensure the target group’s implementation of public decisions,
and by the target group to maintain the status quo. Consequently, the effects of the
instrument depends on who mobilises it:
− the process of the polluted soil in Niederbipp showed that it can be used by
authorities to impose additional obligations;
− the process of the tax on added land value in Nieberbipp showed that local
authorities used the instrument in order to ensure the payment of land service;
− in the process of the building obligation on previously zoned land in Wiedlisbach,
landowners mobilised it to prevent a withdrawal of rights and gain more time.
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building obligation on
serviced land:
Confirmed Threat of zoning (type 2) is countered
by building permit (type 2), which res-
ults in circumvention LRA
Implementation of green zone (type 2)
compensated by additional development
rights (type 2) also results in a circum-
vention LRA
NIEDERBIPP
Tax on added land value Disproved Tax on added land value (type 1) is
implemented (implementation LRA),
considered that it "substitutes" the land
service tax
MALLEY
MAO use restrictions Partly con-
firmed
Circumvention LRA modifying plot
ratio fixed in local development plan
(type 2)
Table 6.27: Synthesis of the verification of H4a.
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6.2.7 H4b: Effects of instrument mix on the LRA
Based on the distinction between type 1 and type 2, and type 3 and type 4 instru-
ments, I now test the effects of the analysed processes that involve a mix of different
instrument types on the LRA:
H4b: If authorities combine different types of instruments, then they will
be able to implement the institutional regime of soil. This can be ex-
plained through the additional restrictions and/or obligations that these
instruments impose on landowners, which allow for the enhancement of the
institutional regime’s strictness and for the reduction of its incoherences.
6.2.7.1 Wiedlisbach
In the case of Wiedlisbach and the building zone transfer, authorities used a mix Building zone transfer
disproves H4bof type 1 instrument (rezoning priority, exemption from tax on added land value
created through zoning), type 2 instrument (plot ratio, green zoning, building zone
extension), and type 4 instrument (emption right). The LRA that resulted from the
implementation of this instrument mix amounted to a diversion of the institutional
regime of soil, because it created "holes" in the building zone and fostered small scale
urban sprawl. Therefore, in the process of the building zone transfer, H4b is disproved.
As already mentioned in the discussion of H1, the specificity of the process "building
zone transfer" is such that local authorities function as the actors who orchestrate the
diversion of land use policy objectives, not the policy’s target group.
Following local authorities’ implementation of building obligations, three LRAs in- Building obligations
confirm H4bvolved a mix of public policy and property rights instruments and representing an
innovation in the current institutional regime, confirming H4b:
− in the case of serviced land, the LRA consisted of a contract between authorities
and landowners, the latter contractually committed to developing their plot
within 15 years. This contract is categorised as type 3, because it is not part of
the institutional regime, relies on civil law, and has an impact on use rights. As
a consequence, the LRA reduces the landowner’s margin of manoeuvrability by
imposing a land use change (development) within a given time period. The LRA
consists of an innovation of land use policy objectives, which confirms H4b;
− in the case of un-serviced, industrial land, a legal mortgage with a delay of
payment (type 3 instrument) is used. The financial resources required for the
land service can be covered through the mortgage that local authorities hold
on the land. It also guarantees the development of the land (innovation LRA):
when the mortgage expires, landowners will have to reimburse approximately
1 million francs to local authorities, a sum that they might not be able to pay
without selling the land. Hence,H4b is confirmed;
− in the case of the building zone extension in the Gerzmatt, the applied instru-
ment mix consisted of zoning (type 2), which is exchanged for emption right
(type 4), land service tax (type 1) and tax on added land value (type 1). The
emption right is used to prevent a circumvention strategy by landowners (such
as land hoarding and non-payment of the tax), whereas the tax on added land
value value redistributes part of the added economic value generated by the
operation (see H4). The building zone extension creates important added eco-
nomic value, which is used as a levy by authorities to implement the various
instruments mentioned. The implementation of these instruments is guaranteed
through the emption right. In this case, the LRA consists of an implementation
of land use policy objectives, which confirms H4b.
6.2.7.2 Huttwil
The process in Thomasbode consisted in a failed un-zoning process, and in a reduction Building zone reduction
disproves H4bof the constructible surface (type 2 instrument), achieved through a higher plot ratio
(type 2). The commune traded the landowners’ financial contribution to land service
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(type 1) for a higher plot ratio, and status quo, in terms of obligations (no building
obligation). The negotiated LRA benefited local authorities, because their building
zone reserves were reduced, and a portion of the land service costs they faced were
passed on to landowners (secured by type 3 instrument, legal mortgage). However,
local authorities failed in the un-zoning process. The lack of political support and
consensus resulted in a LRA that meant a passive implementation of the institutional
regime of soil, which disproves H4b.
The case where the two communes use building rights in order to make land availableBuilding right confirms
H4b to development, thus creating an LRA that implements the institutional regime of soil
and confirms H4b: the combined use of zoning (type 2 instrument) and building right
(type 3 instrument) allowed local authorities to dedicate new land to development and
make it directly available to potential inhabitants. They also passed on land service
costs (type 1) to future home owners, their payment being conditioned on the delivery
of the building right. The mix of instruments used, together with the policy resources
mobilised ("infrastructure" through land, and "money" through the low rental income
they agreed on), allowed local authorities to achieve a portion of their land use policy
objectives.
6.2.7.3 Niederbipp
Once the plots were zoned as industrial land (through type 2 instrument), the de-
velopment of the former landfill was bound to a set of construction specifications
and surveillance obligations (type 1 instruments), whose fulfilment was defined in
the building permit (type 1 instrument). The risk against water contamination, and
some of the costs that would be incurred in case pollutants exfiltrate from the landfill,
were covered through a 10 year financial guarantee (type 3 instrument). The LRA
that results from the instruments’ mix implements the institutional regime of soil, and
thus confirms H4b for the 10 year period that the guarantee lasts and up to the fin-
ancial amount deposited. Beyond the 10 year period, or in case of remediation costs
exceeding the financial deposit, the implementation of the institutional regime is no
longer guaranteed.
The LRA also shows that 20% of the added economic value created through zoning
was used to cover additional costs linked with the polluted soil (through a reduced
sale price), leaving the landowner with a gain of 80% of the pre-agreed land price.
6.2.7.4 Malley
The exchange of plots (type 4 instrument) between landowners allows Lausanne toLand exchange confirms
H4b implement land use policy and cultural policy objectives. The infrastructure owned
by Lausanne was mobilised as a means of establishing the new cantonal museum on
communal territory, and as a means of creating housing and working areas in Malley.
The LRA that results from the land exchange implements the institutional regime of
soil, and H4b is confirmed.
The high costs linked with the obligation to remediate the excavated polluted soilRelocation of
development rights
confirms H4b
(type 2 instrument) led the actors to minimise the amount of soil excavated and the
amount of underground surfaces created. The park was located where the soil is the
most polluted, and the development rights were transferred from the un-developed
areas (park, underground) to the places where future construction will be located
(through zoning, type 2 instrument). The relocation of development rights within the
perimeter of the local development plan is part of the process of elaboration of a local
development plan, but the process was made possible without a dedicated instrument
such as a land improvement syndicate (see Cheseaux), only because the property
structure involved one single landowner; this situation removed the obligation to
compensate for the difference, in terms of uses (and thus the differences in terms
of economic value) between plots or owners. As a consequence, the use of type 4
instruments was substituted by the single landownership. The LRA consisted in an
implementation of the institutional regime of soil, indirectly confirming H4b.
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The process of the extended land service tax (type 1 instrument) results in a LRA Circumvention of the
extended land service tax
disproves H4b
where the amount of tax is a pure product from negotiations between communes and
landowners. Despite a fixed rate written in communal regulations, the LRA results
in the payment of a negotiated lump-sum. Therefore, the institutional regime of soil
is circumvented, which disproves H4b.
The legal requirements for the establishment of an energy plan produces limited effects
on the local development plan: the instrument does not define any binding measure,
nor any additional instrument in order to guarantee the implementation of energy
objectives. Target groups pass the responsibility of achieving the targeted energy ob-
jectives to the end beneficiaries. The circumvention of the institutional regime of soil
is explained by local authorities’ acquisition (type 4) of a portion of the district heat-
ing infrastructure. Thus, the achievement of energy objectives becomes secondary.
As a consequence, H4a is disproved.
6.2.7.5 Cheseaux
In order to satisfy a large part of its land needs, build a school, and achieve its land use Land exchange confirms
H4bpolicy objectives, the commune exchanged (type 4 instrument) private plots located
in the future perimeter of the LIS for bigger agricultural plots they owned in the
agricultural zone. The commune also acquired plots (type 4 instrument) within the
LIS perimeter. The use of these instruments anticipated the LIS process, and resulted
in an LRA which implements the institutional regime of soil. As a consequence, H4b
is confirmed.
The relocation and reshaping of rights achieved through the land improvement syndic- Land improvement
syndicate confirms H4bate (mix of type 2 and 4 instruments) which allows for the removal of the intermediary
zone, creates a separation between agricultural and building zones, opens new land for
development, and ideally locates communal property for future communal infrastruc-
ture. The instrument mix used produces an LRA that results in an implementation
of land use policy objectives, which confirms H4b.
6.2.7.6 General discussion
Synthesising the results of H4b, I can state that the combination of different instru-
ment types facilitates the implementation of the institutional regime of soil. For
example, property rights instruments can be used by authorities as a guarantee in
order to increase the regime’s strictness and ensure:
1. the effective implementation of the desired outcome (availability/sale of land,
development or land), that is to say as insurance on future land use;
2. the availability of the money (potentially) due to local authorities (service of
industrial land in Wiedlisbach, polluted soil in Niederbipp) – such guarantee is
often automatically granted by law;
3. a third use is the relocation of property titles, as shown in hypothesis H3a.
However, the instrument mix does not overcome existing power relations. Wied-
lisbach managed to impose their strategy of building zone transfer through the mobil-
isation of a political majority, and used to approve new building regulations. Huttwil
failed in removing the hoarded building zone, because of the prevalence of the target
groups, and the stance of the elected representatives. In Malley, landowners mobilised
various policy resources they mobilised in order to limit the effects of the extended
land service tax. In the process of energy planning, it was precisely the mobilisation
of property rights instruments (acquisition of district heating infrastructure) that
facilitated the circumvention of policy objectives.
A counter-example to the above cited cases is the land improvement syndicate
in Cheseaux. The LIS consists of an instrument mix that overcomes part of the
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power struggle among actors: as opposed to other instruments analysed which target
individual plots, the LIS defines a new decisional (majority-based) rule that applies to
all plots at once within the perimeter of intervention. The instrument goes one step
further than regular instrument mixes by creating a community of landowners where
all members – notwithstanding the surface they possess – have one equal vote. This
decisional setting implies a redefinition of the individual property right, as it enables
collective decisions on a group of plots.
Finally, the instrument mix (including the LIS) does not solve the question of
economic value, which appears to play a central role in the processes where the in-
struments’ implementation was circumvented (building zone reduction, extended land
service tax, energy planning). On the contrary, the processes where type 3 and 4 in-
struments were used, permitted to implement or innovate the institutional regime of
soil, I observed that most processes were linked with a substantial value creation,
benefiting the target group:
− the building obligations on un-serviced land and on the new building zone were
linked with the effective creation of added economic value. The property rights
instruments forced the realisation of economic gains, but at the same time con-
ditioned their creation;
− the process of building rights in Huttwil created minor permanent economic
value, but more importantly, the process pursued broader communal goals of
demographic growth;
− the added economic value created in the process of polluted soil in Niederbipp
was, despite additional development and monitoring costs, substantial. It also
settled the soil pollution issue for the landowners, their obligations limited to
the expiration of the10 year financial guarantee they deposited;
− the land exchange between the SBB and Lausanne granted both parties sub-
stantial benefits in terms of rent (Malley) and recognition (museum);
− in the polluted soil process in Malley, a relocation of rights prevented loss of
economic value, but also minimised the reduction economic value linked with
soil remediation;
− the added economic value in the two processes of Cheseaux were also evident,
both for the landowners who sold or exchanged land with the commune, and
for those involved in the land improvement syndicate.
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building zone transfer: Disproved Diversion LRA despite the use of type
1, 2 and 4 instruments
Building obligation on
serviced land:
Confirmed Type 3 instrument (voluntary obliga-
tion) allows innovation
Building obligation on
zoned industrial land:
Confirmed Innovation through type 3 instrument
(mortgage)
Building obligation on
new building zone:
Confirmed Innovation through type 2 and 4 instru-
ment (zoning and emption right)
HUTTWIL
Building zone reduction: Disproved Passive implementation, type 3 instru-
ment (mortgage guaranteeing the pay-
ment of land service) is implemented by
default; no guarantee that the land will
be developed
Building right: Confirmed Implementation through type 2 and 4
instrument (building regulations, zon-
ing, building right) + resource infra-
structure
NIEDERBIPP
Polluted soil Confirmed Implementation for a 10 year period
through type 1 (building permit) and
type 3 instrument (financial guarantee)
MALLEY
Land exchange Confirmed Implementation through type 4 instru-
ment (land exchange)
Polluted soil Confirmed Property structure owned by sole
landowner allowed to relocate (type
4) development rights within the local
development plan’s perimeter
Extended land service
tax
Disproved Circumvention due to unclear legal
basis, and the time limitations and
lack of organisation of local authorit-
ies. Legal mortgage (type 3) guarantees
only the payment of the amount due
Energy planning Disproved Circumvention of energy objectives due
to infrastructure bought by local au-
thorities
CHESEAUX
Land exchange: Confirmed Implementation through acquisition
and exchange of land by local authorit-
ies (type 4)
Land improvement syn-
dicate:
Confirmed Implementation through combination of
type 2 and 4 instruments. Marginal cir-
cumvention of type 1 instrument (land
service tax) by landowners through the
use of the resource “time”
Table 6.28: Synthesis of the verification of H4b.
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6.2.8 H5a: Redistributive effects of public policy instruments
The general hypothesis underlying the redistributive effects of policy instruments is
that only a mix of instruments allows for the redistribution of value. In order to test
the hypothesis, the redistributive processes analysed are divided among those that
only involve type 1 and type 2 instruments (H5a), and those that involve a mix of
different instrument types (H5b). As a reminder:
− type 1 instruments are public policy instruments that do not impact use or
disposal rights;
− type 2 instruments are public policy instruments that have an impact on use
and/or disposal rights;
− type 3 instruments are property rights instruments that impact use and disposal
rights;
− type 4 instruments are property rights instruments that impact the distribution
of property titles.
H5a is formulated as follows:
If authorities use solely type 1 and type 2 instruments, then they do not
redistribute value. This can be explained by the complex institutional
regime that does not provide authorities with the necessary tools to impose
value redistribution.
6.2.8.1 Wiedlisbach
In the process where local authorities threaten to utilise the green zone on hoarded,
serviced land, some of the landowners requested a building permit (in order to main-
tain the status quo), but they did not intend to build. No value redistribution took
place.
Other landowners agreed to the green zone transfer, which was exchanged for a
higher plot ratio, and derogations to future building regulations. Thus, a temporary
preservation (until the plots are zoned back to the building zone) of ecological value,
and a temporary suspension of economic value, are achieved for a period of at least
ten years (until the next revision of building regulations). When the plots will be
put back into the building zone, then a small increase of economic value should occur
(due to the higher plot ratios). Hence, in both processes, no value redistribution takes
place, and H5a is confirmed.
6.2.8.2 Niederbipp
Authorities use the tax on added value created through zoning (type 1 instrument) to
punctually capture some (21%) of the added economic value created through zoning.
They redistribute the value within the communal territory for other (undetermined)
land use planning measures. As a consequence, H5a is disproved.
6.2.8.3 Malley
The reduced economic value induced by the implementation of the major accidentsValue transfer from MAO
to the property right ordinance on the plots intended for development is compensated for through the use
of plot ratio (type 2), but no value redistribution (across actors or places) takes place.
Hence, H5a is confirmed.
6.2.8.4 General discussion
In a complex regime that does not have a redistributive mechanism to compensate
for advantages and disadvantages resulting from land use planning, the results of H5a
show that value redistribution without using property rights instruments is limited
to very specific circumstances: the case of Niederbipp has shown that in the absence
of land service costs, local authorities were able to substitute the landowners savings
with the tax on added land value created through zoning. In the two other cases, the
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policy instruments used by authorities only distributed value (or compensated a loss
of value).
Furthermore, the cross-case analysis of the evolution of communal tax rates has
shown the marginal use of classic fiscal instruments in order to capture added eco-
nomic land value (Viallon, 2016a): in the studied regions, communal land tax rates,
like the income tax rates, have decreased over the past twenty years; further, there is
no specific land property income tax – all types of revenues are taxed together through
the income tax. Such observations reveal that the matter at stake is less a question of
the type of instrument available, but of the political setting that may or may not allow
for their use. In fact, factors such as fiscal federalism and the underlying communal
competition limits the use of these instruments. The reduction of inhabitants exper-
ienced by some peri-urban communes amounts to fiscal competition. As discussed in
H5b, it appears easier for authorities to negotiate punctually value capture together
with the distribution of added value through zoning, both occurring punctually in
time, and separately (for each development project), than to demand a small tax
from all landowners in a durative manner. This practice reveals an offset between
the permanent value creation that occurs through land use planning decisions – and
which materialises through the rent paid every month by the tenant to the property
title holder –, and the predominantly punctual value capture mechanisms mobilised
by authorities.
Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building obligation on
serviced land:
Confirmed Threat of zoning (type 2) and building
permit (type 2) do not induce redis-
tributive effects.
Implementation of green zone (type 2)
compensated by additional development
rights (type 2) induce distributive ef-
fects in time.
NIEDERBIPP
Tax on added land value Disproved Redistribution of value captured
through the tax on added land value
(type 1) to communal land use policy
MALLEY
MAO use restrictions Confirmed Increase of plot ratio allows for the
compensation of the value loss induced
by use restrictions
Table 6.29: Synthesis of the verification of H5a.
256 of 327
Test of hypotheses
6.2.9 H5b: Redistributive effects of instrument mix
Based on the distinction between type 1/2 and type 3/4 instruments, I now test
the redistributive effects of the analysed processes that involve a mix of different
instrument types:
If authorities use a mix of instrument types, then they can redistribute
value. Value redistribution is only a possibility, because the complex in-
stitutional regime does not provide authorities the tools to impose value
redistribution. However, authorities tend to redistribute value in order to
implement their own strategies.
6.2.9.1 Wiedlisbach
The building zone transfer process relies on type 1, 2, and 4 instruments, and allowsBuilding zone transfers
only temporarily
redistribute value
a spatial redistribution of economic and ecological value across a spatially and frag-
mented land property structure belonging to various owners. However, this transfer
occurs during a limited time period, as landowners have priority zoning rights, and will
benefit from an exemption on the tax on added land value in 10 to 15 years when the
communal building regulations are revised. The process’ medium-term redistributive
effects equates to a simple building zone extension (distribution of economic value).
Hence, H5b is disproved.
In the process "building obligation on serviced land", some landowners signed a "vol-Emption right as
enforcement mechanism untary building obligation" (type 3 instrument). Through this instrument, an effective
realisation of the added economic value (created through zoning) occurs, but no value
is captured and subsequently redistributed. Hence, H5b is disproved.
In the process "building obligation on industrial land", the mortgage (type 3) only
allows for a temporary value capture in order to compensate local authorities for the
cost of land service. As a consequence, H5b is disproved.
The hypothesis H5b is confirmed in the process of the new building zone creation
in the Gerzmatt: the process involves a type 1, 2 and 4 instrument mix and punctually
captures a portion of the added economic value through the tax on added land value
created through zoning.
6.2.9.2 Huttwil
The process of building zone reduction in Thomasbode relied on type 1 (building reg-Building zone reduction
confirms H5b ulations), type 2 (zoning), and type 3 (legal mortgage) instruments. It produced two
types of redistributive effects: first, a reduction of the surface to be developed, which
was compensated for with a higher plot ratio (spatial redistribution/concentration of
development rights). Second, the reduced constructible perimeter limited the number
of water catchments to be destroyed (reduction of ecological value to be destroyed
through development). Third, a portion of the land service costs were passed on to
landowners. Consequently, H5b is confirmed.
In the process building right, land development through building right induced a re-Building right process
confirms H5b distribution of economic value from the land use policy’s target group to the end
beneficiaries: through the reduction of the rent charged by landowners, future inhab-
itants benefited from cheaper land. Therefore, H5b is confirmed. Such redistribution
in the present case was made possible by the possession of the resource infrastructure,
and the control of land use regulations.
6.2.9.3 Niederbipp
The zoning of the plots (type 2 instrument) creates significant economic value. Spe-
cific construction and monitoring prescriptions (type 1 instruments), as well as the
financial guarantee (type 3 instrument), made the delivery of a building permit pos-
sible, which in turn made the development of the plots possible. The construction
of a lid prevented the infiltration of water, and thus limited the potential spread of
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pollution (reduction of ecological value). However, the arrangement is for a limited
time, and redistributive issues could arise after the financial guarantee has expired,
which would not be covered by the arrangement. Therefore, H5b is partly confirmed.
6.2.9.4 Malley
The land exchange (type 4) aimed to exchange two plots of the same value, com- Spatial value
redistribution through
land exchange
pensating any difference through cash payments. The redistributive process occurred
spatially. Consequently, H5b is confirmed.
In the polluted soil process, the soil’s remediation costs induced the transfer of devel- Spatial value
redistribution through
soil pollution
opment rights across plots, possible because of the single landownership and of the
reshaped plots (type 4 instrument). Hence, H5b is confirmed.
Actors negotiate the amount of value captured punctually by the extended land service Value redistribution
through land service taxtax (type 1 instrument), based on financial considerations linked to the project’s
development plans (type 2 instrument). The lack of precedent for implementation
of the tax involving a public landowner allowed actors to mobilise several policy
resources, which led to a redistribution of value. As a consequence, H5b is confirmed.
In the process of energy planning, the elaboration of the local development plan (type Value transfer from end
beneficiaries to target
group
2 instrument), and the circumvention of energy objectives led to the use of the district
heating system as the main source of energy. This choice meant a redistribution of
value from end beneficiaries to the target groups: the heating system paid by end
beneficiaries, and target groups are able to capture the amount of money saved on
the building heating system in the form of additional rent. Such redistribution is only
possible because target groups own the district heating infrastructure and production.
As a consequence, H5a is confirmed.
6.2.9.5 Cheseaux
The process involves the acquisition and exchange of plots (type 4) for money and Spatial value
redistribution through
land exchange
for wider plots. The commune distributed additional value (overrated exchange price,
or additional land surface) to the landowners, in exchange for more centrally located
plots. Hence, a spatial redistribution of value takes place, and H5b is confirmed.
Authorities and landowners conducted a value redistribution process composed of Spatial value
redistribution through
LIS
three elements: an economic value creation through the new building zone of the
LIS(type 2, 3 and 4 instrument), which allowed them to reduce the intermediary zone,
as well as relocate and reshape the plots through the LIS. Hence, H5b is confirmed.
6.2.9.6 General discussion
The verification of H5b presented a set of findings summed up as follows: in a complex
regime, property rights instruments play a central role in value redistribution, because
contracts partly substitute for the absence of punctual value capture mechanisms such
as the tax on added land value (prior to 2014), or the extended land service tax (in
canton Vaud prior to 2013). Contracts allow for the passing-on of various additional,
project-based obligations that are not (and could only partly be) explicitly planned
by law.
In regard to the voluntary instruments "tax on added land value" and "extended
land service tax", the implementation of the former in canton Bern has been more dif-
ficult than the latter in canton Vaud. This can be understood through the direct and
indirect benefits landowners receive from the extended land service tax, as opposed to
the tax on added land value. In fact, the main difference between the two instruments
is that the extended land service tax redistributes value to predetermined uses gen-
erally located within the neighbourhood or the communal territory, whereas the tax
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on added land value primarily aims to compensate landowners. The point is that the
(lack of) success of their implementation is not primarily linked with the mobilisation
of property rights instruments, but with the perceived and spatially defined benefits
they brought (or not) to landowners as well as to the broader community (in the case
of the extended land service tax).
In the absence of an institutional compensation mechanism, local authorities cre-
ated case specific alternative compensatory mechanisms (through public policy or
property rights instruments): a "rezoning priority" in the process of the building zone
transfer, an increase of the plot ratio in the process of building zone reduction, and
land acquisition above market prices in the process of land exchange in Cheseaux.
Consequently, as mentioned before, it is not fundamentally the type of instrument
that determines authorities’ capacity to redistribute value, but the ability of author-
ities to use them in order to create or mobilise added economic value and achieve
redistribution.
This last point merges with one conclusion from H4b: property rights instruments
work primarily as insurance on future land use, or as insurance on the payment of
money captured by or due to authorities. Their uses are either planned as such in
legislation, or mobilised ad hoc by public actors.
Furthermore, in cases where authorities own land, property rights instruments
allow them to mobilise the policy resource "infrastructure" in order to:
− capture rent induced by land use policy (building right in Huttwil);
− capture rent induced by other public policies (energy planning in Malley).
− for the exchange of infrastructure (Malley, Cheseaux);
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building zone transfer: Disproved Temporary redistribution of economic
and ecological value
Building obligation on
serviced land:
Not applic-
able
Concretisation of existing added eco-
nomic value
Building obligation on
zoned industrial land:
Not applic-
able
Concretisation of existing added eco-
nomic value
Building obligation on
new building zone:
Confirmed Redistribution of part of the added eco-
nomic value created through zoning to
other land use policy goals
HUTTWIL
Building zone reduction: Confirmed Spatial redistribution of development
rights and of ecological impacts of de-
velopment
Building right: Confirmed Redistribution of added economic value
(created through zoning) for end benefi-
ciaries through cheaper rent
NIEDERBIPP
Polluted soil Partly con-
firmed
Minimisation of ecological reduced
value through the added value created
through zoning and subsequent land
development
MALLEY
Land exchange Confirmed Spatial redistribution of property titles
Polluted soil Confirmed Spatial redistribution of development
rights
Extended land service
tax
Confirmed Redistribution of a portion of the added
value created through zoning, to public
infrastructure within the communal
territory
Energy planning Confirmed Value redistribution from end benefi-
ciaries to target group: authorities do
not depend on instrument (energy plan)
CHESEAUX
Land exchange: Confirmed Spatial redistribution of property titles
Land improvement syn-
dicate:
Confirmed Land improvement syndicate allowed
for the reduction of the intermediary
zone, extension of the agricultural zone,
and a reshaping of plots
Table 6.30: Synthesis of the verification of H5b.
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6.2.10 H6: Effects of expected added economic value on the
LRA
If a land use policy process is expected to produce redistributive effects,
then target groups successfully use available policy instruments and re-
sources to obtain full compensation for their anticipated loss of economic
value. This can be explained through the capacity of land use policy to
create added economic value that authorities can use for compensation
and redistribution.
6.2.10.1 Wiedlisbach
The transfer of the building zone partly confirms H6 : some landowners negotiatedPartial successful
resistance to economic
value reduction
an increase of the plot ratio, which proved a valuable enough incentive for them to
agree to the temporary value redistribution process initiated by authorities. Other
landowners did not agree with the communal strategy, and asked for building permits:
they preferred to maintain the status quo over the temporary lowered economic value
induced by the green zone. These arrangements confirm H6.
However, other landowners legally opposed the revision of building regulations,
and/or voted against it, both without success; these arrangements hindered them
from obtaining compensation and preventing redistribution, which disprove H6.
The various landowner reactions in the case of the green zone show that the sole
dimension of expected redistributive effects (notably in terms of economic value) is
not sufficient to explain the negotiated arrangements. It does impact the LRA, but
landowner strategies vary according to other criteria, such as the strategy they pursue
in regard to the future use of their property, their temperament or willingness to fight
communal decisions, their perception of and relations with communal authorities, etc.
The building obligation implemented through the threat of the green zone confirmsPartial successful
resistance to reduced
economic value
and disproves the H6, because those landowners who request a building permit manage
to maintain the status quo (confirmation of H6 ), whereas others sign the "voluntary
building obligation" (disproof of H6 ).
The case of the mortgage on industrial land disproves H6: no net added economic
value is created for the landowners, since in the end they pay for the entire land
service. In addition, landowners need to sell the land within a given time span, i.e.
authorities force landowners to take their gains. However, the land sale is greatly
facilitated, because the plots are serviced, which bestows them with an additional
characteristic: they are ready for development (effective use). Specific landowners
concerned by the process need to interpret the result of the hypothesis with caution.
The building zone extension (distribution of added economic value) provides a
significant economic levy which allows to pass land service costs on, and capture
some of the added value through the tax on added land value created through zoning.
H6 is confirmed.
6.2.10.2 Huttwil
The landowners and the planning commission opposed the initial communal strategySuccessful resistance to
value reduction to remove the building zone of Thomasbode, mainly because authorities did not have
and had not considered a means of compensation. When the parties agreed on a re-
duced constructible perimeter, and on the passing-on of land service costs, landowners
were compensated with significant increases of their plot ratios. This increase allowed
for an increase in the overall added economic value of the building zone. Thus, H6 is
confirmed.
Authorities occupied both functions of authority as well as target group, allowingExpected added economic
value and demographic
growth
them to set low rent prices (financial return of the building right) and fulfil other
communal objectives: attract new inhabitants, and better the financial situation.
Therefore, the hypothesis H6 is disproved.
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6.2.10.3 Niederbipp
The value redistribution that takes place is limited to the prevention of reduced Limited redistributive
effectsecological value. For the landowner, the expected economic value from the land’s
acquisition and development are balanced with the additional costs of analysis, de-
velopment and monitoring costs, and the probability of the exfiltration of pollutants
over the next ten years ( financial costs which are contained in the financial guarantee
that landowners must deposit). The process results in a reduced (20% reduction, due
to additional costs induced by the soil structure), but still significant added economic
value for the selling landowner. As a consequence, H6 is confirmed.
The expected economic value from the zoning operation is both high, and immediate Redistributive effects
lower than regular land
service costs
(buyer of all plots is predetermined). Landowner gains are increased through the
reduced land service costs (partly carried by other landowners from previous zoning
operations, and by the land buyer). These increased profits are only partly captured
through the tax on added land value. Therefore, H6 is confirmed.
6.2.10.4 Malley
Landowners expected a high amount of added value from the plot in Malley and High anticipated added
economic value for both
parties
from the one adjacent to Lausanne’s station is high. As the financial estimations
of both surfaces are comparable, and the contract plans compensatory payments in
case of land value changes (due to zoning for example), the land exchange faced no
opposition. Consequently, H6 is confirmed.
The landowners initially refused the implementation of use restrictions and construc- Successful blocking of
expected reduced
economic value
tion specifications due to the MAO. They successfully blocked negotiations until the
reduced economic value induced by the MAO was fully compensated by additional
development rights, which confirms H6.
The landowners calculated the precise additional costs linked with the development of Minimisation of expected
reduced economic valuethe polluted soil, and, in accordance with local authorities, located future buildings
(and the park) based on the soil pollution criteria. Further, they chose a type of
construction which minimised underground construction, which in turn minimised
excavation and underlying remediation costs. As a consequence, H6 is confirmed.
The extended land service tax reduced the added economic value landowners gained Reduction of taxed
amount of valuefrom the development of their properties. The legal uncertainty about the implement-
ation of the tax led to a long and resource-intensive negotiation between landowners
and authorities, with the authorities agreeing to a reduced rate in order to finalise
negotiations, which confirms H6.
Inthe landowners’ perspective, following economic factors led to the passing-on of the Absence of obligations
reducing expected
economic value
provision on renewable energy to end beneficiaries and thus confirm H6 :
− expected additional costs of installation and production of geothermal or solar
energy compared to those of district heating;
− expected reduced economic value from landowners’ and local authorities’ invest-
ments in the district heating system;
− expected reduced economic value from the reduced amount of gas sold by the
landowners.
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6.2.10.5 Cheseaux
For the landowners, land exchange and acquisition with the commune resulted in anImmediate added value
for landowners immediate added economic value, either in cash (land acquisition), or in kind (ex-
change for a larger surface of agricultural land). Therefore,H6 is confirmed. This
relatively low compensation (compared to the final land value) can be partially at-
tributed to the commune’s intentions to build a school. Would the landowners have
agreed to the same compromises if the commune had only intended to develop housing,
or simply sell it to developers?
The use of the land improvement syndicate entailed the creation of a significantHigh added economic
value expected amount of added economic value, because new land was opened for development.
Landowners included in the LIS perimeter expected a redistribution of the shape
and location of their properties. The significant added economic value resulting from
the partial zoning of the land as constructible, created a significant incentive for
landowners to cooperate to achieve development goals among fellow landowners, and
with local authorities. Consequently, H6 is confirmed.
6.2.10.6 General discussion
As opposed to the other hypotheses, the sixth hypothesis is formulated from the
perspective of the target groups. The broad support in its confirmation shows that
target groups have powerful means to control value redistribution in land use planning
processes. They can:
− obtain compensation for reduced economic value;
− maximise the added economic value authorities create;
− limit the redistributive impacts of policy instruments, and capture major parts
of the added economic value created;
− negotiate additional added economic value against policy resources that author-
ities lack of.
Landowners’ means are policy resources (“consensus” in the case of Wiedlisbach,
“political support” in the case of Huttwil, “time” in the case of Malley and Cheseaux,
“infrastructure” in the case of the energy plan in Malley, etc.), instruments (building
permit in Wiedlisbach, land exchange in the case of Malley and Cheseaux), as well
as more generic arguments, such as the right to appropriate land rent, as an inherent
part of the property title, the necessity of making a profitable operation, or saving
land for their children.
Although authorities and target groups almost systematically negotiate develop-
ment rights, including the definition of various obligations and financial contributions,
authorities do not systematically link the added economic value they produce through
zoning with the costs involved in development and land use policy in general.
Further, the threat to reduce the economic value of land (used in Wiedlisbach
and Huttwil) provides a limited levy of action for several reasons. First, it resists the
guarantee of property, which a priori requires full compensation for restrictions on
property equivalent to an expropriation. Second, it reduces the coherence of planning
activities, and more broadly the achievement of policy objectives (as shown by the
green zoning in Wiedlisbach).
Another outstanding element is that in the process MAO restrictions, landowners
managed to obtain compensation for the reduced value imposed by the MAO, though
this reduced value was purely theoretical and did not figure in any legally binding
planning document (local development plan or zoning plan) defining the actual plot
ratio. The expected value remained largely fictitious, but served landowners as a
basis for calculating the minimal acceptable financial return linked with the plots’
redevelopment. One of the explanations for this situation is the mobilisation of the
resource time by target groups. Their blocking of the project for several months put
authorities in a paradoxical situation of emergency with regard to the landowners and
inhabitants, as they needed to show results to their electorate. Although authorities
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can be perceived as perennial actors in possession of time, the cases analysed show
the contrary (Malley, Cheseaux). In these cases, local authorities used the economic
levy of zoning to obtain landowners quick approval (resource time).
Other uses of the economic levy by authorities were to reduce the financial needs
in the case of building zone reduction in Huttwil (a pass-on of land service costs,
prevent the payment of compensation for material expropriation), or to adapt land
values in order to facilitate land exchanges (Malley, Cheseaux).
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Cases Verification Explanation
WIEDLISBACH
Building zone
transfer:
Partly con-
firmed
Expected reduced value of green zone led to
various reactions of target groups: some ob-
tained added economic value, some main-
tained the status quo, some experienced a re-
duction of economic value through the green
zone
Building oblig-
ation through
threat of green
zone:
Partly con-
firmed
Expected limitation of added economic value
allowed certain landowners to maintain the
status quo, others signed a building obligation
Building oblig-
ation on zoned
industrial land:
Confirmed Redistributive effects limited to recovery of
land service costs, counterbalanced by the
possibility to sell the land at a later date
Building obliga-
tion on new build-
ing zone:
Confirmed Expected redistributive effects limited to re-
covery of land service costs and value capture
through the tax on added land value, coun-
terbalanced with the added economic value
created through zoning
HUTTWIL
Building zone re-
duction:
Confirmed Expected reduced economic value from zone
removal was blocked; expected increase of eco-
nomic value through higher plot ratio was ac-
cepted as counterpart to building zone reduc-
tion and to the pass-on of a portion of land
service costs
Building right: Confirmed Expected economic value also fulfils wider
communal demographic objectives
NIEDERBIPP
Polluted soil Confirmed Expected added economic value perceived as
sufficient to accept prevention measure lim-
iting the potential creation of reduced ecolo-
gical value
Tax on added land
value
Confirmed Expected high added economic value created
through zoning and absence of land service
costs perceived as sufficient in order to accept
the capture of part of the added value
MALLEY
Land exchange Confirmed Expected added economic value allowed to
exchange the plots
MAO use restric-
tions
Confirmed Expected reduced economic value fully com-
pensated through zoning
Polluted soil Confirmed Expected reduced economic value determined
the location and type of constructions
Extended land
service tax
Confirmed Expected reduced economic value opposed
successfully
Energy planning Confirmed Expected reduced economic value opposed
successfully by target group and local author-
ities
CHESEAUX
Land exchange: Confirmed Expected added economic value (intermediate
land price proposed by the commune + wider
plots) and withdrawal from future complex
and costly LIS procedure perceived as suffi-
cient by landowners
Land improvement
syndicate:
Confirmed Expected added economic value maximised by
landowners due to a deficiency in communal
policy resources.
Table 6.31: Synthesis of the verification of H6.
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6.3 Factors conditioning the use of instruments
6.3.0.1 Property structure
The four processes that tested the influence of land property on the authorities’
strategy and instrument use, showed the relevance of the existing property structure
when elaborating a strategy or choosing the instrument to be used: depending on the
number of landowners involved, and the shape of existing plots, the instruments used
change:
− if only a few landowners are involved, instrument choice may be limited to
classic public land use policy instruments. Public law instruments are either
adapted to fit the existing property rights structure, or combined with classic
landowner-to-landowner property rights instruments such as conventions and
easements (for example to modify plot limits, or allow overlapping uses);
− if about a dozen landowners are involved, and/or the property structure does
not fit future land uses (high level of fragmentation, unordered property limits),
instrument choice needs to consider regular public law instruments combined
with property rights instruments that allow for the reshaping of the property
structure, such as the land improvement syndicate;
− if numerous landowners are involved, or if the project scale is to broad (if, for ex-
ample,it involves, geographically separated areas), authorities lack instruments
permitting the redefinition of property rights. In the cases analysed, author-
ities limited implementation to the use of public law instruments (such as in
the building zone transfer process in Wiedlisbach), or adopted dedicated, mixed
instruments such as the LIS. In this regard, the LIS in Le-Mont-sur-Lausanne,
which applies to a perimeter of hundreds of hectares, and involves several dozens
of landowners, is an example revealing this lack of relevant instrumentation: the
LIS has existed for more than thirty years and has still not fulfilled its task.
One explanation underlying the difficulty of restructuring multiple property rights
is the uniqueness of each plot: no single plot is equivalent to another, so it is extremely
difficult to implement land use policy regulations while simultaneously guaranteeing
equal treatment for the concerned landowners. One factor reducing this difficulty,
is the involvement of a limited number of landowners (Malley, Cheseaux), and basic
property shapes (Huttwil).
The building zone transfer process in Wiedlisbach revealed an additional factor
which conditions the use of instruments: the acceptable amount of reduced economic
value that a landowner can endure without authorities having the obligation to com-
pensate the concerned landowner(s). The main criteria used by the Federal Tribunal
to decide if compensation is due, is the degree of loss the landowner endures compared
to other landowners (Sonderopfer). As Bovay et al. (2010, 34) noted, the compens-
ation that authorities would be obligated to pay is linked more to the principle of
equal treatment than to infringement of the property guarantee. Nevertheless, these
questions hold significant implications for the authorities managing the resource soil:
to what extent can they adopt economic value reduction or value control strategies?
Or, does land use policy only work in a context of growth?
6.3.0.2 Information
Through five processes, the resource information has had a decisive influence on the
strategy adopted and on the instruments mobilised by authorities:
− in Huttwil, information was first mobilised by authorities for the removal of the
building zone. New information was then used by landowners to contest the
building zone removal, and jointly by authorities and landowners to redefine
zoning in the concerned area;
− in the process polluted soil in Niederbipp, information was used to define the
technical modalities of the building permit, minimising uncertainty and pollu-
tion risks in the development process;
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− in Malley, information contributed to the financial feasibility of the land ex-
change. This land exchange was budgeted with minimal financial consideration
for Lausanne (cash payment of less than 1 million francs). But in order to min-
imise the financial repercussions, the densities and land use restrictions defined
in the local development plan of Malley-gare needed to reflect the plot’s estim-
ated initial value, an argument successfully mobilised by landowners;
− in regard to soil pollution, information contributed in Malley to spatially define
the future areas of construction, thus excluding certain areas from development
in order to ensure the profitability of the operation;
− in the implementation of the MAO, the information that the target group with-
held blocked the elaboration of the local development plan until authorities
agreed to increase density in the given area;
− in the elaboration of an energy plan, the information that the target group did
not provide led local authorities to invest in infrastructure, which in turn limited
future energy choices for the neighbourhood.
6.3.0.3 Public infrastructure
In the five processes where infrastructure owned by local authorities was involved in
the land use policy process, it was mobilised in order to contribute to communal goals,
use new instruments, or define their modalities:
− in the case of Huttwil, land owned by the Herdgemeinde was used jointly with
communal planning tools to combat demographic decline and support the com-
munal growth strategy;
− in Niederbipp, available land service was mobilised to justify the implementation
of the new tax on added land value created through zoning;
− in Malley, the co-ownership of the district heating system led to the absence
of binding energy obligations for the landowners, and to the elaboration of
an energy plan that favoured the district heating system. Further, the costs
induced by the remediation of the location and the type of development (e.g. no
underground constructions) constrained the modalities of the local development
plan;
− in Cheseaux, infrastructure allowed the commune to participate as a landowner
in the land improvement syndicate and to locate their properties in a desired
location.
6.4 Factors determining land use policy output and
value redistribution
6.4.1 The role of policy resources
In the five cases analysed, I observed that policy resources played a significant role in
explaining instrument use, land use policy outputs and, subsequently, redistributive
effects. Actors who had, and mobilised the necessary resources, were able to bargain
with significant advantages in the implementation process (such as definition of the
modalities of implementation of (new) instruments, modification of the implementa-
tion schedule, or securing a larger amount of the added value created), whereas those
who lacked resources made concessions to the other party on the negotiated output.
Reviewing the mobilisation of policy resources across the various cases and processes
analysed, the following elements can be mentioned:
1. resource personnel played a key role, because they provided local authorities the
counselling required to chose the instruments, and/or define the modalities of
their implementation, and, in the end, enabling authorities in the achievement
of their goals. This was particularly visible in:
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− Wiedlisbach, where new strategies and instruments were adopted and used,
in close cooperation with the planner working with the communal author-
ities;
− Niederbipp, with qualified, internal planning staff, negotiated the creation
of an industrial zone, and the application of a tax on added land value;
− Malley, where the landowners relied on their staff (planners, housing and
real estate experts, etc.) in order to fulfil the various objectives such as:
provision of land for the cantonal museum, financial profitability of de-
velopment (e.g. minimisation of the amount of extended land service tax
owed), increase of energy rent, cooperative housing;
2. hypothesis H3b showed the importance of information in land use policy im-
plementation. When information was shared between actors (building zone
reduction in Huttwil, land exchange in Malley, polluted soils in Niederbipp and
Malley), a compromise was found for all parties. In the processes where an
asymmetry of information existed (building zone transfer and building obliga-
tion in building zone in Wiedlisbach, MAO restrictions and energy planning in
Malley), these processes resulted in a conflict between actors, or in circumven-
tion of the institutional regime of soil. Further, successful (non-) mobilisation
of information can also be linked to the use of other resources: resource “per-
sonnel” in order to exploit available information, time or infrastructure in order
to limit the effects of the resource.
3. the resource infrastructure also played a central role:
− authorities mobilised infrastructure for negotiating the implementation of
type 3 or type 4 instruments (land exchanges, building right)
− authorities mobilised infrastructure in order to enhance the implementation
of the institutional regime (existing land service allowing for the introduc-
tion of the tax on added land value in Niederbipp, and relocation of public
property in Cheseaux)
− in Malley, landowners mobilised public land and the district heating system
in order to create lucrative development possibilities at reduced costs and
thus secure land rent.
4. in the processes where a lack of consensus between authorities and target group
was present, the communal strategy was only partially implemented, and the
LRA resulted in a circumvention, passive implementation, or diversion of the
institutional regime of soil. Target groups often mobilised consensus in combin-
ation with other resources. This was the case for:
− the green zone and building obligation on serviced land in Wiedlisbach,
where landowners fought against green zoning and building obligations
through the resource law (request of a building permit);
− for the building zone reduction in Huttwil, where landowners mobilised
political support in order to prevent a building zone removal;
− for the MAO restrictions in Malley, where landowners used the resource
time in order to obtain a higher plot ratio;
− for the extended land service tax in Malley, where landowner used the
resource personnel in order to limit the instrument’s effects;
− in energy planning, where infrastructure and organisation was shared with
local authorities;
5. the resource time played a decisive role in determining the process output and
its redistributive effects:
− Wiedlisbach’s executive body mobilised time in the building zone transfer
to avoid permanently withdrawing landowners’ rights in the green zone.
They used time in the building obligation processes as a guarantee for the
instrument’s effectiveness;
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− landowners mobilised time in Malley, leaving the table of negotiations for
more than a year, until they received additional development rights as a
compensation for the MAO restriction they had to comply to;
− local authorities lacked time in Malley while implementing the extended
land service tax (the negotiation process held to the tight agglomeration
program’s schedule), reducing the amount of tax they could request;
− local authorities in Chesaux bought time from the landowners in the im-
plementation of the LIS: the commune wanted to build the school in time,
and did not want to further delay the process. This urgency influenced the
reference value applied to the new communal property (as well as public
sharing in land service costs);
When authorities lack one or several of the resources identified above (like in the
processes of building zone reduction, MAO restrictions and extended land service
tax in Malley, or LIS in Cheseaux), they either fail to achieve their goals, or need
to rely on the economic levy created through zoning in order to obtain the target
group’s acceptance (building zone reduction in Huttwil, over-proportionate share of
land service costs in the LIS in Cheseaux).
Personnel and information are mobilised externally in small communes, because
they lack the internal resources or competencies to implement land use policy. Bigger
communes rely both on internal and external experts, particularly when they are
involved in costly urban redevelopment projects. This frequent mix of public and
private personnel is not solely a matter of costs; in addition to the competencies and
knowledge brought by the experts, these are also perceived as (or legally obligated
to be) neutral actors and negotiators: this function is prescribed legally in the case
of the land improvement syndicate, and also applies to land use policy procedures
in general, through the involvement of the contracted planner in negotiations with
landowners (Wiedlisbach, Huttwil).
Political support was a condition of the achievement of the broad communal goals
in four of the analysed processes: in the building zone transfer process in Wiedlis-
bach, inhabitants protested against the additional traffic that a building zone exten-
sion would create, and were in favour of retaining unobstructed views; in the build-
ing zone reduction in Huttwil, local representatives opposed a withdrawal of rights
without financial compensation; in the land exchange in Lausanne, local representat-
ives supported the creation of the new museum; in Cheseaux, inhabitants supported
the construction of a new school.
The resource money was present through the added value generated by the grant-
ing of development rights, but materialised in negotiations through the financial pay-
ments which authorities and landowners agreed to. It appeared as a threat in the
case of Huttwil, where authorities could have faced compensation claims, and in the
case of polluted soil in Niederbipp, where the exfiltration of pollutants could have
led to very costly protection measures. It also played an indirect role when local
authorities hire personnel or buy information. In the two processes "land exchange"
analysed, local authorities preferred to exchange their infrastructure (exchange land)
rather than money (buying the land).
6.4.2 The role of instruments
The majority of land use policy processes analysed showed that local authorities used
a mix of public policy and property rights instruments to implement land use policy.
H4 and H5 showed how only the combined use of different instrument types made
it possible for authorities to implement and complement the institutional regime, as
well as pursue their own goals. Such instrument mix granted authorities the following
possibilities:
− guarantee effective land use;
− guarantee payments due to authorities;
− capture part of the added value created;
− pass on various project-based obligations not explicitly planned by law;
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− determine and capture the rent they seek to obtain from their property title (in
cases where they own the land);
− capture the rent induced by other public policies (such as energy planning);
− exchange and relocate their land (infrastructure).
But the instrument mix did not appear sufficient for the implementation of the
institutional regime of soil, or achieving local objectives. One key additional condition
was the creation of economic value, as the results of H6 have shown.
6.4.2.1 Economic value creation as key factor
In all processes, added or reduced economic value played a central role: target groups
sought to preserve existing value, creating added value if possible, and/or to minimise
the costs induced by various legal obligations.
Five processes resulted in a failure (diversion, circumvention, passivity) to imple- No value capture or
reduction without
compensation
ment land use policy objectives: the building zone transfer in Wiedlisbach, building
zone reduction in Huttwil, the MAO restrictions, the extended land service tax, and
energy planning in Malley. With the exception of the building zone transfer (whose
failure can be explained by the diversion strategy pursued by the commune), the fail-
ure of the four other processes can be explained by the reduced economic value that
implementation of the instruments would have created for the landowners. In fact,
all value capture or value reduction processes that succeeded, induced as a counter-
part, at least a full compensation of the reduced value or, in the majority of cases, the
creation of additional added economic value. Let us discuss these cases of failure in
more detail:
− in the case of the building zone reduction in Huttwil (passivity – process failure),
the reduced economic value for the landowners is obvious, and the coalition of
actors in the political decision process opposed to a pure withdrawal of value
(development rights) are dominant. In order to fulfil its land service obligations
and elaborate a new contract where the commune does not pay for land service,
the communal executive body creates added economic value through zoning,
and thus passes on a portion of the land service costs;
− in the case of the extended land service tax (circumvention – process failure), a
high degree of legal uncertainty prevails, and none of the actors want to settle
the issue publicly in front of a court. One could argue that the amount of tax
paid is largely covered by the development rights granted, which is true; but
the problem is the late "arrival" of the tax: actors had been negotiating value
redistribution for almost a decade when, at the last minute, authorities announce
a new tax that calls into question the financial calculus made by the landowners.
The remaining options were: for the landowners, to play the time card like it did
for the MAO restrictions; for the communes, risk arousing political opposition
where the communal legislative bodies would see the tax exemption that the
landowners benefited from; or negotiate the amount of tax to be paid in order to
seal the deal quickly, which is also in the all actors’ interest, and in particular of
the local authorities – they benefit from public funding for local infrastructure,
whose use is limited in time;
− the case of energy planning (circumvention – process failure) is also obvious
and has been discussed in section 5.1 presenting the Malley case study. As for
the extended land service tax, one could argue that the additional costs linked
with more environment-friendly energy provisions are covered by the overall
creation of added economic value. The attitude seemed to be: but now that
joint investments in heat pipes have been made, why not take full advantage of
them?
− the case of the MAO restrictions (implementation through full compensation)
reflect the shift of information in time between the SBB, which set the restric-
tions, and the canton, who initially accepted them as such. When the canton
gained access to the necessary information, they imposed a set of restrictions
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impacting the initial added economic value calculations by the SBB, who in
turn accepted, after several months, the restrictions, under the condition of full
economic compensation.
Thirty years ago, in his analysis of land markets in canton Vaud, V. Ruffy (1989)From simple value
distribution... observed that the economic levy provided by land use policy is a key factor in ex-
plaining the implementation of land use policy instruments.
Starting from the introduction and emergence of the institutional regime of soil
introduction in the 1960’s, through land use policy instruments, authorities have
mainly distributed economic value: zoning occurred based on local interests, as in
the case of Huttwil, and the more recent case of Malley (local development plan sized
according to property structure), have shown. One of the few obligations imposed on
landowners and developers was the connection of construction to the sewer (Nahrath,
2003). Land service benefiting private owners was financed by the public (Huttwil,
Wiedlisbach, and to a lesser extent, Cheseaux). Further, due to the absence of a
compensation mechanism for land use planning measures, a large part of the land
rent was captured by the landowner, and the implementation of the institutional
regime of soil faced significant difficulties, such as the correct dimensioning of building
zone, and the relocation of building zones (H1). As H3a has shown, these issues were
particularly problematic in cases of fragmented or unordered property structures,
because public policies did not grant authorities the necessary tools, leaving them to
rely on property rights instruments (H4), whose implementation was conditioned on
the approval of the landowners. Thus, policy implementation was often tied to the
creation of substantial added economic value for the landowner.
The element that has changed over time is that authorities used available in-...To redistribution
within land use policy... struments not only to distribute, but also redistribute this value. The added value
induced by zoning is redistributed in order to meet land use policy objectives such as
land service, and infrastructure costs. More recently, this redistribution has funded
the compensation mechanism through the tax on added land value created through
zoning, or communal infrastructure through the extended land service tax. H1 has
also shown that authorities have mobilised public policy instruments as threats, in
order to implement the institutional regime.
Beyond value redistribution within land use policy, the added economic value cre-... To redistribution
spread across policies ated has also been increasingly redistributed to other public policies. Among these
public policy recipients are: fiscal policy, where urban growth strategies are meant to
compensate for lowered tax rates (H2), economic promotion, in order to make land
available for new businesses, major accidents ordinance (MAO) through the addi-
tional development rights that compensate use restrictions, transport policy through
the provision of additional users, and energy policy through the provision of captive
clients. Such value redistribution benefited various parties, for example: landowners
who profit from additional land rent, developers who receive new contracts, inhab-
itants and companies who benefit from low taxes, transport companies that benefit
from additional users, energy companies that guarantee the profitability of their in-
vestments, and inhabitants with new homes. One element to emphasise is that end
beneficiaries are rather poorly represented in the negotiation of policy outputs, as
they mainly intervene at the end of the process through the communal legislative
body, which is often restricted by the pre-negotiated decisions between communal
executive and landowners. This fact has already been acknowledged in early works
on land use policy (Knoepfel, 1977).
The observed redistributive processes also contain spatial implications. Those con-
sidered by actors primarily are within communal boundaries. Hypothesis H5 showed
the link between the acceptance of value redistribution and the spatial proximity
of the infrastructure financed through value redistribution: landowners opposed re-
distribution of the captured value beyond the neighbourhood, and communes that
dimensioned their building zones correctly do not want to pay for those who did not.
6.4.2.2 Parsimonious value redistribution
What has not changed over time is that redistribution remains parsimonious. One
element illustrating this, is that despite sharp increases in Swiss urban land prices,
authorities have taken only limited steps towards controlling or redistributing the
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value induced by the institutional regime of soil. With the exception of specific zones
in canton Geneva (zones de développement), there has been an absence of control on
land values.
Considering the initial reasons of the launch of the federal land use planning
policy in the 1960’s (Nahrath, 2003, 194), today’s absence of control on land values
is paradoxical, because one of the motives justifying federal intervention were the
perceived indirect negative effects of land price increase, such as speculation and
inflation. The analysed cases show that the political objective of value control has
completely failed.
One partial explanation for the absence of value control is provided by H6: land Both authorities and
landowners benefit from
high land values
value plays a central role in the negotiation between authorities and target groups, as
both parties intend to benefit from it. Therefore, no party intends to "kill the golden
goose". Another explanation is linked to the current conception of land property,
which reflects in existing value taxation instruments:
− first, taxation focusses on anticipated (fictitious) gains which refer to the ex-
change value of land, and neglects the effective amount of rent generated for the
property title holder. The effective rent is taxed together with revenues or bene-
fits generated by a regular occupation or work. There is no distinction between
income and benefits generated by production or service provisions on one hand,
and income and benefits generated by the mere possession of a property title
on the other hand;
− second, current fiscal instruments subsidise the mobilisation of landed capital
through the mortgage of the property title: the subsidy is granted to the prop-
erty title holder and indirectly to banks through the possibility of deducting
mortgage interest from their tax declaration.
These two elements show the current dominant conception of land as a banal Land as banal good
good and, contribute to explaining the limited role of value redistribution in the
institutional regime of soil.
An additional element representing the parsimony of value redistribution is the Limited link between
ecological and economic
land values
marginal link between ecological and economic values: there is no incentive for de-
velopers or landowners to remediate soil, preserve fertile land, or avoid an urban
growth strategy. This has been shown through the two polluted soil processes, and
by the peri-urban cases, where authorities face an institutional setting and structural
changes beyond their influence. Further, the considerable price difference between
building land and agricultural land severely restricts the initiation of redistributive
mechanisms for the protection of such economically lower value uses. This becomes
particularly salient when these uses do not have local users to protect them (such as
neighbours who want to keep their view, or inhabitants that want to keep the nearby
natural area for walks).
6.4.2.3 Increase of redistributive processes
Recent legal changes and the practices of authorities have evolved towards a more
constrained distribution of value: landowners cannot expect to receive added economic
value without being obliged to adhere to a set of obligations, either in the form of
value retro-cession, or through different land use obligations. Thus, one can state
that there is a progressive increase of redistributive processes in land use policy.
This increase is due to the adoption of new land use policy instruments, such as
the tax on added land value and the extended land service tax, as well as the exten-
sion of redistribution to other soil related policies, as shown by the empirical analysis.
However, it is not possible to assess how the overall percentage of redistributed eco-
nomic value has evolved over time, because value capture through fiscal instruments
has declined over the same period. The consideration of time for the quantification of
the percentage of captured value is central, because market prices reflect the land’s
value only at a specific moment, and not over the entire period during which the land
is used. Depending on future land use, land market prices include the expected added
value of land over the next five, ten, or thirty years, but land continues to generate
added economic value beyond the time span referred to in its calculation.
These two findings – the increased number of instruments dedicated to value cap- A historical fight on soil
value
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ture, and the ongoing parsimonious redistribution of value – reflect the ongoing histor-
ical fight between advocates of State intervention, and protectors of the landowners’
interests. This fight already existed in the 1960’s, when planning milieus, unions and
left parties argued in favour of a stronger regulation of the resource soil in order to
control soil uses and value, and bourgeois and economic interests stood against cent-
ral planning competencies and State intervention on the land market (Nahrath, 2003,
197ff).
6.4.3 Redistributive capacity of analysed instruments
6.4.3.1 Several instruments taxing the same added value?
The increase in redistributive processes referred to in section 6.4.2 translated into aDistinct punctual value
capture tools set of value capture instruments. The analysed redistributive processes have shown
that several instruments can pile up and jointly tax the added economic value created
at a specific moment in time:
− when a plot is zoned as building land and sold by its owner (in which case
the tax on added land value created through zoning and real estate gains taxes
applies);
− when additional development rights are granted and the landowner sells the plot
(in which case the extended land service tax and real estate gains tax apply);
− potentially when additional development rights are granted (in which case the
tax on added land value created through zoning and the extended land service
tax would apply2).
Eventually these instruments all capture a share of land’s added value. In orderThe chase after value
to limit their cumulative effects, federal and cantonal legislators have added specific
clauses in legislation. The questions that arise for authorities are twofold:
1. what share of the value created does each level of government receive?
2. how much added value is to be captured?
The first question depends upon each zoning case or land transaction: dependingDifferent taxes for
different levels of
government
on the location of the instruments’ use (commune, canton), different instruments and
different taxation rates apply. The real estate gains tax depends on the duration of
ownership and cantonal legislation. The extended service tax depends on communal
regulations, and the tax on added land value created through zoning depends on
cantonal legislation (based on the minimum federal rate of 20% and a defined use
of the tax produce). Based on a set of legal dispositions, the gains generated are
dispersed among authorities.
The second question remains presently unanswered. In a case in canton Basel3,Public interest in value
capture where the tax on added land value has been applied since the 1970’s, the Federal
Tribunal has left the question deliberately open. The court argued that development
rights granted to a plot create a special advantage from which the landowner benefits.
The capture of these benefits are due in order to respect the principle of equality in
the eyes of the law. Further, the court argued that given the degree of industrialisa-
tion and agglomeration of society, there is a public interest in capturing the added
value created, to finance planning and urbanisation costs that aim to concentrate
certain land uses in given perimeters and to protect other perimeters from these uses.
The only response provided by the Court is that the guarantee of the institution of
property requires that the legislator preserves the substance of existing property and
the possibility to create new wealth. However, they do not set a maximum amount
of taxation.
If we now individually consider the main redistributive instruments of land use
policy, a set of conclusions can be drawn for the cases analysed.
2Federal legislation leaves the choice of implementing the tax on added land value created through
zoning in up-zoning processes for the cantons. Current legislative proposals in canton Vaud plan to
tax the value created through new building zones, and on existing building zones that were granted
additional development rights.
3ATF 105 Ia 134.
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6.4.3.2 Tax on added land value created through zoning
In the absence of a federal tax on added land value created through zoning, the cases Marginal communal
implementation of the taxanalysed focussed on cantonal value capture instruments and their implementation.
As the empirical findings have shown, the voluntary instrument adopted in canton
Berne, the tax on added land value created through zoning, is not a success story:
twenty years after canton Bern introduced the tax on added land value in its cantonal
legislation, only 18 communes out of 47 in Oberaargau implemented the tax in their
building regulations.
The analysis on local level showed that in the case of Huttwil, the tax was adopted Tax as mean of pressure
on landownersin communal building regulations, but only used as means of pressure to compel
landowners to financially participate in land service costs, and thus never effectively
implemented. In the case of Niederbipp, where the tax was applied, the amount taxed
did not match land market values.
Further, the tax revenue was not used for out-zoning operations, primarily because Tax revenue not used for
out-zoningthe local implementation of the tax on added land value does not fit the scale of the
problem of reduction and relocation of building zones.
Further, figure 6.5 shows that the communes that introduced the tax are mainly Tax primarily
implemented in commune
with over-sized building
zones
those that have already over-sized building zones. Significantly, these communes
introduced the tax only decades after the definition of their building zone, (from the
2000’s onwards) (Viallon, 2016a). Consequently, the initial aim of the instrument
– the collection of funds to financially compensate building zone reductions – could
not be fulfilled, as subsequent zoning operations were quite limited due to existing
over-sized building zones.
Overall, the adoption of the tax on added value created through zoning on the Local adoption of the tax
faces strong resistancecommunal level faced strong resistance, because it directly challenged local interests
of landowners, who perceived the capture of a portion of their gains as "robber bar-
ony", and of communal authorities, who faced strong incentives not to implement the
instrument. Reasons for not implementing the tax are the pressure of fiscal compet-
ition among communes, and the fear of jeopardizing future development and losing
territorial attractiveness (Viallon, 2016a).
Figure 6.5: Communes with oversized building zones (as percentage of overall housing
and mixed zone) and implementation status of the tax on added land value created
through zoning in Oberaargau. Data: Communal building regulations. Map: FSO
(2014b).
In order to fulfil the redistributive processes intended by the instrument, such as Time and level of
implementation limits the
tax’ effects
the reduction of oversized building zones, it would have been necessary to implement
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the instrument (at least on a regional level), where potential for value redistribution
exists (for example between a more attractive growing commune with smaller build-
ing zone reserves or a less attractive, declining commune with larger building zone
reserves). The un-official, country-wide analysis of the location of oversized build-
ing zones completed by the ARE, shows that such an instrument would be the most
relevant at the inter-cantonal or federal level.
As a result, the instrument which dictated the instrument’s scale of action on
the federal level, as conceived in the initial legislative proposal in 1974, would have
confronted the issue of over-sized building zones on more congruent time and spatial
scales than the instrument defined by the spatial planning act that entered into force
in 2014. In fact, the new tax on added land value currently operates in a best case
scenario on cantonal level (canton Bern, for example, maintained the communal scale
of action regarding the instrument). The implementation of the tax is forty years after
the problem was first politically discussed, reducing the amount of surface on which
the instrument could possibly be implemented, and severely limiting its redistributive
potential.
6.4.3.3 Vaud’s extended land service tax
The study of Vaud’s extended service tax shows that the instrument has been adopted
by most of the urban communes of Lausanne’s agglomeration. This finances general
communal infrastructure such as schools, administrative and cultural buildings and
sports facilities, the aim it was conceived for. Due to a lack of legal clarity, the
question of its application with regards to public landowners remains open, and has
led to the litigious implementation in Malley.
The potential financial overlap of the extended land service tax with the future tax
on added land value created through zoning is, in the current legal proposal, prevented
through the possibility to deduct the amount of money paid for the extended land
service tax from the amount paid for the tax on added land value created through
zoning4.
6.4.3.4 Land tax and income tax
The evolution of land tax rates between 2003 and 2013 in Oberaargau has shown aGeneral reduction of land
taxation general tendency towards a reduction of land tax rates (Viallon, 2016a). This trend
also applies to the income tax. The analysis done between 2008 and 2016 in the
agglomeration of Lausanne shows only evidence of a reduction of the income tax
rate, but not of the land tax rate. The reduction of land taxation is not an isolated
phenomenon but has endured in OECD countries since the 1970’s (Guigou, 1983).
The situation is particularly acute in peri-urban communes: local authorities minimise
value capture on present landowners and residents, and open up new building land in
order to increase the number of residents, which in turn is supposed to increase local
fiscal revenues.
This phenomenon has been highlighted by regional economists such as O. Crevois-Shift to residential
economy ier and A. Segessemann (2016), who emphasised the shift from a productive economy
to a residential economy, i.e. the capture of revenues brought into the territory via the
residential population. The added value created by foreign territories (other regions
and countries) has become a prime source of income for Swiss regions, representing
– independently of the commune’s location – half of their source of income – the
other sources of income being annuitants, industrial production, public spending, and
income from tourism (Segessemann, 2016, 136).
The critical factor for such strategy to succeed, is the effective attraction of newUrban growth as
necessity? residents; an objective that heavily depends on urban growth. As the mayor of Hut-
twil stated5: "without growth, communes face financial collapse". But such strategy
leads to an extension of urbanisation away from urban centres, a result which fully
contradicts the objectives of the institutional regime of soil.
4Art. 65 of the Projet de loi modifiant la partie aménagement de la loi sur l’aménagement du
territoire et les constructions (LATC) du 4 décembre 1985.
5M. Jampen, op. cit.
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6.4.3.5 Land property income tax
This instrument does not exist in Swiss legislation (nor in French or German legisla-
tion), but can play a central role in the control of land value and the redistribution
of the economic value generated through land.
Current value capture tools are mostly punctual value capture tools: the real estate Neglection of durative
value capture toolsgains tax, and the tax on added land value created through zoning (or the extended
land service tax) are bound to zone changes or the sale of land. In current legislation,
durative value capture tools tax income or benefits generated through land over time
– the rent paid by tenants to the landlord for the use of the land and the constructions
on it – together with other types of revenues. Current income and benefits tax are
generic, because they consider jointly all types of income and benefits, regardless
of their source. This means that current durative taxation of land-based income or
benefits confounds the added value created by any kind of individual or collective
effort (production, delivery of a service, trade of non real goods) with the sole net
retribution of possessing property. The retribution is net, because landowners already
have the possibility to deduct property maintenance costs and mortgage interests from
their taxes. As argued in section 6.4.2.2, the absence of a specific instrument for land-
based revenues neglects not only the source of revenue that is taxed, but the time
dimension of value.
According to J. Tinbergen Tinbergen (1952), each policy objective requires its own One instrument for each
objectiveinstrument. If the institutional regime of soil aims to capture economic gains which
landowners benefit from, which concedes them specific and individual advantages
resulting from land use policy, it would be appropriate to consider income and benefits
generated by land property separately from other types of revenues. A durative value
capture instrument such as the land property income tax would neatly complement
punctual value capture instruments (such as the real estate gains tax).
The value capture mechanism would require to separate the declaration of income Separate declaration of
land revenuesand benefits stemming from the lease of immovable properties, from those stemming
from the lease or sale of movable properties and services. The definition of a spe-
cific taxation rate for income and benefits from the lease of immovable properties
would allow to capture a wider amount of land rent than through the current generic
scheme. Tax revenues could then be reinvested in desirable land uses (such as housing,
infrastructure, or agriculture).
6.4.3.6 Other fiscal instruments
Although not explicitly considered in the case studies, two other fiscal instruments
play an important role in the institutional regime of soil, and set forth counter-
productive incentives regarding land use:
− in most cantons, the real estate gains tax, which aims to capture a portion of the
gains generated from acquisition, and subsequent sale of immovable property,
is digressive over time, which means that the longer landowners hold the land,
the less they taxes they pay. This situation has stimulated land hoarding beha-
viours, which in turn block development projects. In cases where farmers own
land (which had been zoned as constructible), these landowners often benefit
additionally from a land taxation based on the land’s provided income value
(similar to the instrument suggested above for land income taxation), rather
than the market value (Egloff, 2008), a valuation which fostered the hoarding
behaviour;
− the possibility to deduct mortgage interest from taxes: landowners who have
mortgaged their property can reduce their taxable income or benefits by declar-
ing the interest paid on the mortgage. Such possibility creates an advantage
for landowners as opposed to home renters, but also fosters individually owned
housing, which is overall more land-consuming than rented housing (Waltert
et al., 2010). Further, it creates an incentive for landowners to finance their
property through mortgage, which in turn subsidises mortgage-lending banks.
6.4.3.7 Soil remediation obligation
The polluted soil processes studied (Niederbipp and Malley) show that the solutions Choice of the cheapest
solution
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chosen adapt construction types and techniques to the polluted grounds in question,
rather than engaging a costly remediation process. Actors cover the contaminated soil
with new buildings, which create a lid, and thus reduce the risk of future damages to
the environment. At the same time, the lid allows for a minimisation of remediation
costs. Such solutions impeaches soil remediation for an undetermined period of time,
which has no relation to our anthropic conception of time. These implementation
strategies can be explained by the financial costs of remediation. More importantly,
these strategies emphasise the absence of a link between land use policy and the qual-
itative protection of soils: in fact, there is no instrument linking the capture of added
economic value with the financing of ecological remediation measures. Currently,
public contributions to remediation projects are financed by the waste tax.
In Niederbipp, the process has shown that polluted soils can be a good deal for
developers: they can buy industrial land at a reduced price; and the landowner can
sell their land four times! In Malley, soil pollution has been a minor issue, as no
exfiltration risks existed, and the development rights have been relocated on less
polluted grounds.
To summarise, contaminated sites policy induces redistributive processes, but in
the absence of site contamination, remediation costs are minimised, which hinders the
redistribution from economic to ecological value.
6.4.3.8 Vaud’s energy planning
Vaud’s energy planning states that authorities and landowners/developers need to
consider the energetic dimension of the neighbourhood when elaborating a new local
development plan. The case of Malley has shown that the plan’s content as well
as its implementation was dependant on the resources owned and mobilised by the
landowners, which reduced the plan’s effects to just a pass-on of costs. However, it
was not possible to take all the energy policy’s effects into account: for example, the
5% development rights bonus that developers can obtain if they exceed legal energy
standards6 was not considered, because the effective policy output depends on the
building permit, which remains to be elaborated.
6.4.3.9 Land improvement syndicate
The study of the land improvement syndicates (LIS) in the case of Cheseaux shows
that:
− the instrument coordinates land improvement and zoning within a determined
perimeter and thus allows a complete redefinition of the shapes and sizes of the
property structure, and the use rights linked to them (through a local develop-
ment plan). In Cheseaux, the use of the instrument has unblocked a land use
process deadlocked for more than 40 years;
− procedural aspects such as the use of a majority rule within the landowners’
assembly, the mandatory conduct of a feasibility study, the communal pre-
definition of the perimeter, the equal treatment of landowners, and the above
mentioned mandatory coordination between the property structure and zoning,
reduce existing constraints of both public and private law, and allow for a nearly
complete reconsideration of land use;
− from a planning perspective, the economic value created through zoning allows,
for example, for a reduction in the amount of soil surfaces dedicated to devel-
opment through the allocation of a higher density coefficient to the landowners;
the added value could also be used to reduce oversized - and relocate badly
located - building zones. Joint simulations made with Vaud’s spatial planning
office, have shown the economic feasibility of a regional transfer of rights (e.g.
from a peri-urban to an urban commune).
− from the landowners’ perspective, the economic value created through zoning
allows them to use their land (and the additional development rights allocated)
as a financial guarantee to pay for land service;
6Art. 97 LATC, SR-VD 700.11.
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− however, there is no coordinated development process which limits the common
aesthetics of construction and their integration into the existing urban frame-
work to the legal prescriptions of the local development plan;
− the number of landowners involved in the instrument’s process is limited to
a dozen cooperative landowners: despite the use of majority rule for decisions
within the landowners’ assembly, negotiations are a central element (e.g. for the
definition of the future property structure and building regulations which will
apply to it) and legal action (through civil and administrative procedures) can
be taken by each landowner in case of disagreement. Thus, a relative consensus
between the involved parties is necessary.
6.4.3.10 Building right/leasehold land
The study of the building right instrument (in Huttwil, and Malley) has shown that Tailor-made arrangement
for developmentthe separation of the property of land from the property of construction allows the
landowner to keep property, and allows the lease holder to dispose of it within a
determined period of time. The terms of the lease generally mention an obligation of
development and a pre-emption right in favour of the landowner. They also specify
the type of construction that can be built, and its intended use, as well as obligations
or restrictions related to its economic use.
In Huttwil, the instrument shows its resilience to shrinking land prices: the public Resilience to shrinking
land pricesowner adopts a low price policy, and thus manages, less dependent of market con-
ditions, to attract more new inhabitants than private landowners. In the long-term,
public owners are able to keep the land in their ownership .
In the case of Malley, the instrument allows the public landowner to ensure the Compromise between
financial return and
social housing
construction of a determined amount of social housing by private developers, to fix
the schedule of development, fix a financial return, as well as the rent the owner of
the building can ask.
6.4.4 The role of urban and peri-urban contexts
The cases analysed have shown the importance of socio-economic conditions for im- Segmentation of land
marketsplementing development objectives. Comparing the peri-urban and urban contexts,
a segmentation of the land markets is observable (Theurillat et al., 2015): peri-urban
communes struggle between self-provision of development (e.g. building right in Hut-
twil), a stage where households provide for their own housing needs and are primarily
focussed on the usage value of constructions, and market-provided development, a
stage where property developers invest in land development in order to generate fin-
ancial return (e.g. Wiedlisbach). Empirically, the difference between these two stages
reflects in local authorities’ ability to impose a set of obligations to the landowner
(e.g. building obligation, land service costs, tax on added land value created through
zoning). But socio-economic conditions are not the sole factor explaining the imple-
mentation of land use policy goals in peri-urban areas: intertwined interests between
authorities and landowners, and authorities’ ability to mobilise resources and instru-
ments, also play a significant role.
In the urban context, local authorities’ land use planning policy attracts institu- Necessity of a sufficient
rate of returntional investors, who operate in national and international, real estate and financial
markets. This capitalist stage is characterised by investors’ comparative risk/return
calculations to determine the most attractive locations to invest in (Theurillat et al.,
2015). Based on these criteria, authorities seek sufficient financial attractiveness for
their project, and thus aim to channel urban growth, and, depending on authorities’
power position (i.e. available policy resources and instruments), shift major infra-
structure costs to developers.
Although acting in different contexts and with different actors, peri-urban and Financial competition
among local authoritiesurban communes both face financial competition from their peers: peri-urban com-
munes struggle to maintain their population and try to increase their attractiveness
towards neighbour communes by lowering tax rates and opening land for development
at low costs. Considering the demographic evolution of the peri-urban communes
analysed, such strategy has encountered limited success, and results in an extensive
consumption of land by low density housing.
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Urban communes try to attract financial investors through the definition of highTwo options for urban
development plot ratios close to transportation networks. They also compete with geographically
separated urban communes for the attraction of capital, and depend on the rate of re-
turn of real estate compared to other investments on the financial markets. However,
in case urban communes own land, they can also lease it to cooperatives and small
local investors, cases in which they opt for a reduced profit rate in exchange of con-
trolled rental prices or additional development obligations (e.g. Malley-gasomètre).
6.5 Feedback to theory
6.5.1 Economic theory
Despite the lack of statistically significant analysis (see however Viallon (2016a)), IKey role of locational
attributes can generally confirm the effects of locational attributes of land suggested by hedonic
pricing models on land value (Sirmans et al., 2005): the further away from and the
less well connected to urban centres, the lower the land prices and the less attractive
urban development are. In Huttwil, the least attractive commune analysed, actors
lowered rental revenues in order to attract new inhabitants. In Malley, the future
urban neighbourhood in Lausanne’s agglomeration, actors achieved urban develop-
ment on a brownfield with a 4.5-5% annual return on the plot’s value. The lower
intermediate cases of Niederbipp and Wiedlisbach achieved growth through a special-
isation of activities: the former used the existing transport infrastructure and flat
land to foster the development of a logistics hub, the latter put forward the view at-
tributes of certain plots and a train connection (to secondary centres like Solothurn)
to attract middle class residents. The upper intermediate case of Cheseaux shows
that a rapid transport connection to Lausanne’s agglomeration, and the proximity of
developed plots to the village’s centre and public infrastructure led to a quick develop-
ment (and sky-rocketing land prices, which were also bound to the general economic
conjuncture).
Confronting the analysed processes with classical land rent theories, I observedCreation of rent
monopolies that in at least two cases analysed, actors – both private and public landowners, and,
to a certain extent, public authorities – tried to create a rent monopoly from which
they sought to benefit (Harvey, 1982). This occurred through various means:
− the elaboration of a growth strategy through the reduction of taxes (Oberaargau,
in general), which can be combined with a reduction of the revenues from land
(building right in Huttwil). As shown by Segessemann and Crevoisier (2016),
commuters are the main source of revenues for communes. In order to capture
these revenues, communes sell residential space below market prices and lower
taxes, in order to attract new inhabitants, which, in turn, should increase their
revenues;
− the resistance to instruments implementation, as shown in the case of Malley:
– by obtaining full compensation for the MAO restrictions, landowners max-
imised the surface of production (gross floor area) in an outstanding loca-
tion (centrality of the plots, close proximity to the train station);
– through the circumvention of the extended land service tax, which aimed
to maximise the amount of rent;
– through the relocation of development rights minimising soil remediation
operations, they reduced construction costs, and thus reduced their impact
on future land rent;
– in regard to energy provision, landowners minimised their costs linked to
the future building’s heating system, by defining the district heating net-
work as a main source of energy, allowing them to pass on the energy provi-
sion costs to future tenants and home buyers. Such transfer of costs forces
higher rental prices than if landowners had invested in their own heat-
ing system. As a consequence, in the present case, landowners achieved
absolute rent;
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Referring to the previous comments made in section 6.4.1 on the role of policy Cross-fertilisation of
economic and political
analyses
resources, economic analysis explaining land rent could be enriched by a systematic
analysis of actors’ mobilisation of policy resources and instruments. This would allow
researchers to explain in greater detail, why actors were able (or not) to maximise
revenues from land property. Contrariwise, policy analysis would benefit from eco-
nomic theory through its qualitative characterisation of the outputs or redistributive
effects resulting from policy processes (differential, monopoly, absolute rent) and the
complementary explanations it provides to actors’ decisions (rent-maximising beha-
viour).
6.5.2 Policy and regime theory
The relevance of policy resources in achieving land use policy objectives has been Prominent role of the
resources personnel and
information
shown and discussed in the present chapter. The importance of possessing and mobil-
ising personnel and information appear to be key factors in successfully implementing
land use policy objectives (building obligations, polluted soils, tax on added land value
created through zoning, LIS), but also in diverting them (building zone transfer).
Consensus and political support have also played important roles in defining policy
outputs, because the target group’s consensus is conditioned on a guarantee (through
compensation, or value increase) of the economic value of the property titles.
Land use policy, which through zoning makes the creation of added value possible, Limited account for the
value induced by land use
policy
only marginally accounts for the value it induces – mainly through punctual value
capture instruments. Until 2014, land use policy delegated the use, capture, or con-
trol of the land value to other circumstantial process-bound policies (environmental
protection, energy, housing, transport, etc.), or simply to the property title holder.
Although the tax on added land value created through zoning is now mandatory, a
major part of the added economic value remains in the hands of the landowners.
This insight sheds new light on what the IRR framework conceptualises as a lack Sustainability of the
resource or of its uses?of extent, coherence, or strictness in managing natural resources: there is a lack of
coordination and of control mechanisms between public policies and property rights
on the potential value created through land use policy. Such regulatory gaps are
symptomatic for what P. Knoepfel et al. (2007, 464) have identified as the absence of
"distinction between sustainability of the resource (system) and the ecological, eco-
nomic and social sustainability of its different uses": current soil resource management
aims to limit building zone extensions, foster densification, and reduce emissions of
pollutants, but does not account for the stock or the reproductive capacities of the
soil resource system. In the case of soil, this is reflected in the absence of link between
the stock of soil and the stock of the services soil provides.
Hence, future research questions are: how is the constructible stock of land to be
defined in accordance with other non-construction uses, and how is the constructible
stock of land to be shared among the various land uses involving construction?
6.5.2.1 Towards an integration of infrastructural and natural resource
management
C. Bréthaut (2012) applied the IRR framework to drinking water networks in tour- More integrated resource
managementist communes, and established a link between these networks and the institutional
regime of water, whose management perimeter is functionally defined by the water
basins. The author cited the progressive change of scale initiated by actors from the
commune’s infrastructure to the intercommunal water basin management, and em-
phasised the increased management possibilities on the natural resource’s stock that
result from such change of scale.
L. Nicol and P. Knoepfel (2014) applied the IRR framework to housing stocks,
a central use of developed land. Through the use of this framework, the authors
identified the stock owners, users and third parties, and classified mains goods and
services derived from the resource housing. This allowed them to show which actors
and elements a housing stock needs to account for to remain functional.
In the two examples cited, there are missing links between the soil stock and
the stock of the various infrastructural resources which rely on soil (such as water
networks, housing, food). These missing links are twofold: at what scale are the "sub-
resources" to be managed? And how (and at what scale) is it to be quantitatively
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regulated in comparison with other soil uses?
The agglomeration programs developed over the past fifteen years have initiatedFunctional localisation of
housing and employment a significant change which provides a first response to the question of the scale for
defining and managing the housing stock: these programs have initiated a change
of scale in defining and locating future housing and employment. In canton Bern,
these changes have even been formalised in regional functional political-administrative
structures that cover the entire territory. However, the new government level in Bern
(or the less formalised agglomeration committees in Vaud) have marginal or no direct
zoning competency, an element crucial for the definition and location of housing stock,
and related employment areas.
Since the 2014 spatial planning act revision, the question of the quantitative man-Quantitative resource
stock managed by
cantons
agement of the soil stock and its allocation to various types of uses (see table 8.32 in
the annexes) is now dependent on the cantons: they have the competency to define
the stock of land dedicated to urbanisation for each commune, and thus manage its
canton-wide (re-) distribution.
6.5.3 Instrumental theory
The theoretical chapter referred to three main strains of research in instrumental
theory: institutions as instruments, politics of instrumentality, and typologies. Con-
fronting the thesis’ results with the instrumental literature mobilised in the theoretical
chapter, the following comments can be made:
− the classification of instruments in a typology, close to the one developed by P.
Lascoumes and P. le Galès (2007), has allowed for the sorting of instruments
stemming from various public policies in order to gain an overview of their
nature, their role in redistributive processes, the governmental level in charge of
implementation, the objectives they aim to achieve, as well as the groups they
target;
− based on the comparative attributes from B. Linder and G. Peters (1998), I
formulated preliminary expectations about the resource intensiveness, the target
quality, and the political risks involved with the instruments’ implementation.
In accordance with the central research question of the thesis, I put an emphasis
on the instruments’ redistributive capacity or effects, which is another dimension
of analysis put forward by A. Schneider and H. Ingram (1990).
Considering instruments as markers of change (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007), IShift from permanent to
punctual value capture
tools
observed a reduction in the importance of permanent value capture instruments (land
tax) – a decades-long phenomenon (Guigou, 1983) –, and a growing use of punctual
value capture instruments (tax on added land value created through zoning, extended
land service tax). In the short term, one can argue that public authorities benefit from
this change, because they quickly capture significant sums of money which they can
use for various political goals. In the long term, the effects on public finances depend
upon authorities’ ability to capture economic added value as a whole. On this aspect,
the previously discussed research results from O. Crevoisier and A. Segessemann 2016
provide useful insights.
Referring to L. Salamon’s (2002) hypothesis on the growth of new governance,More indirect, invisible
and automatic tools notably the premium put on indirect, invisible, and automatic tools, the observed
rise of punctual value capture confirms two of L. Salamon’s features:
− in terms of directness, the newly introduced punctual value capture tools are
defined on the federal (respective cantonal) level, and implemented by cantonal
(respective local) authorities. Compared to other taxation tools, no effective
change in terms of directness is observed;
− in terms of visibility, the impact on the budget process of punctual value capture
instrument tends to be reduced: although their amount can be substantial, funds
collected through the extended land service tax only concern specific landowners.
They are bound to specific communal infrastructure, and cannot be used for
other purposes. On the contrary, permanent value capture instruments (such as
the land tax) concern all landowners and can be used for any politically decided
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purpose, and therefore open up to long and intense discussions on the budget,
regarding, for example, the distribution of revenues, or on the adjustment of
the tax rate;
− in terms of automaticity, punctual value capture instruments have been form-
alised and their implementation has become, in the case of the federal tax on
added land value created through zoning, mandatory. Their adoption as taxa-
tion instruments makes their use systematic and non-negotiable, in contrast with
previous contractual negotiations. Compared to previous less or non-formalised
uses, the tools’ automaticity is enhanced. However, compared to other taxation
tools, their automaticity is not enhanced.
If I relax the functionalist definition of "policy instruments" adopted for analytical
purposes, and include more blurred forms of public intervention – such as action plans
or other indirect instruments that frame the use of instruments directly impacting the
target groups, I observe an increase of the role of indirect instruments in time. Several
recent changes show the increased role of agreements set up by private, or half-public
actors that indirectly condition the delivery of policy output.
The 2014 technical directive on building zone dimensioning (Flückiger, 2014; Vi-
allon, 2016a) is characteristic of the new governance era: the federal administration,
with the approval of the cantonal ministers in charge of public works and spatial plan-
ning, defined a highly precise measurement technique in order to calculate the legally
admissible amount of surfaces dedicated to future urbanisation. The tool is imple-
mented through the cantonal structure plan – a second indirect instrument that sets
development goals. However, the structure plan does not take direct action through
resizing building zones. It leaves the task to the communes, which are, in most can-
tons, responsible for dimensioning the building zones. The technical directives solely
provide a highly technical-administrative comparative model that allows for the clas-
sification of "good communes" and "bad communes" for the purposes of comparison.
The tool is also invisible, because it does not have any financial impact on the Con-
federation, only the communes potentially facing compensation claims (for material
expropriation, in case they have to reduce their building zone) are subject to financial
impact. And it is also automatic, in the sense that existing cantonal administrations
only adapt their current building zone calculation methods to federal directives.
Agglomeration programs are contract-based action plans negotiated by the federal Competence shift to new
State level?administration with cantonal political administrative authorities. The latter, in turn,
set up (ad hoc) governance structures gathering delegates from the cantonal admin-
istration, dedicated personnel hired specifically for the program’s implementation,
and the mayors of the involved communes. In canton Vaud, this twofold political-
administrative process (Confederation-canton and canton-communes) is entirely con-
tractual and voluntary. The agglomeration program’s content is elaborated by an ad
hoc administration, under the supervision of cantonal administrative authorities, and
by representatives of the communal executive body. The program’s content is imple-
mented in successive master plans, and other indirect tools. Communal legislative
bodies, when they adopt the usual land use policy instruments (building regulations,
zoning and local development plans), must comply with the program, without the pos-
sibility to determine their content. Consequently, in Vaud, indirect tools de facto bind
communal legislative bodies, because the zoning plans they adopt need to conform to
the master plans. The situation is different in Bern, where formalised institutional
structures have emerged. However, these structures lack the formal competency to
implement land use policy instruments, such as binding zoning plans for landowners,
a competency which remains in communal hands.
Looking closer at the legal transformations induced by the increased number of Cherry picking strategy
of landownersindirect instruments, the case of Malley reveals that landowners were involved in the
elaboration of master plans, the master plans immediately preceding local develop-
ment plans. The involvement of master plans can be understood through the direct
consequence they have on landowners’ rights and the land’s subsequent value. These
master plans allow a pre-determinination of land prices, and they coordinate and sta-
bilise actors’ expectations prior to the definition of binding instruments. However,
such coordination has, in the case of Malley, resulted in a "cherry picking" strategy
by landowners: they picked elements of the master plans that matched their interests
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(gross floor areas to be built), excluded or minimised those that did not (MAO re-
strictions, energy provision standards), and put forward others they did not intend to
realise at all (a planned pond in the centre of the new neighbourhood). The regional
landscape protection plan in Oberaargau was subject to similar selective implement-
ation: although cantonal administrative and communal political actors agreed on
a regional plan defining wildlife corridors and urbanisation boundaries, their imple-
mentation did not occur in Wiedlisbach’s zoning plan.
The point is that these indirect tools introduced a formal defect, where pre-Formal defect of indirect
tools negotiated arrangements are used by the most powerful actors to secure their interests,
and are presented as non-negotiable in subsequent democratic steps.
The four instrument types defined by the IRR framework are classified as in-Authorities increasingly
rely on instrument mix struments according to their public or private law background and their impact on
property rights. This categorisation allowed them to distinguish between regular pub-
lic tools of intervention (taxes, zoning, building regulations), public tools used more
parsimoniously (redefinition of the property structure, expropriation), and private
tools (exchange, sale, mortgages). The suggested increased blurring in authority
use of instruments (Peters, 2005, 362) is confirmed by the thesis’ empirical results.
Authorities increasingly rely on property rights instruments to implement land use
policy goals: They extend the regime’s scope to match the problems they face, (such
as building obligations or the relocation of development rights), or add contractually-
defined, project-bound obligations (cost division for local infrastructure in Malley,
playground in the process LIS in Cheseaux). Further, property rights instruments
are frequently (and often by law) used as payment guarantees: land is mortgaged by
public authorities to ensure landowner payment.
Further, considering authorities’ practice and the evolution of legislation, I observeFormalisation of
contractual practices over
time
that specific contractual practices (building obligation, passing-on of infrastructure
costs linked to development to landowners) tend to be formalised in public policies
over time: this applies, for example, to Vaud’s extended land service tax, which
formalised informal value redistribution practices; further, the contractual building
obligations developed in Wiedlisbach have recently been formalised in federal and
cantonal laws.
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Conclusion
In order to respond to the research question asked at the beginning of this thesis, in
section 7.1 I summarise the knowledge gathered from the literature review in chapter 2,
from the conceptual framework applied to the analysis, and from the results obtained
from the studied cases and redistributive processes. In section 7.2, I present the recent
legal changes in Swiss legislation on soil, and discuss how these changes respond to
the challenges and implementation issues observed in the empirical field.
Based on the knowledge acquired in this thesis, I list in section 7.3 a set of chal-
lenges that I consider relevant for soil management in the future. Section 7.4 ends
the present work with concluding thoughts.
7.1 Response to research question
In the introduction, I formulated the following research questions:
What is the redistributive capacity of the current Swiss institutional re-
gime of soil? What obstacles and limits does the current institutional
regime of soil face in terms of redistribution? What are the consequences
in terms of land use? And what are the most promising strategies for
increasing the regime’s redistributive capacity?
The underlying postulate was that the redistribution of added and reduced eco-Increase of land related
issues nomic and ecological values in land use policy processes can lead to a more sustainable
use of soil. The literature review in chapter 2 has shown that existing research on
the soil’s institutional regime focussed essentially on the emergence and adoption
of land use planning regulations and the effects they produced on land uses from
the 1960’s through the 1990’s (Nahrath, 2003). Since then, land use planning has
grown in importance, and the restrictions and obligations linked with land property
have increased. The revision of the federal spatial planning act in 2014 and the
re-introduction of a value compensation mechanism, were relevant opportunities to
review the effects of the institutional regime of soil over the last 25 years, and to dis-
cuss if and how these legal changes were conditioned by land use issues encountered
in practice. Further, since the 1990’s, other issues linked to soil management grew
in importance (such as contaminated sites), because of the high environmental and
financial costs induced by their management and potential remediation. In the 2000’s,
supra-communal forms of political action emerged, introducing an intermediate level
of coordination in land use planning, and a set of indirect tools overlaying existing
land use policy instruments (Pflieger, 2013b).
Based on these literature findings and on existing theoretical approaches to naturalValue and its
redistribution as main
stake
resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Gerber et al., 2009), I elaborated a framework
of analysis that included contextual and institutional factors, as well as instruments
and policy resources available to actors, in order to analyse actors’ games in the
implementation of Swiss land use policy, in particular regarding the redistribution of
added and reduced economic and ecological values. The theoretical analysis conducted
in chapter 2 allowed the institutional regime of soil to be charaterised as follows:
1. there is a gross incoherence between the duration of anthropic soil uses and
the renewal capacity of the resource stock. From a financial perspective, the
maximum time period to write-off land or real estate investments is 30 years.
However, from an ecological perspective, the time to "write-off" land develop-
ment can be thousands of years, for example, if land that has been developed is
supposed to be reused for agriculture (Bartz et al., 2015, 7);
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2. current legal conceptions view soil as a mortgageable commodity to be ex-
changed on a market, whose economic rent can be appropriated by the property
title holder. Notwithstanding the differential and residual characteristics of land
rent, one can define current Western conception of land property as simple ficti-
tious capital, in the sense that similar to any financial asset, "rent figures in the
landowner’s accounts as the interest on the money laid out on land purchase"
(Harvey, 1982, 347);
3. given the importance of value redistribution in the successively formulated pub-
lic problems linked with soil (see section 2.3.1), the redistribution of land rent
is considered the eminent issue of land politics;
4. policy instruments, through the form of social control they exercise, and the val-
ues they carry (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007), are where negotiation crystal-
lises between authorities and target groups on the appropriation of rent, which
makes the study of these actors a key element for understanding redistributive
issues on soil.
The empirical analysis conducted in chapters 4, 5 and 6 allowed for the character- Lack of tool use for
permanent value captureisation of the redistributive capacity of the Swiss institutional regime of soil prior to
the 2014 spatial planning act revision as follows:
1. the absence of a mandatory compensation mechanism for advantages resulting
from land use planning (art. 5 SPA) induced a significant incoherence between
the property right system and land use policy (Nahrath, 2003). This incoherence
constrained authorities in their use of land use policy instruments in several
ways:
− the region of Oberaargau has shown that the late and partial introduction
of voluntary mechanisms, such as the communal tax on added land value,
have produced limited effects, in particular on the reduction of oversized
building zones. These limited effects are not only due to the resistance
faced by authorities in capturing land rent, but also to inherited zon-
ing practices: the communes inherited their zoning plans with oversized
building zones prior to the introduction of the spatial planning act, which
severely reduced their possibility of capturing added value created through
zoning;
− consequently, authorities were unable to constitute a monetary fund that
could compensate landowners who would lose such rights, which reduced
their margin of manoeuvrability when reducing (and since 2014 relocating)
oversized building zones and dimensioning them in accordance with legal
prescriptions;
2. fiscal land use policy tools as durative instruments are widely underused. These
tools grant a much more precise picture of the economic value generated on each
plot, and allow its capture and control:
− official fiscal plot and real estate values are generally underrated;
− official land values are not publicly accessible. This creates an information
asymmetry between end beneficiaries and the policy’s target groups, and
limits the assessment of the costs and benefits, and of the winners and
losers, of the current institutional regime of soil. Only those who own land,
and fiscal experts in the administration, that can access the databases;
− tax rates of permanent value capture tools on land have shrunk over the
past decades, and are at a historical low (see section 6.4.3 in chapter 6 and
Guigou (1983));
− fiscal tools are not coordinated with land use policy tools: there is no
coherence of redistributive mechanisms (for example between the land tax
or the land property tax) with land use policy issues. The objectives of
land use policy oppose those of fiscal competitiveness: whereas the former
aims to set spatial boundaries on urban development, the latter aims to
increase communal revenues through urban expansion and the attraction
of new fiscal contributors;
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− further, hidden fiscal instruments, such as the deduction of mortgage in-
terest in the fiscal declaration, favour already privileged natural persons
who, in the words of Credit Suisse, are not even longer able to afford a
mortgage because of the increase of real estate prices (Fries et al., 2015);
3. the absence of considerations on soil quality when defining new zones of devel-
opment: the restrictions set by the federal cropland protection plan are limited
to a cantonal quota of fertile surfaces to be preserved. But as long as the quota
is not reached, this land can be developed. In canton Bern, a higher minimum
plot ratio (0.4) applied to the development of such land.
4. the exclusion of end beneficiaries from land use policy implementation: most
inhabitants and land users are included at the end of (re-) development projects,
because previous steps mainly serve negotiations between authorities and target
groups. This issue has existed since the beginning of land use policy (Knoepfel,
1977). Further, future users are not all yet present (for example new renters),
or are excluded, because their grievances (linked for example with rental lease
law) are not addressed by land use policy.
In summary, the redistributive capacity of the institutional regime of soil has beenValue through economic
development limited: a set of tools exist, but these are underused and lack coordination among
each other. This induces the following consequences on land use:
1. oversized building zones have been marginally reduced over the past thirty years
and are still a major issue in Swiss land use policy:
− the case of Wiedlisbach has shown that these large oversized building zones
have created urban sprawl within the building zone, leaving development
holes and unordered property structures unused;
− the cases of Wiedlisbach, Niederbipp, and Huttwil have also shown that
despite this important zoning gap and the unused, oversized building zones,
urbanisation continues to expand, the political pressure on the extension
of these zones being significant (essentially motivated by landowners’ gains
and public growth strategies);
2. the systematic privilege of development (and of the linked added economic value)
over other land uses, such as agriculture, protected areas, landscape, or other
kind of ecological value. This can be explained by the time offset between
financial and ecological perspectives, in addition to the difficulty to take into
account the externalities or spillovers of urban development, (such as the addi-
tional transport distances in a dispersed urban area, additional resource extrac-
tion necessary to development which takes place elsewhere, human travel, and
migration induced by the economic attractiveness of growing urban areas).
Additionally, there is a general lack of consideration of the spatial dimension of
environmental legislation, or, in other words, of the environmental impacts of
land use planning legislation Knoepfel and Nahrath (2014, 771): spatial restric-
tions on noise, air, water, soil pollution are not defined in local development
plans. The authors explain this lack of coordination by citing the prevalence of
use rights on land given precedence over other natural resources (those present
being subject to financial compensation in case of withdrawal);
3. the avoidance of costly soil remediation projects: the reuse of former brown-
fields (in Malley) or landfills (in Niederbipp) is conditioned on the possibility
of developing the site without disturbing the existing soil structure. Otherwise,
threshold values could be exceeded and remediation would become mandatory.
Developers have no incentive to increase the ecological value of soil beyond
legal obligations. Consequently, they seek to minimise interventions in order
to reduce costs (e.g. treatment of soil excavations, prevention of (rain) water
infiltration and exfiltration of pollutants);
4. the importance of owning land in order to achieve land use changes in less
attractive locations (such as in Huttwil). Without a double control on the
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resource (as public regulator and property title holder), land development is
constrained to locations where the land rent satisfies the investor’s desired profit
margin. The broader issue at stake is the functioning of current land use policy
and the property rights system in a context of economic stagnation or recession;
5. the directions taken by spatial planning and fiscal policy combined with eco-
nomic promotion are diverging. Considerations of sustainability are contrary to
considerations on attractiveness for developers, and for general economic activ-
ity. These tensions are reflected in the multiple cropland protection initiatives
launched in Zurich, Berne, Thurgau, and currently, at the federal level;
6. the limited availability of instruments jointly considering land property and
public law, such as the land improvement syndicate, is an issue that has led to
a suboptimal use of building zones (non-development of plots whose shape is
unfit for construction in Wiedlisbach);
7. the lack of a specific rent capture instrument limits the redistributive capacity
of the regime. Authorities capture the anticipated capitalised gains on land,
instead of effectively taxing generated income. This issue is particularly salient
in respect to the underused existing fiscal tools: currently the control of rent is
only marginally considered part of land use policy.
Land use changes observed over the past decades are the same which led to the Main issue of the loss of
fertile soil unchangedemergence of land use planning policy in the 1970’s: the consumption of arable land
through urbanisation. As the Federal Council states in the message accompanying
the proposed spatial planning act (Federal Council, 2010): the spatial planning act
has led to a reduction in urban sprawl and the loss of fertile soils, but it has not
managed to control their evolution.
7.2 Recent changes in the institutional regime of
soil
7.2.1 Changes induced by the 2014 spatial planning act revi-
sion
The 2014 spatial planning act revision changed important elements in the institutional Indirect tools become
more stringentregime of soil that can be subsumed as follows:
1. the compensation mechanism for advantages resulting from planning (tax on
added land value created through zoning) is now mandatory (art. 5 SPA).
This resolves theoretically one of the main incoherences of the IRR, because
it provides the funds for the payment of compensation in cases of material
expropriation and grants authorities a margin of manoeuvrability in their use
of zoning;
− however, the scale of implementation of the instrument is not adequate for
the problem of the oversized building zones, the problem it is tasked with
solving: cantons such as Basel or Geneva tend to have a building zone
shortage, high land prices, and could provide the funds captured through
the instrument to compensate building zone reductions in Valais and Fri-
bourg, where the largest oversized building zones are. As it is conceived
today, no redistribution of value across cantons is possible, severely limiting
the instrument’s expected effects. Thus, the current solution seems to be
less effective than the 1976 legal proposal, which included a compensation
mechanism on a federal scale;
− further, federal law obliges cantons and communes to tax advantages gran-
ted by zoning only on new building zones. The cantons are free to imple-
ment the instrument in case the plot ratio is increased;
− in addition, the payment of the tax on added land value created through
zoning is due when the building permit is delivered, which means that
landowners or developers do not have an immediate obligation to develop
the land once it is zoned. This can induce hoarding behaviours;
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− notwithstanding this fact, a new article (art. 15a SPA) delegates the re-
sponsibility to define instruments able to guarantee the availability of zoned
land to the cantons, in cases where availability is justified by public interest;
− the tax on added land value captures a portion of the expected fictitious
land rent. The estimations of the amount of value captured is essen-
tially speculation, because anticipation of potential land rent over a given
time period, does not necessarily correspond to the added value effect-
ively gained by the property title holder, and misses the essential timeless
characteristic of the property title.
2. In terms of the dimensioning of building zones, the 2014 federal law introduced a
set of changes (Flückiger, 2014): a unified calculation method for dimensioning
which anticipates the needs of the next fifteen years. Widely inspired from the
Bernese calculation method, the federal formula introduces a cantonal build-
ing zone use-coefficient (taux cantonal d’utilisation – kantonale Auslastung).
This coefficient defines, for each type of commune (urban, peri-urban, touristic,
etc.), and for the three zone types (housing, mixed, central zone) an admissible
amount of square meters of sealed surface per inhabitant. This in turn allows
comparison of (portions of) communes with each other (and distinctions between
the "good" and the "bad" communes), and helps to define minimal densities for
new building zones. However, with this method, several issues exist(Flückiger,
2014):
− this use coefficient introduces a minimal quota of inhabitants and jobs that
each canton is allowed to accommodate, depending on the demographic
growth scenario they chose, and on the relative host capacity of its building
zones. As the author notes (Flückiger, 2014, 151), this minimal quota of
persons (in order to limit soil consumption) is surprising, as one would
expect a definition of the maximum quota of building zones to limit soil
consumption;
− nevertheless, according to art. 32 SPO, the sum of cantonal serviced build-
ing zones cannot exceed those required for the next fifteen years (based on
the medium demographic growth scenario of the Federal statistical office).
However, single the dimensioning of new building zones can refer to each
of the three (low, medium, high) population growth scenarios elaborated
by the Federal statistical Office. This provides a significant margin of man-
oeuvrability for the definition of the necessary amount of building zones.
− the three types of defined zones (housing, mixed, central) do not take
into account tourist and leisure zones which consume large amounts of soil
through secondary homes;
− further, strategic cantonal zones dedicated to economic development are
excluded from the calculation.
− finally, the inter-communal comparison refers to existing urbanisation/density
patterns in qualifying the admissibility of future densities, which might lead
to a simple reproduction of these patterns on future land use;
3. coordination of urbanisation and transport: the cantons must now define future
zones of urbanisation in the cantonal structure plan (art. 8a SPA), a requirement
that has anchored the agglomeration policy to spatial planning legislation. This
means that the future areas to be developed need to be spatially defined in the
cantonal structure plan, and their relevance in regard to transport infrastructure
demonstrated. This new function tends to transform the cantonal structure
plan from a simple coordination tool into a pre-zoning plan, as intended by
the initial SPA from 1974 (Marti, 2014). The general idea is to (re-) locate
(existing) building zones to the most relevant areas, from a land use planning
perspective, and to ensure their development. In this way, the new federal law
recommends the use of the land improvement syndicate (art. 20 SPA). However,
the instrument does not allow for a spatial relocation of peripheral development
rights to more central locations, although the observed building zone patterns
of the peri-urban and urban cases analysed show the relevance of such transfers;
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4. further, the revision misses the coordination with agricultural land uses and
the protection of the most fertile soils, which was supposed to be considered in
the second part of the SPA revision. This issue has been postponed to 2020.
Currently, the quantitative issue of desirable soil consumption remains open
until the cantonal quotas of the cropland protection plan are exhausted7. From
a qualitative perspective, researchers and political-administrative authorities
aim to eventually create a soil quality index classifying cropland with more
precision than current methods. Such an index would limit the ecological impact
of development through a more precise definition of new zones, or spatially
redistribute ecological value, (e.g. through the ecological melioration of less
fertile soils).
A significant legal change is the decision of the Federal Tribunal from 24 August New venue for
environmental and
landscape organisations
20168. The Swiss Foundation for Landscape Conservation appealed against the ad-
option of a zoning plan by Adligenswil, (a commune in canton Lucerne), featuring
a building zone capacity of five times the village’s actual population. The cantonal
tribunal rejected the appeal, on the grounds that the organisation had no right to
appeal. But the federal judges decided otherwise: based on the grounds that the
federal legislator adhered to extensive regulations on building zone dimensioning, the
judges argued that since 2014, the creation of new building zones is a federal compet-
ency. The consequences of this decision did not include a modification of the recently
modified zoning implementation process, but rather the attribution of a new right of
appeal for nature and landscape protection organisations against communal decisions
on building zone dimensioning. The Tribunal extended the end beneficiaries’ power by
introducing a new watchdog into the zoning plan adoption venue. Thus, the Tribunal
expects to limit future excessive building zone extensions. It remains to be seen if
and when environmental and landscape protection organisations mobilise their rights
of appeal in the future.
7.2.2 Changes induced on cantonal level
In Canton Bern, the construction act (revised in 2016) was subject to four major
changes in order to comply with federal law:
1. capture of added land value created through zoning (art. 142 to 142f BauG):
the communes are obligated to capture at least 20% of the added land value
created through zoning, both on newly zoned land, and on land benefiting from
additional development rights. The taxation level is capped at 50% for newly
zoned land and at 40% on up-zoning procedures. The tax payment is secured
by a legal mortgage. Ninety percent of the tax revenue is distributed to the
commune, and 10% to the canton9. The communal implementation of the in-
strument will severely limit fund use for building zone reductions, as the funds
can only be used within the communal territory;
2. introduction of a building obligation (art. 126a to 126d BauG): in order to
reduce land hoarding behaviours, communes now have the possibility to set a
delay of between 5 and 15 years during which the landowner must use the land in
conformity with zoning prescriptions. Authorities note the building obligation
in the land register. Once the delay has expired, and if the landowner can be
considered responsible for use that does not conform to zoning prescriptions,
then a land use steering tax is to be paid to the commune. The commune
can also implement, with the landowner’s approval, a contractual emption right
(art. 126b). These changes fill a regulatory need for situations experienced
7In 2012, for example, Zurich’s citizens approved higher protection of cropland through the can-
tonal structure plan, but in 2016 refused an initiative which required compensation of any extension
of the building zone on cropland through the zoning of an equal amount of cropland (Kulturlandini-
tiative).
81C_315/2015, 1C_321/2015.
9The division of the tax revenue aims to compensate cantonal losses due to a reduction of the
revenue stemming from the real estate gains tax. In fact, the capture of added value through the
tax on added land value created through zoning, induces a loss of revenues from the real estate gains
tax. This is due to the tax calculation method, based on the net gains the landowners receives, and
not on the difference between land value prior and after the zoning operation.
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by communes such as Wiedlisbach. These regulatory changes confer greater
legitimacy and enforcement possibility to building obligation contracts signed
in the past.
3. the land use steering tax rate ranges from 1% of the land’s market value during
the first year, and up to 5% of the land’s market value, five years after the
expiry of the delay. The funds collected by the land use steering tax are bound
to the same uses as those captured by the tax on added land value created
through zoning (art. 142f BauG). For previously zoned land, the instrument
does not require implementation through local building regulations, and can
directly be adopted by the communal executive body. The land use steering tax
might prove an effective tool to limit hoarding behaviours, because it does not
rely on official land values, which tend to be underrated. The time delay for
implementation can be very long, and the absence of automaticity in the use
of the instrument, can, in cases of conflicts of interest between landowners and
local authorities, limit the intended effects;
4. protection of cropland (art. 8a, 8b, 8c, 19, 54 and 64 BauG): the use of agri-
cultural surfaces protected by the cropland protection plan for development is
conditioned on the implementation of a particularly high plot ratio, a qualitat-
ive compensation of the used surfaces (for example through the melioration of
less fertile soils used for agriculture), the integration of parking spaces within
buildings, and the definition and use of portions of the existing building zone
for redevelopment. Relevant analysis will concern how the canton decides upon
future local development plans on cropland: what plot ratio will authorities re-
quire, and will the plot ratio by applied systematically? How will a mandatory
higher plot ratio fit with existing urban development, which can be of a lower
density?
In Canton Vaud, the spatial planning act is still being revised. The legislativeTaxation of all up-zoning
changes proposal plans for a 20% tax rate of the added value created on newly zoned land,
and on up-zoned land (Conseil d’Etat du Canton de Vaud, 2016). The taxation of
both zoning and up-zoning procedures is justified with the requirement to treat all
landowners equally. The tax cumulates with the extended land service tax. Changes
affecting the federally imposed building incentive or obligation have not yet been
defined.
Nevertheless, in 2014, Vaud introduced the extended land service tax. As opposedPrivilege of office space
over housing? to the tax on added land value created through zoning, the instrument aims to finance
communal public infrastructure like schools, bus stops, and sports facilities. It form-
alises an informal planning practice, used for decades in the canton, through a fixed
tax on each additional square-meter to be built. The amount of the tax varies greatly,
depending on the land use (33 francs per square meter of office, and 140 francs per
square meter of housing). Such variation can stand against a proportionate develop-
ment of housing and office space, the latter being less costly both for commune and
developers.
The case study of Malley provided an outstanding example of the tax’s imple-Ambiguous effects of the
extended land service
tax?
mentation. This was due to the asymmetry of policy resources which actors were
able to mobilise, other infrastructure landowners agreed to participate in (railway
underpass), and to the late mobilisation of the instrument by public authorities. The
broader consequence of the tax’s introduction is that urbanisation becomes cheaper
for authorities, because they are able to pass-on significant costs (inherent in urban
growth or redevelopment) to landowners, reducing their dependence on fiscal reven-
ues. Such increase of revenues can be considered positive for redevelopment projects
in urban communes, because they do not increase the surface of urbanised soil, but
merely intensify its uses. But the result might look different for peri-urban communes:
an increased profitability of urbanisation could induce the opposite effect, and lead to
a situation where the communes could further extend their building zone. However,
the stricter zoning procedure introduced with the 2014 spatial planning act revision is
meant to limit this possibility. Consequently, it is the redistribution of the additional
value captured by authorities that is determinant for future resource use: where is it
redistributed? And to what aim?
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Further, the agglomeration policy launched by the Confederation in the 2000’s Formal defect of
agglomeration policy’s
action plans
led to the emergence of informal structures that defined indirect instruments of land
use policy (action plans) in canton Vaud. These plans precede traditional land use
policy instruments like zoning plans or local development plans in the implementation
process. As counterpart for the action plans’ stabilisation of prices and expectancies,
the action plans introduced a formal defect into land use policy procedures which
restricts the subsequent democratic choices in the adoption of zoning plans: legislative
bodies are tied to adopt the plan as it is and lose the possibility to modify the pre-
negotiated deal.
7.2.3 Other recent redistributive developments
On the federal level, the 2013 revision of the environmental protection act essentially Guarantee that the
polluter pays?aimed at ensuring the payment of remediation costs by polluters. In certain cases,
authorities faced difficulties in compelling polluters to pay for their actions – actions
which may have occurred decades ago. The limited legal possibility of prosecuting
polluters created a cat-and-mouse game impeding quick rehabilitation of the polluted
perimeter: practitioners cite examples of companies that have polluted in the past
and have subsequently transferred their assets to another company. Having moved
their significant assets, they declared bankruptcy, and and appeared unable to pay
for the damage caused. The recent introduction of article 32dbis of the environmental
protection act aimed to circumvent the problem by introducing a cost cover guarantee
to impeach the transfer of assets.
Integration of energy policy in to land use policy
On the cantonal level, Vaud revised the cantonal energy law in 2014, and introduced
mandatory coordination of local development plans with the energy provision of future
constructions. The general objective is that 20% of electricity needs and 30% of hot
water needs in new buildings are derived from renewable sources (art. 28a and 28b
LVLne10).
The case study of Malley has provided an example of the new mandatory energy
plan’s implementation. The plan has produced marginal effects, because the minimal
renewable energy standards defined in cantonal legislation were already largely ex-
ceeded. But the case revealed cost minimisation strategies pursued by actors, who
circumvented their own energy targets, which were far more ambitious than the legal
minima. Furthermore, the new planning procedure reveals the general tendency to
shift from centralised energy production and distribution, to a local reflection on ef-
fective energy needs and their more decentralised production. To a certain extend,
these changes are in opposition with the interests of established actors. The reduction
of higher costs associated with the production of renewable energies, and the more
efficient use of these energies, represent a possible target of value redistribution.
End of the Bernese Fahrleistungsmodell
Another cantonal tool with redistributive effects was the Bernese Fahrleistungsmodell
introduced in 2002. The instrument was based on the emission prognostics for mo-
torised individual vehicles. These prognostics anticipated a reduction of the overall
emission of pollutants from motorised individual vehicles. This anticipated "reduc-
tion" was divided into quotas, allocated to well-connected agglomerations, effectively
granting them "credits" for their future traffic increases. The remaining quotas were
granted to buildings generating high traffic (such as commercial centres) and thus
aimed to control the emissions generated by each of these buildings through traffic.
As the set targets were met, the quotas were abandoned in 2016 (Kanton Bern, 2015).
The model is nevertheless interesting, because it linked air pollution issues to land
use planning measures: it coordinated motorised individual transport and land use
policy through a quota system that granted use rights on emissions to users whose
(intended) location was most suitable from a planning perspective.
10Loi vaudoise sur l’énergie du 16 mai 2006, SR-VD 730.01.
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Integration of land use policy in fiscal equalisation Two other recent develop-
ments particularly relevant for the integration of land use policy with broader policy
issues like fiscal equalisation or transport:
The integration of land use policy objectives into the inter-communal fiscal equal-
isation in Canton Thurgau: the idea behind the parliamentary motion was to fin-
ancially compensate communes that durably renounce extensions of their building
zones (Regierungsrat des Kantons Thurgau, 2012). The instrument would have been
paid by the canton as compensation for the costs supported by the commune, such
as keeping the land undeveloped, and costs linked to the provision of recreational
areas. The solution adopted by the cantonal legislative body introduced a separate
mechanism where communes that do renounce a building zone extension can apply
for compensation at the responsible cantonal department. This means that the funds
do not stem directly from the cantonal equalisation, which compensates outstanding
costs (such as those linked to social assistance), but from a dedicated cantonal fund
(Institut für Wirtschaftsstudien Basel, 2016).
Another compensation mechanism of the federal fiscal equalisation was introduced
in 2008 (Frey, 2016): it aimed at horizontally (between communes) compensating ter-
ritorial externalities, such as renouncement of a building zone extension. However, the
compensation was to be negotiated directly between communes, which has, to date,
prevented the implementation of the mechanism. A suggested alternative approaches
the solution adopted in Thurgau (Estermann, 2016): authorities could attribute some
of the funds collected through the tax on added land value created through zoning,
to such compensatory payments. However, making this choice induces two elements
which need to be considered:
1. if the compensatory payments are meant to occur on a regular basis, then one
has to ensure that the funds (provided by the tax on added land value created
through zoning) are also durative, which is in opposition to the punctual value
capture mechanism of the tax on added land value created through zoning;
2. one has to ensure that the compensatory payments indeed have a positive ef-
fect on issues such as landscape, the protection of high quality soils, and on
ecosystem service provision.
Emption right in Rothenbrunnen
The case of Rothenbrunnen in Graubünden shows us a different setting, where local
authorities relied on cantonal legislation in order to use the threat of an emption
right on specific plots without the landowners’ consent (Hengstermann, 2017). Since
2004, the cantonal legislation mentioned the possibility that communes will have to
"take the necessary measures to ensure the availability of land for the designated
zone purpose"11. The commune of Rothenbrunnen revised its building regulations,
and threatened, with the political support of the legislative body, to implement the
type 4 instrument emption right on previously zoned land. This would have occurred
through an administrative decision that did not require the landowners’ approval.
This situation proved to be sufficient to convince most land hoarding owners to develop
their plots. However, the possibility to use an emption right depends on the possibility
provided by cantonal legislation, as the discussion of the recent legal changes in section
7.2.2 shows.
7.2.4 Institutional limits to the regulatory capacity of author-
ities
In a brief assessment of the institutional limits of authorities’ current regulatory capa-Fiscal competition
opposes a coherent
implementation of land
use policy
city, a set of elements can be pointed out. First, fiscal competition opposes a coherent
implementation of land use policy. Local authorities use available fiscal instruments
in the broader political context of cross-communal and cross-cantonal fiscal equalisa-
tion and competition. Therefore, the use of fiscal instruments as they exist today are
only as abated levies, whose use only marginally depends on land use policy. Such
11Art. 19 par. 2 of the Raumplanungsgesetz des Kantons Graubünden vom 06.12.2004, SR-GR
801.100.
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abatement is reflected in fiscal legislation: it does not distinguish between revenues
and benefits resulting from the production or the provision of services, nor does it
distinguish between revenues and benefits from sole possession of land. Further, the
autonomy possessed by communes regarding in fiscal and planning matters, pushes
authorities to favour demographic and economic growth, and opposes the land use
policy rationale of using soil economically and appropriately.
The other aspect linked with the adoption and use of fiscal instruments is the right Remuneration of land
ownership as core issueof the landowner to collect the rent induced by the possession of a property title. This
fact remains a hidden, and legally open issue that is difficult to highlight, because it
flirts with a core principle of capitalist economies, namely the remuneration of land as
a form of capital, which is anchored in Western civil law societies and institutions. The
discussion of these issues have been circumscribed to the political left, but reduced
economic growth rates, increasing inequalities, high unemployment rates on the EU
level, and the debates on the introduction of an unconditional revenue, might provide
a favourable political context for posing these questions.
Direct democracy has played both a favourable and a blocking role on land use Reduction of the
consociational nature of
the political system
policy processes. Popular votes favourable for land use policy have been: the approval
of the initiative in Rothenthurm in 1987, the initiative on the limitation of secondary
homes to 20% of a commune’s overall homes in 2012, the referendum on the revised
spatial planning act in 2013, the first cropland protection initiative in canton Zurich
in 2012, and the cropland initiative in Thurgau. Popular votes impeaching land use
policy include: the popular vote which rejected the first spatial planning act in 1974,
and the second cropland protection initiative in canton Zurich in 2016. Upcoming
votes on cropland protection in Bern, Thurgau, and others at the federal level, show
the recent political importance of landscape and agricultural land protection, but does
not indicate the people’s support: the success rate of popular initiatives is limited,
and their impact on the outcomes of the political process has changed marginally
since the 1970’s; what has changed, is the consociational nature of the political sys-
tem, as political parties more systematically oppose government decisions, and the
government is unable to continue relying on the coalition parties’ unanimous support
(Sciarini, 2014).
7.3 Suggestions for a more sustainable resource use
Based on recent redistributive developments (previously introduced), and on the res-
ults of the thesis, I propose a set of elements that, if taken into account in land
use policy legislation and processes, can lead to a more sustainable use of the soil
resources:
1. tighten the coordination between spatial planning and soil protection regula-
tions: explicitly consider soil quality in planning procedures, and consider, in
addition to available transport infrastructure, the creation of a soil quality in-
dex (Wolff, 2006), and its use as criteria for determining which areas to zone.
Further, consider the redistribution of the funds provided by the tax on ad-
ded land value created through zoning, to environmental protection, such as
coordination measures bound to local development plans, remediation projects,
or energy projects;
2. jointly coordinate fiscal policy tools with land use policy in order to increase
rent capture: punctual (tax on added land value created through zoning, the
real estate gains tax) and durative (land property income tax, land tax) rent
capture tools offer two approaches of value capture that should be jointly con-
sidered in order to respond to political issues on soil protection. In particular,
the introduction of a new instrument that specifically taxes revenues and be-
nefits generated by land property would provide a fine-tuned, and temporally
adaptive levy in order to control and redistribute land value.This would be an
improvement on the tax on added land value created through zoning, whose
calculation is based on fictitious capital. The captured value could then be
dedicated to a revaluation of non-constructible land (e.g. the financial com-
pensation for the absence of development), or through an enhanced protection
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of other resource uses, such as agriculture, recreational areas, affordable hous-
ing, and energy provision. From a legal perspective, no major obstacles impede
the introduction of such instrument; the Federal Tribunal left quite open the
question of the amount of rent that the landowner is entitled to12;
3. favour the relocation of oversized, and badly located building zones to more
central and well connected areas. Such spatial transfer could occur through
Vaud’s land improvement syndicate, as long as the instrument’s modalities are
redefined: the geographic unit of the instrument’s perimeter should allow for
the definition of non-contiguous areas, in order to transfer development rights.
4. coordinate urbanisation with surrounding agricultural production. Whereas the
2000’s were shaped by the coordination between urbanisation and transport,
the 2020’s should be oriented towards the integration of agricultural production
into regional food provision. The increasing political will to protect farmland
requires a common interpretation with regard to urbanisation aspects, so that
the production of food in a given region is primarily oriented towards the needs
of the inhabitants of the same region. This would also contribute to the local and
regional legitimacy of soil protection measures by reinforcing the link between
urban and peri-urban regions;
5. foster coordination between energy provision and land use policy, by taking
into account energy and material requirements, as well as energy and material
sources for each development project. An example would be, a cutting-edge
housing development, like in Malley, which takes factors into consideration such
as, grey energy(energy used in order to extract raw materials, transport them to
the building site, building), the time span during which the building is built, the
underlying needs constructions create in terms of infrastructure and provision
of goods, as well as the disposal of the various materials when the building’s
lifetime is over;
6. assess and propose solutions to the "external" spillovers of land use policy: in
a world of global markets, one cannot limit the question of soil protection to
a country’s borders, but must include goods and services provided by soil that
are produced elsewhere and consumed internally. These foreign land uses are
not considered by current land use reports, either because these uses are located
beyond regional or national borders, or because such an assessment would be
highly complex. In fact, it would be necessary to trace back over the entirety
of the production processes and include evaluation of their impact on land use
abroad in order to get a more complete picture of the sustainability of land use.
However, this external soil consumption increases (FOEN, 2015, 35), and we
need to account for it. First initiatives exist, for example, in the agricultural
(local circuits of consumption) and energy (local production) sectors.
7. regulate the "internal" spillovers induced by tourism: with the expansion of the
European air and high speed train transportation networks, new rivalries have
emerged between weekend tourist visitors and local inhabitants. The former
increased the demand for housing, particularly in cities, inducing rent inflation.
These foreign revenues have been captured by landowners, real estate compan-
ies, and internet platforms (Council, 2017, 105), for the benefit of tourists, but
at the expense of local inhabitants. The latter experience increasing rent, gentri-
fication, and face relocation and eviction. The transition to a digitised economy
where regulations are increasingly challenged underlines the importance of per-
manent and use-based value capture mechanisms for controlling rent. The data
collected by internet platforms is an indispensable source of information for de-
fining the proper amount of tax and ensuring the declaration of revenues and
benefits by landowners.
12See ATF 105 Ia 134.
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7.4 Concluding thoughts
The French revolution substituted the plura dominia model with an individual land A property model dating
back to the French
revolution
property title model in order to overthrow the domination of lords over peasants, and
grant single male citizens enough land to cultivate, and thus support their family.
The reference unit that served the division of land was the surface a horse required
to be fed in one year.
With industrialisation, urbanisation and the division of labour, the requirements Decoupling of use and
ownership rightson individual property have changed considerably. Broadly defined, individual de-
mands on soil depend on housing, work, leisure, and transport. Forty percent of the
Swiss population controls the category "housing" through an individual property title.
The rest of the population has only a temporary use right on their home. Work areas
are owned by limited companies, with a portion of these also owned by the State.
Transport areas are almost entirely public property. Constructed part dedicated to
leisure are privately owned (e.g. commercial centres) and public owners (e.g. sports
facilities); natural leisure areas are owned by the authorities (e.g. parks, forests,
mountains). The point is, that there is a vast decoupling of use and ownership rights
which contrasts with the revolutionary era of the eighteenth century. I argue that the
purpose for which these property titles were created no longer correspond to current
land uses. The numerous public policies regulating land use that were set up over
the last decades are emblematic of these changes (Ruegg, 2000, 17): they were meant
to adapt, and redefine the rights included in the property title according to societal
needs, which have constantly changed and increased.
S. Nahrath (2003, 448) argued that the phenomena of the over-exploitation and ab- Relative rarefaction of
goods and services
provided by soil
solute rarefaction of resources are not enough to induce a regime change, but that these
phenomena need to be translated into the effective rarefaction of specific goods and
services (housing, fertile land) in order to induce regime change. In particular, change
can occur if these goods and services have consequences for other socio-economic activ-
ities (importance of collateral effects). The problem is that the consequences of the
rarefaction of arable land in Switzerland have been overcome through food imports,
and that actual spillovers are blurred by the physical distance between producers and
consumers, and the lack of production tracking.
In order to modify the submission of land use for monetary return underlying our Land use submitted to
monetary returncapitalist economy (see section 2.2.2 in chapter 2), P. Griethuysen and R. Steppacher
(2015, 44f) suggest two main institutional innovations: the institutionalisation of
common property titles and the sharing of return (added economic value) between
creditor and debtor, as in Islamic societies. The introduction of community land
trusts (organismes fonciers solidaires) in the French housing and urbanism law in 2016
constitutes a first step in the transformation of Napoleonic civil law. Its evolution in
terms of actual implementation should be followed closely.
In my opinion, the integration of agricultural production and soil protection into Towards an increased
regional redistribution of
land rent?
land use policy would be a good starting point for managing the resource soil in a
more integrated manner. As encouraged by the 2014 spatial planning act, as well as
planning and soil experts (Imhof, 2016; Estermann, 2016), a regional redistribution
of land rent towards sustainable food production and consumption would not only
facilitate the provision of ecosystem services by agriculture, but also foster soil pro-
tection and enhance biodiversity. Further, it can foster territorial identity, and thus
provide a local response to public distrust in globalisation.
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Goods and services provided by the resource soil
Type of use Category of goods and services
A Constructible sur-
faces
A1 Urbanised land, public amenities, infrastructure
A2 Housing, collective housing, single family homes,
secondary homes
A3 Commercial and industrial zones
A4 Transport infrastructure
A5 Tourism and leisure infrastructure
A6 Military infrastructure
A7 Building zone reserves
A8 Investment, hoarding, speculation
A9 Heritage and landscape protection
A10 Leisure and recreational areas (parks and green
spaces)
A11 Archeological sites
B Natural and biodi-
verse areas
B1 Landscape and nature protection areas of regional
or national importance
B2 Wetlands
B3 Natural areas without specific attribution (hedges,
groves)
B4 Hunting reserves
B5 Forests and forest borders
B6 Ecological compensation areas
C Waste storage C1 Open landfill
C2 Landfill for incinerated waste
D Extraction of ve- D1 Mines
getal and mineral
resources
D2 Gravel pits, sandpits, quarries
D3 Peatlands
D4 Humus
E Water filtration and E1 Water filtration
water cycle regula-
tion
E2 Air filtration
E3 Regulation of the water cycle
F Fertile surfaces F1 Intensively used agricultural land
F2 Pastures, grasslands, alpine pastures, extensively
used agricultural land
F3 Forests
F4 Hydroponics
F5 Surfaces dedicated to gardening, tree nurseries
Table 8.32: Types of uses of the resource soil and goods and services derived from
them (Nahrath, 2003, 127f).
ANNEXES
Working definitions
In order to orient the reader and clarify the concepts referred to in this thesis, I provide
a set of definitions. These are drawn from the literature, and from the collection,
sorting, analysis and interpretation of the collected data.
Soil and land are used as synonyms. When referring to soil pollution, soil consump-
tion, or land development, the reader should keep in mind the horizontal and
vertical dimensions of soil.
Compared to other resources systems ( fishing grounds, bridges, grazing areas,
etc.) one of the specificities of land is the heterogeneity of uses, and the immense
variety of goods and services it provides. Table 8.32 in the annex proposes a
typology of uses of the resource land, and the categories of goods and services
stemming from the different types of use, (based on S. Nahrath (2003)).
Resource : natural or man made resource system composed of a resource stock and a
resource flow (Ostrom, 1990). The resource flow or resource units are produced
by the resource system, and withdrawn by humans in order to obtain goods and
services from these units. The resource stock are resource units necessary for
the reproduction of the resource system.
Land use policy is meant as all interventions by authorities through public policies
and the private law that regulate ownership and use rights on the resource
soil. It is understood as a synonym of the institutional resource regime of soil.
It encompasses land use planning policy, soil protection policy, remediation of
contaminated sites policy, interventions on the land market through property
rights, etc.
Economic value refers to the economic or financial value of land that can be meas-
ured in monetary terms. Its creation corresponds to land prices (expected land
value, capitalised value, fictitious value), or the rent provided through land lease.
When the value is captured by authorities, it may adopt the form of a financial
payment, of a tax, or of a contribution.
Ecological value can be defined and measured in various ways, depending on the
goods and services, and, notably, the ecosystem services one refers to. For
example, the ecological value of a plot might be very high for agriculture, but
low in terms of flood protection. As explained later on in a section dedicated
to the explanation of the soil’s value (section 2.1 in chapter 2), I focus on two
attributes of soil: its (non) development and its pollution or contamination.
Value distribution is understood as the existence or provision of economic (or eco-
logical or social) value to a specific area. This value is granted by the goods and
services a given location provides to humans. Depending on the theoretical per-
spective adopted (see chapter 2), a given location can have different values. The
important element is that this value exists either because of the soil’s intrinsic
properties, or because it is granted by law in terms of possible uses which in
turn, can be monetised. Therefore, value distribution can be assimilated with
value creation or concession.
Value redistribution is the transfer of value through its capture and subsequent
distribution. A redistributive process can occur from one location to another,
from one actor to another, between public policies, and across time.
Value compensation is a specific form of value redistribution. Compensation refers
to a payment as counterpart of imposed obligations or prohibitions that reduce
or enhance the economic, ecological, or social value of its property. The oblig-
ation or prohibition can be set by public policies (e.g. obligation to service the
land) or the property rights regime (e.g. cases of expropriation).
Urban and peri-urban areas rely on the definition and classification of the spatial
planning office, which is derived from the categorisation elaborated by Schuler
and Joye (2000).
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Sustainability can be defined in several ways. Referring to P. Knoepfel et al. (2007),
three levels of conception of the sustainable resource management can be iden-
tified, the third one is referred to in this work (see sustainable resource use
below):
1. the environmental policy level, which defines obligations,restrictions, in-
centives, and information on resource units withdrawal, and uses, not ne-
cessarily in accordance with the resource’s stock reproductive capacity. In
fact, the effectiveness of the policy is determined by the way the underlying
problem the policy intends to solve is politically defined;
2. the sustainable development level, which coordinates environmental, so-
cial, and economic requirements linked to the "modes of uses of goods and
services provided by natural resources" (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 462);
3. the level of the resource system, which requires that "all of the users jointly
ensure that the quantities they extract or withdraw from a resource do
not reach the limit of the reproductive capacity of the resource system"
(Knoepfel et al., 2007, 464).
Sustainable resource use is defined by the literature on common pool resources
(Ostrom, 1990) as a withdrawal of resource units from the resource’s stock that
does not exceed the resource stock’s reproductive capacity. One particularity of
the resource soil units is that they cannot entirely be withdraw: one can with-
draw the fertile layer or the minerals in the ground, but a surface ( essentially
a deep hole) will always remain. The fertile layer of soil has an extremely slow
renewal rate: it takes approximately 2,000 years for 1 cm of fertile ground to
form (Bartz et al., 2015, 34), whereas its compaction and sealing (its destruc-
tion), occurs in a matter of minutes. The time required for minerals to form,
strongly varies depending upon the mineral. The key point is that the renewal
of fertile ground is not possible on a human time scale. As a consequence,
there are two options for characterising soil uses as sustainable: focus on the
renewal or recycling of the soil’s (human) uses, or on the predictability of future
withdrawals.
Land use policy process are defined as implementation cases of land use policy,
where authorities, in a specific context, intervene on a target group and mobilise
a set of policy instruments and resources, in order to achieve a specific goal or
solve a specific policy problem. The term process refers to the different steps
of the policy cycle, beginning from the political administrative program, and
ending at the (expected) outcomes or redistributive effects on the target group
and on end beneficiaries.
Land use policy objectives understood as synonymous with the objectives of the
institutional regime of soil, with the objectives of the various public policies
impacting land use.
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List of intreviewees
Name Function Place Date
OBERAARGAU
Robert Grogg Journalist, Berner Zeitung Langenthal 25.03.2014
Rennie Wyss Englisch-Professor und Landschafts-
chutzaktivist
Attiswil 26.03.2013
Daniel Ott Architekt und Planer, Mitglied der
Geschäftsleitung baderpartner
Solothurn 01.04.2014
Ernst Grütter Pensionierter Ingenieur, Pro Natura
Mitglied
Langenthal 01.04.2014
Markus Ischi Ingenieur, ehemaliger Präsident der
Region Oberaargau
Langenthal 01.04.2014
Dominik Lues-
cher
Leiter Abteilung Grundstücks-
gewinnsteuer, FIN
Bern 08.04.2014
Roger Schibler Kreisoberingenieur Oberaargau-
Emmental Tiefbauamt, BVE
Burgdorf 14.04.2014
Christoph
Matti
Projektleiter Wasserbau Tiefbauamt,
BVE
Burgdorf 14.04.2014
Petra Graf Projektleiterin Artenschutz und
Naturschutzgebiete Abteilung
Naturförderung, Amt für Land-
wirtschaft und Natur
Münsingen 14.04.2014
Anita
Schnyder
Verantwortliche Orts- und Region-
alplanung Oberaargau, Amt für Ge-
meinden und Raumordnung, JGK
Bern 24.04.2014
Selina Bleuel Kantonsplanung, Geschäftsführerin
ESP, Amt für Gemeinden und Raum-
ordnung, JGK
Bern 24.04.2014
Regula Sie-
genthaler
Planerin, Sektion Orts- und Region-
alplanung, Amt für Gemeinden und
Raumordnung, JGK
Bern 24.04.2014,
25.08.2014
Stefan Costa Geschäftsführer Region Oberaargau Langenthal 25.04.2014
Jean-Pierre
Clément
Fachbereichsleiter Grundwasser und
Altlasten, Amt für Wasser und Abfall,
BVE
Bern 14.05.2014
Martin Alle-
mann
Gemeindepräsident von Wiedlisbach,
Informatiker
Wiedlisbach 24.06.2014
Carina
Schneeberger
Leiterin Administration Wiedlisbach Wiedlisbach 24.06.2014
René Suter Bauverwalter der Gemeinde Nieder-
bipp
Niederbipp 08.07.2014
Martin
Jampen
Gemeindeverwalter von Huttwil Huttwil 13.08.2014
Hansjörg Mur-
alt
Gemeindepräsident von Huttwil Huttwil 13.08.2014
Stefan Ghioldi Jurist in der Abteilung Orts- und Re-
gionalplanung, Amt für Gemeinden
und Raumordnung, JGK
Bern 27.08.2014
Christoph
Schneider
Architekt und Planer, Büro Schneider
Partner, zuständig für die Gemeinde
Huttwil
Burgdorf 16.09.2014
Table 8.33: List of interviewees in region Oberaargau.
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Name Function Place Date
LAUSANNE
Philippe de
Almeida
Architecte communal, urbaniste ad-
joint de la commune de Renens
Renens 12.05.2015
Patrick
Hassler
Chef du service de l’urbanisme et des
constructions de la commune de Prilly
Prilly 19.50.2015
Nicolas Wisnia Chef de projet de Malley pour le
SDOL
Renens 20.05.2015
Jean-Louis
Griver
Municipal d’Etagnières, ancien trav-
ailleur indépendant des abattoirs de
Lausanne
Etagnières 21.05.2015
André Baillot Chef du service de l’urbanisme de la
commune de Lausanne
Lausanne 28.05.2015
Julien Guérin Service de l’urbanisme de la commune
de Lausanne
Lausanne 28.05.2015
Guillaume
Dekkil
Chef de projet en charge de Malley,
CFF Immobilier
Lausanne 08.06.2015
Yvers Deillon Chef de service, Service de la co-
ordination et du cadastre, Ville de
Lausanne
Lausanne 15.06.2015
Mohamed
Meghari
Ingénieur section efficacité éner-
gétique, Service de l’énergie, Direction
de l’environnement
Lausanne 25.06.2015
Mme An-
namaria
Mosetto
Ingénieur section efficacité éner-
gétique, Service de l’énergie, Direction
de l’environnement
Lausanne 25.06.2015
Mme Céline
Dubois
Ingénieur section efficacité éner-
gétique, Service de l’énergie, Direction
de l’environnement
Lausanne 25.06.2015
Elinora Krebs Chef du service du logement et des
gérances
Lausanne 09.07.2015,
13.05.2016
Jean-Philippe
Dind
Chef de projet au Groupe opérationnel
des pôles
Lausanne 13.07.2015
Tinetta
Maystre
Municipale de Renens, Direction de
l’urbanisme et des travaux
Renens 28.07.2015
Christophe
Jemelin
Responsable du développement de
l’offre, membre de la direction des
transports lausannois
Renens 29.07.2015
Adriano Bar-
tolomei
Directeur de CADOuest SA Prilly 21.08.2015
André Jomini Juge au tribunal cantonal du Canton
de Vaud
Lausanne 15.12.2015
Régis Courd-
esse
Ingénieur géomètre, directeur de
Courdesse et associés SA
Echallens 14.01.2016
Urs Zuppinger Urbaniste, Urbaplan SA Echallens 14.01.2016
Gabriel Conus Service technique et urbanisme de la
commune de Cheseaux
Cheseaux 08.01.2016
Damien Villi-
ger
Urbaniste, Service technique et urban-
isme de la commune de Cheseaux
Cheseaux 08.01.2016
Table 8.34: List of interviewees in region Lausanne.
304 of 327
Bibliography
24 heures (2015a). Des privés cherchent à troquer des droits à bâtir. rédigé par Lise
Bourgeois, édition du 13 février 2015, Lausanne.
24 heures (2015b). Le dézonage s’organise dans les districts. rédigé par Isabelle
Biolley, édition du 2 avril 2015, Lausanne.
Abdalla, M. A., Alavipanah, S. K., Bationo, A., Chude, V., Comerma, J., Gerasimova,
M., Hempel, J., Indraratne, S., Krasilnikov, P., McKenzie, N., Mendonça-Santos,
M. d. L., Norbu, C., Ogunkunle, A., Pennock, D., Reinsch, T., Robinson, D., Smith,
P., Taboada, M., and Yagi, K. (2015). Status of the world’s soil resources. Main
report. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United nations, Rome.
Adank, N. (2016). Le contrat de planification. Schulthess, Zurich.
Adhikari, K. and Hartemink, A. E. (2016). Linking soils to ecosystem services—a
global review. Geoderma, 262:101–111.
Agarwal, S., Koo, K. M., and Sing, T. F. (2015). Impact of electronic road pricing
on real estate prices in singapore. Journal of Urban Economics, 90:50–59. doi:
10.1016/j.jue.2015.09.004.
Agglomération Lausanne-Morges (2008). Projet d’agglomération Lausanne-Morges
(PALM). Pour une développement équilibré à l’horizon 2020. Rapport final de
décembre 2007 incluant les modifications d’août 2008, Lausanne.
AGR (1977). Bewilligungsdekret vom 27.05.1977. Genehmigung der revidierten Orts-
planung von Huttwil und Aufhebung der provisorischen Schutzzonen definiert durch
den dringlichen Bundesbeschluss von 1972. Archivbox BB 03.3.672. Bau-, Verkehrs-
und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
AGR (1979a). Bewilligungsdekret vom 11.04.1979. Genehmigung der Überbauung-
sordnungen von Chrummacher and Rüttistalden in Huttwil. Archivbox BB 03.3.672.
Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
AGR (1979b). Bewilligungsdekret vom 11.10.1979. Genehmigung der revidierten Orts-
planung von Wiedlisbach und Aufhebung der provisorischen Schutzzonen definiert
durch den dringlichen Bundesbeschluss von 1972. Archivbox BB 03.3.670. Bau-,
Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
AGR (1984). Bewilligungsdekret vom 29.11.1984. Genehmigung der revidierten Orts-
planung von Niederbipp. Archivbox BB 03.3.665, Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirek-
tion BVE, Bern.
AGR (1985). Bewilligungsdekret vom 22.08.1985. Genehmigung der Überbauungsord-
nung Thomasboden in Huttwil. Archivbox BB 03.3.672, Bau-, Verkehrs- und Ener-
giedirektion BVE, Bern.
AGR (1988). Vorprügunsakten der Ortsplanungsrevision von Wiedlisbach. Archivbox
BB 03.3.2437, Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
AGR (1989). Beschluss der Baudirektion des Kantons Bern vom 28.11.1989.
Genehmigung der Ortsplanungsrevision von Wiedlisbach. Archivbox BB 03.3.2437,
Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGR (1990). Vorprüfungsakten zur Ortsplanungsrevision der Gemeinde Niederbipp.
Archivbox BB 03.3.1563. Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE Kanton Bern,
Bern.
AGR (1993). Beschluss der Baudirektion des Kantons Bern vom 01.10.1993.
Genehmigung der Ortsplanungsrevision von Niederbipp. Archivbox BB 03.3.1563.
Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE Kanton Bern, Bern.
AGR (1994a). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom
22.08.1994. Genehmigung der revidierten Ortsplanung von Huttwil. Archivbox BB
03.3.1598. Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK. Kanton Bern, Bern.
AGR (1994b). Vorprüfungsakten zur Revision der Ortsplanung von Huttwil.
Archivbox BB 03.3.1598. Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (1997). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom 18.09.1997.
Genehmigung der Überbauungsordnung Sonnegg in Huttwil. Justiz-, Gemeinde- und
Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (1998a). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom
05.02.1998. Genehmigung der Überbauungsordnung Thomasbode in Huttwil. Justiz-,
Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (1998b). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom
07.08.1998. Genehmigung der Überbauungsordnung Sonnegg in Huttwil. Justiz-,
Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (2000). Leistungen JGK/AGR zu Gunsten von ESP. herausgegeben am 1.
Dezember 2000. Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (2011). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom 13 Januar
2011. Genehmigung der revidierten Ortsplanung von Huttwil. Justiz-, Gemeinde-
und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (2012). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom 10 Dezem-
ber 2012. Genehmigung der Überbauungsordnungen von Dähnechnubel in Huttwil.
Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (2013a). Verfügung des Amtes für Gemeinden und Raumordnung vom
30.07.2013. Genehmigung der revidierten Ortsplanung von Wiedlisbach. Justiz-,
Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (2013b). Vorprüfungsakten zur Revision der Ortsplanung vonWiedlisbach.
Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, Bern.
AGR (VVYY). Vorprüfung der Einzonungsgebiete Moosrain, Neumatt, Aufhebung
der Planungszonen FFF, Umzonung W2 in WG Erzele. Archivbox BB 9.2.798,
Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
Alexander, R. (2001). A transaction-cost theory of land use planning and development
control: Towards the institutional analysis of public planning. The Town Planning
Review, 72(1):pp. 45–75.
Alexander, R. (2015). Policy instruments and the remediation and redevelop-
ment of contaminated properties. Environmental Politics, 24(1):75–95. doi:
10.1080/09644016.2014.954770.
Alonso, W. (1964). Location and land use: toward a general theory of land rent.
Publication of the Joint Center for Urban Studies. Harvard University Press.
Amt für Finanzen (2003). Statistische Mitteilung. Steuerfüsse und Gebühren der so-
lothurner Gemeinden. Kanton Solothurn, Solothurn.
Amt für Finanzen (2013). Statistische Mitteilung. Steuerfüsse und Gebühren der so-
lothurner Gemeinden. Kanton Solothurn, Solothurn.
ARE (2003). Richtplan Kanton Bern, Prüfungsbericht. 18 Mai 2003. Federal Depart-
ment of the environment, transport, energy and communications DETEC, Bern.
306 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARE (2012). Bauzonenstatistik. Federal Department of the environment, transport,
energy and communications DETEC, Bern.
ARE (2013). Utiliser le potentiel de densification du milieu bâti: une des thématiques
clés du développement territorial. Federal Department of the environment, trans-
port, energy and communications DETEC, Ittigen.
ARE (2014). Directives techniques sur les zones à bâtir. approuvé le 17 mars 2014.
Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy and communications
DETEC, Bern.
ARE (2014). Projet d’agglomération Lausanne-Morges 2e génération. Rapport
d’examen de la Confédération. Office fédéral du développement territorial, Départe-
ment fédéral de l’environnement, des transports, de l’énergie et de la communication
DETEC, 26 février 2014, Bern.
Artus, P., Bozio, A., and García-Peñalosa, C. (2013). Fiscalité des revenus du capital.
Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, numéro 9, septembre 2013.
Aubin, D. (2008). Asserted rights; rule activation strategies in water user rival-
ries in belgium and switzerland. Journal of Public Policy, 28:207–227. doi:
10.1017/S0143814X0800086X.
Aubin, D. (2011). Non-owners’ success: confrontations of rules in rivalries between
water users in belgium and switzerland. Environmental Politics, 20(2):210–226.
Aubin, D. and Nahrath, S. (2015). De la plura dominia à la propriété privative. In
Travési, C. and Ponsonnet, M., editors, Les conceptions de la propriété foncière à
l’épreuve des revendications autochtones. Cahiers du Credo, Marseille.
AWA (1995). Altdatdatei des Altlastenkadasters. Aktennummer 09810014, Archivbox
BB 06.5.151. Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
AWA (2005). Pfahlbauer über eine Altdeponie. In for water protection, O., editor,
GSA Informationsbulletin. March 2005. Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE,
Bern.
AWA (2014). Cadaster of polluted soils. In of the Kanton Bern, G., editor, Struc-
ture plan of the Kanton Bern. Bau-, Verkehrs- und Energiedirektion BVE, Bern.
Accessible online: http://www.apps.be.ch/geo/.
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. S. (1963). Decisions and nondecisions: An analytical
framework. The American Political Science Review, 57(3):pp. 632–642.
Bartz, Dietmarand Beste, A., Brent, Z., Chemnitz, C., Dunbar, M., Ehlers, K., Feldt,
H., Fuhr, L., Gerke, J., Green, A., Holdinghausen, H., Kotschi, J., Lal, R., Lymbery,
P., Mathias, E., Montanarella, L., Mundy, P., Nolte, H., de Lara, M. D. N. B.,
Ostermeier, M., Peinl, H., Rodrigo, A., Sharma, R., Sperk, C., Tomiak, K., Weigelt,
J., Wetter, K. J., and Wilson, J. (2015). Soil atlas. Facts and figures about earth,
land and fields. Heinrich Böll Foundation and Institute for advanced sustainability
studies, Berlin and Potsdam.
Batt, H. W. (2001). Value capture as a policy tool in transportation economics: An
exploration in public finance in the tradition of henry george. American Journal of
Economics and Sociology, 60(1):195–228. doi: 10.1111/1536-7150.00061.
Bauart and Raderschall (2012). Schéma directeur intercommunal de Malley. Schéma
directeur de l’Ouest lausannois SDOL, Lausanne.
Baud, E. (2016). Syndicat d’améliorations foncières – aménagement du territoire (AT-
AF). Etude de cas à Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne. Mémoire de science politique. Faculté
des sciences sociales et politiques, Université de Lausanne, Lausanne. Accessible
online: http://serval.unil.ch/.
Becker, K., Kronthaler, F., and Wagner, K. (2010). Composition of regional condi-
tions for start-up activity- evidence based on Swiss Mobilite Spatiale regions. Paper
presented and the European regional science association congress in May 2010,
Chur.
307 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bemelsman-Videc, M.-L., Rist, R., and Vedung, E. (1998). Carrots, sticks and ser-
mons. Policy instruments and their evaluation. Transaction publishers, New Brun-
swick and London.
Berner Zeitung (2011). Neue Bauzone sorgt für rote Köpfe. von Robert Grogg,
herausgegeben am 9. März, Bern.
Berner Zeitung (2014). Natürlich gefällt es keinem, wenn die Aussicht versperrt wird.
von Sebastian Weber, herausgegeben am 29. März, Bern.
Besson, C. and Courdesse, R. (1999). Syndicat d’améliorations foncières de
l’évitement de Cheseaux numéro 2667. Nouvel état. Estimation des terres. Modific-
ations de l’avant-projet des travaux collectifs. Rapport de la commission de classi-
fication, Cheseaux.
BHP AG (2006). Evaluation der Abfallpolitik des Bundes. BHP AG, Zurich. Accessible
online: http://www.umwelt-schweiz.ch/abfall.
Blaug, M. (1980). Reviewed work: Critics of henry george. a centenary appraisal
of their strictures on progress and poverty by robert v. andelson. Economica,
47(188):471–472.
Bonnie, R. (1999). Endangered species mitigation banking: promoting recovery
through habitat conservation planning under the endangered species act. Science
of the Total Environment, 240(1):11–19.
Boulay, G. (2011). Le prix de la ville : le marché immobilier à usage résidentiel dans
l’aire urbaine de Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (1990-2010). Université de Provence
Aix-Marseille 1, Thèse de doctorat en sciences géographiques et de l’aménagement
soutenue le 21 novembre 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011AIX10151/document.
Boulay, G. and Buhot, C., editors (2013). Les mots du foncier. Dictionnaire critique.
adef, Paris.
Bourdieu, P. (1986). Habitus, code et codification. Actes de la recherche en sciences
sociales, 64(1):40–44.
Bovay, B. (2005). Propositions pour une nouvelle loi fédérale sur l’aménagement du
territoire. In Bovay, Benoît and Nguyen, Minh Son, editors, Mélanges Pierre Moor.
Théorie du droit. Droit administratif. Organisation du territoire, pages 653–665.
Staempfli, Bern.
Bovay, B., Didisheim, R., Sulliger, D., and Thonney, T. (2010). Droit fédéral et
vaudois de la construction. Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel, 4th edition.
Bréthaut, C. (2012). Analyse comparée de régimes institutionnels de gestion des
réseaux urbains de l’eau en station touristique de montagne. Thèse de doctorat
soutenue le 2 juillet 2012 à l’Institut universitaire Kurt Bösch. Université de
Lausanne, Lausanne.
Bréthaut, C. (2013). Le fonctionnement du réseau d’eau d’une station touristique :
spécificités et réinterprétation locale des règles. Flux, 2(92):36–46.
Breuste, J., Haase, D., and Elmqvist, T. (2013). Urban landscapes and ecosystem
services. Ecosystem services in agricultural and urban landscapes, pages 83–104.
Brundtland, G., Khalid, M., Agnelli, S., Al-Athel, S., Chidzero, B., Fadika, L., Hauff,
V., Lang, I., Shijun, M., de Botero, M. M., et al. (1987). Our common future
(Brundtland report).
Brülhart, M. (2014a). Comparison of average communal and cantonal tax rates. Data
visualization. Sinergia projects no 130648 and 147668 funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation, Accessible online: http://fiscalfederalism.ch/.
Brülhart, M. (2014b). NFA und Steuerwettbewerb. Finanzpolitisches Seminar der
Finanzkommissionen der eidgenössischen Räte. University of Lausanne, 3 July 2014.
Heiden.
308 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Buitelaar, E. (2004). A transaction-cost analysis of the land development process.
Urban Studies, 41(13):2539–2553.
Buitelaar, E. (2007). The cost of land use decisions: applying transaction cost eco-
nomics to planning and development. Blackwell, Oxford.
Burge, G. and Ihlanfeldt, K. (2013). Promoting sustainable land development patterns
through impact fee programs. Cityscape, 15(1):83–105.
Burge, G., Trosper, T., Nelson, A., Juergensmeyer, J., and Nicholas, J. (2013). Can
development impact fees help mitigate urban sprawl? Journal of the American
Planning Association, 79(3):235–248. doi: 10.1080/01944363.2014.901116.
Burgergermeinde Wiedlisbach (2014). Geschichte der Burgergemeinde Wiedlisbach.
Accessible online: http://www.bgwiedlisbach.ch.
Bussmann, W., Klöti, U., and Knoepfel, P. (1997). Einführung in die Politikevalu-
ation. Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel.
Bühlmann, L. and Jäger, C. (2010). Questions d’indemnisation en cas de reclassement.
In VLP/ASPAN, editor, Raum und Umwelt/Territoire et environnement. No 6,
novembre 2010. Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung/Association suisse
pour l’aménagement national, Bern.
Bühlmann, L. and Perregaux Dupasquier, C. (2013). La disponibilité des terrains à
bâtir dans les cantons et les communes. pistes pour une mise en œuvre de l’art.
15a lat. In VLP/ASPAN, editor, Raum und Umwelt/Territoire et environnement.
No 5, Septembre 2013. Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung/Association
suisse pour l’aménagement national, Bern.
Calvet, C., Napoléone, C., and Salles, J.-M. (2015). The biodiversity offsetting
dilemma: Between economic rationales and ecological dynamics. Sustainability,
7(6):7357–7378.
Canton de Neuchâtel (2015). Définitions. Département du développement territorial
et de l’environnement, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.ne.ch/ > Autor-
ités > Département du développement territorial et de l’environnement > Service
de la géomatique et du registre foncier > Définitions.
Canton de Vaud (2005). Plan directeur cantonal. Un projet de l’Etat de Vaud. Avant-
projet définitif. Volume 1 et 2. Service de l’aménagement du territoire. 5 octobre
2005, Lausanne.
Canton de Vaud (2011). Plan directeur cantonal. Adaptation 1. Version du 16.11.2010.
Entrée en vigueur le 1er décembre 2011, Lausanne.
Canton de Vaud (2013). Plan directeur cantonal. Adaptation 2bis. Version du
11.06.2013. Entrée en vigueur le 15 juin 2013, Lausanne.
Canton de Vaud and ALM (2012a). Projet d’agglomération Lausanne-Morges de
deuxième génération révisé. Volume B. Première édition pour l’enquête publique
du 24 mai au 8 juin 2012, Lausanne.
Canton de Vaud and ALM (2012b). Projet d’agglomération Lausanne-Morges de
deuxième génération révisé. Volume A. Première édition pour l’enquête publique
du 24 mai au 8 juin 2012, Lausanne.
Canton of Vaud (2009a). 11 sites d’exception, 1 lieu pour le futur musée cantonal des
beaux-arts. Synthèse du groupe cantonal d’évaluation des sites pour le choix d’un
emplacement pour le nouveau musée cantonal des beaux-arts, Lausanne.
Canton of Vaud (2009b). Comptes de fonctionnement détaillés par département 2008.
Conseil d’Etat du Canton de Vaud, Lausanne.
Canton of Vaud (2014). Postulat Stéphane Rezso et consorts – Quand tro pde taes
tuent les taxes ou pour que la nouvelle LAT ne pénalise pas les communes. Rapport
de commission 14 POS 079. Grand Conseil du Canton de Vaud, Lausanne.
309 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Canton of Vaud (2016). Comptes de fonctionnement détaillés par département 2015.
Conseil d’Etat du Canton de Vaud, Lausanne.
Carpataux, J. and Crevoisier, O. (2000). Logique économique, logique financière : les
mécanismes de la dualisation économique et spatiale de la suisste (1975-2000). In
Sagarra, A., editor, Qui contribue à la désindustrialisation des régions fragilisées ?,
pages 277–315. Editions Economie et société. oai: doc.rero.ch:20160303160924-BC.
Carpenter, S. R., Mooney, H. A., Agard, J., Capistrano, D., DeFries, R. S., Díaz,
S., Dietz, T., Duraiappah, A. K., Oteng-Yeboah, A., Pereira, H. M., et al. (2009).
Science for managing ecosystem services: Beyond the millennium ecosystem assess-
ment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(5):1305–1312.
Carrel, M. (2015). Le régime du sous-sol en droit suisse. Schulthess, Zürich.
Cavailhès, J., Peeters, D., Sékeris, E., and Thisse, J.-F. (2004). The periurban city:
why to live between the suburbs and the countryside. Regional Science and Urban
Economics, 34(6):681–703. doi: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2003.08.003.
Cervero, R. and Murakami, J. (2009). Rail and property development in hong kong:
experiences and extensions. Urban Studies, 46(10):2019–2043.
Chabran, F. and Napoléone, C. (2012). Les conditions du développement des
banques d’actifs naturels en france. Développement durable et territoires, 3(1).
doi: 10.4000/developpementdurable.9199.
Cheshire, P. and Sheppard, S. (2002). The welfare economics of land use planning.
Journal of Urban economics, 52(2):242–269.
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16):386–405. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x.
Cole, D. H. and Grossman, P. Z. (2002). The meaning of property rights: law versus
economics? Land Economics, 78(3):317–330.
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics,
44(04):823–830. doi: 10.1017/S1049096511001429.
Commune of Cheseaux (1978). Plan des zones. Bureau technique R. Stutz. Approuvé
par le Conseil d’Etat du canton de Vaud le 8 septembre 1978, Le Mont sur Lausanne.
Commune of Cheseaux (2001). Plan directeur localiséet annexes. Cheseaux: péréqua-
tion E1 – Derrière le château. Urbaplan, Lausanne.
Commune of Cheseaux (2002). Préavis numéro 04/02. Adhésion à la démarche fon-
cière liée à la mise en valeur du secteur de "Derrière le Château". Municipalité de
Cheseaux, Cheseaux.
Commune of Cheseaux (2003). Préavis numéro 31/03. Périmètre E1 – derrière le
château. Plan directeur localisé. Plan partiel d’affectation. Municipalité de Che-
seaux, Cheseaux.
Commune of Cheseaux (2013). Règlement concernant la taxe relative au financement
des équipements communautaires liés à des mesures d’aménagement du territoire.
Grille tarifaire actualisée par la Municipalité pour l’année 2013, Cheseaux.
Commune of Huttwil (1992). Explanatory report of the building regulations revision
of Huttwil. Gerber und Flury AG. Vorprüfungsakten zur Revision der Ortsplanung
von Huttwil. Archivbox BB 03.3.1598, Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion
JGK, Bern.
Commune of Huttwil (2006). Vorarbeiten Orgsplanungsrevision / Plifchtenheft Orts-
planer, Arbeitspapier "Grundlagen". Discussion draft, 18 September 2006, Bader-
partner AG, Huttwil.
Commune of Huttwil (2007). Vorarbeiten Ortsplanungsrevision, Arbeitspapier
"Grundlagen Siedlung, Landschaft und Verkehr". Baderpartner AG. 3 April 2007,
Huttwil.
310 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Commune of Huttwil (2009a). Auszug aus dem Protokoll der 9. Gemeinderatssitzung.
Gemeinderatssitzung vom 14. September 2009, Geschäft Nr. 179. Ortsplanungsre-
vision 2007-2009, Huttwil.
Commune of Huttwil (2009b). Bericht zur Ortsplanungsrevision. Auflageexemplar
vom 15 Juli 2009, Huttwil.
Commune of Huttwil (2011). Anderung ZPP5, Thomasboden. Bericht des Gemeinder-
ates vom 15. November 2011, Huttwil.
Commune of Huttwil (2014). Huttwil in Zahlen. Official website of Huttwil, Accessible
online: www.huttwil.ch > portrait > gemeindeinzahlen.
Commune of Lausanne (1998). Abattoirs de Lausanne. Restructuration et mise aux
normes européennes. Construction d’un nouveau centre collecteur de déchets an-
imaux. Préavis 1998/42 du 20 août 1998, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2000). Construction d’une chaufferie à Malley. Préavis
2000/157 du 22 juin 2000, Lausane.
Commune of Lausanne (2005a). Construction d’un centre intercommunal de logistique
de gestion des déchets. Préavis 2005/81 du 3 novembre 2005, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2005b). Mise en place d’un agenda 21 (politique de dévelop-
pement durable) en ville de Lausanne. Préavis 2000/155 du 8 juin 2000, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2011a). Création de la société CADOUEST SA pour le
développement du réseau du chauffage à distance sur le territoire des Communes
de Prilly et de Renens. Octroi d’un cautionnement solidaire. Préavis 2011/27 du
13 avril 2011, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2011b). Musée Cantonal des Beaux-Arts – Pôle muséal. Con-
vention sur l’échange foncier. Octroi d’une subvention d’investissement. Préavis
2011/46 du 5 octobre 2011, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2012). Programme de législature 2011-2016. Municipalité de
Lausanne. Février 2012, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2013). Réponse au postulat de Monsieur Vincent Rossi: Con-
struire Minergie à Lausanne est une pratique normale. Rapport-préavis 2013/20
du 8 mai 2013, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2014a). Construction d’une chaudière à eau surchauffée à
l’usine de Pierre-de-Plan. Préavis 2014/11 du 6 mars 2014, Lausanne.
Commune of Lausanne (2014b). Planification énergétique territoriale du plan de
quartier "Malley-gare". In Dossier de mise à l’enquête du plan de quartier Malley-
gare. Service du logement et des gérances SLG, Commune of Lausanne, SBB, SDOL,
Lausanne.
Commune of Niederbipp (1993a). Einladung: Amt für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.
Erschliessung / Einzonung der Industriezone Niederbipp. Besprechung vom Freitag,
9. Juli 1993 auf der Volkswirtschaftdirection des Kt. Bern, Bern.
Commune of Niederbipp (1993b). Zonenplan von Niederbipp. Version vom 1. Oktober
1993. Gerber and Flury AG, Herzogenbuchsee.
Commune of Niederbipp (1996). Infrastrukturvertrag Industriezone Ost between the
commune of Niederbipp and Tela AG et al. Ortsplanungsakten der Gemeinde
Niederbipp, Cantonal spatial planning office, Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirek-
tion JGK, Niederbipp.
Commune of Niederbipp (1998). Entwicklungspotential im Zentrum der Schweiz: In-
dustriezone Niederbipp. Advertising brochure for the industrial zone, Niederbipp.
Commune of Niederbipp (2012). Building regulations. Approved version of 11 June
2012, Niederbipp.
311 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Commune of Renens (1995). Règlement sur l’évacuation et l’épuration des eaux.
Approuvé par le Conseil d’Etat le 14 juin 1995, Renens.
Commune of Renens (2013). Concept énergétique communal 2013-2016. Rapport
final, avril 2013, Renens.
Commune of Wieblisbach (2013). Protokolle der Gemeindeversammlung vom
09.12.2013. Communal legislative body of Wiedlisbach, Wiedlisbach.
Commune of Wieblisbach (2014). Protokolle der Gemeindeversammlung vom
02.06.2014. Communal legislative body of Wiedlisbach, Wiedlisbach.
Commune of Wiedlisbach (2011a). Grundlagen vom 21 Februar 2011 zur Revision
der Ortsplanung 2010/2011/2012. Baderpartner AG, Solothurn.
Commune of Wiedlisbach (2011b). Planungsbericht vom 21 Februar 2011 zur Re-
vision der Ortsplanung 2010/2011/2012. Zweite Vorprüfung, Baderpartner AG,
Solothurn.
Commune of Wiedlisbach (2013). Communal building regulations. Baderpartner AG,
Accessible online: http://www.wiedlisbach.ch/ > Onlineschalter.
Commune of Wieldisbach (2014). Chronik der Gemeinde Wiedlisbach. Accessible
online: http://www.bgwiedlisbach.ch > Portrait > Chronik.
Communes of Prilly and Renens (2015a). Plan de quartier intercommunal de Malley-
gare. FHY architectes urbanistes, Lausanne.
Communes of Prilly and Renens (2015b). Plan de quartier intercommunal Malley-
Gare. Règlement. publié le 14 janvier 2015, Prilly and Renens.
Communes of Prilly and Renens (2016). Préavis intercommunal. Adoption du plan de
quartier intercommunal Malley-Gare. Adoption du projet routier "avenue de Malles
et rue de l’Usine à gaz avec création d’une zone 30mk/h". Adoption de la modific-
ation de la limite communale entre Prilly et Renens. Préavis 100-2016 du 11 avril
2016, Prilly and Renens.
Conseil d’Etat du Canton de Vaud (2010). Exposé des motifs et projet de décret
accordant un crédit d’étude de 13’870’000.- francs pour le concours, les études
préliminaires, le projet et la mise en soumission de la construction du nouveau
Musée cantonal des Beaux-Arts, ainsi que le concours d’idées pour le pôle muséal
et culturel sur le site ’Halle CFF aux locomotives’ à Lausanne. Mai 2010, Lausanne.
Conseil d’Etat du Canton de Vaud (2016). Exposé des motifs et projet de loi modifi-
ant la partie aménagement du territoire (art. 1 à 79) de la loi sur l’aménagement
du territoire et les constructions du 4 décembre 1985 (LATC). 7 octobre 2016,
Lausanne.
Convers, C. (2012). Les servitudes et les charges foncières. Revu et adapté
en novembre 2005, complété pour intégrer les modifications du Code civil au
01.01.2012, Genève.
Council, F. (2017). Rapport sur les principales conditions-cadres pour l’économie
numérique. Rapport du COnseil fédéral du 11 janvier 2017, Berne.
Cour des comptes du Canton de Vaud (2011a). Audit du découpage territorial dans
le Canton de Vaud. Rapport numéro 16 du 10 octobre 2011, Lausanne.
Cour des comptes du Canton de Vaud (2011b). Droits de superficie octroyés par
les collectivités publiques vaudoises. Rapport numéro 19 du 13 décembre 2011,
Lausanne.
Courdesse, R. (2014). Les améliorations foncières en territoire agricole, un domaine
d’activité riche en enseignements pour les aménagistes. Collage, 6.
Crozier, M. and Friedberg, E. (1977). L’acteur et le système. Seuil, Paris.
CSD SA (1999). Sondage SC 11. Mandat numéro VD 2482, Le Mont-sur-Lausanne.
312 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cullingworth, J. (1993). The Political Culture of Planning: American Land Use
Planning in Comparative Perspective. Taylor & Francis.
Daﬄon, B. (2015). Panorama des impôts suisses. Du local au fédéral, entre équité et
concurrence: quels enjeux? Domaine public, Lausanne. Accessible online: http:
//www.domainepublic.ch/panorama-des-impots.
Dantas, M. (2010). Analyse économique des effets de la planification urbaine sur
les prix immobiliers et fonciers en zone littorale : le cas du Bassin d’Arcachon.
Economies and finances. Université Montesquieu – Bordeaux IV, Accessible online:
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00521976.
de Buren, G. (2014). La gestion des services environnementaux: entre règles et régu-
lation négociée. Six études de cas de services forestiers pour la production d’eau
potable dans trois pays. Thèse de doctorat de l’Université de Lausanne. Accessible
online: http://serval.unil.ch.
de Buren, G. (2015). Understanding resource management: an introduction to In-
stitutional Resource Regimes (IRR) and a field guide for empirical analysis. Sanu
durabilitas and IDHEAP-UNIL, Biel and Lausanne.
de Groot, R., Wilson, M., and Boumans, R. (2002). A typology for the classification,
description and valuation of ecosystem functions, goods and services. Ecological
Economics, 41(3):393–408.
Dubauloz, A. and Courdesse, R. (2004). Syndicat d’améliorations foncières de
l’évitement de Cheseaux numéro 2667. Remaniement parcellaire – nouvel état. Ré-
duction du périmètre du syndicat AF de l’évitement de Cheseaux et répartition des
frais dans la zone de derrière le château. Rapport de la commission de classification,
Cheseaux.
Dubey, J. (2012). Espace, temps, propriété: définition et restriction de la pro-
priété privée du sol à l’heure du développement durable et l’aménagement du ter-
ritoire. Arbeiten aus dem juristischen Seminar der Universität Freiburg Schweiz.
Schulthess.
Dupuis, J. and Knoepfel, P. (2015). The politics of contaminated sites management.
Institutional regime change and actors’ mode of participation in the environmental
management of the Bonfol chemical waste landfill in Switzerland. Springer, Cham,
Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London.
Dupuy, C. and Pollard, J. (2012). La comparaison de politiques publiques infran-
ationales : méthodes et pratiques. Revue internationale de politique comparée,
19(2):7–14.
Ecoscan (2015). Notice d’impact sur l’environnement PQ "Malley – gare". Communes
de Prilly et Renens, Lausanne.
EFV (2015). Finanzausgleich 2016 zwischen Bund und Kantonen. Eidgenössische
Finanzverwaltung EFV, Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement EFD, Bern.
Egloff, D. (2008). La contribution de plus-value selon l’art. 5 de la lat. In
VLP/ASPAN, editor, Territoire et environnement/Land und Umwelt. Nr 3,
Mai 2008. Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung/Association suisse pour
l’aménagement national, Bern.
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online (2015). Rent. Accessed 30 June 2015, http://www.
britannica.com/topic/rent-economics.
Epiney, A. (2003). Marktwirtschaftliche Instrument in der Raumplanung – ein Prob-
lemaufriss aus rechtlicher Sicht. Internes Arbeitspapier. Juni 2003. Institut für
Europarecht der Universität Freiburg, Freiburg.
Estermann, J. (2016). Wie sich der Bodenverbrauch stoppen lässt. sanue durabilitas,
Biel.
313 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Etat de Vaud (2005). Plan des mesures OPAir 2005 de l’agglomération Lausanne –
Morges. Catalogue des mesures. Comité de pilotage de l’agglomération Lausanne –
Morges.
Etzioni, A. (1975). A comparative analysis of complex organizations: on power, in-
volvement, and their correlates. Free Press, New York.
European Commission (2012). Lignes directrices concernant les meilleurs pratiques
pour limiter, atténuer ou compenser l’imperméabilisation des sols. Office des public-
ations de l’Union européenne, Luxembourg. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
soil/sealing_guidelines.htm.
European court of auditors (2015). Performance audit manual. European Union,
Luxembourg.
Fantoli, M. (2006). Nouvelle centralité dans l’agglomération lausannoise : une gare
régionale à Malley, vecteur de la revitalisation du quartier. Mémoire de master de
l’Ecole d’architecture de l’EPFL, Lausanne.
Federal Chancellery (2014). Termdat. Languages services, Terminology section of the
Swiss Confederation, Bern. Accessible online: https://www.termdat.bk.admin.
ch/Search/Search.
Federal Council (2005). Message du 2 décembre 2005 concernant le fonds pour le trafic
d’agglomération et le réseau des routes nationales (Fonds d’infrastructure). Federal
gazette 2005-1951, Swiss Confederation, Bern.
Federal Council (2008). Reconversion des friches industrielles et artisanales – Mesures
d’encouragement. Rapport du Conseil fédéral en réponse au postulat 04.3583 Leu-
tenegger Oberholzer du 8 octobre 2004, Swiss Confederation, Bern.
Federal Council (2010). Message du 20 janvier 2010 relatif à une révision partielle de
la loi sur l’aménagement du territoire. Swiss Confederation, Bern. Accessible online:
http://www.parlament.ch > Curia Vista > Recherche > no d’objet 10.019.
Federal Council (2012). Sustainable Development Strategy 2012–2015. Swiss Confed-
eration, Bern.
Feiock, R. C., Tavares, A. F., and Lubell, M. (2008). Policy instrument choices for
growth management and land use regulation. Policy Studies Journal, 36(3):461–
480. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2008.00277.x.
FIN (2009). Amtliche Bewertung der Grundstücke und Wasserkräfte. Erläuterungen
zum steuerlichen Bewertungssystem von Grundstücken und Liegenschaften im Kan-
ton Bern. Finanzdirektion FIN, Bern. Accessible online: http://www.fin.be.ch
> Steuerverwaltung > Publikationen.
FIN (2014). Kantonaler Finanzausgleich, Gemeindejournal – Péréquation financière
du Canton de Berne, Journal des communes. Finanzdirektion FIN, Bern. Access-
ible online: http://www.fin.be.ch > Finanzen > Publikationen > Kantonaler
Finanzausgleich.
FIN (2015). Steueranlage der Gemeinden und Steuersätze. Finanzdirektion FIN,
Bern.
Flückiger, A. (2014). La création et le dimmensionnement des zones à batir : enjeux
et méthodes. In Actes du colloque du 5 septembre 2014 sur la révision de la loi sur
l’aménagement du territoire LAT. Institut pour le droit suisse et international de
la construction / Institut du fédéralisme / Cercle du droit sur l’aménagement du
territoire, Fribourg.
FOEN (1999). Richtlinie für die Verwertung, Behandlung und Ablagerung von
Aushub-, Abraum- und Ausbruchmaterial (Aushubrichtlinie). Federal Office for the
Environment FOEN, Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy
and communications DETEC, Bern.
314 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
FOEN (2006). Ressourcenplan Boden. Ein Konzept zum planerisch-nachhaltigen
Umgang mit Bodenqualität. Federal Office for the Environment FOEN, Federal
Department of the environment, transport, energy and communications DETEC,
Accessible online: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/ > Publikationen > Boden.
FOEN (2008). Abfallwirtschaftsbreicht 2008. Zahlen und Entwicklungen der sch-
weizerischen Abfallwirtschaft 2005–2007. Federal Office of the Environment FOEN,
Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy and communications
DETEC, Bern.
FOEN (2015). Altlastenbearbeitung auf Kurs. Federal Office of the Environment
FOEN, Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy and communic-
ations DETEC, Bern.
FOEN (2015). Environment Switzerland 2015. Federal Office for the Environment
FOEN, Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy and communic-
ations DETEC, Accessible online: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/er2015.
FOEN (2016). Sondermülldeponie Kölliken: Das Mahnmal verschwindet. Fed-
eral Office of the Environment FOEN, Federal Department of the environment,
transport, energy and communications DETEC, Bern. Accessible online: http:
//www.bafu.admin.ch/altlasten/13660/16147/16156/index.html?lang=de.
Frey, R. (2016). Instruments de la péréquation financière en cas de renoncement à
l’extension des espaces urbanisés. In Estermann, J., editor, Wie sich der Boden-
verbrauch stoppen lässt. sanue durabilitas, Biel.
Friedberg, E. (1997). Le pouvoir et la règle: dynamiques de l’action organisée. Col-
lection Points: série essais. Editions du Seuil.
Fries, D., Hasenmaile, F., Kaufmann, P., Kraft, C., Leissner, S., Rider, T., Steffen, D.,
and Waltert, F. (2015). Real estate market 2015. Structures and prospects. Credit
suisse group AG, Zurich.
FSO (2000). MS-Regionen der Schweiz am 5.12.2000. Federal Department of Home
affairs, Neuchâtel.
FSO (2014a). Arealstatistik. Federal Department of Home Affairs FDHA, Neuchâtel.
FSO (2014b). General map of institutional divisions. Federal Department of Home
affairs FDHA, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/.
FSO (2015a). Swiss construction costs index. Federal Department of Home Affaires
FDHA, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/.
FSO (2015b). Swiss consumer price index CPI. Federal Department of Home Affaires
FDHA, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch.
FSO (2015c). Swiss population statistics. Federal Department of Home Affaires
FDHA, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch.
FSO (2016). Conditions d’habitation – Chiffres-clés. Federal Department of Home
affairs, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch> Thèmes > Con-
struction, logement > Conditions d’habitation.
FSO (2016). Leer stehende Wohnungen sowie Leerwohnungsziffer in den Gemeinden
mit mehr als 5000 Einwohnern, Entwicklung. Federal Department of Home affairs
FDHA, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/ > Statistiken
finden > Bau- und Wohnungswesen.
FSO (2016). Taux de logement occupé par leur propriétaire. Federal Department of
Home affairs, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch > Thèmes
> Construction, logement > Conditions d’habitation.
FSO (2016). Urban audit. Federal statistical office FSO, Department of Homme affairs
FDHA, Neuchâtel.
315 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
FSO (2016). Zinssätze (Bankeinlagen, Hypotheken). Federal Department of Home
affairs, Neuchâtel. Accessible online: http://www.bfs.admin.ch > Themen >
Banken, Versicherungen > Finanzmärkte > Daten, Indikatoren.
FSO and Kanton Bern (2015). Average fiscal capacity per inhabitant per commune,
fulltime equivalent jobs and vacancy rate. Federal Department of Home Affaires
FDHA, Neuchâtel.
FTA (2014). Die Liegenschaftssteuer. Federal tax administration FTA, Schweizerische
Steuerkonferenz SSK, Berne.
Garraud, P. (1990). Politiques nationales: élaboration de l’agenda. L’Année sociolo-
gique (1940/1948), pages 17–41.
Geoghegan, J. (2002). The value of open spaces in residential land use. Land use
policy, 19(1):91–98.
George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social
sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge.
George, H. (2006). Progress and poverty. edited and abriged for modern readers.
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York.
Gerber, J.-D., Knoepfel, P., Nahrath, S., and Varone, F. (2009). Institutional resource
regimes: Towards sustainability through the combination of property-rights theory
and policy analysis. Ecological Economics, 68(3):798–809.
Gilg, A. and Kelly, M. (1997). The delivery of planning policy in Great Britain: ex-
plaining the implementation gap. New evidence from a case study in rural England.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 15(1):19–36.
Giuliani, G. (2002). Landwirtschaftlicher Bodenmarkt und landwirtschaftliche Boden-
politik in der Schweiz. Eine theoretische und empirische agrarökonomische Ana-
lyse anhand von Daten über Handelsfälle von Landwirtschaftsland in den Kantonen
Aargau, Graubünden und Zürich. Abhandlung zur Erlangung des Titels Doktor der
technischen Wissenschaften der ETHZ. Diss. Nr. 14781, Zurich.
Giuliani, G. and Rieder, P. (2003). Landwirtschaftlicher Bodenmarkt – Dominanz der
nicht-landwirtschaftlichen über die landwirtschaftlichen Faktoren? Agrarwirtschaft
und Agrarsoziologie, 1.
Gmünder, M., Pflieger, G., Nahrath, S., and Bombenger, P.-H. (2017). Handbuch zur
Instrumente der Raumplanung. Ruegger Verlag, Chur.
Gmünder, M. (2004). Mit weniger Planung zu mehr Raum? Zum Einsatz anreizori-
entierter Instrumente in der Raumplanung. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik,
pages 557–570.
Gmünder, M. (2010). Raumplanung zwischen Regulierung und Markt. Ruegger Verlag,
Zürich/Chur.
Goldthau, A. (2014). Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: Scale,
decentralization and polycentrism. Energy Research and Social Science, 1:134–140.
doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.009.
Guérois, M. and Le Goix, R. (2009). La dynamique spatio-temporelle des prix im-
mobiliers à différentes échelles : le cas des appartements anciens à Paris. Cybergeo:
European Journal of Geography, document 470. doi: 10.4000/cybergeo.22644.
Guigou, J.-L. (1982). La rente foncière. Les théoris et leur évolution depuis 1650.
Economica, Paris.
Guigou, J.-L. (1983). Fiscalité foncière : analyse comparée des pays de l’O.C.D.E.
Economica, Paris.
Gyourko, J. and Glaeser, E. (2003). The impact of zoning on housing affordability.
Economic policy review, 9(2).
316 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Häberli, R. (1975). Diminution des surfaces agricoles cultivables durant les années
1942 à 1967. In Bulletin d’information du délégué à l’aménagement du territoire
no 2. Federal Department of justice and police, Bern.
Häberli, R., Lüscher, C., Praplan-Chastonay, B., and Wyss, C. (1991). L’affaire SOL:
Pour une utilisation mesurée du sol en Suisse. Editions Georg, Genève.
Haefliger, C. (n.d.). Les gages immobiliers. Unknown publisher. Access-
ible online: http://www.vd.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/organisation/dfin/
sg-dfin/rf/fichiers_pdf/Gages_immobiliers.pdf.
Hall, P. A. (2006). Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it. European
Management Review, 3(1):24–31. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500050.
Hallwood, P. (2007). Contractual difficulties in environmental management: the case
of wetland mitigation banking. Ecological Economics, 63(2):446–451.
Halpern, C., Lascoumes, P., and le Galès, P. (2014). L’instrumentation et ses effets.
débats et mises en perspectives théoriques. In Halpern, C., Lascoumes, P., and
le Galès, P., editors, L’instrumentation de l’action publique: Controverses, résist-
ances, effets. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.
Harvey, D. (1982). The limits to capital. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Harvey, D. and Chatterjee, L. (1974). Absolute rent and the structuring of space by
governmental and financial institutions. Antipode, 6(1):22–36. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8330.1974.tb00580.x.
Hengstermann, A. (2017). The building obligation – instrument against undeveloped
gaps in Switzerland. Routledge, London.
Herdgemeinde Huttwil (2014). Presentation of the Herdgemeinde. Commune
of Huttwil, Huttwil. Accessible online: http://www.huttwil.ch/de/portrait/
herdgemeinde/.
Hodgson, g. (2014). "The economics of property rights" is about neither property nor
rights. Hertfordshire business school, Herfordshire.
Hohfeld, W. (1913). Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning.
Yale Law Journal, 23(1):16–59.
Hood, C. (1983). The tools of government. Public policy and politics. Macmillan
Education, London.
Hood, C. (2007). Intellectual obsolescence and intellectual makeovers: Reflections
on the tools of government after two decades. Governance, 20(1):127–144. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-0491.2007.00347.x.
Hood, C. and Margetts, H. (2007). The tools of government in the digital age. Public
Policy and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan.
Horber-Papazian, K. (2006). Les communes. In Klöti, U., Knoepfel, P., Kriesi, H.,
Linder, W., Papadopoulos, Y., and Sciarini, P., editors, Handbuch der Schweizer
Politik – Manuel de la politique suisse. NZZ Libro.
Hoyt, H. (1954). Homer hoyt on development of economic base concept. Land Eco-
nomics, 30(2):182–186. doi: 10.2307/3144940.
Ihlanfeldt, K. R. (2007). The effect of land use regulation on housing and land prices.
Journal of Urban Economics, 61(3):420–435. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2006.09.003.
Imhof, P. (2016). S’approrier la nouvelle taxe – lui donner sens – les retours du canton
de vaud. Collage, (3):10–12.
Institut für Wirtschaftsstudien Basel (2015). Bauen ausserhalb der Bauzonen: Fehlan-
reize im Nichtbaugebiet – eine Übersicht. Schlussbericht vom 27.07.2015. Bundes-
amt für Raumentwicklung ARE, Bern.
317 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Institut für Wirtschaftsstudien Basel (2016). Steuerungsinstrument der Boden-
nutzung. Faktenblätter. sanu durabilitas, Biel.
Jaccaud, J.-P., Kaufmann, V., Lamunière, I., and Lufkin, S. (2008). Les friches
ferroviaires urbaines en suisse, potentiel à conquérir. Géo-Regards, 1(1).
Jaeger, J., Schweick, C., Bertiller, R., and Kienast, F. (2008). Landschaftszer-
siedelung Schweiz – Quantitative Analyse 1935 bis 2002 und Folgerungen für die
Raumplanung. Wissenschaftlicher Abschlussbericht. Schweizerischer Nationalfonds,
Nationales Forschungsprogramm NFP 54 "Nachhaltige Siedlungs- und Infrastruk-
turentwicklung", Zurich.
Jäger, C. (2006). Du non-classement au déclassement. la jurisprudence du
tribunal fédéral relative à l’expropriation matérielle en cas de déclassement. In
VLP/ASPAN, editor, Raum und Umwelt/Territoire et environnement. No 5,
septembre 2006. Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung/Association suisse
pour l’aménagement national, Bern.
Jennings, A. (1997). Testimony before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and
Environment of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. US House of
Representatives. 105th Congress, First Session. 9 December 1997, Washington.
Jessop, B. (2001). Institutional re(turns) and the strategic – relational approach.
Environment and Planning A, 33(7):1213–1235. doi: 10.1068/a32183.
Jomini, A. (2008). Les évolutions récentes de la jurisprudence fédérale en matière
d’expropriation matérielle dans le domaine de l’aménagement du territoire.
Présentation du cours donnée le 12 juin 2008 dans le cadre du séminaire "Propriété
foncière et développement territorial durable" à l’IDHEAP, Lausanne.
Kägi-Diener, R. (2008). Gemeinden. In Ehrenzeller, B., Mastronardi, P., Schweizer,
R., and Vallender, K., editors, Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Kommentar,
pages 924–936. Schulthess, Zurich, 2nd edition.
Kanton Bern (2011). Kantonaler Richtplan. Version vom 8. Juni 2011, Bern.
Kanton Bern (2012). Voranschlag 2008 und Aufgaben-/Finanzplan 2013–2015 des
Kantons Bern. Angenommen vom Grossen Rat am 30. November 2011, Bern.
Kanton Bern (2015). Richtplan Kanton Bern. Richtplan 2030. Version vom 2. Septem-
ber 2015. Genehmigt vom Bundesrat am 4. Mai 2016, Bern.
Kellerhals and Haefeli AG (2010). Einwohnergemeinde Huttwil – Uberbauung Thom-
aboden (ZPP) – Bericht über die geologischen Untersuchungen betreffend Baugrund,
Quellfassungen und Hangmuren. Bern.
Kettl, D. (2002). Managing indirect government. In Salamon, L., editor, The tools
of government. A guide to the new governance, pages 490–510. Oxford university
press, New York.
Kimberly-Clark (1999). Kimberly-Clark to acquire European tissue businesses of At-
tisholz holding AG. Corporate financial news, 29 April 1999. Dallas.
Knoepfel, P. (1977). Demokratisierung der Raumplanung. Dunker & Humboldt,
Berlin.
Knoepfel, P. (2017). Les ressources. XX, Bern.
Knoepfel, P., Kissling-Naef, I., and Varone, F. (2001). Institutionelle Regime für
natürliche Ressourcen: Boden, Wasser und Wald / Régimes institutionnels de res-
sources naturelles : analyse comparée du sol, de l’eau et de la forêt, volume 17.
Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel and Frankfurt.
Knoepfel, P., Kissling-Naef, I., and Varone, F. (2003). Institutionelle Regime natür-
licher Ressourcen in Aktion / Régimes institutionnels de ressources naturelles en
action. Volum 19. Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel und Frankfurt.
318 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., Varone, F., and Hill, M. (2011). Public policy analysis.
Policy Press, Bristol.
Knoepfel, P. and Nahrath, S. (2014). Umwelt- und raumordnungspolitik/politiques
de l’environnement et de l’aménagement du territoire. In Klöti, U., Knoepfel, P.,
Kriesi, H., Linder, W., Papadopoulos, Y., and Sciarini, P., editors, Handbuch der
Schweizer Politik/Manuel de politique suisse. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zurich.
Knoepfel, P., Nahrath, S., Savary, J., and Varone, F. (2010). Analyse des politiques
suisses de l’environnement. Ruegger, Zürich/Chur.
Knoepfel, P., Nahrath, S., and Varone, F. (2007). Institutional regimes for natural
resources: an innovative theoretical framwork for sustainability. In Knoepfel, P.,
editor, Environmental policy analysis. Learning form the past for the future – 25
years of research. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Knoepfel, P. and Schweizer, R. (2014). Le local et le global : quatre défis de la
codification du droit foncier dans le cadre du processus de rédaction du code civil
suisse de 1907. In Travési, Céline and Ponsonnet, Maïa, editor, Les conceptions de
la propriété foncière à l’épreuve des revendications autochtones. Cahiers du Credo,
Marseille.
Knoepfel, P., Varone, F., and Larrue, C. (2006). Analyse et pilotage des politiques
publiques. Ruegger, Chur, 2 edition.
Knoepfel, P. and Weidner, H. (1982). Formulation and implementation of air qual-
ity control programmes: patterns of interest consideration. Policy and politics,
10(1):85–109.
Knoepfel, P. and Wey, B. (2006). Öffentlich-rechtliche eigentumsbeschränkungen
(ÖREB). Working paper de l’Idheap 7/2006, Lausanne.
Kremen, C. and Miles, A. (2012). Ecosystem services in biologically diversified versus
conventional farming systems: benefits, externalities, and trade-offs. Ecology and
Society, 17(4).
Kuhlmann, S. and Wollmann, H. (2013). Verwaltung und Verwaltungsreformen in
Europa: Einführung in die vergleichende Verwaltungswissenschaft. Springer.
Ladner, A. (2010). Switzerland. In Goldsmith, M. and Page, E., editors, Changing
Government Relations in Europe: From localism to intergovernmentalism, Rout-
ledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science. Taylor & Francis.
Lambelet-Haueter, C., Burgisser, L., Clerc, P., Gloor, S., Moeschler, P., Monney,
J.-C., Müller, A., Michelle, P., Ruckstuhl, M., Salomon Cavin, J., and Zbinden,
N. (2011). Le milieu bâti. In Lachat, T., Pauli, D., Gonseth, Y., Klaus, G.,
Scheideggger, C., Vittoz, P., and Walter, T., editors, Evolution de la biodiversité
en Suisse. Haupt, Bern.
Langenegger, M. (2002). Handbuch zur bernischen Grundstückgewinnsteuer 2001.
Cosmos, Bern.
Lascoumes, P. (1990). Normes juridiques et mise en œuvre des politiques publiques.
L’Année sociologique (1940/1948), pages 43–71.
Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (2004a). De l’innovation instrumentale à la recom-
position de l’etat. In Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P., editors, Gouverner par les
instruments, pages 357–370. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.
Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (2004b). L’action publique saisie par ses instruments.
In Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P., editors, Gouverner par les instruments, pages
11–44. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.
Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (2007). Introduction: Understanding public policy
through its instruments—from the nature of instruments to the sociology of public
policy instrumentation. Governance, 20(1):1–21.
319 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lawrence, R., Hoerber-Papazian, K., Dao, H., Lamber, C., Jacot Descombes, C., Des-
thieux, G., Billeau Beuze, S., Adriana, R., and Littlejohn, K. (2009a). Informer,
consulter, concerter, codécider pour aménager. Dispositif de partage des informa-
tions et des connaissances pour les processus d’aménagement concerté. Rapport
final, novembre 2009, Genéve et Lausanne.
Lawrence, R., Hoerber-Papazian, K., Dao, H., Lamber, C., Jacot Descombes, C., Des-
thieux, G., Billeau Beuze, S., Adriana, R., and Littlejohn, K. (2009b). Informer,
consulter, concerter, codécider pour aménager. Dispositif de partage des informa-
tions et des connaissances pour les processus d’aménagement concerté. Annexes.
Novembre 2009, Genéve et Lausanne.
Lecat, G. (2006). Analyse économique de la planification urbaine. Thèse pour obtenir
le grade de docteur en sciences économiques présentée à l’Université de Bourgogne,
Accessible online: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00086797/.
Leimbacher, J. and Perler, T. (2000). Juristisches Screening der Ressourcenregime in
der Schweiz (1900-2000). Working paper de l’IDHEAP9/2000, vol. 1/2, Lausanne.
Accessible online: http://www.unil.ch/idheap > Publications > Working paper.
Lendi, M. and Elsasser, H. (1985). Raumplanung in der Schweiz. Eine Einführung.
Institut für Orts-, Regional- und Landesplanung, ETHZ, Zurich.
Leroy, D. (2008). Coordination aménagement du territoire et aspects fonciers : de-
scriptif du système vaudois et exemple d’application. Version du 5 février 2008.
Service du développement territorial, Etat de Vaud, Lausanne.
Linder, S. and Peters, G. (1989). Instruments of government: perceptions and con-
texts. Journal of Public Policy, 9(1):35–58.
Linder, S. H. and Peters, B. G. (1998). The study of policy instruments: four schools
of thought. Public policy instruments: evaluating the tools of public administration,
pages 33–45.
Mahaim, R. (2014). Le principe de durabilité et l’aménagement du territoire. Le
mitage du territoire à l’épreuve du droit : utilisation mesurée du sol, urbanisation
et dimensionnement des zones à bâtir. Travaux de la faculté de droit de l’Université
de Fribourg. Schulthess, Fribourg.
Marti, A. (2014). Richtplanung im bereich der siedlung. In Actes du colloque du 5
septembre 2014 sur la révision de la loi sur l’aménagement du territoire LAT. Insti-
tut pour le droit suisse et international de la construction / Institut du fédéralisme
/ Cercle du droit sur l’aménagement du territoire, Fribourg.
Marti, J.-L. and Courdesse, R. (2003). Syndicat d’améliorations foncières de
l’évitement de Cheseaux numéro 2752. Remaniement parcellaire – périmètre et sous-
périmètres nouvel état et estimation des terres ancien et nouvel état. Rapport de
la commission de classification, Cheseaux.
Marti, J.-L. and Courdesse, R. (2012). Syndicat d’améliorations foncières de
l’évitement de Cheseaux numéro 2752. Remaniement parcellaire – Plan des ouv-
rages exécutés colleftifs et privés. Entretien des ouvrages et répartition des frais.
Rapport de la commission de classification, Cheseaux.
Martin, R., Muûls, M., and Wagner, U. J. (2015). The impact of the european union
emissions trading scheme on regulated firms: What is the evidence after ten years?
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. doi: 10.1093/reep/rev016.
Marx, K. (1967). Capital. International publishers, New York.
Marx, K. (1969). Theories of surplus value (part 2). Lawrence and Wishart, London.
McConnell, V., Walls, M., and Kelly, F. (2007). Markets for preserving farm-
land in Maryland. Making TDR programs work better. Report Prepared for the
Maryland Center for Agroecology. University of Maryland, Baltimore County.
URL: https://agresearch.umd.edu/sites/default/files/_docs/locations/
wye/VirginiaMcConnell’sFinalReportHRHCAEPub2007-03.pdf.
320 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Medda, F. (2012). Land value capture finance for transport accessibility: a review.
Journal of Transport Geography, 25:154–161. doi: 10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2012.07.013.
Menghini, G. (2013). Transferable development rights (TDR) in Switzerland: sim-
ulatin a TDR market with agent-based modeling. Thèse no 5707 présentée le 24
avril 2013 à la faculté de l’environnement naturel, architectural et construit. Ecole
polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne.
Metropolitankonferenz Zürich (2013). Fachbericht Mehrwert durch Verdichtung,
Darstellung und Diskussion möglicher Vorgehensweisen zum Ausgleich planungs-
bedingter Mehrwerte. Ecoplan AG, Zurich.
Millenium ecosystem assessment (2005). Ecosystems and human well-being: current
state and trends, volume 1. In Hassan, R., Scholes, R., and Ash, N., editors,
Millenium ecosystem assessment. Island Press, New York. Accessible online: http:
//www.millenniumassessment.org/ > Reports > Framework.
Mills, E. S. (1967). An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan
area. The American Economic Review, 57(2):197–210.
Moor, P. (1982). Aménagement du territoire et expropriation matérielle : l’évolution
de la jurisprudence du tribunal fédéral. In Repertorio di giurisprudenza patria,
volume 115, pages 270–286.
Moor, P. (1992). Droit administratif, L’organisation des activités administrativies,
les biens de l’Etat, volume 3. Stämpfli and Co, Bern.
Moor, P. (2002). Droit administratif. L’organisation des activités administratives, les
biens de l’Etat, volume 2. Stämpfli, Bern, 2nd edition.
Nägeli, R. (2006). Potentiel en géostructures énergétiques du site de Malley. Projet du
7e semestre réalisé sous la supervision du professeur A. Parriaux. EPFL, Lausanne.
Nahrath, S. (2000). Screening historique des régimes institutionnels de la ressource sol
1870-2000. Working paper of the IDHEAP 5/2000, vol. 1/2, Lausanne. Accessible
online: http://www.unil.ch/idheap > Publications > Working paper.
Nahrath, S. (2003). La mise en place du régime institutionnel de l’aménagement
du territoire en Suisse entre 1960 et 1990. University of Lausanne, Lausanne.
Accessible online: http://doc.rero.ch/record/501.
Nahrath, S. (2005). Le rôle de la propriété foncière dans la génèse et la mise en
oeuvre de la politique d’aménagement du territoire : quels enseignements pour la
durabilité des aménagement urbains ? In Da Cunha, A., Knoepfel, P., Leresche,
J.-P., and Nahrath, S., editors, Enjeux du développement urbain durable. Trans-
formations urbaines, gestion des ressources et gouvernance, pages 299–328. Presses
polytechniques universitaires romandes, Lausanne.
Nahrath, S., Knoepfel, P., Csikos, P., and Gerber, J.-D. (2009a). Les stratégies
politiques et foncières des grands propriétaires fonciers au niveau national. Et-
ude comparée, volume 1. Cahier de l’IDHEAP 246/2009, Lausanne. http:
//nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_B6F278C7272B7.
Nahrath, S., Knoepfel, P., Csikos, P., and Gerber, J.-D. (2009b). Les stratégies
politiques et foncières des grands propriétaires fonciers au niveau national. Etudes
de cas, volume 2. Cahier de l’IDHEAP 247/2009, Lausanne.
Nahrath, S., Pflieger, G., Gmünder, M., Prélaz-Droux, R., and Grêt-Regamey, A.
(2012). Towards a more sustainable management of soil resources by redistribution
of economic and ecological added and reduced values. Full proposal for the NRP 68
"Sustainable use of soil as a resource", Swiss national science foundation. Bern.
Napoléone, C. and Calvet, C. (2013). Mise en marché de la nature : des mécanismes
pour sa conservation ? leçons du premier site expérimental français de la com-
pensation par l’offre. In Tatin, L., Wolff, A., Boutin, J., Colliot, E., and Dutoit,
T., editors, Ecologie et conservation d’une steppe méditerranéenne. La plaine de la
Crau. Quae, Versailles.
321 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Napoléone, C. and Geniaux, G. (2011). Evaluation des effets des zonages environ-
nementaux sur la croissance urbaine et l’activité agricole. économie et Statistique,
444(1):181–199.
Nelson, A., Frank, J., and Nicholas, J. (1992). Positive influence of impact-fee in
urban planning and development. Journal of urban planning and development,
118(2):59–64.
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2008). Sinkende Preise für landwirtschaftlichen Boden. heraus-
gegeben am 23 September 2008, Zurich.
Nicol, L. and Knoepfel, P. (2014). Resilient housing: a new resource-
oriented approach. Building research and information, 42(2):229–239. doi:
10.1080/09613218.2014.862162.
North, D. (1955). Location theory and regional economic growth. Journal of Political
Economy, 63(3):243–258. doi: 10.1086/257668.
OFEV (2007). Protection du sol en Suisse : concept directeur. Département fédéral
de l’environnement, des transports, de l’énergie et de la communication DETEC,
Bern.
Ordre des architectes de France (2012). Les nouvelles notions de surface de plancher
et d’emprise au sol et le recours obligatoire à l’architecte. Conseil national de
l’Ordre des architectes de France. Version du 12 janvier 2012. Accessible online:
http://www.architectes.org/.
OSTAG Ingenieure AG (2014). Synergis Weboffice RegioGIS. Accessible online: http:
//www.regio-gis.ch/.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collect-
ive action. Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, D. (1995). Public policy: an introduction to the theory and practice of policy
analysis. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos.
Peters, G. (2005). Conclusion: The future of instruments research. In Eliadis, P., Hill,
M., and Howlett, M., editors, Designing Government: From Instruments to Gov-
ernance, pages 353–364. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston,
London, Ithaca.
Peters, G. and Hoornbeek, J. (2005). The problem of policy problems. In Eliadis,
P., Hill, M., and Howlett, M., editors, Designing Government: From Instruments
to Governance, pages 353–364. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & King-
ston, London, Ithaca.
Peters, R. (2009). Les déductions de l’imposition fédérale directe des personnes
physiques et les possibilités de simplification. Administration fédérale des contribu-
tions, Département fédéral des finances, Bern.
Petitpierre, A. (2015). Environmental law in Switzerland. Kluwer Law International,
Alphen aan den Rijn.
Petitpierre-Sauvain, A. (2012). Droit de l’environnement. Vers un droit économique
au service de l’environnement. Schulthess, Geneva, Zurich, Basel.
Pflieger, G. (2013a). Création et partage de la valeur ajoutée métropolitaine. In
Lefèvre, C., Roseau, N., and Vitale, T., editors, De la ville à la métropole. Les défis
de la gouvernance, pages 199–212. L’oeil d’or, Paris, Lausanne.
Pflieger, G. (2013b). Les enjeux fonciers de l’articulation urbanisme-transport. réflex-
ions sur la base des projets d’agglomération en suisse. In Vodoz, L., Thévenoz, L.,
and Faure, P., editors, Les horizons de la gouvernance territoriale, pages 57–63.
PPUR, Lausanne.
Piketty, T. (2013). Le capital au XXIe siècle. Les Livres du nouveau monde. Seuil,
Paris.
322 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pinson, G. (2004). Le projet urbain comme instrument de l’action publique. In
Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P., editors, Gouverner par les instruments, pages
199–233. Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris.
Prefecture of Wangen (2005). Gesamtbauentscheid vom 1 März 2005 betreffend Par-
zelle 282/1074. Reference: bbew 84/2004, Kanton Bern, Wangen.
Prélaz-Droux, R. (2008). Des instruments fonciers pour faciliter les projets territori-
aux. Urbia. Les cahiers du développement durable, 6.
Price surpervisor (2012). Price supervisor. Federal Department of economic affairs,
education and research EAER, Bern. http://prixgaz.monsieur-prix.ch/web/
index.asp.
Quigley, J. and Rosenthal, L. (2005). The effects of land use regulation on the price
of housing: What do we know? what can we learn? Cityscape, pages 69–137.
Radaelli, C., Dente, B., and Dossi, S. (2012). Recasting institutionalism: Institutional
analysis and public policy. European Political Science, 11(4):537–550.
Regierungsrat des Kantons Thurgau (2012). Botschaft zur Änderung des Gesetzes über
den Finanzausgleich der Politischen Gemeinden. GRG-Nummer 2012/65 Kanton
Thurgau. Accessible online: http://www.grgeko.tg.ch, Frauenfeld.
Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern (2012). Regionales Gesamtverkehr- und Sied-
lungskonzept RGSK Oberaargau. Abschlussbericht der ersten Generation, 4. Mai
2012, Accessible online: http://www.oberaargau.ch > Regionalentwicklung.
Ricardo, D. (1817). On the principles of political economy, and taxation. John Murray,
Albemarle street, London.
Ritchie, J. and Spencer, L. (2002). Qualitative data analysis for applied policy re-
search. The qualitative researcher’s companion, 573:305–329.
Robertson, M. M. (2004). The neoliberalization of ecosystem services: wetland mitiga-
tion banking and problems in environmental governance. Geoforum, 35(3):361–373.
Roth, U., Schwick, C., and Spichtig, F. (2010). Zustand der Landschaft in der Schweiz.
Zwischenbericht Landschaftsbeobachtung Schweiz (LABES). Federal office of the
environment FOEN, Federal Department of the environment, transport, energy
and communications DETEC, Bern.
Ruegg, J. (2000). Zonage et propriété foncière. adef, Paris.
Ruegg, J. (2013). Aménagement négocié, pages 122–123. adef, Paris.
Ruffy, V. (1989). Structure et dynamique géographiques et économiques d’un espace
foncier. Vingt ans de transactions foncières dans le Canton de Vaud. Lausanne.
Salamon, L. (2002). The new governance and the tools of public action: an intro-
duction. In Salamon, L., editor, The tools of government. A guide to the new
governance, pages 1–48. Oxford university press, New York.
Salamon, L. and Lund, M. (1989). The tools approach: basic analytics. In Salamon,
L. and Lund, M., editors, Beyond privatization: The tools of government action.
The Urban Insitute, Washington.
SBB (2014). Info Léman 2030. numéro 3, novembre 2014, Bern.
Scharpf, F. (1997). Games real actors play: actor-centered institutionalism in policy
research. Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy. Westview Press, New York.
Schlager, E. and Ostrom, E. (1992). Property rights regimes and natural resources.
Land economics, 68(3):249–262.
Schneider, A. and Ingram, H. (1990). Behavioral assumptions of policy tools. The
Journal of Politics, 52(2):510–529.
323 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Schuler, M. and Joye, D. (2000). Typologie der Gemeinden der Schweiz: 1980 –
2000. Federal statistical Office FSO, Federal Department of Home Affais FDHA,
Neuchâtel.
Schultz, B., Schilter, R., and Schmid, W. (2003). Siedlungsentwicklung Schweiz.
Analyse auf der Grundlage der Arealstatistik 1979/85 und 1992/97. Entwicklung,
Situation, Trends. Institut für Raum- und Landesplanung IRL. ETHZ, Zurich.
Schweizer, R. (2014). Stratégies d’activation du droit dans les politiques environ-
nementales – Cas autour des bisses valaisans. Thèse de doctorat défendue le 20
juin 2014 à l’Université de Lausanne, Lausanne.
Schweizer, R. (2015). Law activation strategies (las) in environmental policymaking:
a social mechanism for re-politicization? European policy analysis, 1(2):132–154.
Schwick, C., Jaeger, J., Hersperger, A., and Kienast, F. (2013). Stark beschleunigte
zunahme der zersiedelung in der schweiz. Geomatik Schweiz, (2):48–53.
Sciarini, P. (2014). Le processus législatif. In Klöti, U., Knoepfel, P., Kriesi, H.,
Linder, W., Papadopoulos, Y., and Sciarini, P., editors, Handbuch der Schweizer
Politik/Manuel de politique suisse. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Zurich.
SDNL (2007). Schéma directeur du Nord lausannois. Rapport final. Adopted 26 April
2007, Renens.
SDNL (2015). Rapport annuel 2014. Schéma directeur du Nord lausannois, Renens.
SDOL (2003). Schéma directeur de l’Ouest lausannois. Adopté le 18 décembre 2003,
Renens.
SDOL (2005). Chantier 2. Secteur Bussigny à Sébeillon. Ouest lausannois. Lignes
directrices et stratégie d’aménagement. Annexe au schéma directeur, Lausanne.
SDT (2005). Fonctionnement et financemtn des syndicats d’améliorations foncières.
Service des améliorations foncières, Département des infrastructures, Etat de vaud,
Lausanne.
SDT (2012). Liste de contrôle de la recevabilité des dossiers de plans d’affectation
(PGA, PPA, PQ) soumis à examen préalable (art. 56 LATC). Check-list numéro
2 de la divions aménagement communal du Service de développement territorial
(SDT), Lausanne. Accessible online: http://www.vd.ch/sdt > Aménagement
communal.
SDT (2014). Communes de Renens et Prilly. Plan de quartier (PQ) "Malley-gare".
Examen préalable. Préavis des services cantonaux. Service de développement ter-
ritorial SDT, Département du territoire et de l’environnement, Lausanne.
Segessemann, A. (2016). De la production à la consommation : le rôle de l’économie
résidentielle dans le développement régional. Thèse de doctorat de l’Université de
Neuchâtel soutenue le 25 janvier 2016, Neuchâtel.
Segessemann, A. and Crevoisier, O. (2016). Beyond economic base theory: The role
of the residential economy in attracting income to swiss regions. Regional Studies,
pages 1–16.
SIL (2012). Rapport d’activité 2012. Services industriels de Lausanne, Lausanne.
Sirmans, S., Macpherson, D., and Zietz, E. (2005). The composition of hedonic pricing
models. Journal of real estate literature, 13(1):1–44.
Smith, N. (1979). Toward a theory of gentrification a back to the city movement by
capital, not people. Journal of the American Planning Association, 45(4):538–548.
doi: 10.1080/01944367908977002.
Solothurner Zeitung (2014). Verschiedene Gemeinden verabschieden interkantonale
Vereinbarung. von mgt, herausgegeben am 26. August, Solothurn.
SRED (2014). Swiss Real Estate Datapool. Swiss Real Estate Institue, Zurich.
324 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
State of Vaud (2015). Cadastre géologique, cadastre foncier, cadastre des sols pollués.
Office cantonal d’information géographique, Lausanne. http://www.geo.vd.ch.
Stone, D. (1989). Causal stories and the formation of policy agendas. Political science
quarterly, pages 281–300.
Swinton, S. M., Lupi, F., Robertson, G. P., and Hamilton, S. K. (2007). Ecosystem
services and agriculture: Cultivating agricultural ecosystems for diverse benefits.
Ecological Economics, 64(2):245 – 252. DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.09.020.
Swiss national bank (2007). Taux d’intérêt et rendements. Séries chronologiques
historiques 4, novembre 2007, Zurich.
Swiss national bank (2016). Average rates of interest for selected balance sheet items.
SNB data portal, Zurich. Accessible online: https://data.snb.ch.
swisstopo (2014a). Geoportal of the Swiss Confederation. Federal Department of
Home affairs FDHA, Accessible online: http://www.swisstopo.admin.ch.
swisstopo (2014b). Journey through time. Federal Department of Home affairs FDHA,
Accessible online: http://www.swisstopo.admin.ch.
Süess, A. and Gmünder, M. (2005). Weniger zersiedelung durch handelbare
flächennutzungszertifikate? disP – The Planning Review, 41(160):58–66. doi:
10.1080/02513625.2005.10556907.
Theurillat, T., Rérat, P., and Crevoisier, O. (2015). The real estate markets:
Players, institutions and territories. Urban Studies, 52(8):1414–1433. doi:
10.1177/0042098014536238.
Tillemans, L., Ruegg, J., Prélaz-Droux, R., and Weber, P. (2011). Making land-use fit
to planning goals. weaknesses and opportunities within the swiss land management
regime. In Tira, M., van der Krabben, E., and Zanon, B., editors, Land manage-
ment for urban dynamics. Innovative methods and practices for a changing Europe.
Maggioli, Santarcangelo di Romagna.
Tinbergen, J. (1952). On the theory of economic policy. In Contributions to economic
analysis, volume 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, second edition edition.
Tschannen, P. and Zimmerli, U. (2005). Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht. Stämpfli,
Bern, second edition.
Unknown (n.d.). Document de travail. Estimation de la valeur des terrains selon les
SBP et simulations. Documents de travail de M. Urs Zuppinger. Syndicat AT-AF
de Derrière-le-château, Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne.
Valda, A. and Westermann, R. (2004). La Suisse et ses friches industrielles – Des op-
portunités de développement au coeur des agglomérations. Office fédéral du dévelop-
pement territorial ARE et Office fédéral de l’environnement, des forêts et du paysage
OFEFP, Bern.
van der Krabben, E. and Needham, B. (2008). Land readjustment for value capturing:
a new planning tool for urban redevelopment. Town Planning Review, 79(6):651–
672.
van Griethuysen, P. and Steppacher, R. (2015). Possession et propriété : une approche
économique. Cahiers du credo, Marseille.
Varone, F. (1998). Le choix des instruments des politiques publiques. Haupt, Bern.
Varone, F. and Nahrath, S. (2014). Regulating the uses of natural resources. when
policy instruments meet property rights. In Halpern, C., Lascoumes, P., and
le Galès, P., editors, L’instrumentation de l’action publique: Controverses, résist-
ances, effets, pages 237–264. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris.
Varone, F., Nahrath, S., Aubin, D., and Gerber, J.-D. (2013). Functional regulatory
spaces. Policy Sciences, 46(4):311–333. doi: 10.1007/s11077-013-9174-1.
325 of 327
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Veblen, T. (1904). The theory of business enterprise. Charles Scriber’s Sons, New
York.
Vedung, E. (1998). Policy instruments: typologies and theories. In Bemelsman-Videc,
M.-L., Rist, R., and Vedung, E., editors, Carrots, sticks and sermons. Policy instru-
ments and their evaluation. Transaction publishers, New Brunswick and London.
Viallon, F.-X. (2016a). Implementation of redistributive land policy instruments
in peri-urban spaces: the case of Oberaargau (1990-2014). Working paper de
l’IDHEAP 6/2016, Lausanne. Accessible online: http://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_EA8A9FB544952?siteLang=fr.
Viallon, F.-X. (2016b). Implementation of redistributive land policy instru-
ments in urban spaces: the case of Cheseaux. Working paper de l’IDHEAP
10/2016, Lausanne. Accessible online: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:ch:
serval-BIB_1D52ADFF64B06?siteLang=fr.
Viallon, F.-X. and Nahrath, S. (2016). La taxe sur la plus-value : l’outil manquant
de l’aménagement du territoire ? Collage, (3):5–9.
Walter, F. (1986). Propriété privée, équilibre social et organisation de l’espace. Geo-
graphica helvetica, 41(1):11–16. doi: 10.5194/gh-41-11-1986.
Waltert, F., Pütz, M., Böni, R., and Seidl, I. (2010). Fiskalische Instrumente und
Flächeninanspruchnahme. Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape
Research WSL, Federal Office of the Environment FOEN, Bern.
Weber, P., Prélaz-Droux, R., Ruegg, J., and Tillemans, L. (2011). How to supply
enough land at the right place and time? An answer given by the canton of Vaud.
In Tira, M., van der Krabben, E., and Zanon, B., editors, Land management for
urban dynamics. Innovative methods and practices for a changing Europe, pages
381–399. Maggioli, Santarcangelo di Romagna.
Williamson, O. (2007). Transaction cost economics: an introduction. Economics
discussion papers, 3:1–32.
Winkler, G. (2005). Un remède à la dispersion des constructions : le contingentement
de la zone à bâtir en tant qu’instrument économique. Université de Neuchâtel.
Wolff, G. (2006). Bodenschutzkonzept stuttgart (boks). In Schriftenreihe des Amtes
für Umweltschutz. Heft 4/2006.
Wälti, S. (2003). L’effet des rapports financiers sur la dynamique fédérale: la qualité
médiative du fédéralisme suisse. Swiss Political Science Review, 9(1):91–108. doi:
10.1002/j.1662-6370.2003.tb00401.x.
Wüest and Partner (2014). Immo-Monitoring. Baulandpreise für Einfamilienhäuser
nach ausgewählten MS-Regionen. Wüest and Partner, Zurich.
Wüest and Partner (2016a). Asking price index single-family houses for re-
gion Switzerland. Wüest and Partner, Zurich. Accessible online: https:
//www.wuestundpartner.com/en/online-services/immobilienindizes/
angebotspreisindex.html.
Wüest and Partner (2016b). Immo-Monitoring. Baulandpreise für Einfamilienhäuser
nach ausgewählten MS-Regionen. Wüest and Partner, Zurich.
Zufferey, J.-B. (2001). Aménagement du territoire et liberté économique. In Hottelier,
M. and Foëx, B., editors, L’aménagement du territoire – Planification et enjeux.
Schulthess, Basel, Geneva, Munich.
Zuppinger, U. (1986). Les études de cas en aménagement du territoire. Une méthode
d’analyse riche en enseignements. Communauté d’études pour l’aménagement du
territoire CEAT, Lausanne.
326 of 327
Use rights on this thesis
This thesis is part of the National research program 68 on the sustainable use
of soil. It is funded by the Swiss national science foundation through the grant
number 406840_143057. It is published under the creative commons attribution
4.0 international license13. This means that everyone is free to share – copy and
redistribute the material in any medium or format – and adapt – remix, transform,
and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially – the content of this
work, as long as you give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate
if changes were made.
This licence does not apply to third party content used in this thesis such as maps.
Swisstopo has granted to the author the authorisation (BA16055) to reproduce their
maps for the purpose of the present work.
University of Lausanne
Swiss graduate school of public administration
Quartier UNIL Mouline, CH-1015 Lausanne
Tel: +41 21 557 40 00
Document accessible online: http://serval.unil.ch/
13http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
